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Approximation of substantive criminal law: 
The new institutional and decision-making 
framework and new types of interaction 
between EU actors
Anne Weyembergh (in collaboration with Serge de biolley) 
 Introduction
Work on approximating substantive criminal law began within the European 
Union (EU) under the third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. Examples of this are the 
1995 Convention on the protection of the European Community’s financial interests  1, 
about the 1997 Convention on the fight against corruption  2 or about the different joint 
actions adopted at the time in the field of participation in a criminal organisation  3, 
trafficking in human beings  4, racism and xenophobia  5, corruption in the private 
sector  6, etc. 
1 Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the ECs’ Financial interests, OJ, 
no. C 316, 27 Nov. 1995, p. 49 f. This Convention was supplemented with the following 
protocols : Protocol of 27 Sept. 1996 (OJ, no. C 313, 23 Oct. 1996, p. 2 f.), Protocol of 29 Nov. 
1996 (OJ, no. C 151, 20 May 1997, p. 1 f.), Protocol of 19 June 1997 (OJ, no. C 221, 19 July 
1997, p. 2 f.).
2 Convention of 26 May 1997 on the fight against corruption involving officials of the 
EC or officials of Member States of the EU (OJ, no. C 195, 25 June 1997, p. 2). See also the 
abovementioned Protocol of 27 Sept. 1996 to the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection 
of the ECs’ Financial interests (OJ, no. C 313, 23 Oct. 1996, p. 2 f.).
3 Joint Action of 21 Dec. 1998 on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal 
organisation in the MS of the EU (OJ, no. L 351, 29 Dec. 1998, p. 1 f.).
4 Joint Action of 24 Febr. 1997 concerning action to combat trafficking in human beings 
and sexual exploitation of children (OJ, no. L 63, 4 March 1997, p. 2 f.).
5 Joint Action of 15 July 1996 concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia (OJ, 
no. L 185, 24 July 1996, p. 5 f.).
6 Joint Action of 22 Dec. 1998 on corruption in the private sector (OJ, no. L 358, 31 Dec. 
1998, p. 2 f.).
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Work was then pursued under the third pillar of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. 
In this framework and, mainly on the basis of Article 31 e) of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU), there were a growing number of initiatives in the field of 
approximation of substantive criminal law. More than ten framework decisions were 
adopted, in the field of terrorism  7, in the field of trafficking in human beings  8, in 
the field of sexual exploitation of children and child pornography  9, in the field of 
smuggling of human beings  10, in the field of counterfeiting of euros  11, in the field of 
fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash payments  12, in the field of corruption  13, in the 
field of drug trafficking  14, racism and xenophobia  15, cybercrime  16, etc.  17. Some of 
these acts were ‘second generation’ instruments, which simply replaced the previous 
joint actions. 
While assessment of progress in this area has been positive from a quantitative 
point of view, the results have been mixed from a qualitative point of view. EU work 
in this area has been criticised for various reasons  18, such as: 
7 Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combatting terrorism (OJ, 
no. L 164, 22 June 2002, p. 2 f.) and Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 Nov. 2008 
amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (OJ, no. L 330, 9 Dec. 2008, p. 2 f.)
8 Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human 
beings (OJ, no. L 203, 1 August 2002, p. 1 f.).
9 Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 Dec. 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation 
of children and child pornography (OJ, no. L 13, 20 January 2004, p. 44 f.).
10 Framework Directive of 28 Nov. 2002 on the strengthening of the penal Framework to 
prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (OJ, no. L 328, 5 Dec. 2002, 
p. 1 f.) (to be read with the directive of 28 Nov. 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence, OJ, no. L 328, 5 Dec. 2002, p. 7 f.).
11 Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by 
criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction 
of the euro (OJ, no. L 149, 14 June 2000) ; Framework Decision 2001/888/JHA of 6 Dec. 2001 
amending Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA (OJ, no. L 329, 14 Dec. 2001). 
12 Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May 2009 combating fraud and counterfeiting 
of non-cash means of payments (OJ, no. L 149, 2 June 2001).
13 Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating corruption in the private sector (OJ, 
no. L 192, 31 July 2003). 
14 Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 Oct. 2004 laying down minimum provisions 
on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking 
(OJ, no. L 335, 11 Nov. 2004).
15 Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expression of 
racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (OJ, no. L 328, 6 Dec. 2008).
16 Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 Febr. 2005 on attacks against information 
systems (OJ, no. L 69, 16 March 2005).
17 See, among others, the two framework decisions annulled by the ECJ (see infra, namely 
Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the protection of environment 
through criminal law and Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the 
criminal framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution).
18 See, for instance, A. Weyembergh, L’harmonisation des législations: condition de 
l’espace pénal européen et révélateur de ses tensions, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles, 2004; D. Flore, Droit pénal européen, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2009, p. 264 f.; A. Klip 
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– the low level of ambition of most instruments, which were limited to a lowest 
common denominator approach  19;
– their limited approximating impact – reference can be made here to the well 
known expressions coined by Daniel Flore, who has spoken about approximation 
en “trompe-l’œil”  20 and approximation “de façade”  21;
– the lack of thought behind them; 
– the limited place given to general principles of criminal law, such as the legality 
principle  22.
This contribution is mainly intended to serve as a general introduction to this 
co-written book. It pursues two aims. 
First, it aims to remind readers of the main institutional and decision-making 
reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the approximation of substantive criminal 
law. The main changes which will be referred to concern the legal bases (1), the 
importance and functions of approximation (2), the decision-making procedure (3), 
variable geometry (4), the legal tools and their implementation (5).
Second, this contribution aims to give an initial overview of the concrete 
implementation and impact in practice of these changes. 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, various new developments have 
occurred in the field of the approximation of substantive criminal law. This is the area 
where the largest number of initiatives (seven) have been introduced. 
Two have resulted in the adoption of new directives, namely Directive 2011/36/
EU of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims, replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA  23 and 
Directive 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2004/68/JHA  24. It is interesting to look at both of these EU substantive 
criminal law directives from an institutional point of view, namely as a sector which is 
shaped through the relations between the three institutions involved in the legislative 
& H. vAnder Wilt (eds.), Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law, 
Amsterdam, Royal Netherlands Academy of Science, 2002. 
19 For example, according to I. WAttier, the Framework Decision of 22 Dec. 2003 on 
combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography confirms existing 
divergences and does not really approximate national laws (“La lutte contre l’exploitation 
sexuelle des enfants et la pédopornographie et la majorité sexuelle. La consécration d’une 
disparité”, RIDP, 2006, p. 223 f.).
20 D. Flore, “Une justice pénale européenne après Amsterdam”, JTDE, 1999, p. 122 f.
21 D. Flore, “Droit pénal matériel et Union européenne”, in G. de Kerchove et 
A. Weyembergh (eds.), Quelles réformes pour l’espace pénal européen?, Bruxelles, Editions 
de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2003, p. 73.
22 In this regard, see especially europeAn criminAl policy initiAtive (ECPI), « Manifesto 
on European Criminal Policy”, ZIS, 2009, p. 697 f.; see the contribution of M. KAiAFA gbAndi 
in this book and M. KAiAFA gbAndi, “The importance of core principles of substantive criminal 
law for a European criminal policy respecting fundamental rights and the rule of law”, EuCLR, 
2011, p. 7 f.
23 OJ, no. L 101, 15 April 2011, p. 1 f.
24 OJ, no. L 335, 17 December 2011, p. 1 f.
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process. In this regard, the positions and new interactions between the EU institutions 
are of special interest. 
Besides these two adopted directives, five other directives are still being negotiated. 
These are a proposal for a directive on attacks against information systems, which 
is designed to replace Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA  25, a proposal for 
a directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation (the 
Market Abuse Directive, MAD)  26, a proposal for a directive on the freezing and 
confiscation of proceeds of crime in the European Union  27, a proposal for a directive 
on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law  28 
and a proposal for a directive on the protection of the euro and other currencies against 
counterfeiting by criminal law, replacing Council Framework Decision 2000/383/
JHA  29. These will also be taken into consideration in this contribution.
1. Changes in terms of legal bases
As with the whole field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, approximation of substantive criminal law has been transferred into the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and has consequently been communautarised. 
Such a change is of course essential. However, limited approximating EC competences 
had already been recognised in the criminal field by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in its two famous cases of 2005 and 2007 Commission v. Council  30. Subsequent 
to these rulings, some directives containing limited provisions of a criminal nature 
had already been adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty  31. 
The new legal bases are more developed than in the third pillar of the TEU. 
Whereas, under the third pillar, one littera only of Article 31, namely Article 31 e), 
was directly devoted to the field, one whole Article, namely Article 83 TFEU, is now 
entirely devoted to the approximation of substantive criminal law. However, as we 
will see, the change regarding the extent and scope of approximation raises numerous 
questions. 
Article 83 TFEU contains a double legal basis: on the one hand, para. 1, which 
is the legal basis for approximation in the field of “particularly serious crime with a 
cross-border dimension” and the “successor” of Article 31 e) TEU (A) and, on the 
other hand, para. 2 which corresponds more or less to the EC competence in criminal 
25 COM (2010) 517 final, 30 Sept. 2010.
26 COM (2011) 654final, 20 Oct. 2011.
27 COM (2012) 85 final, 12 March 2012.
28 COM (2012) 363 final, 11 July 2012.
29 COM (2013) 42 final, 5 Febr. 2013.
30 ECJ, 13 Sept. 2005, C-176/03, Commission v. Council and 23 Oct. 2007, C-440/05, 
Commission v. Council. About these decisions, see especially V. mitsilegAs, EU Criminal Law, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009, p. 70 f. 
31 Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ, 
no. L 328, 6 Dec. 2008, p. 28 f.; Directive 2009/123/EC amending Directive 2005/35/EC on 
ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ, no. L 280, 
27 Oct. 2009, p. 52 f.; and Directive 2009/52 providing for minimum standards on sanctions 
and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ, no. L 168, 
30 June 2009, p. 24 f.
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matters as defined by the ECJ in its decisions of 2005 and 2007 Commission v. 
Council, also known as “annex competence” (B). The question is to establish whether 
other provisions of the TFEU, and especially Article 325, para. 4 TFEU, may also 
serve as a legal basis for the approximation of criminal law (C). 
A.	 Article	83,	para.	1	or	the	legal	basis	for	approximation	in	the	field	of	
“particularly	serious	crime	with	a	cross-border	dimension”
Para. 1 of Article 83 is itself divided into three indents  32.
The first one specifies the legal tool to be used (i.e. directive) and the decision-
making procedure to follow (i.e. the ordinary legislative procedure). We will 
come back to both aspects later on. The first indent also expresses other general 
requirements. Even if the wording is not precisely identical, approximation still only 
aims at “establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences 
and sanctions”  33. Besides, it restricts the material scope of approximation to “the areas 
of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature 
or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common 
basis”. The second indent of Article 83, para. 1, lists various fields of crime to cover. 
Such a list is longer than in Article 31 e) TEU. Whereas Article 31 e) only referred 
to organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking, the new provision also lists 
trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit 
arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment 
and computer crime. Considering that Article 31 e) had been interpreted broadly, 
Article 83, para. 1, is more to be considered as a codification of previous practice. 
However, such codification is not complete since all fields where approximating 
work effectively took place are not mentioned. This is especially the case for racism 
and xenophobia  34. According to the third indent of Article 83, para. 1, TFEU, the 
Council may adopt a decision identifying other areas of crime where to carry out 
approximation but these must meet the condition of being “particularly serious crime 
with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or 
32 According to Article 83 TFEU: “1. The European Parliament and the Council may, by 
means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish 
minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of 
particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of 
such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis. 
These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money 
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised 
crime. 
On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying other 
areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph. It shall act unanimously after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament”. 
33 Article 31 e) TEU refers to “(…) establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent 
elements of criminal acts and to penalties (…)”. 
34 H. sAtzger, International and European Criminal Law, München, C.H. Beck, Hart, 
Nomos, 2012, p. 74 ; P. Asp, The substantive criminal law competence of the EU, Stockholm, 
Skrifter utgivna av juridiska fakulteten vid Stockholms universitet, no. 79, 2012, p. 92-93.
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from a special need to combat them on a common basis” and only through a decision to 
be adopted unanimously by the Council with the consent of the European Parliament. 
From the sole existence of this third indent, it follows logically contrary to the opinion 
of some scholars  35 – that the list of areas of crime contained in the second indent is not 
a list of examples but an exhaustive list  36. As a consequence, the explicit extension of 
the list by the Lisbon Treaty seems to result in the paradoxical effect of reducing the 
scope of this legal basis by comparison with the scope of Article 31 e) TEU.
Para. 1 of Article 83 raises numerous questions  37. 
Among them, there is the question of the exact scope of the general requirements 
of the first indent and especially the question of the link between these and the second 
indent: are these requirements considered as being met per se by all the areas of crime 
mentioned in the second indent? Although these areas can be considered as usually 
particularly serious  38, they are not all necessarily crossborder in nature. However, as 
it emerges from the wording of Article 83, the crossborder nature of the areas of crime 
not only results from their nature but also from their “impact or from a special need to 
combat them on a common basis”. Of course the exact meaning of this last expression 
is not clear. But these alternative sources of the crossborder nature of areas of crime 
and the structure of the provision – especially the word “these” opening the second 
indent – plead in favour of the opinion according to which the listed areas of crime are 
considered as meeting the general requirements of the first indent. 
Besides the abovementioned expression “from a special need to combat them on 
a common basis”, other expressions contained in Article 83, para. 1, TFEU are rather 
vague and consequently create uncertainty. It is particularly the case for “minimum 
rules” “concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions” and “areas of 
particularly serious crime”. 
What exactly does “minimum rules” mean? Such a question is relevant both with 
regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions. Firstly, concerning the 
definition of criminal offences, the mainstream interpretation considers that minimum 
rules refer to a minimum of criminalisation and that EU Member States are therefore 
allowed to criminalise more. However some authors have tried to counter such an 
approach and have boldly suggested that minimum rules could also refer to a minimum 
of constituent elements, which would lead to a maximum of criminalisation  39. 
Although this would make it possible to circumvent many problems created by the 
“minimum rules” system and especially its missed or reduced approximating impact 
35 C.F. bergström, J. hettne and A. södersen, Lissabonfördraget, Stockholm, SIEPS, 
2008, p. 50, quoted in P. Asp, op. cit., p. 81.
36 See P. Asp, The substantive criminal law competence of the EU, op. cit., p. 81-82.
37 About these questions, see especially P. Asp, The substantive criminal law competence 
of the EU, op. cit., p. 15-16 and H. sAtzger, op. cit., p. 74 f.
38 Doubts about this particular seriousness are worded by P. Asp, op. cit., p. 83.
39 In this respect, see A. Klip, European Criminal Law, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2nd ed., 2012, 
p. 162 and, more explicitly, H. G. nilsson, “How to combine minimum rules with maximum 
legal certainty?”, Europättslig tidskrift, 2011, p. 670 f.
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and the general move towards more criminalisation  40, such an audacious interpretation 
is logically problematic and difficult to justify. In this respect, we fully share P. Asp’s 
opinion  41. These attempts confirm the need to do a more in-depth evaluation of the 
general impact of EU legal instruments in the field on internal criminal law  42 and the 
need to reflect on the sensitive question of how to avoid the problematic impact of the 
“minimum rules” system. Secondly, there is also a clear need to reflect on the meaning 
of “minimum rules” as regards sanctions. Although the usual applicable system was 
to prescribe a minimum level for the maximum penalties (the so-called minimum of 
maximum system), the last two proposals – i.e. the proposal for a directive on the 
fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law and 
the proposal for a directive on the protection of the euro and other currencies against 
counterfeiting by criminal law – also provide for a minimum level for the minimum 
penalties  43. Although such a system is compatible with the wording of Article 83, 
it is nevertheless open to criticism from the point of view of consistency. To our 
knowledge none of the guiding documents in the field mentioned the introduction of 
such a system  44 and the reasons given to justify such a new approximating mechanism 
are not very convincing  45. Besides, such a mechanism could create problems in some 
national legal systems  46.
What is the scope of “the definition of criminal offences and sanctions”? Does 
this expression only cover the definition of constituent elements of crime and 
sanctions and does it exclude approximation of all other fields of criminal law, such 
as criminal law jurisdiction? Considering the broader contents of the framework 
decisions adopted on the basis of Article 31 e) TEU  47, a positive answer to the 
40 In this respect, see for instance V. sAntAmAriA and A. Weyembergh, “Conclusions” 
in The evaluation of European criminal law. The example of the Framework Decision on 
combating trafficking in human beings, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009, 
p. 379 f. 
41 P. Asp, op. cit., p. 116-121.
42 In this regard, see A. Weyembergh and S. de biolley, Comment évaluer le droit pénal 
européen ?, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2006.
43 See Article 8 of the proposal for a directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s 
financial interests by means of criminal law and Article 5 para. 4 a) of the proposal for a directive 
on the protection of the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting by criminal law.
44 See especially the conclusions of the Council of 25 and 26 April 2002, doc. 9141/03; 
Council document, Council Conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal 
law délibérations, adopted by the JHA Council on 30 November 2009; “Towards an EU 
criminal policy?: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal 
law”, Commission Communication of 20 September 2011, COM (2011) 573 and European 
Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal law (2010/2310 (INI)) 
(see annex to the present book).
45 See especially the link made with the EAW in the Commission’s proposals (COM 
(2012) 363 final, p. 8 and 14 and COM (2013) 42 final, p. 12.
46 See, for example, the French legal system.
47 Framework decisions based on Article 31 e) did contain provisions tackling other 
aspects of criminal law than only constituent elements and sanctions, such as criminalisation of 
ancillary offences, jurisdiction, liability of legal persons, etc.
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question would amount to a very formal approach. In its Communication of 2011 
entitled “Towards an EU criminal policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of 
EU policies through criminal law”, the Commission lists a broader series of measures 
which can be covered by Article 83  48. And all new initiatives contain other rules than 
those strictly related to the definition of offences and sanctions. But only the proposal 
for a directive on the protection of the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting 
by criminal law is based solely on Article 83, para. 1, TFEU. Four others are based 
on both Articles 83, para. 1 and 82, para. 2, TFEU, i.e. the two abovementioned 
newly adopted directives, the proposal for a directive on attacks against information 
systems and the proposal for a directive on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds 
of crime in the European Union  49. However it is important to know how extensive 
the interpretation of the scope of Article 83, para. 1, can be. Does Article 83 allow, 
for instance, to cover requirements related to prescription? Such a question is quite 
topical since the abovementioned proposal for a directive on the fight against fraud to 
the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law contains such requirements. 
Its Article 12 requires the establishment of a minimum period of prescription as well 
as a provision on the prescription period for the enforcement of penalties following a 
final conviction. As we will see later on, this proposal is not based on Article 83 but 
on Article 325, para. 4, TFEU. However, this choice of legal basis raises important 
debates and seems to be quite controversial among the Member States of the EU. If 
such a legal basis is rejected and if Article 83, para. 1, is chosen to replace it, then 
it is important to know whether this legal basis allows the rules on prescription to 
be covered. Article 82 relating to criminal procedure cannot be of any help since 
prescription is not among the fields mentioned by its para. 2. So, in the end, it remains 
to be seen whether such a provision will survive negotiations in Council and, if yes, 
on what legal basis. 
What are “areas of particularly serious crime”? No definition and no criteria are 
provided, which would help define the needed threshold that areas of crime must 
satisfy to allow approximation on the basis of Article 83, para. 1, TFEU. Petty crimes 
are of course excluded but the rest is still shrouded in uncertainty. This is all the 
more true as it is not “areas of serious crime” which are mentioned but “areas of 
particularly serious crime”  50. 
B.	 Article	83,	para.	2	or	the	so-called	“annex-competence”	
Article 83, para. 2, is new in the Treaty. It is a quasi-codification  51 of the case 
law of the ECJ in its two famous rulings of 2005 and 2007 Commission v. Council. 
It shares numerous common features with the annex-competence as recognised by 
the ECJ. However, as provided for by Article 83, para. 2, the annex-competence is 
more circumscribed on some aspects. This is particularly clear when thinking about 
48 Commission Communication of 20 September 2011, COM (2011) 573, p. 9.
49 COM (2012) 85 final, 12 March 2012.
50 P. Asp, op. cit., p. 85-86.
51 P. Asp speaks about a “codification” of the ECJ’s case law but considers at the same time 
that the annex competence of Article 83, para. 2 is not identical with the competence resulting 
from that case law (op. cit., p. 127).
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the existence of the emergency brake provided for in Article 83, para. 3. But, on 
other aspects, the new legal basis is broader. In its second ruling of 2007, the ECJ 
had expressly declared that “contrary to the submission of the Commission, the 
determination of the type and level of the criminal penalties to be applied does not 
fall within the Community’s sphere of competence”  52. Such a limitation is not of 
course valid any more under Article 83, para. 2  53. Besides, the 2007 Commission 
v. Council decision did not provide a clear answer to the question as to whether the 
annex competence extended beyond the EU’s environmental policy. With Article 83, 
para. 2, it is of course very clear that it does  54.
Under the condition that “approximation of criminal law proves essential to 
ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy which has been subject to 
harmonisation measures”, this provision makes it possible to extend or diversify the 
areas in which approximation is carried out. Considering that it does not require a 
certain level of harmonisation, it is to be considered that Article 83, para. 2, only 
requires the existence of harmonisation measures. Such a legal basis potentially opens 
the way towards a very broad criminal law competence  55. This was also the view 
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht [German constitutional court], which called for this 
provision to be interpreted narrowly  56. Consequently, its insertion in the Treaty and its 
“accompanying” risks resulted in a kind of beneficial or salutary awareness as to the 
need to somehow frame the approximation work. It led to the adoption by the Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, by the European Commission and by the European 
Parliament of guidelines aimed at orienting the EU’s work on the approximation of 
substantive penal law  57. We will come back to these texts later on in this contribution 
and elsewhere in this book  58.
As with para. 1, para. 2 of Article 83 raises numerous questions. Under para. 2, 
approximation is also limited to the establishment of minimum rules concerning the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions. The meaning of this wording raises the 
same questions as under para. 1. As previously underlined, approximation is allowed 
if criminal law proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union 
policy. What then is the exact meaning of “essential”? Is such an expression more 
demanding than the necessity criteria or is it equal to it? Another question is whether 
52 Para. 70.
53 D. Flore, Droit pénal européen, op. cit., p. 271.
54 See also, P. simon, “The criminalisation power of the EU after Lisbon and the principle 
of democratic legitimacy”, NJECL, 3, 2012, p. 250.
55 According to H. sAtzger, Article 83, para. 2, is a “blanket clause” (see op. cit., p. 76 f). 
See also V. mitsilegAs, op. cit., p. 112 ; P. Asp, op. cit., p. 128-129.
56 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BVE 2/08, 30 June 2009, para. 361 and 362.
57 Council document, Council Conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s 
criminal law deliberations, adopted by the JHA Council on 30 november 2009; “Towards an 
EU criminal policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal 
law”, Commission Communication of 20 September 2011 COM (2011) 573 and European 
Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal law (2010/2310 (INI)) 
(see annex to the present book).
58 See especially the contributions by C. de Jong and by J.A.E. vervAele.
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harmonisation measures should preexist before allowing the adoption of measures on 
the basis of Article 83, para. 2, or whether both harmonisation measures and criminal 
law measures may be adopted simultaneously   59.
So far, there has been no “abuse” of para. 2: the proposal for a directive on 
criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation  60 is the only text based 
on this legal basis.
C. Article 325, para. 4, TFEU as a legal basis for the approximation of criminal 
law	in	the	field	of	fraud	affecting	the	Union’s	financial	interests?	
Besides these legal bases in Title V of the third part of the TFEU, the potential of 
other provisions located elsewhere in the Treaty is an open question. Besides Article 
33 TFEU on measures to strengthen customs cooperation  61, it is especially Article 
325 TFEU that has attracted attention and especially the question of whether it can 
be interpreted as containing additional criminal law competence in the field of fraud 
affecting the Union’s financial interests. It is the “successor” of Article 280 TEC  62. 
Although some notions it uses, such as “fraud” have a criminal law connotation, it 
does not explicitly refer to criminal law  63. The exception which existed in Article 280, 
para. 4 – “These measures shall not concern the application of national criminal law 
or the national administration of justice” – has been deleted. In spite of this change, 
as with its predecessor Article 280, para. 4, TEC  64, Article 325, para. 4, can give 
59 On both questions, see for instance P. Asp. op. cit., p. 129 f.
60 COM (2011) 654 final, 20 Oct 2011.
61 See V. mitsilegAs, EU Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 109; S. miettinen, Criminal law and 
Policy in the EU, London – New York, Routledge, 2013, p. 52.
62 According to Article 280 TEC “1. The Community and the Member States shall counter 
fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Community through 
measures to be taken in accordance with this Article, which shall act as a deterrent and be such 
as to afford effective protection in the Member States.
2. Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial 
interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial 
interests.
3. Without prejudice to other provisions of this Treaty, the Member States shall coordinate 
their action aimed at protecting the financial interests of the Community against fraud. To 
this end they shall organise, together with the Commission, close and regular cooperation 
between the competent authorities.
4. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b, after 
consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in the fields of the 
prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community 
with a view to affording effective and equivalent protection in the Member States. These 
measures shall not concern the application of national criminal law or the national 
administration of justice.
5. The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, shall each year submit to the European 
Parliament and to the Council a report on the measures taken for the implementation of this 
Article”.
63 P. Asp. op. cit., p. 142-143.
64 Some have considered that, in spite of the exception contained in its para. 4, Article 280 
TEC provided the EC with a criminal law competence. In this respect, it is worth reminding 
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rise to two different interpretations  65. One is that the deletion of the reservation is 
interpreted as having removed all impediments to the recognition of an additional 
basis of criminal law competence. Article 325 is then considered as providing a 
specific legal basis for EU criminal law competence in the field of combating fraud. 
This is the opinion defended by the European Commission, which based its proposal 
for a directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of 
criminal law  66 on Article 325, para. 4, TFEU  67. According to the other interpretation 
as understood by the legal service of the Council, the deletion of the reservation must 
be read in conjunction with the insertion of Article 83, para. 2, and the very existence 
of such an annex-competence must be interpreted against an approach viewing 
Article 325 as an autonomous legal basis in criminal law  68. It is true that the first 
approach offers numerous advantages from the point of view of the approximation 
scope and impact, all of which lead to the abolition or reduction of the restrictions 
existing in the framework of Article 83 TFEU. In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
the inapplicability of the emergency brake and of the opt-outs for Denmark, the UK 
and Ireland, the possibility to use directive and regulations  69, as well as the possibility 
to go beyond the establishment “of minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions”... However both opinions are based on convincing 
arguments  70. It remains to be seen what will be the outcome of the negotiations of 
the abovementioned proposal. But, for the time being, it seems that the legal basis 
selected by the Commission has not gained consensus among the Member States and 
that it will be most probably rejected by the Council. 
that some experts of the Corpus Juris considered that at least parts of the Corpus Juris could be 
adopted on that legal basis (see E. bAcigAlupo, in M. delmAs-mArty and J.A.E vervAele, The 
implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States, vol. I, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2000, 
p. 369 f. ; M. delmAs-mArty, in ibid., p. 374 f.; D. spinellis, in ibid., p. 383 f.; K. tiedemAnn, 
in ibid., p. 385 f). The European Commission shared the same opinion since it chose Article 
280 TEC as a legal basis for its proposal for a directive on the criminal law protection of 
the Community’s Financial interests (COM (2001) 272, OJ, no. C 240 E, 28 August 2001). 
Others considered that the existing exception in Article 280, para. 4 excluded any criminal law 
competence (J. spencer, in ibid., p. 380 f.). 
65 V. mitsilegAs, op. cit., p. 109.
66 COM (2012) 363 final, 11 July 2012. This is also the opinion of scholars such as 
H. sAtzger, op. cit., p. 55-56.
67 According to Article 325, para. 4, TFEU: “The European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, after consulting the Court of 
Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in the fields of the prevention of and fight against 
fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union with a view to affording effective and 
equivalent protection in the Member States and in all the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies”.
68 Council legal Service document 15309/12, 22 Oct. 2012, only partially accessible but 
see para. 12, quoted by P. Asp, op. cit.
69 It is to be noted that if Article 325 TFEU is considered as entailing independent 
criminal law competence, then the possibility to use regulations opens the way not only to an 
approximation or harmonisation of criminal law but to a real unified supranational EU criminal 
law (in this regard, see H. sAtzger, op. cit., p. 46 f.). 
70 About this whole debate, see especially P. Asp, op. cit., p. 142 f.
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2. Changes in terms of importance and functions of approximation 
Approximation is first mentioned in the general provisions opening Title V of 
the third part of the TFEU, more precisely in Article 67, para. 3, as one of the types 
of measures to ensure a high level of security. This is not new: approximation was 
also mentioned in the opening provision of ex Title VI TEU – i.e. Article 29. And as 
previously, it is the last kind of measures mentioned. It intervenes after coordination 
and cooperation measures and after mutual recognition. As previously, it is moreover 
preceded by the words “if necessary”, showing the particular sensitivity of the field. 
Approximation of criminal laws is then further developed in Chapter IV of Title 
V. But this chapter is entitled ‘judicial cooperation in criminal matters’, so that, as 
previously, approximation does not appear in any title. However, in Chapter IV, 
approximation is given much more space than in Title VI TEU: Article 83 TFEU is 
much more developed and longer than the previous Article 31 e) TEU. 
As regards the functions of approximation of substantive criminal law, it is 
to be stressed that, contrary to Article 82, para. 2, TFEU, which subordinates the 
development of approximation of procedural law to the condition that it is necessary 
to facilitate mutual recognition and cooperation, Article 83 does not impose such a 
condition. 
As a consequence, Article 83, para. 1, does not explicitly consider approximation 
of substantive criminal law as being only an auxiliary of cooperation and mutual 
recognition or as an element fostering and strengthening mutual trust  71. Consequently, 
it allows the development of approximation independently of any other ongoing EU 
work and consequently leaves room for its so-called “autonomous functions”. Since 
we already develop on other occasions this difference between auxiliary or ancillary 
functions, on the one hand, and the autonomous functions of approximation, on the 
other hand  72, we will not repeat our reflection here. But we would like to point out 
that approximation’s autonomous functions include the development of the so-called 
“sword function”  73 of EU substantive criminal law which aims at enhancing the 
fight against crime and at preventing criminals from benefitting directly or indirectly 
from the existing disparities in substantive criminal law between the EU Member 
71 In its Communication of 20 Sept 2011 “Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the 
effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law”, the European Commission 
explicitly mention such auxiliary function of approximation of substantive criminal law : 
“Common minimum rules in certain crime areas are also essential to enhance the mutual trust 
between Member States and the national judiciaries. This high level of trust is indispensable for 
smooth cooperation among the judiciary in different Member States. The principle of mutual 
recognition of judicial measures, which is the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, can only work effectively on this basis” (p. 3).
72 See A. Weyembergh, L’harmonisation des législations: condition de l’espace pénal 
européen et révélateur de ses tensions, op. cit., and A. Weyembergh, “The Functions of 
Approximation of penal Legislation within the European Union”, Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, 2005, p. 149 f.
73 About the distinction between the sword and the shield functions of criminal law, see 
J.A.E. vervAele, “Régulation et répression au sein de l’Etat providence : la fonction “bouclier” 
et la fonction “épée” du droit pénal en déséquilibre”, Déviance et Société, 123, 1997.
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States  74. The importance of such an autonomous function already resulted from 
Article 29 TEU since it mentioned approximation among the measures to ensure a 
high level of security. Such importance has been confirmed by the abovementioned 
Article 67, para. 3. As previously, the text of the TFEU does not rule out considering 
other autonomous functions as well, such as developing and ensuring the exercise 
of the free movement of persons within the EU, reinforcing the notion of European 
citizenship and giving citizens a common sense of justice throughout the Union  75. 
If it is true that such autonomous functions of approximation are not directly and 
explicitly mentioned in the Commission’s Communication, such a common sense of 
justice is essential as it greatly contributes to creating a feeling of belonging together 
to a common area  76. In this regard, the ‘identity fostering effect’  77 of approximated 
criminal law should also be taken into consideration. 
By comparison with the previous Treaty, the biggest novelty of the Treaty of 
Lisbon regarding the approximation’s functions lies in Article 83, para. 2, which 
develops the auxiliary/ancillary functions of approximation but vis-à-vis EU policies. 
Its main aim is to ensure effective enforcement of Union policies, to guarantee their 
“effet utile”. As Valsamis Mitsilegas explains, criminal law is treated here again as a 
means to an end and is evoked to protect a potentially wide range of interests  78. We 
will not go further into the details of the functions of approximation on the basis of 
para. 2 since this is precisely one of the focuses of John Vervaele’s contribution to 
this book. 
When reflecting on the functions of the approximation of substantive criminal 
law, it should of course be borne in mind that, along with the necessity condition 
provided for by Article 67 TFEU, draft legislative acts aiming at approximating 
substantive criminal law must satisfy the conditions of subsidiarity and proportionality 
as prescribed and defined by Article 5 TEU  79. In this regard, the role of national 
parliaments has been extended by Protocol no. 2 on the application of the principles 
74 In its Communication of 20 Sept 2011 “Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the 
effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law”, the European Commission 
explicitly mentions such a function: “In view of the cross-border dimension of many crimes, the 
adoption of EU criminal law measures can help ensuring that criminals can neither hide behind 
borders nor abuse differences between national legal systems for criminal purposes” (p. 3).
75 See L’espace judiciaire européen, Actes du colloque organisé en Avignon le 16 octobre 
1998, Paris, la Documentation française, 1999, p. 114 ; contra ibid., p. 115.
76 About the criminal field and this sense of belonging see M. verdussen, Contours et 
enjeux du droit constitutionnel pénal, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1995, p. 695. In the field of criminal 
sanctions see A. bernArdi, “Opportunité de l’harmonisation”, in M. delmAs-mArty, G. 
giudicelli-delAge and E. lAmbert-AbdelgAWAd (eds.), L’harmonisation des sanctions pénales 
en Europe, Paris, Société de legislation comparée, 2003, p. 460.
77 The ‘effet constitutif d’identité’ is the expression used by U. sieber, “Union européenne 
et droit pénal européen. Proposition pour l’avenir du droit pénal européen”, Revue de science 
criminelle, 1993, p. 262.
78 V. mitsilegAs, op. cit., p. 112.
79 For a reflection of the principle of subsidiarity in the context of substantive EU criminal 
law, see P. de hert and I. WieczoreK, “Testing the principle of subsidiarity in EU criminal 
Policy”, NJECL, 3, 2012, p. 394 f. 
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of subsidiarity and proportionality  80 and such a role is stronger in the criminal law 
field than in the context of other EU policies  81. The link between the conditions of 
necessity and proportionality, on the one hand, and the principle of ultima ratio, on the 
other hand, needs to be underlined  82. Such a link is especially obvious in the Council 
conclusions of 30 November 2009 on model provisions guiding the Council’s criminal 
law deliberations  83 and in the 2011 Communication of the Commission “Towards an 
EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through 
criminal law”  84.
With regard to the abovementioned conditions, the importance of thorough impact 
assessments preceding any legislative proposal introduced by the Commission must 
of course be stressed.
3. Institutional and decision-making changes 
Concerning the right of initiative, the sharing of the right of initiative between 
the Member States and the Commission has been maintained. However, according 
to Article 76 TFEU, the right of initiative of Member States is subordinated to 
a threshold of a quarter of the Member States introducing the proposal. It is quite 
striking to notice that, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, none of the 
abovementioned initiatives introduced in the field of approximation of substantive 
criminal law has been introduced by the Member States. All were introduced by the 
European Commission, thereby confirming that approximation of criminal laws (both 
substantive and procedural) has been a clear Commission priority.
It should be noted that all new Commission proposals have gone through an impact 
assessment  85. Of course, these ex ante evaluations are an excellent idea. However 
their implementation has come up against a lot of criticism. It is a long, heavy and 
expensive process whereas its real added value, autonomy and impact remain to be 
proven.
Regarding the decision-making rules, the move to co-decision was of course a 
fundamental change introduced by the new Treaty. 
The intervention of the European Parliament as a co-legislator represented a huge 
change for the entire EU area of criminal justice but this was of particular importance 
in the field of approximation of substantive criminal law since it concerns the 
definition of offences and of sanctions. This change made it possible to improve the 
work from the point of view of its democratic legitimacy and from the point of view of 
the legality principle in its formal dimension. But, after so many years of the Council’s 
monopolistic decision-making role, this new decision-making role for the European 
80 See especially its Article 6.
81 See Article 7, para. 2.
82 About this link, see also S. miettinen, Criminal law and Policy in the EU, op. cit., p. 
119. See also P. simon, op. cit., p. 253 f. and S. melAnder, “Ultima ratio in European Criminal 
law”, EuCLR, 3, 2013, p. 45 f.
83 Under the title Assessment of the need for criminal provisions.
84 See especially para. 2.2.1.
85 These are available on the following website : http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/
ia_carried_out/cia_2009_en.htm#jls.
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Parliament was a real challenge for all actors concerned, which have had to adapt 
themselves to the new institutional landscape and the distribution of competences. 
The European Parliament has had to evolve from a purely consultative role – which 
was often a role as an opponent – towards a decisive decision-making one. It had to 
gain experience, impose itself and show its credibility in such a technical field. 
The move from unanimity to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was also essential. 
However this change was accompanied by the insertion of the so-called “emergency 
brake”. According to Article 83, para. 3 TFEU, when a Member State considers that 
a draft directive would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system, 
the ordinary legislative procedure is suspended and the proposal is referred to the 
European Council. If, within four months, unanimity is reached, the draft is referred 
back to the Council and the suspension is lifted. If an agreement is not reached in the 
European Council, a group of at least nine Member States can establish enhanced 
cooperation. Such a mechanism can be considered as a compensation for the loss of 
the veto right that each Member State had under the former third pillar TEU  86. It can 
also be viewed as echoing and making concrete the principles expressed in Article 4, 
para. 2, TEU  87 and particularly in Article 67, para. 1, TFEU  88. For the time being such 
a mechanism has not been used. We can really wonder which Member State will first 
take the responsibility to have recourse to it. For the UK and Ireland, it is of course 
easier to use their opt-out. Such a mechanism is most likely to be used in the field of 
procedural law  89. In the field of substantive criminal law, recourse to it seems less 
probable but is, however, always possible. P. Asp, for instance, gives an example from 
the Swedish point of view, i.e. rules concerning the freedom of press  90. Approximation 
of criminal sanctions could also give rise to recourse to such a mechanism. But, so 
far, although provisions on the approximation of criminal sanctions have evolved  91, 
they remain, generally speaking, limited  92. But let us imagine that the provisions 
approximating the sanctions develop into future initiatives or let us imagine that a 
crosscutting initiative is presented in the field of sanctions. In those cases, one could 
easily imagine that the emergency-brake mechanism could be used.
As a consequence of the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in the field 
of the approximation of substantive criminal law, and especially as a consequence 
of the institutional and decision-making reforms, each of the three main intervening 
86 P. Asp, op. cit., p. 140.
87 According to Article 4, para. 2, TEU, “The Union shall respect the equality of Member 
States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional (…)”.
88 According to Article 67, para. 1, “The Union shall constitue an area of freedom, security 
and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of 
the Member States”.
89 See Article 82, para. 3, TFEU.
90 P. Asp, op. cit., p. 140.
91 See Directive on trafficking in human beings and the one on sexual exploitation of 
children.
92 In this regard, see especially the proposal related to insider dealing and market 
manipulation.
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institutions in the legislative process has felt the need to adopt a general position 
on EU substantive criminal law. In chronological order, the Council first adopted its 
“Conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal law deliberations”, 
adopted by the JHA Council on 30 November 2009, the Commission then adopted 
its Communication of 20 September 2011 entitled “Towards an EU criminal policy: 
Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law” and, 
finally, the European Parliament adopted its resolution of 22 May 2012 “on an EU 
approach to criminal law”. These three documents are published in the annex of this 
book and are further examined in other contributions to this book. Although there 
are differences between each of these institutions’ positions, important similarities 
can also be observed. It is interesting to examine what each institution’s purpose was 
when adopting such a guiding document. 
The conclusions of the Council were proposed at the beginning of the Swedish 
Presidency of the EU at a time when the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was 
becoming more likely even if the Irish referendum had not yet taken place. The 
conclusions have to be understood as an attempt by the JHA Council to “protect” 
criminal law both from the Commission, the European Parliament and other formations 
of the Council. The principles recalled in the conclusions are mainly there to avoid 
losing control of the development of the legislation. This fear comes from the sharing 
of legislative powers with the European Parliament stemming from the ordinary 
legislative procedure (co-decision) as well as the explicit legal basis to adopt criminal 
law directives in policies other than JHA (namely Article 83, para. 2 TFEU), which 
could lead to a stronger influence of other formations of the Council. It is interesting 
to note that the Member States and the Council see themselves as the protectors not 
only of criminal law but of a reasonable and nuanced version of a “minimal criminal 
law”, based especially on the principle that criminal law should only be used as an 
ultima ratio. 
It is precisely because these conclusions are there to limit the use of the new 
possibilities and framework of the Lisbon Treaty that some Member States were 
reluctant to adopt them and that the Commission made a declaration  93. While the 
Member States supporting the conclusions could argue that no expert in criminal law 
and no justice minister could oppose the principles mentioned in the conclusions, 
the other Member States were also entitled to reply that, if the only intention was to 
93 According to the Commission’s declaration: “The Commission fully shares the objective 
to ensure consistency in European Union legislation relating to criminal law. However, 
the Commission considers the Guidelines and model provisions contained in the Council’s 
Conclusions are premature and restrict the interpretation of Article 83 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU). By issuing such guidelines and model provisions the Council 
unilaterally establishes a framework for future legislation to which neither the Commission nor 
the European Parliament agreed. The Commission therefore declares that these guidelines and 
model provisions are without prejudice to its right of initiative in accordance with the TFEU. 
The Commission also declares that it will exercise this right with due care and based on an 
impact assessment following appropriate consultations” (see Council of 30 Nov.-1 Dec. 2009, 
doc 16826/09, p. 22).
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recall these somehow obvious principles, there was no need to adopt such conclusions 
which were sending an aggressive signal towards the European Parliament.
The communication of the Commission had been announced early in the mandate 
of Vice-President Reding but was only released on 20 September 2011. While, in 
the beginning, it seemed a good idea for the Commission also to explain its vision, 
enthusiasm was soon replaced by a persistent hesitation. The problem with such 
an initiative was that it compelled the Commission to explain its interpretation of 
Article 83, para. 2, which was both tricky and dangerous as it could either lead to 
disappointment about the lack of ambition of the Commission or criticism from the 
Member States on the fact that the Commission was going too far. The same goes for 
the projects of the Commission regarding the “euro crimes” mentioned in Article 83, 
para. 1. It seemed better to work on a case-by-case basis with concrete proposals in 
specific fields. But it was impossible for the Commission to completely give up on 
the communication. The end result focuses on Article 83, para. 2, and is moderate and 
nuanced. The most striking thing about the communication is its title, which refers 
to an “EU criminal policy”. Such an expression allowed us to expect an ambitious 
text. However, the real added value or usefulness of its contents is rather difficult 
to identify. On the basis of its title, one could deduce that, for the Commission, the 
concept of “criminal policy” is limited to deciding when criminal law needs to be 
used in a specific sector. While it is an important aspect of a criminal policy, it seems 
strange to completely leave aside other issues like sanctions and its enforcement.
The European Parliament’s resolution of 22 May 2012 was the last of the three 
documents on EU substantive criminal law that was adopted. Such an initiative seems 
less based on the feeling of a real need to carry out this horizontal work than on 
the irritation generated by the unilateral work of the Council and resulting in the 
abovementioned conclusions. As for the report itself, its quality is certainly due to 
the expertise and approach of the rapporteur himself. Its contents were not really 
controversial: it was adopted almost unanimously and apparently without many 
changes introduced by the other political groups  94.
Besides these three documents, it is also interesting to take a look at the concrete 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and at the consequences of the institutional and 
decision-making changes it introduces. 
For the time being, it is difficult to say something reliable about the consequences 
of the abovementioned changes on the speed of negotiations and of adoption. The two 
initatives adopted so far on trafficking and on sexual exploitation of children are not 
really representative of the new rhythm of the decision-making process since both 
proposals had already been introduced and discussed before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty  95. After its entry into force, they were re-introduced by the Commission 
94 On this resolution, see the contribution of C. de Jong in this book.
95 See proposal for a Council Framework Decision on preventing and combating trafficking 
in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, COM 
(2009) 136 final, 25 March 2009 and proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating 
the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, repealing Framework 
Decision 2004/68/JHA, COM (2009) 135 final, 25 March 2009.
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as proposals for directive  96. They were adopted in first reading. The Council reached 
a general approach on two other proposals, namely the one on attacks against 
information systems  97 and the one on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and 
market manipulation (the market abuse directive)  98. The delay in formally adopting 
the first proposal seems mainly due to the suspension of the decision-making process 
following the “legal conflict” on the Schengen evaluation mechanism between the 
European Parliament and Council in June 2012  99. The three other ones have been 
introduced more recently and are still being negotiated within the Council.
As regards the consequences of the abovementioned institutional and decision-
making changes in terms of the content of the instruments, some tendencies emerge 
from the directives on trafficking in human beings and on sexual exploitation of 
children. However, since these directives are the only ones, which have been adopted 
so far, we lack the necessary distance to make any thorough conclusion. Besides, when 
examining each institutions’ role, especially the Council or the Parliament’s role, one 
should always keep in mind that it does not necessarily represent the views of each 
component of the institution. EU substantive criminal law is not a battleground for 
the redefinition of the powers of the European Parliament in former third pillar issues 
in the same way as the sector of data processing has been in the last few years. No 
negotiation of a directive on EU substantive criminal law has led to an institutional 
drama such as the vote on the EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) 
Agreement or on the EU-US Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement. Nevertheless, 
an important part of the content of EU instruments of substantive criminal law is the 
result of a power game within and between the institutions in the same way as national 
legislation is the result of a power game between the different players in the national 
legislative process.
Neither of the two new directives adopted since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
treaty (the one on trafficking in human beings and the one on sexual exploitation 
of children) is a straightforward ‘Lisbonisation’ of the preexisting EU framework 
decisions. Major changes have been brought in terms of the contents. Since this is not 
the place to analyse in detail all the changes made  100, we would just like to identify 
96 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing 
and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework 
Decision 2002/629/JHA, COM (2010) 95 final, 29 March 2010 and proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation 
of children and child pornography, repealing Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, COM (2010) 
94 final, 29 March 2010. 
97 The Council reached a general approach on 10 June 2011 (see Council doc. 11566/11).
98 The Council reached a general approach on 3 December 2012 (see Council doc. 
16820/12).
99 See the declaration of 14 June 2012 by Martin Schulz, European Parliament president, 
according to which the European Parliament would suspend all cooperation with Member 
States on five key justice and home affairs files until the legislature was included again in the 
Schengen decision making.
100 For an analysis of the new Directive on trafficking in human beings, see especially T. 
oboKAtA and B. pAyne, “Implementing action against trafficking in human beings under the 
TFEU: a preliminary analysis”, NJECL, 3, 2012, p. 298 f. and the contribution of Francesca 
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some general trends. Besides the multiplication of recitals  101, the texts have gained 
some precision, at least on some aspects: definitions have been added  102. In terms 
of criminalisation, generally speaking the new directives go in the direction of an 
extension of criminal offences in the field. Whereas such an extension is rather modest 
in the field of trafficking in human beings  103, such trend is more important in the field 
of sexual exploitation of children  104. The approximation of sanctions has developed 
and, generally speaking, the level of sanctions has raised  105. In the case of the 
Directive on sexual offences against children, a wide range of relatively specifically 
determined penalties have been provided  106. They are no longer based on the model 
bands for penalties which were provided for in the 2002 Council’s conclusions  107. In 
both directives, the kinds of sanctions have also somewhat diversified and, in the case 
of individuals, they are no longer limited to imprisonment  108. Concerning jurisdiction, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction has been strengthened: exercising the active nationality 
principle has become mandatory  109. Although the margin for manoeuvre left to the 
Galli to this book. Concerning the new Directive on sexual exploitation of children, see for 
example P. beAuvAis, “Harmonisation des infractions et des peines en matière de délinquance 
sexuelle sur mineurs Dir. 2011/92/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 13 déc. 2011 
relative à la lutte contre les abus sexuels et l’exploitation sexuelle des enfants, ainsi que la 
pédopornographie et remplaçant la décision-cadre 2004/68/JAI du Conseil”, RTDE, 2013 
p. 877 f.
101 H. noWell-smith, “Behind the scenes in the negotiation of EU criminal justice 
legislation”, NJECL, 3, 2012, p. 384.
102 See for instance the definition of vulnerability in the directive on trafficking in human 
beings (Article 2, para. 2). However for criticisms of the vagueness of such new definition, see 
H. sAtzger, F. zimmermAnn and G. lAngheld, “The Directive on preventing and combatting 
trafficking in human beings and the principles governing European Criminal policy – A critical 
evaluation”, EuCLR, 3, 2013, p. 114.
103 The exploitation purposes have been extended to begging, removal of organs and 
exploitation of criminal activities (Article 2, para. 3 of the directive).
104 Compare previous Articles 2 and 3 of the previous Framework Decision and Articles 3 
to 6 of the new Directive.
105 In the field of trafficking of human beings, Article 3, para. 1 of the previous Framework 
Decision required that offences of Articles 1 and 2 are punishable by effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail extradition and only required a maximum 
penalty of at least eight years of imprisonment for offences of Article 1 when some aggravating 
circumstances were met. Article 4, para. 1 and para. 2 of the new directive require that 
offences referred to in Article 2 are punishable by a maximum penalty of at least five years 
of imprisonment and by a maximum penalty of at least ten years of imprisonment when some 
aggravating circumtances are met… In the field of sexual exploitation of children, compare 
Article 5 of the previous Framework Decision and Articles 3 to 6 of the new directive. 
106 In this regard, see especially S. miettinen, op. cit., p. 139 f.
107 Ibid., p. 143.
108 See Article 7 on seizure and confiscation of the Directive on Trafficking in human 
beings and Article 11 of the Directive on sexual exploitation of children. See also Article 10 of 
the latter related to the disqualifications arising from convictions.
109 See Article 10, para. 1 of the Directive on trafficking in human beings and Article 17 
para 1 of the Directive on sexual exploitation of children.
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Member States has been reduced, some provisions still leave them discretionary 
power but, interestingly, the wording has been adapted  110. Finally, both new directives 
follow a holistic approach. They extensively develop the measures on protection 
and compensation for victims  111 and contain provisions on prevention  112. Such an 
evolution is quite positive. Nevertheless it raises the question of the coherence of each 
of these directives as they contain a very mixed range of provisions. Most correspond 
to hard law, clearly having an impact on national criminal law. Some do not have an 
impact on internal criminal law  113. And some are quite difficult to classify. This is 
for instance the case of the interesting clause on non-prosecution/non-punishment 
of victims. According to Article 8 of the Directive on trafficking in human beings 
and Article 14 of the Directive on sexual exploitation of children, “Member States 
shall, in accordance with the basic principles of their legal systems take the necessary 
measures to ensure that competent authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose 
penalties (on victims) for their involvement in criminal activities, which they have 
been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subjected to (either any 
of or some of the offences contained in the provisions of the directives)”  114. Such 
provisions do not amount to real decriminalisation clauses, which are in any case 
not permitted under the existing legal bases. They can however been considered as a 
sort of “substitute”, but as a “poor substitute” since their language is rather weak  115: 
Member States must take the necessary measures but it is in accordance with the 
basic principles of their legal systems and it aims only at entitling authorities not to 
prosecute, which seems to leave Member States considerable margin for manoeuvre  116. 
It remains to be seen how such clauses will be implemented, especially in the Member 
States where prosecutions are submitted to the so-called ‘legality principle’.
110 In the field of trafficking of human beings, compare Article 6, para. 1 and 2 of the 
previous Framework Decision with Article 10, para. 1 and 2. In the field of sexual exploitation 
of children, compare Article 8, para. 1 and 2 of the previous Framework Decision with Article 
17, para. 1 and 2 of the new Directive.
111 Articles 11 to 17 of the Directive on trafficking in human beings and Articles 14 to 20 
of the Directive on sexual exploitation of children.
112 Article 18 of the Directive on trafficking in human beings and Article 23 of the Directive 
on sexual exploitation of children. 
113 See especially the provisions related to prevention which deal for example with 
education, training, awareness-raising campaigns, etc. (Article 18 of the Directive on trafficking 
in human beings and Articles 22-23 of the Directive on sexual exploitation of children). In this 
regard, it should anyway be underlined that the EU is explicitly deprived from the power to 
harmonise legislation in the field of crime prevention (Article 84 TFEU).
114 See also 14th recital of the preamble of Directive on trafficking in human beings and 
24th of Directive on sexual exploitation of children. 
115 Compare with Article 26 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings of 16 May 2005: “Each Party shall, in accordance with the basic 
principles of its legal system, provide for the possibility of not imposing penalties on victims 
for their involvement in unlawful activities, to the extent that they have been compelled to do 
so”.
116 T. oboKAtA and B. pAyne, op. cit., p. 310 f. and the English case-law they quote.
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The abovementioned general trends were already present in the Commission’s 
proposals. It is true, for instance, for the extension of criminalisation and for the 
increase in the levels of sanctions. If the extension of criminalisation can be explained 
by the considerable influence exercised by the other international and/or European 
conventions  117, the increase in the level of penalties cannot be explained on that basis 
and was not clearly justified by the Commission. Far from countering such a trend 
towards more severity in the definition of offences and of sanctions, the European 
Parliament went in the same direction, pushing, for instance in the case of trafficking 
in human beings, for the criminalisation of other behaviours, not even covered by the 
Commission’s initial proposal – i.e. criminalisation of the users  118. Such a situation 
where the Commission and particularly the European Parliament require increased 
severity, on the one hand, and where the Council tempers such an approach, on the 
other hand, is rather striking. The rather “repressive” approach shown by the European 
Parliament is linked with its deep focus on victims and raises various questions. One of 
them is whether such a position is consistent with the various principles enshrined in 
its abovementioned resolution on an EU approach to criminal law. But, of course, this 
resolution is dated after the adoption of both directives, namely from 22 May 2012. 
It is also true that trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of children are 
very specific sectors, so that it does not mean that the Parliament will always be more 
repressive than the Council  119. Besides, it should not lead us to conclude that Member 
States were countering a more repressive approach as such, their main concern being 
rather to protect their internal law as much as possible.
4. Development of variable geometry 
Variable geometry has been considerably reinforced by the Treaty of Lisbon and 
by the protocols complementing it. In this regard, specific mention is to be made of 
the opt-outs for the UK, Ireland and Denmark, respectively organised by Protocol 
no. 21 on the position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security 
and justice and Protocol no. 22 on the position of Denmark. These opt-outs apply to 
the instruments adopted on the basis of Title V of Part III of the TFEU. The question 
arose as to whether the opt-outs apply or not to the measures adopted on the basis of 
Article 83, para. 2 of the TFEU. Both opinions could be defended. The location of 
Article 83, para. 3, pleads for the application of opt-outs but the fact that this Article 
explicitly provides that “such directives shall be adopted by the same ordinary or 
117 In the field of trafficking in human beings, see especially the UN Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children and the Council of 
Europe Convention of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (Warsaw 
Convention), CETS no. 197. In the field of sexual exploitation of children, see Council of Europe 
Convention of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse (Lanzarote Convention), CETS no. 201.
118 Such concerns appear, however, in the provisions related to prevention: see Article 8, 
para. 1 and 4, of the Directive on trafficking in human beings.
119 Think for instance about a proposal for a directive on infringements to intellectual 
property on the internet: in such a case would the Parliament go as far as the Commission and 
the Member States?
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special legislative procedure as was followed for the adoption of the harmonisation 
measures in question” could constitute an argument for their non-application… But 
this question was soon resolved by the first initiative based on Article 83, para. 2, 
namely the proposal for a directive on insider dealing and market manipulation in 
favour of the first opinion, namely of the application of the opt-outs. And this position 
does not seem to create specific discussion. 
These opt-outs are problematic and likely to create severe distortions and/or 
imbalances which appear clearly when we think about the accessory functions of 
the approximation of substantive criminal law. On the one hand, if approximation 
is developed on the basis of Article 83, para. 1 TFEU as a necessary complement 
to mutual recognition, how can we legitimise mutual recognition with Member 
States which are not bound by the approximating instruments? On the other hand, 
if approximating instruments are adopted on the basis of Article 83, para. 2 and are 
presented as being essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union Policy, 
how is it possible to justify that, contrary to the basic instruments developing the 
concerned policy, they do not bind all Member States  120. 
The abovementioned opt-outs do not apply to the instruments adopted outside 
Title V. Consequently, one of the major advantages of the Commission’s choice of 
basing its proposal for a directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial 
interests by means of criminal law on Article 83, para. 2 was precisely to avoid the 
application of such variable geometry. However, as explained earlier, such a legal 
basis will most probably not be accepted by the Council. 
UK IE
Trafficking in human beings Opted in after adoption Opted in before adoption
Sexual exploitation of children Opted in before adoption Opted in before adoption
Attacks against information systems Opted in before adoption Opted in before adoption
Insider dealing and market  
manipulation
Did not opt in before adoption Opted in before adoption
Freezing and confiscation Did not opt in before adoption Did not opt in before adoption
Protection of the Euro Did not opt in before adoption Opted in before adoption
Concerning the concrete impact of such opt-outs, it is to be noted that Denmark 
is out of the first six proposals for a directive on substantive criminal law based on 
Title V. Since none of them are Schengen-related, Denmark is not allowed to opt in  121. 
But it continues to be bound by the old framework decisions in the field. Ireland opted 
in to five of the first six proposals for directives on substantive criminal law based 
on Title V. The only initiative to which it has not so far opted in is the proposal on 
freezing and confiscation. But it can still opt in after its adoption of course. So far, the 
UK has made less extensive use of its right to opt in than Ireland: it only opted in to 
half of the first six proposals for directives on substantive criminal law based on Title 
V, namely to the directives on trafficking in human beings and on sexual exploitation 
120 D. Flore, Droit pénal européen, op. cit., p. 271.
121 See Article 4 of Protocol no. 22.
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of children and to the proposal for a directive on attacks against information systems. 
It can still opt in to the three other proposals after they have been adopted.
5. Changes in terms of legal tools and their implementation 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, substantive criminal law must be 
approximated through directives, at least when achieved under Title V of Part III of 
the TFEU. We will not come back here to the question of whether Article 325, para. 4 
may serve as a legal basis for such approximation and allow or not for the adoption of 
directives and regulations in the field. 
According to Article 288 TFEU, EU directives are binding, as to the result to 
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave the 
choice of form and methods to the national authorities. Directives are the privileged 
instrument of approximation of legislation and need in principle the adoption of 
internal transposition measures. The difference with the previous framework decisions 
is that, according to the Van Duyn case law of the CJ, on the basis of the need for 
effectiveness (“effet utile”), a directive may have a direct effect  122. However, such 
direct effect is subordinated to several conditions and important limits. The provisions 
must be sufficiently precise, unconditional and not contingent on any discretionary 
implementing measures  123. The direct effect is limited to a vertical ascending direct 
effect, which means that private individuals may only invoke it against a Member 
State, which either failed to implement the directive within the prescribed period or 
implemented it incorrectly. Directives may not be given direct effect to the detriment 
of individuals. They are deprived of any vertical descending direct effect, from 
the Member State, and its authorities against individuals  124 and of any horizontal 
direct effect (between private individuals)  125. Considering that the rules related to 
substantive criminal law mostly pursue “repressive objectives” rather than “protection 
aims” it is generally considered that such direct effect will not benefit the directives 
for the approximation of substantive criminal law. This is true for provisions, which 
aim at fixing minimum standards related to the definition of offences and sanctions  126. 
However, as we have previously underlined, the two first adopted directives follow 
a holistic approach and also contain “protective provisions”. If such provisions 
are sufficiently precise, unconditional and not contingent on any discretionary 
implementing measures, they can benefit from direct effect. 
The new directives aiming at approximating substantive criminal law will 
definitely benefit from other consequences of the communautarisation achieved 
by the Lisbon Treaty, among which is the application of basic EC principles, such 
122 CJ, 4 Dec. 1974, case 41/74, Van Duyn, see especially para. 12.
123 See for instance CJ, 19 January 1982, Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, case 
8/81, para. 25, etc.
124 See for example CJ, 5 April 1979, case C-148/78, Ratti, para. 22 or CJ, 8 Oct. 1987, 
case 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, para. 7 f.
125 See for example CJ, 26 February 1986, Marshall I, case C-152/84, para. 48.
126 In this regard, see especially P. Asp, op. cit., p. 104 f. and S. miettinen, op. cit., p. 222 f. 
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as the primacy principle  127 and the full set of the ECJ competences  128, including 
infringement actions which is of course a quite efficient tool to convince reluctant 
Member States to implement the EU law as it should be implemented. The full set of 
the ECJ competences also includes the application of the “normal” preliminary ruling 
competence, independently of any individual declaration of acceptation by each 
Member State. Such extension of the ECJ jurisdiction was immediately applicable 
to the new instruments, i.e. those adopted after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon. It will also soon be extended to the “old” instruments, namely the ones 
adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, after the transitional period 
of five years, namely from 30 November 2014 onward. The pre-existing framework 
decisions approximating substantive criminal law, which have not yet been replaced 
by new directives, will consequently be submitted to such an extension. However, if 
we take a look at the existing case law of the ECJ, with the exception of the two cases 
Commission v. Council related to conflicts of legal bases between the third and first 
pillars, it is worth noticing that no case has been directly linked to an instrument of 
substantive approximation  129. Attempts have been made but they were unsuccessful. 
Let us recall, for instance, the preliminary questions concerning the validity and 
interpretation of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combatting terrorism, 
which both the NGO la Ligue des droits de l’Homme and the Belgian Conseil des 
Ministres suggested the Belgian Constitutional Court refer to the ECJ in the context 
of the annulment request introduced by the first one against the relevant implementing 
internal law  130. In its ruling dated 13 July 2005, the Constitutional Court rejected the 
recourse and refused to refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice, declaring 
that it was not necessary to do so  131. 
127 This principle was decided by the CJ in its famous decision dated 15 July 1964 in the 
case Costa c. ENEL (case 6/64) and was recalled in Declaration no. 17 to the Lisbon Treaty, 
which states that “The Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the 
basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, under the conditions laid 
down by the said case law”. According to this case-law principle, EC law takes precedence over 
any rule of domestic law of the MS, including principles of national constitutional nature (CJ, 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, case 11/70, 17 December 1970).
128 Concerning the control by the ECJ after the Treaty of Lisbon, see especially V. ricci 
and A. Weyembergh, “Le traité de Lisbonne et le contrôle juridictionnel sur le droit pénal 
européen”, in A. Weyembergh and S. brAum (eds.), Quel contrôle juridictionnel pour l’espace 
pénal européen?, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009, p. 227 f.
129 On the contrary, the case-law of the ECJ in the field of approximation of criminal 
procedure was much more developed: see the seven rulings on the Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (OJ, no. L 82, 22 March 
2001): ECJ, 16 June 2005, Pupino, C-105/03; 28 June 2007, Giovanni dell’Orto, C-467/05; 9 
Oct. 2008, Katz, C-404/07; 15 Sept. 2010, Gueye and Sameron Sanchez, C-483/09 and C-1/10; 
21 October 2010, Eredics and Sapi, C-205/09; 21 Dec. 2011, M.X., C-507/10; 12 July 2012, 
Giovanardi et al., C-79/11.
130 See Belgian Constitutional Court, Ruling no. 125/2005, 13 July 2005, para. A.8.2. and 
A.9.
131 Ibid. para. B. 8.
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Last but not least, the importance of Article 70 TFEU concerning objective 
and impartial evaluation is worth underlining. It is, however, regrettable that the 
approximation of criminal laws is not explicitly mentioned. Evaluation is particularly 
necessary in the field of approximation of substantive criminal law since, as previously 
mentioned, the Lisbon Treaty can be interpreted as limiting EU substantive criminal 
law rules to directives, which need to be implemented by the Member States  132. 
 Conclusion
As shown by the previous developments, the approximation of substantive 
criminal law in the EU is “at a crossroads”. This is of course due to the importance 
of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty but also to the adoption of the three 
abovementioned documents respectively adopted by the Council, by the Commission 
and by the European Parliament, which have been qualified by some authors as 
“European criminal Policy documents”  133. 
This contribution aimed at introducing the following articles. Many aspects 
mentioned will consequently be developed further. We will also come back on some of 
the main issues in the conclusion of the book, where we will develop some reflections 
on the way forward. 
132 About evaluation, see Gisèle Vernimmen’s contribution to this book.





The European Parliament Resolution  
of 22 May 2012  
on a EU approach to criminal law
Dr. Cornelis de Jong  1
Shortly after I took up my responsibilities as a Member of the European Parliament 
(EP), and, in particular, as a member of the Civil Liberties Committee, I submitted 
a request for an own initiative report on an EU approach to (substantive) criminal 
law. It took some time for my request to be formally approved by the European 
Parliament but it is with great pleasure that I can now present this report to ECLAN. I 
am particularly grateful to those members of the network who contributed directly to 
my report – John Spencer and André Klip – who provided me with extremely valuable 
information both during the hearing in the EP and in our informal talks.
I am not ashamed to say that my report was influenced by academics. I was inspired 
in particular by the Manifesto on European Criminal Policy, which the European 
Criminal Law initiative adopted in 2009  2. By following principles developed by 
academics, I was able to avoid the status of the report becoming a partisan issue. It 
was adopted in the Civil Liberties Committee by 49 votes in favour, four against and 
no abstentions  3. In the plenary, 537 MEPs voted in favour, 38 against and there were 
57 abstentions  4. Of the political groups, only Europe on Freedom and Democracy 
(EFD) voted against it, wrongly assuming that this report was designed to transfer 
more powers to the EU in the field of criminal law.
1 Since 2009, Cornelis (Dennis) de Jong is Member of the European Parliament, 
representing the Dutch Socialist Party. 
2 See: https://sites.google.com/site/eucrimpol/manifest/manifesto.
3 See Report on a EU Approach to Criminal Law (2010/2310 (INI)), doc. A7-0144/2012, 
24 April 2012.
4 See European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2012 on a EU Approach to Criminal 
Law (2010/2310 (INI)) (P7_TA-PROV(2012)0208) (see annex to the present book).
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1. Background to the report
The European Union is facing a crisis of legitimacy. In 2005, the European 
Constitution was voted down both in France and in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, 
a similar Treaty was drafted, called the Lisbon Treaty, and was ratified without 
additional referenda in these two countries. One of the features of the Lisbon Treaty 
was to abolish the right of Member States to wield a veto in the field of criminal 
law. Although one can understand the reasons behind this move (i.e. a more efficient 
decision-making process), it is a huge step for Member States to give up part of 
their sovereignty in such a sensitive area. It illustrates the gap between European 
policymakers and the European public. Had we asked the public for their opinion, 
the majority would probably have rejected the criminal law provisions of the Treaty. 
However, we did not do that and we are therefore now engaged in lawmaking in this 
area without knowing for certain whether we are actually acting in accordance with 
the wishes of the electorate. 
In a way, this is nothing new. For example, when the Schengen Agreement was 
concluded, the public was told that this would greatly facilitate travel within Europe 
as they would no longer have to show their passports at the borders when travelling 
within the European Union. However, no-one was told then that lifting the internal 
border controls would lead to common asylum and immigration policies and indeed 
would lead to an ‘espace judiciaire’ that would also include European lawmaking 
in the area of criminal law. Thus, we engaged in a very important project without 
being fully backed by the European public. It is no wonder then that many of them 
were shocked when faced with the European Constitution with its provisions on an 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. I do not want to argue that lifting the internal 
border controls was the wrong step to take but those politically responsible for this 
step should have informed the public of the far-reaching consequences of this move. 
Building support for European integration means first and foremost taking Europeans 
seriously and respecting their opinions. Integration cannot be achieved by the back 
door as this will backfire on politics and on the European integration project as a 
whole.
The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty providing for an EU competence in criminal 
law can be found in particular in Article 83, para. 1 and 2 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Other provisions are relevant as well 
though: Article 86, for example, refers to the possibility of establishing a European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
It is important to note that the Treaty provides for the possibility of lawmaking 
but it does not force the European Union to do so. However, in practice the EU always 
engages in lawmaking once a competence for it to do so has been created. On the one 
hand, the European Commission often sees lawmaking as an end in itself. Although 
these days impact assessments are required for the Commission to propose new 
legislation, in practice there is always an argument to be found in order to make use of 
newly created competences. On the other hand, national politicians also use European 
harmonisation measures to solve national problems. For example, in 1996, Belgium 
was in turmoil because of the failing national justice system in the famous Dutroux 
case. It did not take the Belgian Minister of Justice long to take a ‘European initiative’ 
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calling for a harmonised approach concerning the offence of sexual exploitation of 
children. Although many of his colleagues were not convinced of the cross-border 
nature of this offence, a so-called joint action on sexual exploitation of children was 
adopted in 1997.
Against this background, I considered that, now that the Lisbon Treaty has not 
only done away with the veto power of Member States in the field of criminal law 
but also created co-legislative rights for the European Parliament, we should at least 
create a framework for lawmaking in this field. Such a framework should clarify that 
the European Union would confine itself to passing legislation in those cases where 
there is concrete evidence showing that national legislation is not sufficient. It should 
also contain a number of criteria for ensuring high quality lawmaking, thus promoting 
coherence whilst moving away from the often fragmented nature of the European 
legislative process. In this way, we can hopefully remove to some extent the reasons 
for the feeling of mistrust concerning the developments in the field of criminal law by 
the European Union that has prevailed among Europeans ever since the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty.
A final consideration in favour of this initiative was that other European institutions 
had taken similar initiatives. In November 2009, the Council adopted its own 
conclusions  5 and, in September 2011, the Commission submitted a communication 
on this subject  6.
2. Results
The first part of the report recalls the important principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. In particular, it refers to the fact that, despite the abolishment of the 
veto power of individual Member States, Article 83, para. 3 of the Treaty does contain 
an emergency brake procedure whenever a Member State feels that the proposed 
legislation would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system. This 
shows that the authors of the Treaty were well aware of the sensitivities involved and 
therefore created this special escape clause, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the 
subsidiarity principle.
Concerning the principle of proportionality, the report sets out that, by definition, 
criminal law measures restrict certain human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Of course, it does so on good grounds but not without carefully weighing up the 
different interests. Apart from general and internationally recognised principles of 
human rights law, national traditions also played an important part in each Member 
State in describing the extent to which criminal sanctions may limit human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
On this basis, the second part of the report contains the following criteria for new 
European legislation in the field of criminal law:
5 Council document 16798/09 of 27 November 2009 (see annex to the present book).
6 Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies 
through criminal law, COM (2011) 573 final (see annex to the present book).
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“Emphasises that in this respect it is not sufficient to refer to abstract notions or to symbolic 
effects, but that the necessity of new substantive criminal law provisions must be demonstrated 
by the necessary factual evidence making it clear that:
– the criminal provisions focus on conduct causing significant pecuniary or non-pecuniary 
damage to society, individuals or a group of individuals;
– there are no other, less intrusive measures available for addressing such conduct,
– the crime involved is of a particularly serious nature with a cross-border dimension or has a 
direct negative impact on the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which 
has been subject to harmonisation measures,
– there is a need to combat the criminal offence concerned on a common basis, i.e. that there 
is added practical value in a common EU approach, taking into account, inter alia, how 
widespread and frequent the offence is in the Member States, and
– in conformity with Article 49(3) of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, the severity of 
the proposed sanctions is not disproportionate to the criminal offence”.
It should be noted that, as per these conclusions, it is not sufficient for the 
Commission to argue that ‘in general’ there is a need for a legislative text. It should 
ground its case on concrete factual evidence. Moreover, it should do so for all criteria 
mentioned. It is not sufficient for the Commission to argue that only one or a few of 
the criteria have been met.
Most of these principles can also be found in the Council’s conclusions of 
30 November 2009. Interestingly, the Commission distanced itself from these 
conclusions at the time. This reflected the general desire of the European Commission 
to protect its full right of initiative without interference from the Council. Also, the 
Commission might have felt embarrassed by the fact that the Council adopted these 
conclusions on the eve of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, thus excluding the 
European Parliament, which would have been entitled to the right of co-decision the 
day after.
It may well be that the Commission also carried substantive objections against the 
criteria that were to be found in the Council conclusions. In its own communication, 
the Commission pays heed to the principle of subsidiarity but only mentions the 
following, far more general and broader criteria:
– internal market considerations, i.e. the importance of legislation for freedom of 
movement and for the trust of consumers;
– avoiding crime shopping which may occur on the basis of differing national 
criminal law provisions;
– mutual recognition requires mutual trust, which in turn requires harmonisation;
– effective implementation of a Union policy.
On the basis of my report, the European Parliament has now clearly rejected such 
broad criteria and, together with the Council, is sticking to a much more stringent 
subsidiarity test.
The third part of the report contains references to quality principles that are well-
known to all academics, and which I shall therefore not explain in any detail:
– ultima ratio;
– lex certa;
– nulla poena sine culpa;
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– non bis in idem;
– presumption of innocence.
In general, these principles are not controversial. But the proof of the pudding is 
in the eating and hence procedures have to be developed in order to check if proposed 
new legislation indeed meets with each of these criteria. I must add that the principles 
of ‘non bis in idem’ and ‘presumption of innocence’ seem to be primarily related to 
procedural rights and I have not therefore included them in my draft report. When 
colleagues proposed to add them, I did not of course object, as they are general 
principles of criminal law, although it remains to be seen whether they can be 
effectively applied to draft legislation.
3. Way forward
The final part of the report contains a number of procedural paragraphs. Its 
primary objective is to make sure that the conclusions contained in the report do not 
become dead letters but remain alive. Thus, the report calls for an interinstitutional 
agreement. This is not uncontroversial and the Commission has already indicated that 
it does not see the need for a formal arrangement. However, the EP will have to take 
initiatives, at least to explore the possibilities for such an arrangement, especially as 
the Council seems interested in it too.
Secondly, in some cases the report seeks to look beyond the façade of the 
institutions. How does the decision-making, in the preparatory phase too, work in 
practice? For example, do the justice and home affairs ministers decide on all proposals 
with criminal law provisions? Does the Commission see to it that all proposals with 
criminal law provisions are checked by one Commissioner or at least by one service? 
A centralised approach is essential for the development of a coherent and high quality 
system of criminal law provisions. In the Netherlands, for example, all criminal law 
legislation is checked by the legislative directorate of the Ministry of Security and 
Justice. A similar check needs to be introduced at European level as well.
This also holds true for the European Parliament. The Civil Liberties Committee 
does not take the lead in all criminal law proposals. Other committees may take charge 
because of the particular subject matter but may lack criminal law expertise. In order 
to make sure that there is a horizontal check on quality and coherence, the report 
suggests an enhanced role for the legal service as well as a supporting office for MEPs 
to help them draft their legislative amendments.
I would like an in-depth discussion and an agreement among all three institutions 
to make sure that there is a coherent and high quality approach in all phases of 
the legislative process. The Commission could usefully show how it includes the 
subsidiarity and necessity/proportionality tests in its impact assessments as well 
as how it applies its fundamental rights checklist. The Council could give us more 
information on its Working Party on Substantive Criminal Law and how it helps 
to ensure coherence and high quality. And the European Parliament will have to 
take the necessary implementing decisions in order to enhance the role of the legal 
service so that MEPs understand all the legal implications and can submit last-minute 
amendments (if the coherence or quality of a criminal law is found to be insufficient) 
before the final vote on a piece of criminal legislation is taken. 
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4. Conclusion
The report adopted by the European Parliament can provide a solid basis for 
lawmaking in the field of criminal law. It can help prevent unnecessary European 
legislation being passed, for example, in respect of sensitive areas such as abortion or 
euthanasia. It also sets high quality benchmarks and provides for some institutional 
arrangements to ensure these.
However, the report does not take a purely negative approach towards European 
lawmaking in this field. There are many cross-border crimes that need an EU approach. 
This holds true, for example, for trafficking in human beings but also for corruption 
and financial crimes. I am convinced that Europe has to act in the field of criminal law 
too but that, if it does, it should do so carefully and not in a fragmented way.
I am confident that, if we succeed in securing an interinstitutional agreement 
following this report, we can rest assured that we will end up with a coherent and high 
quality set of EU criminal law provisions.
Harmonised Union policies and the 
harmonisation of substantive criminal law
John A.E. vervAele
1. European integration and criminal law – the history of its development  1
It is no secret that the founding fathers of the European Communities overlooked 
the importance of the enforcement of Community law at least to a certain extent. This 
has meant that the enforcement of the common agricultural and fisheries policy, the 
Community customs code, European financial services regulations, EU subsidy fraud 
rules, European environmental policy and European rules on corporate law have been 
entirely left to the autonomy and discretion of the Member States. 
The European Commission soon became aware of the enforcement gap in the EC 
Treaties. An attempt was made in 1976 to supplement the EC Treaties with two protocols 
concerning EC fraud and corruption by EC officials. However, neither protocol 
gained the political approval of the Council of Ministers (Council)  2. In the period 
1975-1990, the Commission was therefore forced to explore the political and legal 
boundaries of the EC Treaties instead. The Commission, supported by the European 
Parliament, was already then of the opinion that there was a considerable enforcement 
deficit on the part of the Member States when it came to compliance with EC policies. 
The Commission therefore submitted various concrete legislative proposals to the 
Council with the aim of obliging Member States to use both (punitive) administrative 
1 For a more detailed analysis, see J.A.E. vervAele, “The Europeanisation of Criminal 
Law and the Criminal Law Dimension of European Integration”, in P. demAert, I. govAere 
and D. hAnF (eds.), 30 Years of European Legal Studies at the College of Europe, Liber 
Professorum, Brussels, Oxford, Peter Lang, 2005, p. 277; N. hAeKKerup, Controls & Sanctions 
in the EU Law, Copenhagen, Djoef Publishing, 2001.
2 J.A.E. vervAele, Fraud against the Community. The need for European fraud legislation, 
1992, p. 85 f.
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law and criminal law in the enforcement of Community law. The Council approved 
many of the Commission’s proposals, obliging the Member States to impose punitive 
administrative sanctions, especially in the area of the common agricultural policy. The 
regulations in question provide for fines, forfeiture of financial guarantees, exclusion 
from subsidy schemes, professional disqualification, etc. This harmonisation was not 
just limited to reparatory sanctions but also expressly concerned punitive sanctions 
and thus fell under the obligations, at least for the they, of Article 6 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights  3. Member States were obliged to provide rules for these 
sanctions and apply them. Of course, Member States were also free to impose these 
sanctions entirely or partly via criminal law enforcement, instead of solely or partly 
using administrative regulation, if this was in conformity with the requirements for 
enforcement as established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The growing 
influence of EU law on the law of punitive sanctions was not well received by all 
the Member States. Some Member States considered the European Community to 
be applying the EC Treaties quite extensively or that it had even imposed obligations 
that did not have a proper legal basis. In 1990, Germany felt that the limit had 
been reached. Two regulations on agriculture provided it with the perfect pretext to 
bring an action for annulment before the Court. The regulations not only prescribed 
restitution (with a surcharge) of subsidies that had been unjustifiably obtained, but 
also punitive exclusion from subsidy schemes. Germany was of the opinion that the 
European Community did not have the power to prescribe punitive sanctions. What 
was remarkable in this case was that none of the other Member States intervened 
to support Germany in its contentions. Germany received a rude awakening when, 
in 1992, the Court ruled that the European Community was competent to adopt the 
measures, including the punitive sanctions, in its judgement in case C-240/90  4. This 
landmark judgement finally cleared up the controversy surrounding the European 
Communities’ power to harmonise administrative (punitive) sanctions. 
With regard to criminal law enforcement, it is mainly thanks to the ECJ that 
the autonomy of the Member States to enforce Community law has been somewhat 
limited. Member States were bound by the Court’s interpretation of Article 10 EC 
Treaty (the duty of co-operation or loyalty principle). The Court had established 
that the Member States had a duty to enforce Community law whereby they have 
to provide for procedures and penalties that were effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive and that offer a degree of protection that was analogous to that offered 
3 I refer to the Engel-criteria of the European Court of Human Rights (see Eur. Court HR, 
8 June 1976, Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, Series A, no. 22).
4 ECJ, 27 October 1992, Judgement C-240/90, Germany v. Council and Commission, 
ECR, p. I-5383. For a detailed analysis of the EC harmonization of administrative enforcement, 
see J.A.E. vervAele, “Administrative Sanctioning Powers of and in the Community. Towards 
a System of European Administrative Sanctions?”, in J.A.E. vervAele (ed.) Administrative 
Law Application and Enforcement of Community Law in The Netherlands, Deventer and 
Boston, Kluwer, 1994, p. 161; J. schWArze, “Rechtsstaatliche Grenzen der gesetzlichen und 
richterlichen Qualifikation von Verwaltungssanktionen im europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht”, 
EuZW, 2003, p. 261 f.; M. poelemAns, La sanction dans l’ordre juridique communautaire, 
Brussels, Bruylant, 2004.
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in the enforcement of provisions of national law of a similar nature and importance 
(the assimilation principle). It was not only incumbent on the national legislation 
to fulfil these requirements. They also had to be put into practice in the course of 
enforcement  5. From the case law of the ECJ, it is abundantly clear that criminal 
(procedural) law belongs to the sphere of competence of the Member States but that 
Community law may impose requirements as to the fulfilment and interpretation 
of this competence within the framework of the enforcement of Community law. 
Criminal law must not just be put to one side when the rules to be enforced turn 
out to be contrary to Community law (negative interpretation). Community law also 
unmistakably establishes requirements which national criminal law enforcement has 
to fulfil if it is invested with the aim of compliance with Community law (positive 
integration). This duty to enforce in accordance with certain requirements also applies 
to criminal law if the Member States decide that this is the tool they will use to enforce 
Community law  6. This includes, for example, shaping policy as to when to dismiss 
a case or indictment and the exercising of prosecutorial discretion in cases that are 
relevant from a Community law perspective and where the interests of the EC must 
also be taken into account  7. An airtight separation between the criminal law policy of 
the Member States and that of the EC has never existed. Both de iure and de facto, 
the process of indirect EC harmonisation of national criminal law (mainly concerning 
the definition of the offences) has been going on for decades. The Community legal 
order and integration also include the criminal (procedural) law of the Member States 
as a result of which Member State autonomy is restricted. The European integration 
model is not compatible with a restriction of criminal law to national confines such 
that it would remain out of reach of any Community law influence whatsoever. The 
key question is, however, whether the EC’s competence to harmonise reaches so far 
as to enable the EC to directly oblige Member States to criminalise violations of 
Community rules. Was the EC competent to impose requirements as to the nature 
and severity of the criminal penalties? Did this possible competence also extend to 
the scope of application, rationae materiae, rationae personae and rationi loci, to 
procedural aspects, to the modalities of application (statute of limitation, dismissal, 
or dismissing charges, etc.)? There is plenty of debate in the literature about these 
questions. The majority of criminal law authors  8 in Europe denied that the EC had any 
power, however minor, to directly harmonise criminal law.
The Commission and the European Parliament have, for decades, been attempting 
to convince the Council to impose a Community obligation on Member States to 
5 See ECJ, 21 September 1989, Judgement 68/88, Commission v. Greece, ECR, p. 2965 
and the Commission Communication as a result of this case, OJ, no. C 147, 16 June 1990, p. 3.
6 ECJ, 21 September 1989, Judgement 68/88, Commission v. Greece and ECJ, 16 June 
1998, Judgement C-226/97, Lemmens, ECR, p. 195.
7 ECJ, 9 December 1997, Judgement C-265/95, Commission v. France, ECR, p. I-6959.
8 The minority position among criminal lawyers was argued, inter alia, by G. Grasso, K. 
Tiedemann, M. Delmas-Marty, J. Vogel and J. Vervaele who all defended a limited functional 
competence. For an interesting discussion between proponents and opponents, see ZStrW, 
2004, p. 332 and B. schünemAnn (ed.) Alternativentwurf Europäische Strafverfolgung, Köln, 
Carl Heymanns, 2004.
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criminally enforce EC policy. The legislative proposals to this end, for example in 
the fields of money laundering and insider dealing, were functional in their approach 
and only provided for limited harmonisation. By and large, these proposals obliged 
Member States to criminalise certain intentional acts and thus provide for a criminal 
penalty and, in the case of serious offences, a prison sentence. The proposals did 
not contain any concrete provisions as to the substance of these penalties and prison 
sentences. However, even this limited harmonisation approach has never been able 
to win the Council over. The Council, as usual, approved the proposals but only after 
amending them in such a way that the obligations were stripped of their criminal 
law packaging. Any and all references to the criminal law nature of the obligations 
were systematically deleted. Criminal law prohibitory or mandatory provisions were 
changed into prohibitory or mandatory provisions of an administrative nature. 
Obligations to impose criminal sanctions were replaced by simple sanctions. The 
systematic political neutralisation of the Commission’s criminal law harmonisation 
proposals could be indicative of a staunch unity on the part of the Member States in 
the Council. Nevertheless, the Member States were internally divided on this question 
to such an extent that, in 1990, the ministers of justice assigned a Council working 
group consisting of public servants to the task of subjecting the relationship between 
Community law and criminal law to fundamental discussion  9. The government experts 
agreed that Community law can set requirements for national criminal law but could 
not agree on an unequivocal position concerning the direct criminal law harmonisation 
competence of the EC. The small majority of Member States that were in favour of such 
a competence nevertheless wished for certain conditions to apply. Such harmonisation 
could only be the criminal law tailpiece of a Community law policy, i.e. it could not 
be criminal law harmonisation as such. This harmonisation should, furthermore, leave 
intact a number of principles or guarantees that were considered by (some of) the 
Member States to be essential for their own criminal (procedural) law. The red lines 
that they did not want crossed at that time with regard to functional harmonisation 
were as follows: prosecutorial discretion, criminal liability of legal persons, minimum 
penalties, sentencing discretion. The report of the divided working group therefore did 
not result in a political breakthrough. A fundamental political difference of opinion 
started to develop  10. During the intergovernmental conference organised to pave the 
way for the Maastricht Treaty, Dutch attempts to integrate aspects of criminal justice, 
including the power of direct harmonisation, into EC law were doomed to failure. The 
Luxemburg compromise, known as the three pillar structure, organised criminal law 
co-operation and harmonisation into a separate semi-intergovernmental pillar which 
entered into force as part of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. With the entry into force 
9 For the report of the ad hoc working group see J.A.E. vervAele, Fraud against the 
European Community, p. 313.
10 For example, the Member States were prepared to criminalize money laundering, based 
on obligations deriving from the international law made by the UN and Council of Europe, but 
not by the EC. See intergovernmental declaration to Directive 91/308/CEE of 10 June 1991 on 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, OJ, no. L 66, 
20 June 1991, p. 77.
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of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the third pillar shed its semi-intergovernmental 
character and thereby became a fully-fledged EU policy area.
2. Criminal law harmonisation in the EU: from political stalemate  
to the ECJ ruling in case C-176/03 on Criminal Enforcement  
of Environmental Protection
Structuring the third pillar to include the direct legislative competence of the EU 
in the field of co-operation in criminal matters and criminal law harmonisation  11 has 
not led to a full resolution of the issue. In fact, the reverse has happened. After all, 
the third pillar was a supplementary power that cannot undermine or interfere with 
the array of EC powers. Both Article 2 EU and Article 47 EU, in conjunction with 
Article 29 TEU, were clear on this. Whether or not this power exists does not depend 
on whether, prior to the EU Treaty’s entry into force, any regulation or directive was 
ever created that imposes a duty to harmonise criminal law. Neither lack of use of 
power nor the entry into force of the EU Treaty leads to the demise of this power. It is 
not political will that determines legal competence, at least not without amending the 
Treaty. Nevertheless, the third criminal law pillar has been defined by many as being 
exclusive, i.e. excluding any criminal law competence within the first pillar.
It was my belief that it was clear from the outset that the political division of the 
legal regime between the first and the third pillar would culminate in an institutional 
battle of competence concerning the position of criminal law within the EU. In the case 
of many of the legislative initiatives during the period 1993-2005, the Commission 
came to diametrically oppose the Council. Both have been involved in institutional 
legislative skirmishes concerning the harmonisation of criminal law. There is no point 
in repeating every single initiative and counter-initiative here where the EC and the 
Member States raised the issue in the Council. Altogether, three types of legislative 
conflict can be distinguished. The first type may be described as ‘warding off’. The 
Commission submitted proposals for the harmonisation of criminal law enforcement 
of Community law, which the Council subsequently rejected. At best, the proposal 
was neutralised and stripped of its criminal law packaging. Here, the Council applied 
an old legislative tactic that was used in the period before the entry into force of the 
Treaty on the European Union. The Commission proposal for a regulation on official 
feed and food controls  12 (2003) is an excellent example. The Commission emphasised 
the need to provide for a functional harmonisation of criminal law enforcement 
supplementing the existing harmonisation of administrative law enforcement. The 
Commission claimed that a basic list of offences – committed intentionally or through 
serious negligence – which could threaten feed and food safety and therefore public 
health, and for which the Member States must provide criminal sanctions, should 
be drawn up. The list should not be limited to offences related to actual placing 
on the market, but include all offences which may eventually lead to the placing 
on the market of unsafe feed or food. For this list of serious offences, the Member 
11 I refer to the Engel-criteria of the European Court of Human Rights (Engel and Others 
v. the Netherlands).
12 COM (2003) 52 final, 5 February 2003.
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States should provide for minimum criminal standards according to Article 55. The 
fact that serious infringements of food safety might threaten public health has been 
conclusively proven by the various food scandals in numerous European countries 
which, in some cases, for example, the rapeseed oil poisoning case in Spain, have 
resulted in many people dying. Nevertheless, the Member States did not submit a 
proposal for a framework decision but rather stripped the Commission proposal of its 
criminal law wrappings in the Council. 
The second type of legislative conflict may be described as ‘hijacking’, whereby 
the content of a proposal for a regulation or directive is copied into a proposal for a 
framework decision or vice versa. The competing proposals concerning the criminal 
law enforcement of environmental policy is an excellent illustration  13. In a number of 
cases, this approach has led to a stalemate whereas in others it has led to the adoption 
of framework decisions contrary to the opinion of the Commission and the European 
Parliament. 
The third type may be termed ‘cohabitation force’, whereby two proposals are 
elaborated alongside each other and in harmony with each other. The substantive 
provisions and, as the case may be, provisions concerning administrative harmonisation 
are included in a directive or a regulation while the criminal law harmonisation 
aspects are incorporated into a framework decision. A good example of what is 
known as ‘a double text’ approach is Directive 2002/90, coupled with Framework 
Decision 2002/946, concerning illegal immigration  14. Another good example relates 
to environmental pollution from ships, where both proposals  15 were drafted by the 
Commission  16. Article 6 of the proposal for a directive includes the obligation to 
provide for criminal penalties regarding the illegal discharge of pollutants as defined 
in the Marpol International Convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 
including cases of serious infringements and custodial sentences, also for natural 
persons. The proposal for a framework decision directly refers to Article 6 of the 
directive and further defines the forms of criminal sanctions. The proposal for a 
framework decision further includes provisions concerning joint investigation teams, 
13 Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law (OJ, no. L 29, 5 February 2003, p. 55) which was annulled 
by the Court of Justice and the proposal for a Directive on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law, COM (2001) 139, 13 March 2001 as amended by COM (2002) 544, 
30 September 2002.
14 Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorized 
entry, transit and residence, OJ, no. L 328, 5 December 2002, p. 17, and Framework Decision 
2002/946/JHA of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent 
the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence, OJ, no. L 328, 5 December 2002, 
p. 1.
15 Directive 2005/35/EC of 7 September 2005 on ship-source pollution and on the 
introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ, no. L 255, 30 September 2005, p. 11 and 
Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the criminal-law framework 
for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, OJ, no. L 255, 30 September 2005, 
p. 164. 
16 Often, this involves interinstitutional co-operation between the Directorate General 
responsible for the specific subject and the Directorate General for the third pillar.
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judicial mutual legal assistance, etc. Here too, the criminal law provisions in the 
proposal for a directive proved ultimately unpalatable to the Council. In the approved 
directive, all references to criminal law obligations were eliminated. 
In the proposals concerning migration and pollution at sea, the Commission 
has had to accept its defeat but it has not yet given up. The Commission proposed 
a proposal for a directive and a framework decision concerning criminal measures 
to combat intellectual property infringements of 12 July 2005  17. This proposal was 
the continuation of Directive 2004/48 concerning the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights  18, which obliged the Member States to provide for private law and 
administrative law measures and to implement the obligations following on from 
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) 
which makes criminal enforcement mandatory. In the proposal for a directive, the 
Commission clearly claimed a direct power to impose criminal law harmonisation, 
but, in doing so, restricted itself to the obligation for the Member States to criminalise 
intentional offences, to provide for certain methods of criminal participation and to 
impose criminal penalties, including custodial sentences. The further determination 
of the sanctions (level, etc.), the question of jurisdiction and some aspects of criminal 
procedure, such as the initiation of criminal proceedings independently of a complaint, 
were all regulated under the framework decision.
This further analysis brings to light several issues. There was no coherent 
European criminal law policy present where all or any actors were involved. The 
Member States were not primarily concerned with the enforcement of Community 
policy but with the fight against terrorism, organised crime, etc. The fact that the 
obligation for Member States to achieve criminal law harmonisation was not imposed 
through a directive or a regulation is not an unbiased conclusion. Framework decisions 
required unanimity. Directives and regulations were usually adopted by means of 
co-decision and qualified majority. Furthermore, as opposed to framework decisions, 
regulations as well as unconditional and clear provisions of directives have direct 
effects. In the first pillar, the Commission also has many more aces up its sleeve to 
oblige the Member States to comply with the harmonisation of criminal law. The 
Commission may initiate infringement proceedings against a Member State. The 
Member States may be held financially responsible for non-compliance by means of 
enforcement duties and the Member States can even be fined for failing to comply 
with ECJ rulings. The Community approach therefore has many advantages, both in 
terms of legitimacy and efficiency. 
The political stalemate could only be broken by a ruling on the principle from the 
court. The Commission has therefore succeeded in provoking such a ruling by raising 
objections under Article 35(6) EU against the legality of the framework decision 
approved by the Council on 2003 on the criminal enforcement of environmental law  19. 
17 Proposal for a directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights and the proposal for a framework decision to strengthen the criminal 
law framework to combat intellectual property offences, COM (2005) 276 final, 12 July 2005. 
18 Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004, OJ, no. L 157, 2 June 2004, p. 45.
19 That the Commission did not start proceedings before the Court in the matter of EC 
fraud may be explained by legal reasons. At the time of the approval of the 1995 PIF Convention 
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With this decision, the Council set aside a proposal submitted by the Commission 
for a directive on the criminal enforcement of environmental law of 2001 with 
similar substance  20. On 2005, the court delivered its long-awaited judgement in case 
C-176/03. This judgement is a second landmark ruling concerning the enforcement 
of Community law as the court recognised the competence of the EC to harmonise 
the enforcement by criminal law of Community law. No less than eleven Member 
States intervened in the proceedings. Ten Member States  21 supported the position 
of the Council. The Netherlands was the only Member State to argue in favour of a 
combined criminal harmonisation competence under EC law: 
“(…) provided that the penalty is inseparably linked to the relevant substantive 
Community provisions and that it can actually be shown that imposing penalties 
under criminal law in that way is necessary for the achievement of the objectives of 
the Treaty in the area concerned (see C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR 
I-5383). That could be the case if the enforcement of a harmonizing rule based, for 
example, on Article 175 EC gave rise to a need for criminal penalties”  22.
The ECJ first of all underlines that the third pillar cannot undermine the 
competences of the first, as Article 47 TEU provides that nothing in the Treaty of 
the EU can affect the EC Treaty. Concerning the criminal law competence in the first 
pillar, the ECJ accepts a criminal annex-competence, functional to the substantive 
policy, for ensuring effective enforcement:
“47. a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within 
the Community’s competence (see, to that effect, case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 
2595, para. 27, and case C-226/97 Lemmens[1998] ECR I-3711, para. 19).
48. However, the last-mentioned finding does not prevent the Community legislature, 
when the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties 
by the competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious 
under the Maastricht third pillar, approval of a criminal law harmonization directive would only 
have been possible on the basis of Article 209A. This provision did not, however, constitute a 
legal basis for harmonization. This was only introduced by Article 280 of the Amsterdam Treaty 
on European Union. On that basis, the Commission in 2001 submitted a proposal for a directive 
on criminal law harmonization without questioning the legal validity of the Conventions. 
The proposal for a directive was provoked, however, by the slow ratification procedures and 
incomplete ratifications of the PIF protocols.
20 In defence of the Community approach see F. comte, “Criminal environmental law and 
Community Competence”, European Environmental Law Review, 12, 2003, p. 147. Argued 
from the contrary standpoint: Y. burumA and J. somsen “Een Strafwetgever te Brussel inzake 
milieubescherming”, NJB, 2001, p. 795 f. and I.M. KoopmAns “Europa en de handhaving van 
het milieurecht: een pijler te ver?”, NTER, 2004, p. 127 f. For a balanced position, see C. 
bAcKes et al. (eds.), Lex Dura, Sed Lex. Opstellen over de handhaving van omgevingsrecht, 
Deventer, Kluwer, 2005, p. 159.
21 Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom.
22 From consideration 36 in the Court’s judgement in case C-176/03. ECJ, 13 September 
2005, Judgement C-176/03, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the 
European Union, ECR, p. I-7879. 
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environmental offences, from taking measures which relate to the criminal law of the 
Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it 
lays down on environmental protection are fully effective. 
49. It should also be added that in this instance, although Articles 1 to 7 of the 
framework decision determine that certain conduct which is particularly detrimental 
to the environment is to be criminal, they leave to the Member States the choice of the 
criminal penalties to apply, although, in accordance with Article 5(1) of the decision, 
the penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
50. The Council does not dispute that the acts listed in Article 2 of the framework 
decision include infringements of a considerable number of Community measures, 
which were listed in the annex to the proposed directive. Moreover, it is apparent 
from the first three recitals to the framework decision that the Council took the view 
that criminal penalties were essential for combating serious offences against the 
environment.
51. It follows from the foregoing that, on account of both their aim and their content, 
Articles 1 to 7 of the framework decision have as their main purpose the protection 
of the environment and they could have been properly adopted on the basis of Article 
175 EC.
52. That finding is not called into question by the fact that Articles 135 EC and 
280(4) EC reserve to the Member States, in the spheres of customs cooperation and 
the protection of the Community’s financial interests respectively, the application 
of national criminal law and the administration of justice. It is not possible to infer 
from those provisions that, for the purposes of the implementation of environmental 
policy, any harmonisation of criminal law, even as limited as that resulting from the 
framework decision, must be ruled out even where it is necessary in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of Community law”.
3. The Commission’s view on the harmonisation of criminal enforcement of 
EU policies after case C-176/03: a first blueprint for a criminal law policy?
In November 2005, the Commission submitted a communication  23 to the EP and 
the Council concerning the implications of the ECJ judgement in case C-176/03. The 
Commission started off by analysing the contents and scope of the ECJ decision. 
Article 47 TEU provides that EC law has priority over Title VI EU, i.e. the first pillar 
prevails over the third. The ECJ further held that Article 75 EU constitutes a proper 
legal basis for the matters regulated in Articles 1-7 of the Framework Decision. 
The Commission subtly pointed out that Articles 1-7 are criminal law provisions 
dealing with the definition of offences, the principle of the obligation to impose 
criminal penalties, the level of penalties, accompanying penalties and the rules 
on participation and instigation. The ECJ went further than the Advocate General 
in his Opinion by not only accepting that the EC may oblige the Member States to 
enforce measures by means of criminal law but may also lay down in detail what 
the arrangements should be. The Commission then turned to the scope of the ECJ 
judgement. The Commission highlighted the fact that the judgement does not mean 
that the ECJ has thereby recognised criminal enforcement as an area of Community 
policy. Criminal enforcement is merely the tailpiece of a substantive policy area. 
23 COM (2005) 583 final, 23 November 2005. 
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However, the Commission did find that the ECJ judgement might impact all policy 
areas of negative integration (the four freedoms) and positive integration, possibly 
making criminal law methods necessary to ensure effective enforcement. This test 
of necessity must be defined functionally on an area-by-area basis. For some policy 
areas no criminal enforcement is required, but for others it is. The necessity test also 
determines the nature of the criminal measures to be taken. The ECJ did not impose 
any restrictions there. Here too, the approach was functional. The Commission did 
not elaborate further, but we may conclude that the Commission obviously wished to 
leave the door open, where necessary, for harmonisation of aspects of the general part 
of criminal law or of criminal procedural law. The Commission further indicated its 
preference for horizontal measures where possible, i.e. transcending specific policy 
areas. Here we might think of horizontal criminal measures for the agricultural sector 
and the structural funds in connection with fighting EC fraud or terrorism or organised 
crime. The Commission also believed that the judgement puts an end to the double 
text approach, i.e. adopting directives and regulations for substantive policy and 
its administrative enforcement in addition to framework decisions for the criminal 
enforcement of that same policy. From now on, all this can be laid down in one single 
directive or regulation.
In the second part of the communication, the Commission discussed the 
consequences of the judgement more specifically. The Commission first of all 
indicated that criminal law provisions concerning police and judicial co-operation, 
including measures on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions and measures 
based on the principle of availability, fall within the area of competence of the third 
pillar. This is also true for the harmonisation per se of the general part of criminal law 
or criminal procedural law in the framework of co-operation and mutual recognition. 
The criminal harmonisation of policy areas that are not part of the EC Treaty but that 
are nevertheless necessary for the objectives of the EUs’ area of freedom, security and 
justice are placed within the third pillar. An interesting point is that, in this second 
part, the Commission further defined the conditions for criminal harmonisation 
using Community competence under the heading ‘Consistency of the Union’s 
criminal law policy’. The Commission clearly indicated that criminal harmonisation 
under EC competence is only possible if there is a clear need to make the policy in 
question effective. Furthermore, the requirements of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality have to be met. This means that there is a strict obligation to provide 
grounds and reasons. The harmonisation may concern the definition of offences, the 
criminal penalties, but also what is called ‘other criminal-law measures appropriate 
to the area concerned’. It is clear that the Commission, from the start, does not wish 
to pin itself down to merely the harmonisation of definitions of offences and criminal 
penalties. The Commission continued by stating that: “The criminal-law measures 
adopted at sectoral level on a Community basis must respect the overall consistency 
of the Union’s system of criminal law, whether adopted on the basis of the first or 
the third pillar, to ensure that criminal provisions do not become fragmented and ill-
matched”. Both the Commission, on the one hand, and the Council and the EP, on the 
other, must take care to ensure that there is this consistency and also prevent Member 
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States or the persons concerned from being required to comply with conflicting 
obligations. 
4. The judgement in case C-176/03: reception in the Member States  
and in the JHA Council
Despite the unanimous opinions of the various legal services of the EU institutions, 
including that of the Council itself, the ECJ judgement was greeted with amazement 
and disbelief by many governments. It is hardly surprising that the ECJ decision 
was not embraced by the Member States given their numerous interventions in the 
proceedings in favour of the Council. However, the governments mainly focused 
their criticism on the communication of the Commission and reflected this at the JHA 
Council. In Denmark, the Minister of Justice wasted no time informing the Danish 
parliament of the judgement and submitting a reservation  24. The Danish Ministry of 
Justice maintained the view that no legal basis for the judgement could be found in the 
EC Treaty, even though it expressed awareness that the ECJ judgement was not limited 
to environmental law. In France, the initiative came from parliament itself. On 25 
January 2006, the European Affairs Commission of the French Assemblée Nationale 
[National Assembly or lower house of the French parliament] informed the Speaker 
of the Assemblée  25. The Commission was of the opinion that the ECJ had acted 
beyond its competence and demonstrated a certain fédéralisme judiciaire [judicial 
federalism]. The Commission also stated that it is high time to end the gouvernement 
des juges [rule by judges] and restore power to the entities to whom it belongs, 
namely the governments of the Member States. The Commission therefore proposed 
applying the bridging provision of Article 42 EU, thereby building an emergency 
brake procedure into the European Council  26. The European Affairs Commission 
was not very pleased with the European Commission’s communication in response 
to the judgement either. It rejected what it considered ‘its excessive interpretation’. 
According to the Commission, it is impossible to conclude from this judgement that 
there is a Community competence for criminal harmonisation in all common policy 
areas of the EC and the four freedoms of the internal market. Instead, the ECJ limited 
this power to essential, cross-sector and fundamental objectives.
The European Commission had, meanwhile, published a new proposal for a 
directive on the environment through criminal law, replacing the annulled framework 
decision  27 and the proposal for a directive of 2001  28. In this area, there is a legal vacuum 
24 Memorandum of 13 October 2005, available at http://www.euo.dk/upload/application/
pdf/a16a3e79/2005_sv21.pdf. 
25 Assemblée nAtionAle, Rapport d’information sur les conséquences de l’arrêt de la Cour 
de Justice du 13 septembre 2005 sur les competences pénales de la Communauté européenne, 
no. 2829, 25 January 2006, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/europe/rap-info/
i2829.asp.
26 This refers to the emergency brake procedure provided for in the proposal for a European 
Constitutional Treaty in case of criminal law harmonization which poses a threat to essential 
interests of a Member State.
27 Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA.
28 COM (2001) 139 final, 13 March 2001.
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to be filled. Despite the cautious strategy mentioned above, the Commission submitted 
a varied set of proposals with criminal law substance, most of which were related to 
the further implementation and execution of international law instruments, including 
criminal law enforcement obligations. The Commission submitted an amended 
proposal for a directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights  29. This proposal was related to the WTO Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPS Agreement) which was 
approved by means of Council Decision 94/800/EC  30. The criminal law substance 
of the proposal was in accordance with that of the proposal for the environmental 
directive to a large extent. It is interesting to note that, in other proposals, such as the 
one for a new regulation on the Community customs code  31, which is one of the most 
harmonised areas of EC law, the Commission did not include any criminal offences 
or criminal sanctions at all in Article 22 on penalties, even though recital 12 of the 
regulation underlines the need for dissuasive sanctioning. The same can be said of 
the draft regulation concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange 
of data between Member States on short-stay visas  32. Article 29 of the Presidency 
proposal  33 seems to go beyond the Commission proposal  34. However, both stop short 
of imposing criminal sanctions for the misuse of data. The least that can be said is that 
it is not very clear from the proposals when and by which criteria the Commission 
does in fact opt for criminal law obligations. A blueprint for criminal legislative policy 
can certainly not be said to have been acting as a guide at this stage. 
5. The second ruling of the ECJ in case C-440/05 on criminal enforcement  
of ship source pollution: the reintroduction of the double text approach
Framework Decision 2005/667 deals with maritime transport issues (and its 
environmental effects) and contains very specific rules on the harmonisation of 
criminal sanctions. Both the Member States and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
considered this case to be a new landmark case. In the proceedings before the Grand 
Chamber of the Court of Justice, no less than nineteen Member States intervened, all 
in support of the Council of Ministers  35.
29 COM (2006) 186 final, 28 April 2006. 
30 Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf 
of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached 
in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994), OJ, no. L 336, 23 December 
1994, p. 1. 
31 COM (2005) 608, 30 November 2005.
32 COM (2004) 835, 28 December 2004.
33 Article 29 of the Presidency Proposal: “Member States shall take the necessary measures 
to ensure that any misuse of data entered in the VIS is punishable by penalties, including 
administrative and/or criminal penalties in accordance with national law, that are effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive”.
34 Article 29 of the Commission Proposal: “The Member States shall lay down the rules 
on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation relating to data 
protection and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented (...)”.
35 The following countries were granted leave to intervene: Portugal, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Slovakia, Malta, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Czechia, Greece, Estonia, 
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In his opinion in case C-440/05, Advocate General Mazäk stressed that, contrary 
to the view expressed by certain governments, Article 47 TEU establishes the primacy 
of Community action and law under the EC Treaty over activities undertaken on the 
basis of Title V or Title VI of the EU Treaty  36 and that is does not make a difference 
if the Community, at the time of the adoption of the framework decision, had already 
or had not yet adopted legislation with regard to the matters covered  37. Second, he 
pointed out that, if the ECJ were to find that, for one reason or another, there was 
no such competence under the policy on transport, this finding would not, strictly 
speaking, be the end of the story. There can be alternatives for the legal basis in the 
EC Treaty. The AG did, however, reject the argument of the Member States that EC 
criminal competence should be limited to the environment or to substantial matters 
with a horizontal approach in the EC Treaty. His approach was mainly that criminal 
law competence should be a corollary to the general principle of effectiveness of 
Community law (effet utile principle). For this reason, he accepted that Article 80(2) 
EC indeed provides the legal basis for the criminal law enforcement of ship-source 
pollution, instead of Article 31 (1)(e) and Article 34(2)(b) EU, and he proposed that 
the Court should annul Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA. However, he also agreed 
with the opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in the C-176/03 case: “the Community 
legislature is entitled to constrain the Member States to impose criminal penalties and 
to prescribe that they be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, but beyond that, it is 
not empowered to specify the penalties to be imposed”  38. He believed that this could 
otherwise lead to fragmentation and compromise the coherence of national penal 
systems and that Member States are, as a rule, better equipped than the Community 
to translate the concept of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties 
into their respective legal systems and societal context. The ECJ first followed the 
same reasoning as in case C-176/03. It considered it to be its task to ensure that acts 
which, according to the Council, fall within the scope of Title VI do not encroach 
upon the powers conferred on the Community by the EC Treaty. The ECJ emphasised 
that the common transport policy is one of the foundations of the Community and 
that the Council, under Article 80(2) EC, may decide whether, to what extent, and 
by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea transport. Since 
Article 80(2) EC contains no explicit limitations, the Community legislature has 
broad legislative powers under Article 80(2) EC and is competent to take measures 
to improve transport safety. Moreover, environmental protection forms part of the 
common transport policy. 
Concretely, the ECJ took a careful look at the objectives and substance of 
Framework Decision 2005/667. Its main purpose is to enhance maritime safety and 
improve the protection of the maritime environment. The Council took the view that 
criminal penalties were necessary to ensure compliance with the Community rules 
on maritime safety. The ECJ came to a double conclusion. Articles 2, 3, and 5 of 
United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Austria, and Poland.
36 Para. 53 of the opinion.
37 Para. 57 of the opinion.
38 Para. 103 of the opinion.
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the framework decision must be regarded as being essentially aimed at improving 
maritime safety as well as environmental protection and could have been justifiably 
adopted on the basis of Article (80)2. This means that the definition of the offences 
(actus reus and mens rea), liability issues, the prescription of the obligation to 
provide for criminal sanctions for natural persons and the obligation to provide for 
criminal or administrative sanctions for legal persons must be dealt with under EC 
law. However, the ECJ came to the conclusion that the type and level of criminal 
penalties to be applied does not fall within the Community’s sphere of competence. 
The Community legislator may not adopt provisions such as Articles 4 and 6 of the 
Framework Decision. This last point comes as quite a surprise. Many EC instruments 
do in fact contain concrete penalty provisions, including on the type and level and the 
liability of legal persons and including the prescription of administrative or criminal 
sanctions, defined as administrative penalties or prescribed as administrative or 
criminal penalties. Member States remain free to choose between administrative or 
criminal sanctions when defining the type and level of sanctions. Nevertheless, the 
ECJ considered the prescription of the type and level of administrative or criminal 
sanctions as being a third-pillar competence.
This ruling has several consequences. The EC’s functional criminal law 
competence has been confirmed even outside the horizontal field of environmental 
protection. If the EC policy is an important policy of the EC, then functional 
competence can be included in its discretionary powers to take all appropriate 
measures. However, the harmonisation of criminal law continues to be necessary 
and is the only way to achieve this objective (i.e. enforcement of that policy). In 
other words, in EC law too, criminal law is ultima ratio and is necessary for the effet 
utile. The functional criminal law competence has therefore been broadly extended 
but it is still not clear which EC policies are actually included and which are actually 
excluded. With regard to the scope of the competence, the ECJ has clearly stipulated 
that the nature of the criminal sanction can be prescribed under EC law but that the 
type of criminal sanction and the level of the sanction must be prescribed under EU 
law. The ECJ judgement does not explicitly deal with other possible EC criminal law-
related issues, such as, for instance, jurisdiction and the designation of contact points 
for transnational cooperation. As Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the Framework Decision must 
have been justifiably adopted on the basis of Article 80(2), the Framework Decision 
infringes Article 47 EU and, being indivisible, was annulled in its entirety. As a result, 
the Commission had to elaborate a new directive for ship-source pollution and on the 
introduction of penalties for infringements. The directive was adopted in 2009  39. The 
European Commission had meanwhile published a new proposal for a directive on the 
environment through criminal law  40, replacing the annulled Framework Decision  41 
and the proposal for a directive of 2001  42. The new directive on protection of the 
39 Directive 2009/123/EC of 21 October 2009 on ship-source pollution and on the 
introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ, no. L 280, 27 October 2009, p. 52. 
40 COM (2007) 51 final, 9 February 2007. 
41 Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA. 
42 COM (2001) 139 final, 13 March 2001. 
hArmonised union policies And the hArmonisAtion oF substAntive criminAl lAW     57
environment through criminal law, adopted in 2008  43, takes into account the ruling of 
the ECJ in the ship-source pollution case and contains, in Article 5, only an obligation 
to provide for criminal law protection in this area without stipulating the type and 
the level of criminal penalties. In fact the directive only repeats the formula of the 
Greek maize case but applies it to criminal penalties: Member States must provide for 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.
6. Intermediate conclusions 
Although in case C-240/90  44 (1991) the ECJ recognised that the EC was competent 
to prescribe and harmonise the administrative law enforcement of EC policies, 
including punitive sanctions, it cannot be said that the EC has abused this power over 
the last twenty years. In fact, the reverse is the case. It is remarkable that, in many areas 
of Community law, no initiatives whatsoever have been taken in this direction. One 
might think of, for example, environmental law, tax law, financial services regulation 
(banking and securities), customs regulation, etc. It is my opinion that the Commission 
has shown insufficient initiative to give any systematic or consistent shape to the 
harmonisation of administrative enforcement of EC policies. The Commission has 
failed to make use of its power to outline an EC enforcement policy from which it 
can be clearly concluded in which area of policy the harmonisation of administrative 
enforcement by the Member States would be needed. Often, an ad hoc approach was 
applied by the directorate generals of the Commission. 
The ECJ rulings on criminal law competence in the first pillar were landmark 
decisions on the division of labour within the EU’s institutional framework. Their 
importance was not limited to issues of competence as they had consequences for 
interactions with the Member States’ legal order (Community method versus third 
pillar method). Thanks to the ruling, the first directives with criminal law substance 
have been voted on in the EU. However, their impact was limited as the type and 
level of criminal sanctions had to be defined in a second third pillar instrument. It is 
astonishing to see that neither the Member States nor the Commission submitted a 
third pillar proposal or a proposal for a directive under Article 83(2) TFEU, stipulating 
the type and level of criminal sanctions in the environmental field. As it stands there 
is less harmonisation of criminal law enforcement of the environment under the 
actual framework than the one adopted by the annulled Framework Decision as the 
latter contained extensive obligations concerning criminal law sanctions. The result 
is that harmonisation in the criminal law field is only aimed at establishing minimum 
constituent elements in respect of certain criminal offences. 
To sum up, we can say that neither the Commission nor the Member States have 
submitted legislative proposals based on a well-thought enforcement and criminal law 
policy of harmonised EC policies. In its Tampere Conclusions of 1999, the Council 
accepted that “efforts to agree on common definitions, incriminations and sanctions 
should be focused in the first instance on a limited number of sectors of particular 
43 Directive 2008/99 of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law, OJ, no. L 328, 6 December 2008, p. 28. 
44 Case C-240/90, Germany v. Council and Commission. 
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relevance”  45 but the Tampere programme  46 has clearly provided insufficient direction. 
Even in policy areas of far-reaching integration, such as the internal market, customs 
union or monetary union, there was no clear enforcement policy. Both in the Council 
and in the Commission, the approach has been predominantly ad hoc and eclectic. What 
is striking in this context is that the Commission has not submitted any EC proposal for 
the criminal protection of the euro (which is after all ‘hardcore’ EC monetary policy) 
and has gone along with the Council completely in the elaboration of a framework 
decision  47. It is also striking that, in some policy areas, the Commission has failed to 
develop any initiative for the harmonisation of punitive administrative law or criminal 
law or has only done so sparingly. In this context, one might think of financial services 
and securities regulations. It is true that the Market Abuse Directive of 2003  48 obliges 
Member States to enforce the provisions administratively but no mandatory sanctions 
have been prescribed. Article 14(2) authorises the Commission to draw up a list of 
administrative measures and penalties but this list is merely informative. The lack 
of any well thought out criminal law policy is also reflected in the initiatives for the 
harmonisation of criminal law. Why, for instance, does the Commission press for 
the criminal law harmonisation of environmental law and criminal law protection 
of the financial interests of the EC but fail to do the same in the field of competition 
or fisheries or the financing of terrorism? Why do the Member States press for the 
criminal law harmonisation of terrorism, xenophobia and the protection of victims of 
crime but not for the criminal law harmonisation of serious violations of food safety 
rules, intellectual property infringements or the financial management of businesses?
7. Council’s criminal legislative policy on the eve of the entry into force  
of the Lisbon Treaty
Both Member States and the Council felt the need to streamline the content of their 
legislative work in the criminal law field. In 2002 the Council agreed on an approach 
regarding the approximation of penalties  49. The Council elaborated a dual approach. 
In some cases, the Council states, it may be sufficient to stipulate that Member States 
shall provide that the offences concerned are punishable by effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive penalties and leave it to each Member State to determine the level and 
type of the penalties. In other cases, the Council accepted the need to go further and 
agreed to establish a system of four levels of penalties to be used in legislation:
Level 1:  Penalties of a maximum of between one and three years of imprisonment
Level 2:  Penalties of between two and five years of imprisonment
Level 3:  Penalties of between five and ten years of imprisonment
45 Conclusion no. 48. 
46 Most recently updated by COM (2004) 0401 final, 3 June 2004. 
47 Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by 
means of criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the 
introduction of the Euro, OJ, no. L 140, 14 June 2000, p. 1.
48 Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation 
(market abuse), OJ, no. L 96, 12 April 2003, p. 1. 
49 Council conclusions on the approach to apply regarding approximation of penalties, 
Doc. 9141/02, DROIPEN 33, 27 May 2002. 
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Level 4:  Penalties of a maximum of ten years of imprisonment (cases where very 
serious penalties are required)
In practice, the streamlining of criminal law harmonisation through minimum 
requirements for the maximum level of the penalties to be provided by national law in 
respect of specified offences has not been very successful and has not been sufficient 
to draw up a common approach to criminal law enforcement in EU legislation. This 
is certainly the reason why, in 2009, the Council adopted conclusions on model 
provisions  50 guiding the Council’s criminal law deliberations. The Council’s aim was 
to secure the following advantages: a) guidelines and model provisions would facilitate 
negotiations by leaving room to focus on the substance of the specific provisions; b) 
increased coherence would facilitate the transposition of EU provisions in national 
law and c) legal interpretation would be facilitated when new criminal legislation is 
drafted in accordance with agreed guidelines which build on common elements. The 
main aim is, however, that the model provisions should guide future Council work on 
legislative initiatives that may include criminal provisions. 
The Council’s model provisions integrate the 2002 conclusions on penalties. 
Moreover, the model provisions explicitly refer to the Lisbon Treaty: “If the 
approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential 
to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been 
subject to harmonisation measures, as under Article 83(2) of the Lisbon Treaty, it 
should follow the practice of setting the minimum level of maximum penalty”. 
The conclusions on model provisions of 2009 deal with both the need for criminal 
provisions and the structure of criminal provisions. With regard to the necessity 
test, the conclusions insist that criminal law enforcement should be introduced only 
when it is considered essential for the protection of a legal interest, and, as a rule, be 
used only as a last resort. This double test (essential for the protection of the legal 
interest and ultima ratio/ultimum remedium) is made more concrete by insisting on 
proportionality and subsidiarity. Criminal law provisions should address a clearly 
defined and delimited conduct (lex certa), which cannot be addressed effectively by 
less severe measures. These criteria are applied in the model provisions to two areas: 
– in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting 
from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them 
on a common basis, or 
– if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States 
proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an 
area which has been subject to harmonisation measures.
Finally, when defining such a need, a final impact assessment should take into 
account the expected added value of the criminal provision compared to other 
enforcement measures, how serious and/or widespread and frequent the harmful 
conduct is and the impact on existing criminal provisions in EU legislation and on 
different legal systems with the EU. It is clear that these assessment criteria regarding 
the need for criminal provisions contain general principles of criminal law and criminal 
50 Draft Council conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal law 
negotiations, doc. 16542/09, DROIPEN 160, 23 November 2009. 
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policy issues and cover the two substantive areas under Article 83 TFEU, the ‘euro-
crimes’ under Article 83(1) TFEU and the criminal law enforcement of harmonised 
EU policies (annex-competence) under Article 83(2) TFEU. 
The second part of the model provisions deal with the structure of criminal 
provisions as such. The model provision covers actus reus, mens rea, inciting/aiding/
abetting and attempt, penalties, liability of legal persons and penalties against legal 
persons. This means that provisions on jurisdiction or on mutual legal assistance or 
mutual recognition, dealt with in former EU conventions and framework decisions, 
have not been included in the model provisions. 
With regard to the definition of the actus reus, the following criteria have been 
put forward: lex certa, foreseeability, conduct that causes actual harm or seriously 
threatens the right or essential interest to be protected. Abstracted danger to the 
protected right or interest is only possible if appropriate for the protection of interest 
of right. Concerning the mens rea element, as a general rule EU criminal legislation 
should only deal with intentionally committed conduct. However, negligence can be 
included when particularly appropriate for the protection of the interest or right. Strict 
liability is explicitly excluded. As regards inciting, aiding and abetting, the model 
provisions impose criminalisation following criminalisation of the main offence. 
When dealing with attempt, the model rules are relatively cautious. They refer to a 
necessity and proportionality test and to consideration of the different legal systems 
under national law. 
When it comes to penalties, the model rules provide for two regimes (let us call 
them models A and B). In some cases it may be sufficient to provide for effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties and leave it to each Member State to 
determine the level of the penalties (model A). In other cases there may be a need to 
go further in the approximation of the levels of penalties (model B). In these cases, the 
Council conclusions of 2002 on penalties apply. It is striking that the model provisions 
under model B do not deal with the type of criminal sanctions. When criminal law 
harmonisation under Article 83(2) TFEU is at stake, it will certainly not be sufficient 
to limit harmonisation to the deprivation of liberty. 
Finally, the model provisions contain extended provisions on the liability of legal 
persons and penalties against legal persons. They introduce the obligation of ensuring 
that a legal person can be held liable, under civil law or administrative law, for 
criminal offences. Attribution of liability is based on the benefit for the legal person 
and attribution of (vicarious) liability of natural persons to the legal persons. The 
liability of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal liability of natural persons. 
Liability of legal persons is prescribed for entities having legal personality except for 
States or public bodies in the exercise of state authority and for public international 
organisations. When it comes to penalties against legal persons, the model provisions 
prescribe a list of different penalties (such as exclusion of public benefits, judicial 
winding-up, placing under judicial supervision, fines). However, these penalties of 
a criminal or non-criminal nature must meet the standard of effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive penalties. It is astonishing that the model provisions contain very 
detailed provisions on the liability of legal persons but stick to the practice under the 
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Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and avoid the possibility of mandatory criminal 
liability in some areas of substantive criminal law.
Although the Council’s model provisions were adopted one day before the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force (30 November 2009) and were aimed at guiding the future 
work of the Council on legislative initiatives that may include criminal provisions, 
they are much more of a summary of past performance than a prospective criminal 
policy document. They do not fully take into account the substantive changes under 
the Treaty of Lisbon. The Lisbon Treaty provides for a new legal framework for 
criminal legislation with the aim of preventing and punishing crime in the common 
area of freedom, security and justice. Not only has the substance of criminal law 
harmonisation and the applicable rules been changed by the Treaty of Lisbon but so 
has the objective of harmonisation. Article 3 TEU clearly states that 
“The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without 
internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration 
and the prevention and combating of crime”
Prevention and punishment of crime has become, compared to Article 2 of the 
Amsterdam TEU, an objective that is related to the rights and duties of citizens and 
not only related to the free movement of persons. Given the wording of Article 82 
TFEU, harmonisation of criminal law and criminal procedure is also a necessary tool 
for strengthening judicial cooperation in criminal matters based on mutual recognition 
and mutual trust. From this perspective the model provisions of the Council do not 
guide us as to the content of criminal policy choices. What legal interests deserve 
criminal protection and to what extent? This is certainly the case for Article 83(2) 
TFEU, for which no or very little acquis had been build up in the past either under the 
former third pillar or under the first pillar. The criminal law protection directives in 
the environmental field are the exceptions to the rule. In the light of Article 2 TFEU, 
which states that, in case of shared competence, the Member States shall exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence, it becomes 
more and more necessary to understand for which areas and to what extent the EU 
is willing to exercise its competence. As a mitigating factor we could say that the 
Council as such has no right of legislative initiative and is thus not very well placed 
to elaborate legislative policy. On the other hand, the Council’s model provisions are 
a policy document that have been thoroughly discussed and adopted by the Member 
States in the Council and the Member States have a legislative initiative. 
8. A criminal legislative policy under the Lisbon Treaty?
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission (and 
its Directorate General (DG) Justice in particular) has taken a proactive stand on the 
topic. On its website  51, DG Justice spells out three specific competences for criminal 
law in the TFEU. First, the EU can adopt directives providing for minimum rules 
regarding the definition (constituent elements and criminal sanctions) of euro offences 
under Article 83(1) TFEU. Article 83(1) TFEU contains a list of ten serious areas of 
51 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-law-policy/index_en.htm 
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crime with a crossborder dimension. They include terrorism, trafficking in human 
beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit 
arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, 
computer crime and organised crime. Second, the EU can also adopt directives, under 
Article 83(2) TFEU, providing for minimum rules on the definition of offences and 
criminal sanctions if they are essential for ensuring the effectiveness of a harmonised 
EU policy. Third, DG Justice refers to the duty to protect the financial interests of the 
EU, under Article 310(6), 325, 85 and 86 TFEU, which might include, if necessary, 
by means of criminal law. This would mean that Article 325 TFEU could be used as 
a proper legal basis for criminal law protection of the financial interests of the EU. It 
remains unclear if DG Justice is of the opinion that this competence could also include 
regulations providing for criminal law provisions instead of directives. 
Moreover, the Commission published, in September 2011, a communication 
entitled ‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy : ensuring the effective implementation of 
EU policies through criminal law’  52, dealing specifically with the EU’s competence 
under Article 83(2) TFEU. The Commission is aware of the fact that, due to the lack 
of an explicit legal basis in this respect prior to the Lisbon Treaty, only very few 
measures have been taken for the purpose of strengthening the enforcement of EU 
policies. Firstly the Commission elaborates on the scope for EU criminal legislation. 
The Commission underlines that Article 83(2) aims at strengthening mutual trust, 
ensuring effective enforcement and coherence and consistency in European criminal 
law itself. Article 83(2) does not list specific offences or areas of crime. For that reason 
the Commission has drawn up this communication as guidance for the policy choices 
about whether to use criminal law as an enforcement tool or not, as well as in relation 
to other enforcement tools such as the administrative one. The Commission also adds 
Article 235(4) of the TFEU, referring to the protection of the financial interests of the 
EU:
“4. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the necessary 
measures in the fields of the prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial 
interests of the Union with a view to affording effective and equivalent protection in 
the Member States and in all the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies”.
The Commission does not make any explicit reference to directives or regulations 
with a criminal law substance. However, by mentioning Article 235(4) it is considering 
the possibility to do so. 
Second, the Commission deals with the question of which principles should guide 
EU criminal law legislation. The communication refers to general principles such as 
subsidiarity and respect for fundamental rights, referring explicitly to the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR, but not referring to Article 6(3) TEU, and 
thus not referring explicitly to fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and 
“as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States”. It 
seems to me impossible to elaborate a criminal policy that would not take into account 
constitutional traditions common to Member States, and I stress the word ‘common’ 
52 COM (2011) 573 final, 20 September 2011. 
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as they are a direct source for the general principles of EU law under Article 6(3) 
TEU. After the reference to the general principles, the Commission follows the two-
step approach of the Council’s model provisions. Step 1 is the decision about whether 
to adopt criminal law measures at all (last resort – ultima ratio/ultimum remedium). 
The proposed necessity and proportionality test is written in a negative way (restrain 
unless necessary and proportional) without taking into account that there might be 
positive duties under fundamental rights to investigate, prosecute and punish, also 
under Article 83(2) TFEU. Step 2 deals with the principles guiding the decision 
on what kind of criminal law measures to adopt. The text refers to the concept of 
‘minimum rules’ and excludes full harmonisation but underlines the need for legal 
certainty at the same time. The requirements for legal certainty are, however, not the 
same as for national criminal law legislation as the directive has to be implemented in 
national law and cannot create or aggravate criminal liability as such. It is surprising 
that the Commission does not further elaborate on the concept of minimum rules as 
this formulation was already used in the Amsterdam Treaty. These minimum rules 
are related to the Treaty objectives, including equivalent protection and common 
provisions when dealing with crossborder crime or enforcement of EU policies. This 
means that the concept of minimum rules is functional to the objectives of the Treaty 
and not an autonomous criterion. Regarding sanctions, the Commission refers both to 
the type of sanctions and to the level of sanctions (taking into account aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances) that should be implemented in national law. The choice of 
sanctions must be evidence-driven and submitted to the necessity and proportionality 
test. It is interesting that the Commission insists on tailoring the sanctions to the 
crime, which has consequences for the choice of type of sanctions and consequences 
for the choice of criminal liability for legal persons. It thus becomes clear that the 
Commission does not exclude the criminal liability of legal persons and criminal 
sanctions for legal persons from its competence under Article 83(2) TFEU. Finally, 
the minimum rules may also include provisions on jurisdiction as well as other aspects 
that are considered partly essential for the effective application of the legal provision. 
Third, the Commission deals with the choice of policy areas where EU criminal 
law might be needed. The criteria are lack of effective enforcement or significant 
differences among Member States leading to inconsistent application of EU rules. Still, 
in that case the Commission will have to assess the specific enforcement problems and 
the choice of administrative and/or criminal enforcement on a case-by-case basis. 
However, the Commission has already indicated, in its communication, priority fields 
for criminal law harmonisation under Article 83(2) TFEU. Three areas are mentioned:
– The financial sector, e.g. concerning market manipulation and insider trading  53
– The fight against fraud affecting the financial interest of the EU
– The protection of the euro against counterfeiting 
The Commission also refers to a set of areas (not an exclusive list) in which 
criminal law enforcement might play a role:
– Illegal economy and financial crime
53 See Communication on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector, COM 
(2010) 716 final, 8 December 2010. 
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– Road transport  54
– Data protection  55
– Customs rules
– Environmental protection
– Fisheries policy 
– Internal market policies (counterfeiting, corruption, public procurement).
The assessment has to take into account a whole set of factors, including the gravity 
and nature of the breach and the efficiency of the enforcement system. The choice of 
administrative enforcement and or criminal enforcement is part of this assessment. 
The list of topics is not exclusive but it is rather surprising that counterfeiting and 
piracy of products, feed and food safety and corruption are not in the priority list of 
areas that have already been selected. Criminal law acquis for corruption  56 already 
exists. The Commission had already submitted, in 2005, a proposal for a directive on 
criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
and a proposal for a framework decision to strengthen the criminal law framework to 
combat intellectual property offences  57. The Commission had already tried, in 2003  58, 
in vain, to have a regulation containing criminal law enforcement obligations adopted 
in the area of feed and food safety. 
At the time of writing, the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs is working on a ‘Report on an EU approach to Criminal 
Law’  59. The Rapporteur Cornelis de Jong published a draft report in February 2012  60 
after a hearing on the topic in December 2011. The final output is expected to be a 
resolution of the EP on the topic. The draft report contains an explanatory statement 
and a draft EP resolution. As far as the content is concerned, the draft resolution 
combines the tests of necessity, subsidiarity and proportionality with the general 
principles of criminal law (lex certa, nulla poena sine culpa, lex mitior, etc.) and 
fully corresponds to the 2011 Commission communication. The draft resolution 
does not contain any reference to the choice of policy areas that should be worthy of 
criminal law protection. More interesting is the procedural approach. The resolution 
calls for an interinstitutional agreement on the principles and working methods 
governing proposals for future substantive criminal law provisions and invites the 
Commission and the Council to establish an interinstitutional working group in 
which these institutions and Parliament can draw up such an agreement and discuss 
54 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2011) 391, 28 March 2011, accompanying 
the White Paper, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and 
resource efficient transport system, COM (2011) 144, 28 March 2011. 
55 See the Communication, A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the 
European Union, COM (2010) 609, 4 November 2010. 
56 Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the 
private sector, OJ, no. L 192, 31 July 2003, p. 54. 
57 COM (2005) 276 final, 12 July 2005. 
58 COM (2003) 52 final, 17 November 2003.
59 Note of the editors: the report has been meanwhile adopted. See Annex to this book.
60 europeAn pArliAment, Report on a EU approach to criminal law, (2010/2310 (INI)), 
24 April 2012. 
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general matters with a view to ensuring coherence in EU criminal law. As things 
stand, there is a Council Working Party on substantive criminal law (DROIPEN) and a 
new interservice coordination group on criminal law at the Commission. Furthermore 
the Commission decided, in February 2012, to set up a formal expert group on EU 
criminal policy  61. At the EP there is no formal structure at all. 
9. Criminal harmonisation under the Lisbon Treaty in practice
Directive 2011/36 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings 
and protecting its victims  62 is the first directive to have been adopted under Article 
83(1). It contains the usual content as foreseen under the Council’s model provisions 
and includes specific harmonisation of the type and level of sanctions (model B of 
the Council’s model provisions), but goes also beyond it, as it deals with aspects 
of jurisdiction, seizure and confiscation and some aspects related to investigation 
and prosecution and of course many aspects of victim protection and victim rights. 
Directive 2011/92  63 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography follows the same pattern. Meanwhile the Council reached 
a general agreement  64 on a proposal for a directive on attacks against information 
systems, replacing Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA. In this directive too, the 
choice was made to harmonise the type and level of criminal sanctions (model B). 
However, these directives do not always follow the four types/levels of harmonisation 
of custodial sanctions as elaborated in the 1992 agreement on criminal sanctions, 
as incorporated in the Council’s model provisions. The influence of the EP as 
co-legislator has resulted, through amendments for more severe repression, in other 
levels of sanctions. 
The first initiative under Article 83(2) is in one of the three already selected 
areas in the communication of September 2011, namely in the financial sector and on 
criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation. The Commission has 
used the policy criteria of its communication of September 2011 for its assessment and 
has even produced, in 2010, a communication on ‘Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in 
the financial service sector’  65 based on comparative research by the three Committees 
of Supervisors (the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) 
and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)) on the equivalence of 
61 Commission Decision 2012/C 53/05 of 21 February 2012 on setting up the expert group 
on EU criminal policy, OJ, no. C 53, 23 February 2012, p. 9. 
62 Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human 
beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, 
OJ, no. L 101, 15 April 2011, p. 1. 
63 Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA, OJ, no. L 335, 17 December 2011, p. 1 
64 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Attacks 
against Information Systems, replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, doc. 
11566/11, DROIPEN 62, 15 June 2011. 
65 COM (2010) 716 final. 
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the sanctioning regimes in the financial sector in Member States. The review by the 
Commission in cooperation with the Committees of Supervisors spells out substantial 
divergences and weaknesses in national sanctioning regimes:
– Some competent authorities do not have important types of sanctioning powers 
for certain violations at their disposal
– Levels of administrative pecuniary sanctions vary widely across Member States 
and are too low in some Member States
– Some competent authorities cannot address administrative sanctions to both 
natural and legal persons
– Competent authorities do not take into account the same criteria in the application 
of sanctions
– Divergence exists in the nature (administrative or criminal) of sanctions provided 
for in national legislation
– The level of application of sanctions varies across Member States.
As a consequence, the Commission considers that a minimum common standard 
should be set and that this minimum common standard might include criminal 
sanctions for the most serious violations. The proposed directive on criminal sanctions 
for insider dealing and market manipulation  66, submitted in October 2011, is part of 
a legislative double text package, which also includes a proposal for a regulation 
on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse)  67. In fact the proposed 
regulation, based on Article 114 TFEU and designed to replace Directive 2003/6/
EC  68, is the basic regulatory framework. The proposal for a regulation contains 
all the definitions, obligations and prohibitions and also regulates the applicable 
administrative enforcement regime, including administrative sanctions of a non-
punitive and punitive nature. This means that the proposed regulation contains very 
detailed provisions on the definition of the illicit behaviour and on the applicable 
administrative sanctions, including the type and level of sanctions (such as, for 
instance. withdrawal of the authorisation to carry out an activity or pecuniary 
sanctions for legal persons up to 10% of the legal person’s total annual turnover in the 
preceding business year)  69. The proposed directive is the result of the Commission’s 
assessment on the need, proportionality and subsidiarity of criminal law enforcement 
in the financial sector. The Commission came to a positive result as far as serious 
market abuse offences are concerned. The proposed directive is surprising from 
different angles. Although the proposed regulation and the proposed directive are 
a regulatory package and contain quite a number of cross-references, the proposed 
directive only refers to the definitions of financial instruments and inside information 
in the proposed regulation but, strangely enough, reformulates the definition of insider 
dealing and market manipulation. These definitions in the proposed directive and 
regulation are not shaped in the same way. The ones in the proposed directive are 
written in a more precise style and do not contain further explanations and details. 
66 COM (2011) 654 final, 20 October 2011. 
67 COM (2011) 651 final, 20 October 2011. 
68 Directive 2003/6/EC. 
69 Article 26 of the proposal. 
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Second, given the assessment that there is a need for criminal law harmonisation 
to ensure the effective enforcement of Union policy against market abuse, it is also 
surprising that the proposed directive is opting for what we have called model A of the 
Council’s model provisions. This means that, in this area, it is sufficient to provide for 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties and leave it to each Member 
State to determine the type and level of the penalties. This type of criminal law 
harmonisation was already possible under the 1st pillar of the Amsterdam Treaty even 
after the ruling of the European Court of Justice in the ship source pollution case. And 
this brings me to the third point. The choice of Article 83(2) TFEU as a legal basis 
is not discussed. There is no consideration as to which Article 83(2) TFEU is more 
appropriate than a legal basis linked to the relevant policy area (financial services). 
The consequence of the choice of Article 83(2) TFEU is at least that Denmark is not 
taking part in the adoption of this directive  70 and that the UK and Ireland have an 
opt-in but no obligation to become part of and be bound by the directive  71. In other 
words under Article 83(2) TFEU, it is possible that criminal enforcement obligations, 
considered in line with proportionality and subsidiarity and considered necessary for 
the effective enforcement of a harmonised EU policy, will not be binding in three EU 
countries, including the EU country with the biggest centre for financial services. In 
this sense, the proposal is rather a step backward than forward. 
The second priority area under Article 83(2) TFEU concerns the protection of 
the financial interest of the EU. The acquis in this field dates back to the Maastricht 
Treaty, the 1995 regulation on administrative enforcement  72 and the 1995 Convention 
and two protocols  73 on criminal enforcement. The Commission already submitted, in 
2001, a proposal for a directive on the criminal law protection of the Community’s 
financial interest  74 but the proposal was never thoroughly discussed in the Council. 
This file concerns not only the ‘Lisbonisation’ of the Maastricht acquis but also some 
substantial new points, such as the broadening of the material scope of the substantive 
offences, redefinition of the jurisdiction criteria and the possible criminal liability 
of legal persons. Concerning the criminal law protection of the financial interest of 
the EU, the Commission published in July 2012 its proposal  75. The Commission 
opted for Article 325(4) TFEU as a legal basis, but did not opt for a regulation, but a 
directive. Article 325(4) TFEU contains a legal basis for necessary measures with a 
70 In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol no. 22. 
71 In accordance with Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Protocol no. 21. 
72 Regulation 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the EC’s financial 
interest, OJ, no. L 312, 23 December 1995, p. 1. 
73 Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention on the protection of the 
European Communities’ financial interests, OJ, no. C 316, 27 November 1995, p. 47; Council 
Act of 27 September 1996 drawing up a Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the 
European Communities’ financial interests, OJ, no. C 313, 23 October 1996, p. 1; Council Act 
of 19 June 1997 drawing up the Second Protocol of the Convention on the protection of the 
European Communities’ financial interests, OJ, no. C 221, 19 July 1997, p. 11. 
74 COM (2001) 272 final, 23 May 2001.
75 Proposal for a Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by 
means of criminal law, COM (2012) 363 final, 11 July 2012.
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view to affording effective and equivalent protection in the Member States and in the 
EU. The advantage of this option is that it would be binding for all Member States, 
including Denmark, Ireland and the UK, and that they cannot use the emergency 
brake procedure of Article 83 TFEU. Concerning the content of the proposal, there are 
several points to be mentioned. The Commission was rather modest in redefining the 
concept and reach of PIF-offences. It also refrained from introducing criminal liability 
of legal persons. However the Commission included in Article 8 the imprisonment 
thresholds minimum penalties. During the ongoing negotiations Member States are 
battling against the legal basis and the minimum penalties. 
As far as the third priority area is concerned, the criminal protection of the 
counterfeiting of the single currency, the file concerns the ‘Lisbonisation’ of the 
Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on increasing protection by criminal penalties 
and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the 
euro  76. For the time being, there is no legislative initiative in the pipeline.
Concerning the other areas for which the Commission still has to decide if and to 
what extent harmonisation of criminal enforcement is necessary (e.g. customs policy, 
illegal economy and financial crime, data protection, etc.) there are no legislative 
proposals in the pipeline either. The Commission has published a communication on 
‘A Single Market for intellectual property rights. Boosting creativity and innovation 
to provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first class products and services in 
Europe’  77, dealing also with stepping up the fight against counterfeiting and piracy. 
However, so far there has been no legislative proposal although the Commission 
submitted, in 2005, a proposal for a directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights and a proposal for a framework decision 
to strengthen the criminal law framework to combat intellectual property offences  78. 
With regard to corruption, the Commission has published a communication on fighting 
corruption in the EU  79. In some of the abovementioned policy areas the Commission 
has tendered a study, such as the one on sanctions in the field of commercial road 
transport. 
10. Conclusion
The impact of the European integration process on criminal law has been 
substantial. 
The enforcement deficit of EU policies, both in law and in practice, has resulted 
in EU enforcement obligations, including punitive administrative and criminal law 
obligations, whose aim has been to achieve effective application of EU policies in the 
Member States. Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the creation 
of an area of freedom, security and justice, substantive areas of serious crime (the 
so-called “euro crimes” such as organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human 
76 Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection 
by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the 
introduction of the euro, OJ, no. L 140, 14 June 2000, p. 1. 
77 COM (2011) 287 final, 24 May 2011. 
78 COM (2005) 276 final. 
79 COM (2011) 308 final, 6 June 2011. 
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beings, cybercrime, etc.) have been harmonised with the aim of strengthening judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters based on mutual recognition and mutual trust. The 
overall aim of both approaches is to prevent and punish crime in the area of freedom, 
security and justice. 
Given the shared competence  80 in the field of criminal law, based on shared 
sovereignty and common goals, between the Member States and the EU, it is logical 
that both the EU and the Member States should elaborate criminal policies in the 
area of European criminal law too. But the shared competence also means that both 
European and national criminal policies must and should have two dimensions, a 
European and a national one. In fact, European criminal policy has to take account 
of common traditions in the Member States and the national criminal policies have 
to take into account the European dimension in the enforcement of their national 
criminal law. The prevention and punishment of market abuse, the commercialisation 
of dangerous foodstuffs or of trafficking in human beings, just to give a couple of 
examples, can only be achieved through the integration of EU and national criminal 
policies. 
This includes the fact that EU criminal policy and national criminal policies 
should set goals based on the objectives of the EU treaty. What is required to offer EU 
citizens an area of freedom, security and justice in which free movement of persons 
is ensured whilst preventing and fighting crime? It is quite clear that we cannot only 
address serious crossborder crime but that we have to deal with the criminal law 
enforcement of EU policies, if necessary, as well. What types of legal interests require 
and deserve criminal law protection? I think that we still can make a distinction 
between the
– Proper legal interest of the EU (counterfeiting of the single currency, protection 
of the financial interests of the EU, corruption of EU officials)
– Common legal interests in the area of freedom, security and justice (euro crimes 
– Article 83(1) TFEU)
– Legal interest linked to harmonised EU policies (annex-competence – Article 
83(2) TFEU)
Both EU and national criminal policy documents should deal with these three 
dimensions.
Criminal policy must be principle-based, combining the tests of necessity (ultima 
ratio), subsidiarity and proportionality and general principles of criminal law. But 
that is only a part of the story. Criminal policy is of course also about policy. This 
means that political choices must be made about the interests that deserve and require 
criminal law protection. This criminal law protection has to be defined in relation to 
other enforcement regimes, especially punitive administrative enforcement. Criminal 
policy also includes the elaboration of instruments of integrated enforcement of 
Community policies, including prevention, administrative enforcement and criminal 
enforcement. In the light of Article 2 TFEU, which states that, in the case of shared 
competence, the Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that 
the Union has not exercised its competence, it becomes more and more necessary to 
80 Article 2 TFEU. 
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establish for which areas and to what extent the EU is willing to exercise its competence. 
The minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions, as 
defined in Article 83, cannot be read as minimum harmonisation. Once the EU has 
exercised its competence, Member States lose their competence to decriminalise 
the relevant conduct or even to substantially change the constituent elements of the 
offences or of the penalties Moreover, as can be seen from the new directives based on 
Article 83(1) TFEU, the minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences 
and sanctions also include the related aspects of jurisdiction, judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, victim protection etc. From the perspective of common equivalent 
standards in the area of freedom, security and justice it becomes less and less evident 
that Member States can claim that this harmonisation should leave a number of 
principles or guarantees intact that were considered by (some of) the Member States to 
be essential for their own criminal (procedural) law. Member States have traditionally 
had red lines in terms of functional harmonisation in the following areas: prosecutorial 
discretion, the criminal liability of legal persons, minimum penalties and sentencing 
discretion. Procedurally, the emergency break under Article 83 TFEU can be used for 
this purpose but this instrument is rather a political ultima ratio, although it could have 
a preventive effect during the negotiations. In my opinion, national red lines can only 
make sense if they do not obstruct common European goals in the area of freedom, 
security and justice. Finally criminal policy should not be limited to criminal law 
legislation, but should also address implementation and application in the Member 
States (in the books and in practice). This means that the administration of justice in 
the broad sense (from police authorities through to criminal courts) in the Member 
States also has to be addressed from the perspective of its effective application with 
the aim of achieving common European goals. 
The prevention and punishment of crime has become an objective that is related to 
the rights and duties of citizens in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 3 
TEU). Given the wording of Article 82 TFEU, harmonisation of criminal law and 
criminal procedure is also a necessary tool for strengthening judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters based on mutual recognition and mutual trust. From this perspective, 
neither the model provisions of the Council nor the draft resolution of the EP guides 
us as to the content of criminal policy choices. Which legal interests deserve criminal 
protection and to what extent? This is certainly the case for Article 83(2), for which no 
or very little acquis has been built up in the past, either under the former third pillar or 
under the first pillar. The Commission communication of 2011 goes a step further and 
deals with the policy choices. This is clearly of added value, but it remains unclear on 
which basis and by what criteria policy areas have been selected or could be selected 
for criminal law protection. Once it has been decided that a policy area requires 
criminal law protection it also continues to be unclear what the substance of it should 
be. Is it limited to substantive criminal law or should it also include related aspects of 
criminal procedure? Is it limited to imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal sanctions (model A) or does it include harmonisation of the type and level 
of sanctions (model B)? The green paper on the approximation, mutual recognition 
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and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the EU  81 offers an interesting inventory and 
comparison of Member States’ legislation in the annexes but does not, unfortunately, 
include specific sanctions in terms of financial penalties, disqualifications, 
confiscations, withdrawal of licences and temporary closure of activities. This means 
that the specific sanctions for the enforcement of EU policies, which are so important 
in the area under Article 83(2), have been left out of the inventory and comparison. 
Although the European Union is undoubtedly in search of a criminal law policy 
for the enforcement of EU policies, it is carrying out this search without any inter-
institutional coherence. Moreover, the EU has difficulty finding criteria to make 
consistent choices as to whether criminal law protection is necessary and if so, 
what the substance of it should be. The Stockholm programme gives us little or no 
guidance in relation to Article 83(2). The substantial list of topics in the Commission 
communication of 2011 is quite different from the list of EU policies that was selected 
in the Klaus Tiedemann study on economic criminal law in the EU  82. In that study, 
the selection was: EU labour policy, EU foodstuffs policy, EU competition policy, EU 
environmental policy, EU policy on corporate bodies and insolvency, EU financial 
services policy, EU intellectual rights policy (especially patents) and EU policy on 
commercial embargos. 
For the time being, the Member States, which have the right of initiative under 
Article 83(2), are not helping much either. They are not coming up with proposals and 
have not elaborated criminal policy visions on Article 83(2) at all. This also means 
that they are giving no guidance to their national parliaments on the matter either. 
An exception to the rule is a recent notice  83 from the Dutch Minister of Justice and 
Security to the Chamber of Deputies in which he explains the position and policy of 
his department in relation to European criminal law under the Lisbon Treaty. In his 
notice he repeats all the necessary, subsidiarity and proportionality tests that have been 
mentioned and adds a test on financial consequences and enforceability. However, 
when it comes to substantive choices in relation to Article 83(2) he is very brief: I will 
assess the proposals taking into account the fact that administrative enforcement might 
be an excellent tool for some policies. In other words, he is not coming up with a list 
of harmonised EU policies that need equivalent standards of criminal law protection 
in order to offer citizens an area of liberty, security and justice whilst preventing and 
punishing crime either. 
The EU is in no doubt as to its competence but it still does not know when and 
how to deal with it: certus an, incertus quando. 
81 COM (2004) 334 final, 30 April 2004. 
82 K. tiedemAnn (ed.), Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Europäischen Union, Berlin, Carl 
Heymans Verlag, 2002. 
83 http://lecane.com/design/eppodesign/pdf/kst-32317-801.pdf 
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The idea of an EPPO was first presented in 1997 by an international expert group 
entrusted by the European Commission and the European Parliament to improve 
the protection of the financial interests of the EU  1. This expert group elaborated 
the so called Corpus Juris, a policy document which proposed a set of harmonised 
offence descriptions, provisions related to the general part of criminal law as well 
as procedural rules for setting up a new body within the European Community 
institutions – the European Public Prosecutor (EPP). The EPP would be responsible 
for the investigation and prosecution of crimes affecting the EU’s financial interests 
as defined in the Corpus Juris. The Corpus Juris, thus, identified a list of legitimate 
interests that may be protected beyond the traditional concept of the nation state and 
developed a supranational enforcement model for that purpose.
Although the Corpus Juris received substantial support from the European 
Commission and later from the European Parliament, the proposal of the Commission 
– tabled during negotiations on the Nice Treaty – to include a provision on the 
establishment of the EPP in the Treaty failed  2. Instead, Eurojust was given a legal 
basis in the Treaty  3. The Commission nevertheless remained convinced that the 
horizontal cooperation model represented by Eurojust was not sufficient to ensure the 
1 m. delmAs-mArty (ed.), Corpus Juris portant dispositions pénales pour la protection 
des intérêts financiers de l’Union européenne, Paris, Economica, 1997. 
2 See the Communication from the Commission, Additional Commission contribution 
to the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reforms. The criminal protection of the 
Community’s financial interests: a European Prosecutor, COM (2000) 608, 29 September 2000.
3 Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union, Consolidated Version, OJ, no. C 325, 
24 December 2002, p. 1.
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protection of the financial interests of the EU. Therefore, the Commission put forward, 
in 2001, a Green Paper on the criminal law protection of the financial interests of the 
Community and the establishment of an EPP  4. In 2002, the Commission conducted a 
broad public consultation on the Green Paper and published its results in a follow-up 
report  5. Being conscious both of the Member States’ conditional support for the EPP  6 
and the weaknesses of the Green Paper, the European Council of Laeken decided 
“to examine the Commission Green Paper on the European Public Prosecutor, taking 
account of the diversity of legal systems and traditions”  7. 
The discussions on the EPP continued in the framework of Working Group X of the 
European Convention and resulted in the insertion of the EPP into the Constitutional 
Treaty  8. Indeed, Article III-274 of the Constitutional Treaty  9 contained a provision on 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office [EPPO] which was then copied into Article 
86 TFEU and extended by a provision on the possibility of introducing the EPPO 
through enhanced cooperation among at least nine Member States.
Article 86 TFEU belongs to the provisions on an Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice [AFSJ] and constitutes one of the provisions that allow the EU to adopt 
legislation on criminal law. The political struggles leading to the Lisbon Treaty 
replaced Article 31 TEU with the more precise Articles 82-86 TFEU. This created a 
complex system of various legal bases allowing for the harmonisation of substantive 
criminal law (Article 83 TFEU) and procedural criminal law (Article 82 TFEU) 
as well as for developing European bodies of criminal law enforcement (Articles 
84-86 TFEU). Based on Articles 82-86, it is possible to pursue the approximation of 
substantive criminal law in parallel with or separately to procedural and institutional 
developments. 
It is now certain that the European Commission shall present, in 2013, a proposal 
for a Council Regulation on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)  10. 
According to Article 86 TFEU, the proposal must address three types of questions 
in relation to the EPPO: Firstly, it must regulate the institutional design and status 
of this new body, i.e. structure, appointment, accountability, immunity, etc. Second, 
4 Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and 
the establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM (2001) 715 final, 11 December 2001.
5 Follow-up report on the Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests 
of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM (2003) 128 final, 
19 March 2003, p. 1.
6 According to the 2003 follow-up report on the Green Paper, the Member States could 
be divided into three categories: those who support the principle of establishing a EPP, those 
who are simply sceptical about the usefulness or feasibility of the idea and those who reject the 
project out of hand. Follow-up report on the Green Paper, op. cit., p. 6. 
7 Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 300/1/01 REV 1, 14-15 December 2001, para. 43.
8 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ, no. C 310, 16 December 2004, p. 1.
9 Ibid., p. 121.
10 Vice President Reading recently emphasised that the EPPO is an inevitable building 
block ensuring growth and stability in the EU. She also reaffirmed to present a proposal for a 
Council regulation. Speech entitled ‘The future legal and institutional framework of combating 
fraud against the EU’s financial interests’ held on the occasion of the meeting of Prosecutor 
Generals and Directors of Public Prosecution of the EU, Brussels, 26 June 2012.
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it must provide for the procedural framework in the sense of the procedural rules 
applicable to the proceedings of the EPPO, including rules on the admissibility of 
evidence and judicial review. Last but not least, it has to stipulate the material scope 
of competence of the EPPO. The present paper shall deal only with this last aspect, 
namely the competence ratione materiae of the EPPO  11. It shall examine in particular 
whether Article 86 TFEU constitutes a legal basis for the approximation of substantive 
criminal law in the EU. 
2. Which offences is the EPPO in charge of investigating and prosecuting?
Article 86 TFEU offers two possibilities in respect of the material scope of 
competence of the EPPO. According to para. 1 the EPPO shall be established “[i]n 
order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union”. It follows from 
Article 86(2) TFEU that “combating” means “investigating, prosecuting and bringing 
to judgment, (…) the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the Union’s 
financial interests”. According to para. 4, however, the competence of the EPPO can 
be extended – by unanimous decision of the Council – “to include serious crimes 
having a cross-border dimension”.
These possibilities result from the negotiations in Working Group X of the 
European Convention where Member States were divided as to the necessity and 
added value of an EPPO. Whereas some Member States wanted to reinforce the 
prosecution mechanism in relation to offences against the financial interests of the 
Union, others had a preference for a European prosecution service with a scope of 
action going further than the protection of those interests  12. Member States had, 
therefore, rather different visions of what the EPP should be. Those arguing in favour 
of an EPP investigating and prosecuting offences against the financial interests of the 
EU saw the EPP as the logical outcome of the debate that started fifteen years ago with 
Corpus Juris. They argued in favour of a specialised service with a clearly defined 
and narrow remit dedicated to prosecuting offences committed to the detriment of 
the EU budget. Other Member States saw the EPP rather in the broader context of 
building an AFSJ and as an institutional culmination of the work previously done in 
the former Third Pillar. For these Member States the main contribution of the EPPO 
to developing the AFSJ would be to overcome existing international cooperation 
mechanisms deemed too slow and burdensome to effectively combat serious forms 
of cross border criminality such as terrorism, trafficking offences, or organised crime. 
The final adopted text of Article 86 TFEU accommodated both visions and 
established a two-step approach by restricting the primary scope of competence to the 
protection of the financial interests of the EU, but allowing for its potential extension – 
11 For institutional and procedural issues, see K. ligeti and m. simonAto, “The European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office: Towards a Truly European Prosecution Service?”, New Journal of 
European Criminal Law, 4/1-2, 2013, p. 7 f.
12 Accordingly, the Draft prepared by the Convent contained in Article III-175 that the EPP 
shall be established in order “to combat serious crime having a cross-border dimension, as well 
as crimes affecting the interests of the Union”. See CONV 850/03, 18 July 2003. 
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in line with the objectives of an AFSJ – to serious cross-border crime  13. The possibility 
of this extension is subject to a special procedure. The Council must first consult the 
Commission and obtain the consent of the European Parliament. Upon consent of 
the Parliament, the Council may enlarge the material scope of competence of the 
EPPO by unanimous decision. These limitations may seem to point towards stronger 
support for the establishment of a European “Financial” Public Prosecutor  14. This 
impression is, however, tempered by the fact that the Member States have decided 
against placing the legal basis for the EPPO in the chapter concerning the EU budget 
and Article 325 TFEU. Instead, the EPPO shall be a body in the AFSJ and should 
contribute to achieving its objectives. It follows, therefore, from the policy context of 
the Lisbon Treaty that Article 86 TFEU embodies essentially a broader vision of the 
EPPO. This is further underlined by the fact that the two steps provided for in para. 
1 and para. 4 of Article 86 TFEU do not need to be subsequent ones  15. It is possible 
that the Member States decide by unanimity to establish an EPPO and simultaneously 
– also by unanimous decision – extend its scope of competence to cover also serious 
cross-border crime.
The material scope of competence of the future EPPO has not assumed up until 
now a major role in the debate on establishing the EPPO. This is probably the result 
of the cautious approach of the European Commission, in particular of OLAF, that 
took great care to emphasise that the envisaged EPPO should be competent only for 
the protection of the financial interests of the EU  16. This was to avoid projecting the 
image of an omnipotent supranational parquet which could further fuel resistance 
and controversy among Member States. At the same time, the Commission also relied 
on the consequences of the financial crisis and the climate of ‘spending austerity’ that 
draws particular attention to the management of public money in general and the EU 
budget in particular  17.
Nevertheless some commentators  18 as well as some Member States have already 
voiced their concerns as to this limited approach. It has been reiterated that it is not 
sound to limit the competence of the EPPO to the protection of the financial interests 
of the EU, a phenomenon which touches on the lives of EU citizens only indirectly 
13 As it has been pointed out by A. Klip, “Towards a General Part of Criminal Law for the 
European Union”, in A. Klip (ed.), Substantive Criminal Law of the European Union, Antwerp, 
Maklu, 2011, p. 27, it is the same procedure followed as regarding Europol, which initially was 
competent for drug offences only and then its competence has been gradually expanded.
14 l. Kuhl, “The Future of the European Union’s Financial Interests – Financial Criminal 
Law Investigations under the Lead of a European Prosecutor’s Office”, Eucrim, 3-4, 2008, 
p. 187.
15 D. Flore, “La perspective d’un procureur européen”, ERA Forum, 9/2, 2008, p. 233.
16 This approach was recently reaffirmed by Mr. Giovanni Kessler, General Director 
of OLAF, during the 10th Conference of Fraud Prosecutors (“Cooperation of a future Public 
Prosecutor’s Office with national prosecution services”) on 7-9 November 2012 in Berlin, as 
well as on the occasion of the conference “Towards the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
Institutional and Practical Challenges”, held in Trier on 17-18 January 2013.
17 This aspect has been particularly highlighted, inter alia, by Viviane Reding on the 
occasion of the above-mentioned speech (see footnote no. 10).
18 D. Flore speaks of “un champ de compétence paradoxal”, op. cit., p. 237.
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compared to e.g. general cross-border criminality. In particular the French Conseil 
d’Etat demanded that the scope of competence of the EPPO should be enlarged to 
cover not only offences against the financial interests of the EU, but also other forms 
of serious cross-border criminality  19.
Independently from the views of individual Member States, this broader vision 
of the material scope of competence of the EPPO may be hampered by the reality of 
enhanced cooperation. It follows from the wording of Article 86(1) and (4) TFEU that 
setting up the EPPO by enhanced cooperation could automatically render impossible 
the extension of its material scope of competence. The decision to enlarge the scope 
of competence of the EPPO must be taken by the (full) Council. Although the Council 
is free in its negotiations and is not bound by the proposal of the Commission limiting 
the scope of competence of the EPPO to the protection of the financial interests of the 
EU, it is unlikely that the Council could amend it. It is hard to imagine the Council 
disagreeing on the establishment of the EPPO per se, on the one hand, and agreeing 
at the same time to extend the material scope of the EPPO by unanimous decision to 
cover cross-border crime, on the other.
The question remains whether the nine or more Member States participating 
in the enhanced cooperation may by their unanimous decision extend the scope of 
competence of the EPPO. According to Article 329(1) TFEU, those at least nine 
Member States who wish to proceed by enhanced cooperation have to address a 
specific request to the Commission. If the Commission – having established whether 
the criteria for enhanced cooperation are met – submits a proposal to the Council, 
it is the Council that can grant authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation 
after having obtained the consent of the European Parliament. Once authorisation is 
granted, the Member States participating in enhanced cooperation may amend the 
proposal which was the outcome of the prior (unsuccessful) Council negotiations 
and which formed the basis for their decision to engage in enhanced cooperation. 
The Treaty does not set firm limits on the content of enhanced cooperation. Article 
334 TFEU only requires that the activities undertaken in the context of enhanced 
cooperation should be consistent with the “policies of the Union”. Therefore, if 
those Member States who wish to establish the EPPO by enhanced cooperation are 
convinced that its establishment is justified by criminal justice policy interests broader 
than only the fight against EU fraud, they may go ahead with extending its scope of 
competence accordingly. 
Regardless of whether the EPPO has a limited or extended scope of competence, 
two issues need further clarification: (i) which are the crimes “affecting” the financial 
interests of the EU, and (ii) what does it mean, in Article 86 TFEU, that the regulation 
shall “determine” the material scope of competence of the EPPO?
19 conseil d’etAt, Réflexions sur l’institution d’un parquet européen, 24 February 2011, 
p. 58 f.
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3. Which crimes fall within the ambit of crimes “affecting” the financial 
interests of the Union? 
The protection of the financial interests of the EU by criminal law has been 
developed by the EU Commission since the mid-1990s  20. The most important element 
of the legislative framework is the 1995 Convention for the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities (PIF Convention)  21 which was subsequently 
accompanied by two protocols  22. The PIF Convention contains a definition of EU 
fraud affecting both expenditure and revenue  23, while the first Protocol provides 
definitions of active and passive corruption in the public sector  24, and the Second 
Protocol requires Member States to criminalise money laundering  25. This framework 
is complemented by general Union criminal law measures on the fight against certain 
illegal activities, such as money laundering  26 and corruption  27, which – although not 
specific to the protection of the Union’s financial interests – also contribute to their 
protection.
This legal framework had two consequences: first, since all instruments were 
adopted under the former Third Pillar – as either a convention or a framework 
decision – they had to be transposed by national implementing legislation in the 
Member States. Due to the large margin of manoeuvre exercised by the Member States 
when implementing Third Pillar instruments a “patchwork of provisions on crime 
definitions and criminal sanctions [had] developed across the EU under the current 
legal framework”  28. Second, due to the resistance of the Member States to accepting 
the criminal law competence of the EU, the legal framework on the protection of the 
financial interests of the EU developed ad-hoc rather than in a coherent manner. In 
20 The acquis in this field contains also a comprehensive system on administrative 
enforcement. See Regulation 2988/95 on the protection of the EC’s financial interests, OJ, 
no. L 312, 23 December 1995, p. 1 f.
21 Convention of 26 July 1995, OJ, no. C 316, 27 November 1995, p. 49 f.
22 First Protocol of 27 September 1996, OJ, no. C 313, 23 October 1996, p. 2 f., and 
Convention of 26 May 1997, OJ, no. C 195, 25 June 1997, p. 1 f. Second Protocol of 19 June 
1997, OJ, no. C 221, 19 July 1997, p. 12 f.
23 See Article 1 of the Convention on the protection of the European communities’ financial 
interests, OJ, no. C 316, 27 November 1995, p. 49 f.
24 See Articles 2 and 3 of the First Protocol.
25 See Article 2 of the Second Protocol.
26 Several legal instruments have been adopted to ensure an effective anti-money 
laundering and combating terrorist financing framework at the EU level. See the recent Proposal 
for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing, COM (2013) 45, 5 February 2013.
27 See the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European 
Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union, OJ, no. C 195, 25 June 
1997, and the Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in 
the private sector, OJ, no. L 192, 31 July 2003, p. 54 f. For an overview of the EU action against 
corruption, see the Communication of the Commission of 6 June 2011, Fighting the Corruption 
in the EU, COM (2011) 308, 6 June 2011. 
28 Proposal for a directive on the fight against frauds to the Union’s financial interests by 
means of criminal law, COM (2012) 363 final, 11 July 2012, p. 4.
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essence there are definitions only on EU fraud, corruption and money laundering. In 
contrast, the Corpus Juris, which foresaw a comprehensive system for the protection 
of the financial interests of the EU, also included common criminal law provisions for 
market rigging as well as for misappropriation of funds, abuse of office, disclosure 
of secrets pertaining to one’s office, when committed by an official of European 
institutions or a national official managing European funds. Compared to the Corpus 
Juris, the present legal framework is rather limited in scope. The Commission could 
achieve only a limited criminal law protection of the financial interests of the EU.
Due to the patchy implementation of the present legal framework  29 and due to 
its limited scope, the Commission presented in July 2012 a Proposal for a Directive 
on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law 
(hereafter PIF Directive)  30. The proposal not only “Lisbonises” the existing acquis, but 
also includes two additional offences not covered by previous third pillar instruments, 
namely fraud in public procurement or grant procedures and misappropriation  31. 
Without assessing the proposed PIF Directive – under discussion in the European 
Parliament at the time of writing   32 – one may certainly ask to what extent this 
proposal covers all forms of misconduct in the sense of Article 86(1) TFEU. In other 
words, does the notion “crimes affecting” in Article 86(1) TFEU allow the Council to 
include in the scope of competence of the EPPO offences other than those stipulated 
in the proposed PIF Directive? Should the EPPO also be in charge of, for instance, 
other offences which are “generally considered to be in some way ‘functional’ to the 
realisation of behaviours directly affecting financial interests”  33, such as, for instance, 
euro counterfeiting, forgery of public documents, market abuse or “favouritism”?
29 See the two Reports of the Commission on the Implementation of the Convention on the 
Protection of the European Communities’ financial interests and its protocols, of 2004 (COM 
(2004) 709 final, 25 October 2004) and 2008 (COM (2008) 77 final, 14 February 2008).
30 COM (2012) 363 final.
31 The Commission has reflected on including the other offences mentioned in the Corpus 
Juris, namely a specific offence of abuse of office and the breach of professional secrecy. 
However, the Commission decided not to include a special offence on abuse of office as “it has 
been considered a superfluous addition to the offence of misappropriation. Similarly, an offence 
of breach of professional secrecy has not been included in the proposal as the conduct is already 
covered under the disciplinary-law measures of the EU Staff Regulations”. See l. Kuhl, “The 
Initiative for a Directive on the Protection of the EU Financial Interests by Substantive Criminal 
Law”, Eucrim, 2, 2012, p. 65.
32 The main discussion point was less the content of the Proposal as such, but the legal 
basis proposed by the Commission. The Commission intends to use Article 325(4) TFEU that 
allows for all necessary measures with a view to affording effective and equivalent protection to 
the EU budget. Conversely, Member States argue that the proposal should be based on Article 
83(2) TFEU which is the general legal basis for the approximation of substantive criminal 
law. The advantage of using Article 325(4) TFEU is that the directive would be binding for all 
Member States, including Denmark, Ireland and the UK.
33 r. sicurellA, “Setting up a European Criminal Policy for the Protection of EU Financial 
Interests: Guidelines for a Coherent Definition of the Material Scope of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office”, in K. ligeti (ed.), Toward a Prosecutor for the European Union, Vol. 1: A 
Comparative Analysis, Oxford, Hart, 2013, p. 885.
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To answer this question it should be recalled that Article 325(1) TFEU uses the 
same expression as Article 86(1) TFEU. According to Article 325(1), “Member States 
shall counter fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of 
the Union”. Therefore, the phrase “affecting the financial interests” in Article 86(1) 
must be interpreted the same way as for Article 325(1). In this context it is important 
to recall that the Commission based its proposal for the PIF Directive deliberately on 
Article 325 TFEU and the proposal also contains a definition of the Union’s financial 
interests  34. One may, therefore, argue that the EU legislator interpreted the notion of 
“crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union” in the context of the proposed 
PIF Directive and the offences stipulated therein must be identical with those for the 
purposes of Article 86(1). 
4. What does it mean, in Article 86 TFEU, that the regulation shall 
“determine” the material scope of competence of the EPPO?
A further problem derives from the question whether the proposed PIF Directive 
and its implementing legislation in the Member States would satisfy the requirement 
in Article 86(1) TFEU that the regulation establishing the EPPO ‘determine’ the 
offences for which the EPPO should exercise its powers. Would it be sufficient if 
the future regulation makes reference to the new PIF Directive and the national 
implementing provisions, or does Article 86(1) TFEU require that the regulation itself 
define the offences falling into the remit of the EPPO, thus constituting a legal basis 
for the harmonisation of substantive criminal law in the EU? 
The majority of scholars maintain that Article 86 “may very well be read as referring 
to rules defining the material competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
by reference, without providing any actual offence description”  35. In other words, ‘as 
determined’ should be interpreted as ‘as referred to’. On this reading Article 86 TFEU 
deals only with the institutional and the procedural framework. We may, therefore, 
imagine a situation similar to the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, 
which, in its Article 2, contains a list of offences but not their definitions  36. In this 
case, the definitions of offences could be incorporated into the proposed PIF Directive 
and also into (implementing) national criminal law. The advocates of this viewpoint 
further point to the fact that the Member States laid down the legal framework for the 
approximation of substantive criminal law in Article 83 TFEU. The latter only allows 
for the adoption of directives, only for certain areas of crime and does not provide 
for elaborating provisions on the general part of criminal law. Furthermore Article 
34 The Commission decided against using Article 83(2) TFEU as a legal basis. In comparison 
to Article 83(2) TFEU, Article 325(4) TFEU is not subject to the opt out of Denmark, the UK 
and Ireland and the so-called emergency brake procedure cannot be invoked either.
35 p. Asp, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence of the EU, Stockholm, Stockholms 
Universitet, 2012, p. 150. 
36 r. sicurellA, op. cit., p. 894. Also for a “jurisdictional” understanding of the Article 
86(2) TFEU, see J. vogel, “Article 86 TFEU”, in E. grAbitz, m. hilF and m. nettesheim 
(eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Munich, CH Beck, 2011.
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83 TFEU is subject to the emergency brake procedure  37. In view of these limitations 
to approximating substantive criminal law on the basis of Article 83 TFEU, the 
proponents of the above-described position argue that accepting Article 86(2) TFEU 
as a legal basis for the approximation of substantive criminal law would run counter 
to the logic of the Treaty. On this view, it was patently the will of the Member States 
to limit the competence of the EU legislator as to the approximation of substantive 
criminal law.
Conversely, one may argue that Article 86 TFEU “is not only concerned with 
criminal procedure but also with substantive law”  38. In other words, the expression in 
Article 86(1) TFEU ‘as determined by the regulation’ should be read ‘as defined by 
the regulation’  39. Accordingly, Article 86 TFEU requires that the offences for which 
the EPPO has competence be defined by the regulation. 
Indeed, Article 86(2) TFEU does stipulate that the EPPO “shall be responsible 
for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment (…) the perpetrators of, and 
accomplices in, offences against the Union’s financial interests, as determined by the 
regulation provided for in paragraph 1” [emphasis added]. It may be deduced from 
this wording that Article 86 TFEU allows the EU legislator to adopt, by regulation, 
common criminal law provisions for the protection of the EU financial interests 
directly applicable to EU citizens. Accordingly, Article 86 TFEU grants the EU a 
genuine competence to adopt common offence definitions, but also to adopt common 
provisions in relation to the concepts of the general part of criminal law. 
This interpretation, however, requires clarification of the difference between 
Article 325(4) and Article 86(2) TFEU, since both could serve as a legal basis for the 
approximation of substantive criminal law for the protection of the financial interests 
by regulation. Some have argued that this would lead to ambiguity as to whether the 
criminal law provisions for the protection of the financial interests should be adopted 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure provided for in Article 325(1) 
TFEU or the special legislative procedure as in Article 86(1) TFEU. 
In deciding whether Article 86(2) TFEU is a proper legal basis for the 
approximation of substantive criminal law the following aspects, going beyond the 
systematic interpretation of the Treaty, ought to be considered. Plainly – and from 
the viewpoint of the operational functioning of the EPPO – the EPPO must know 
exactly for which kinds of criminal behaviour it may exercise its powers in the AFSJ. 
Furthermore, it must be considered that the EPPO is a single office even if it may be 
37 Article 83(3) TFEU provides for a suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure, and 
for the possibility of the enhanced cooperation among at least nine Member States, “[w]here a 
member of the Council considers that a draft directive (…) would affect fundamental aspects 
of its criminal justice system”.
38 c. sAFFerling, Internationales Strafrecht, Heidelberg, Springer, 2011, p. 409.
39 r. sicurellA, op. cit., 2013, p. 894. The Author specifies that “according to this opinion, 
Article 86 TFEU would represent the legal basis for a limited number of European criminal 
offences directly applicable to individuals (without passing by the implementation procedures 
of directives by the domestic legislator), covering all behaviours falling into the category of 
‘crimes affecting financial interests of the Union’”.
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established in a decentralised fashion  40. If the material scope of competence of the 
EPPO will be defined by referring to the proposed PIF Directive and its implementing 
legislation in the Member States, it will ultimately mean that the EPPO will have as 
many definitions of its competence as the number of Member States participating in 
its establishment. The material scope of competence of the EPPO, therefore, may 
vary from Member State to Member State. This may cause substantial problems in 
investigating and prosecuting transnational cases. 
Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the notion “crimes affecting the financial 
interests of the Union” is an autonomous notion of EU law that has to be interpreted 
independently and uniformly throughout the EU. EU citizens and economic operators 
must be able to rely on a uniform application accordingly. Especially if investigations 
and prosecutions of the EPPO also involve a standard of procedural safeguards and 
judicial review which is different from national criminal procedure, EU citizens and 
economic operators have a fundamental right following from the right to a fair trial to 
know which prosecuting authority (national or European) is in charge of the case. The 
right to a fair trial requires that in all the stages of the criminal procedure, including 
pre-trial proceedings, the applicable law be foreseeable. 
5. Conclusions
Article 86 TFEU exists as a result of decades of political struggle on the side 
of the European Commission and, in particular, of OLAF to ensure adequate and 
equivalent protection for the EU budget in the Member States also by criminal law. 
Practical experience revealed that the national authorities were not the natural born 
guardians of these European interests  41. The idea of the EPPO has been based from the 
outset on the quest for the centralisation of criminal proceedings (both of prosecution 
and defence rights) in the area of the protection of the financial interests of the EU. 
However, Member States have been reluctant to accept the idea of a specialised 
supranational prosecution system for the protection of the EU budget  42. As a result, 
the current legal framework for the protection of the financial interests of the EU is a 
patchwork of harmonised EU rules on administrative irregularities  43, on the one hand, 
and national implementing laws of ex-Third Pillar instruments on fraud, corruption 
and money laundering on the other hand. The respective lack of common offence 
40 See K. ligeti and m. simonAto, op. cit., p. 16.
41 See the Report of the Commission: Protection of the European Union’s financial 
interests – Fight against fraud, Annual Report 2011, COM (2012) 408 final, as well as the 
Follow-up Report on the Green Paper on the criminal-law protection of the financial interests 
of the Community and the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor, COM (2003) 128 
final, p. 9.
42 The reactions expounded during public consultation on the 2001 Green Paper 
demonstrate the strong resistance of some Member States to the idea of an EPPO, which is 
perceived as a threat for national sovereignty and legal principles, as well as for fundamental 
rights and legal certainty. Furthermore, it has been argued that it does not have a real added 
value and that the insufficient volume of EU fraud does not justify the establishment of a new 
body.
43 See in particular Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation no. 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the 
protection of the European Communities financial interests, OJ, no. L 312, 23 December 1995.
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definitions has been identified by EU practitioners as a major obstacle to an effective 
and swift cooperation in investigating and prosecuting these offences  44.
If established, the EPPO must be directly responsible for the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes falling into its material scope of competence. In other words, 
the EPPO will be a “supranational body with operative jurisdiction in a common 
area”  45. Such operative jurisdiction clearly presupposes the uniform definition of its 
scope of action. 
The proposed PIF Directive does not sufficiently define the scope of action of 
the EPPO. Since it ultimately requires national implementing legislation, it cannot 
achieve an equivalent protection throughout the EU. Furthermore, the key aim of the 
proposed PIF Directive is to improve the efficiency of the prosecution of EU fraud 
and fraud-related activities by national authorities of the Member States. It is not the 
aim of the proposed PIF Directive to enable an EPPO to perform its functions  46. It 
has been demonstrated above that it would be a paradox to create European powers 
of investigation and prosecution, but leave it to the national laws of the Members 
States to define when such powers can be used. Therefore, the EPPO proposal based 
on Article 86 TFEU can and should define the offences falling into the substantive 
competence of the EPPO. 
44 Interviews conducted within the recent EPPO impact assessment study confirm that the 
prerequisite for the establishment of any kind of EPPO is the harmonisation of substantive laws.
45 J.A.e. vervAele, “Quel statut pour le ministère public?”, in Quelles perspectives pour 
un ministère public européen? Protéger les intérêts  financiers et fondamentaux de l’Union, 
Paris, Dalloz, 2010, p. 189.
46 Accordingly, Article 86 TFEU is not mentioned as the special basis for the adoption of 
the proposed Directive.
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Maria KAiAFA-gbAndi *
1. The nature of criminal law, the Stockholm Programme and the foundations 
of a European criminal policy in line with the rule of law
Criminal law is the harshest mechanism that States employ to achieve social 
control. Criminal sanctions themselves – proscribed and enforced for lack of milder 
means to address serious violations of basic interests in legally organised societies 
– constitute breaches of, inter alia, the liberty and property of those convicted. This 
is why any criminal justice system necessarily presupposes a set of principles and 
constraints to keep any means of state counter-crime activity in check  1. In that sense, 
the nature of criminal law is closely linked to the protection of fundamental rights and 
the rule of law. 
On the other hand, it is only reasonable that those very features of criminal 
law – apposite to the liberal tradition of democratic societies  2 – also constrain a 
supranational entity such as the European Union (EU). Indeed, fundamental European 
* The text is based on the publication entitled “The importance of core principles 
of substantive criminal law for a European criminal policy respecting fundamental rights 
and the rule of law”, EuCLR, 2011, p. 7 f. It has been enriched with further documentation 
stemming from recent EU legislative acts and with a new chapter discussing the Commission’s 
Communication on a EU Criminal Policy (COM (2011), 573 final, 20 September 2011) as 
well as the resolution of the European Parliament on an approach to European Criminal Law 
(2010/2310 (INI), 22 May 2012). 
1 In a noted passage, von Liszt has described criminal law as an ‘unübersteigbare Schranke 
der Kriminalpolitik’ (“insurmountable blockade for crime policy”). See Strafrechtliche Aufsätze 
und Vorträge, Bd. 2, Berlin, J. Guttentag, Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1905, p. 75, at p. 80.
2 See especially I. mανωλεδακης, Το έννομο αγαθό ως βασικό εργαλείο του ποινικού 
δικαίου, Θεσ/νίκη, Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα, 1998, p. 34.
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values (Article 2 TEU) constitute cornerstones of the EU and should thus be key 
features of EU initiatives designed to bind its Member States to adopt criminal law 
rules  3. Disassociating criminal law from the protection of fundamental rights or even 
loosening such an association – albeit for the purpose of tackling transnational crime 
by means of enhanced judicial cooperation – is liable to emasculate elemental values 
inherent to democratic societies, which subject the exercise of state authority to the 
rule of law. Even within international entities, then, no legitimate approach to criminal 
law can ignore its dual nature as a means of protecting fundamental interests as well 
as acting as a yardstick for civil liberties  4.
This explains why the institutional environment of the Lisbon Treaty  5,  6 offering 
a better basis for fundamental rights but also introducing new risks  7, calls for a 
3 See Article 83 TFEU on minimum rules concerning criminal offences and sanctions. Also 
note the newly-introduced competence of the EU to adopt criminal rules in its own right (i.e. 
without the co-operation of its Member States); on the question of competence for substantive 
criminal law matters after the Lisbon Treaty see s. gless, Internationales Strafrecht, Basel, 
Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2011; b. hecKer, in U. sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011, p. 252; A. Klip, “Towards a general part of criminal law for the 
European Union”, in A. Klip (ed.), Substantive Criminal Law of the European Union, Antwerpen, 
Maklu, 2011, p. 24; H. sAtzger, Internationales und Europäisches Strafrecht, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 5th ed., 2010, at p. 100-102, at p. 116f.; J. vogel, “Die Strafgesetzgebungskompetenzen 
der Europäischen Union nach Articles 83, 86 und 325 AEUV”, in K. Ambos (ed.), Europäisches 
Strafrecht post-Lissabon, Göttingen, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2011, p. 41. 
4 See I. mανωλεδακης, Γενική θεωρία του ποινικού δικαίου, Αθήνα-Θεσ/νίκη, Εκδόσεις 
Σάκκουλα, 2004, p. 29.
5 See OJ, no. C 115, 9 May 2008, p. 1f., “Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. Cf. curiA, Press 
release no. 104/09, The Treaty of Lisbon and The Court of Justice of the European Union, 
General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, The Lisbon Treaty’s impact on the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council: More Co-decision and new working structure.
6 On the Treaty of Lisbon’s impact on criminal law matters see, e.g. K. Ambos (ed.), 
Europäisches Strafrecht post-Lissabon; A. hinAJeros, “The Lisbon Treaty versus standing still: 
A view from the third pillar”, European Constitutional Law Review, 2009, p. 99f.; A. nieto 
mArtin, “An approach to current problems in European Criminal Law”, in L. Arroyo zApAtero 
and A. nieto mArtin (eds.), European Criminal Law: An overview, p. 43; cf. m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, 
“Die Entwicklung in Strafsachen”, in D. tsAtsos (ed.), Die Unionsgrundordnung-Handbuch 
zur europäischen Verfassung, Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-verlag, 2010, p. 511, scrutinising 
the draft EU Constitution which predated the Treaty of Lisbon but never came to fruition.
7 Important steps have been taken in the direction of shifting the focus towards 
guaranteeing civil liberties, including: enhancing the role of the European Parliament by 
extending the co-decision procedure in criminal matters; engaging national parliaments already 
at the consultation stage preceding the adoption of European legal acts (Protocol no. 1, OJ, 
no. C 115, 9 May 2008, p. 203f.); allowing for the safeguarding of fundamental criminal law 
principles of Member States through the so-called ‘emergency break clause’ established under 
Articles 82, para. 3 and 83, para. 3; recognising fundamental rights (Article 6, para. 1 TEU) 
and providing for the accession of the Union into the ECHR (Article 6, para. 2 TEU). Although 
the subject of citizens’ rights in criminal cases has been scrutinised by publicists (see, e.g., the 
conference proceedings of 4. Eurοpäischer Juristentag, Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen 
Strafrecht?, Sammelband, Wien, 2008, p. 205 and the contributions of H. sAtzger, M. bonn, 
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reconsideration of the original principles under which the European legislature 
might develop a balanced counter-crime policy ensuring that criminal law serves 
both its purposes: protecting fundamental interests and acting as a yardstick for civil 
liberties. A set of principles is needed to determine when the European legislature may 
require Member States to employ criminal law rules and under which circumstances 
it shall define an act criminal and provide for the appropriate sentence. It is also 
essential to work out how principles found in domestic systems can be transposed 
into a supranational environment, and – conversely – how EU law may complement 
domestic law.
Before moving on to this subject, one final remark is in order. The object of 
substantive criminal law – even in the form of minimum rules prescribed by the EU – is 
to define criminal acts and provide for sentences. However, this object is hardly served 
when the elements of crimes conceal considerations pertaining to judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters as opposed to fundamental substantive principles, which have to 
be respected in every liberal, democratically legitimised expression of authority in 
defining crimes and penalties. Besides, the mutual recognition of judgments might 
better be served by harmonising rules that do not contain precise elements of crimes 
and would thus allow for flexibility in the respective definitions. For instance, the 
terms ‘corruption’ or ‘sabotage’ connote a whole range of different types of conduct 
proscribed in each Member State, thus facilitating the work of judicial authorities. 
However, the use of similar terms – even by a supranational entity – does not satisfy 
the requirement of ‘lex certa’, which ensures foreseeability and protects against 
abuses by the State. In addition, the principles of proportionality and respect for the 
coherence of each Member State’s domestic criminal law system are better served 
in the absence of a pre-determined minimum level for the maximum sentence with 
regard to harmonised criminal rules. In that respect too, mutual recognition appears 
to conflict with the said principles. A case in point is the European Arrest Warrant as 
a measure of procedural constraint: by extending its scope of application to offences 
punishable with a given sentence (see Article 2, para. 1 of the pertinent framework 
decision) so as to be able to cover serious crimes, the European legislator has in effect 
led to the imposition of sentences of such a level to all Member States for the sake of 
facilitating judicial cooperation and in utter disregard for the gravity of each offence.
Restoring substantive criminal law to its true essence is the first step towards 
reorienting the EU towards protecting the fundamental rights of citizens. What is 
necessary, in other words, is to make it clear when and under which circumstances 
the Union may require its Member States to criminalise conduct, even for the purpose 
of harmonising the legislation of Member States to facilitate transnational judicial 
cooperation. The foundations of a foreseeable, reasonable and balanced EU counter-
crime policy, particularly one that is effectuated by means of criminal repression, can 
P. Asp, m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, h. Fuchs), the need to preserve those rights in actual practice has 
especially grown after the Treaty of Lisbon. One need only consider the majority principle, 
to which the harmonisation of criminal rules is now subject; the binding force of these latter 
rules vis-à-vis Member States; the increased competence of the EU in harmonising criminal 
law where it is deemed a necessary means in order to implement a given European policy 
(Article 83, para. 2); and also the question of supremacy of EU law.
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only be derived from the very principles governing the introduction of substantive 
criminal law rules at a European level. I shall further refer to these principles, which 
have been elaborated in the Manifesto on European Criminal Policy  8, by a group of 
scholars (ECPI)  9 including myself, ultimately highlighting the Commission’s stance 
on this issue, as expressed in its 2011 Communication (COM (573) final) to the 
European Parliament and the Council, as well as the European Parliament’s relevant 
resolution on an approach to European Criminal Law (2010/2310 (INI)).
2. Fundamental principles of substantive criminal law and the lawmaking 
function of the EU in the context of the Treaty of Lisbon
A.	 The	requirement	of	a	fundamental	interest	worthy	of	protection
The first issue of concern when applying criminal law at a European level, 
including when it comes to approximating individual Member States’ relevant 
provisions, is the requirement that there is a fundamental interest worthy of protection 
by means of criminal law.
It would be erroneous to assume that the EU possesses a self-evident, ‘intrinsically 
legitimised’ power to intervene in the field of criminal law simply because the Union’s 
primary law recognises such a competence. This is equally true whether the EU is 
establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and 
sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension under 
Article 83, para. 1 TFEU or where the approximation of criminal laws and regulations 
of the Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a 
Union policy under Article 83, para. 2 TFEU.
Even after it has been determined that the Union’s competence in the field of 
criminal law may be exercised in a specific situation  10 – based on a narrow interpretation 
along the lines followed by the German Federal Constitutional Court in its pertinent 
judgment concerning the Treaty of Lisbon  11 – its activation would require answering a 
8 See ZIS, 2009, p. 697f., where the Manifesto has been published in seven languages 
(English, French, German, Greek, Spanish, Italian and Romanian). See respectively also c. 
prittWitz, “Lissabon als Chance zur kriminalpolitischen Neubesinnung. Das Manifest zur 
Europäischen Kriminalpolitik”, in K. Ambos (ed.), Europäisches Strafrecht post-Lissabon, 
Göttingen, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2011, p. 29. 
9 See http://www.crimpol.eu. 
10 The exercise of such competence would require either an empirical affirmation of 
the cross-border character of a type of crime (based on its particular features and effects) or 
exceptional empirical circumstances justifying criminal suppression as the only means to 
ensure the effective implementation of a policy of the Union: see BVerfG 2 BvR 2/08, BvR5/08, 
BvR1010/08, BvR1022/08, BvR1259/08, BvR182/09, margin no. 359, 361-362.
11 According to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, such a narrow interpretation 
is called for because criminal law is not a mere tool for the enhancement of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters but rather an invasive mechanism of social control which has 
to be democratically legitimised lest it severely affect fundamental civil liberties. Besides, 
the inclusion of the emergency break clause (see Articles 82, para. 3 and 83, para. 3 TFEU) 
also attests – albeit indirectly – to the same conclusion: see BVerfG 2 BvR 2/08, BvR5/08, 
BvR1010/08, BvR1022/08, BvR1259/08, BvR182/09, margin no. 358. For a favourable 
appraisal of the above decision – despite the fact that it could have come sooner – see, e.g., 
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further fundamental question relating to the object of the protection invoked. It would 
be worth considering that the notion of ‘cross-border dimension’ may comprise, for 
example, cybercrime, which is alluded to, inter alia, in the Framework Decision on 
the European Arrest Warrant (see Article 2, para. 2). However, one can only conjecture 
what would be the precise content of ‘cybercrime’ that would be worth protecting by 
means of criminal law. For instance, proscribing the dissemination of ideas via the 
worldwide web is in some cases liable to lead to the criminalisation of one’s thoughts 
(Gesinnungsstrafbarkeit). Is it conceivable for criminal law to do so or to address 
any problem – no matter how serious – arising in the implementation of a Union 
policy absent harm of a different quality, i.e. simply as a means to ensure a duty of 
compliance to the law itself? In other words, what would be the positive element that 
could legitimise the use of criminal law by the European legislator provided that the 
latter is already within the ambit of competence provided in the treaties?
The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy adopts a straightforward position on 
this matter: the legislative powers of the EU in relation to criminal law issues should 
only be exercised in order to protect fundamental interests if: (1) these interests can be 
derived from the primary legislation of the EU; (2) the Constitutions of the Member 
States and the fundamental principles of the EU Charter of Fundamentals Rights 
are not violated; and (3) the activities in question could cause significant damage to 
society or individuals  12.
Such a position takes into account both the long debate concerning the legitimacy 
of criminalising conduct in various Member States of the EU and principles of EU law 
itself. It embraces the common law tradition that has justified criminalisation based 
on the ‘harm principle’  13 as well as the doctrinal proposition that a fundamental legal 
interest is the necessary prerequisite for criminalisation as accepted in certain civil 
law jurisdictions  14. Moreover, the above position also derives from the principle of 
F. schorKopF, “Das Lissabon-Urteil des BVerfG-Die Verfassungsbeschwerde als geschärftes 
Instrument der Verteidigung?”, in K. Ambos (ed.), Europäisches Strafrecht post-Lissabon, 
op. cit., p. 111. Cf. some criticism from an EU law angle in M. böse, “Die Entscheidung 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Vertrag von Lissabon und ihre Bedeutung für die 
Europäisierung des Strafrechts”, Zeitschrift für internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (ZIS), 2010, 
p. 79f.
12 See ZIS, 2009, p. 707f. Cf. Council conclusions on model provisions, guiding the 
Council’s criminal law deliberations (doc. 16542/09, 23 November 2009): although there are 
guidelines concerning the forms of violations of a ‘right’ or ‘essential interest’ under the title 
‘Structure of criminal provisions’, point (5), there seems to be neither a proper delimitation of 
the concept of ‘right’ nor any identification of a minimum degree of seriousness of the harm 
involved, other than criminalising conduct of ‘abstract endangerment’.
13 See A. von hirsch, “Der Rechtsgutsbegriff und das ‘Harm Principle’”, in R. heFendehl, 
A. von hirsch and W. Wohlers (eds.), Die Rechtsgutstheorie, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003, p. 
14, where the author presents other widely accepted grounds for criminalisation of conduct 
under common law, such as the so-called ‘legal paternalism’ and ‘offence principle’ (at p. 21f.).
14 See, e.g., C. roxin, “Zur neueren Entwicklung der Rechtsgutsdebatte”, in F. herzog 
et al., Festschrift für W. Hassemer, Heidelberg, Müller, 2010, p. 573; I. mανωλεδακης, Το 
έννομο αγαθό ως βασικό εργαλείο του ποινικού δικαίου, Θεσ/νίκη, Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα, 
1998, and m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, “Ein Blick auf Brennpunkte der Entwicklung der deutschen 
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proportionality, a cornerstone of EU law  15. indeed, in the absence of a fundamental 
interest worthy of protection against socially harmful conduct of a significant degree, 
no one (including the EU) may be justified in obliging the use of the most suppressive 
form of social control (i.e. penal repression), which could not be deemed either 
necessary or appropriate  16.
The requirement of a fundamental interest as described above has a dual 
significance in terms of restraining the European legislator in the definition of offences. 
First of all, it calls for respect for the same ‘threshold of legitimised criminalisation’ 
which binds the legislature of each Member State guaranteeing fundamental civil 
liberties. Secondly, any attempt to introduce or harmonise criminal law rules should 
pay due heed to the constitutional traditions of Member States, so that use of the 
emergency break clause of Article 83, para. 3 TFEU is avoided. In other words, the 
harmonisation of criminal law at a European level cannot ignore the fact that Member 
States themselves will ultimately have to implement and enforce the rules adopted, 
thus importing their constitutional limitations as well as their own understanding 
concerning the object of protection. Moreover, it is self-evident that the fundamental 
interests protected by the European legislator can only derive from the primary 
legislation of the EU, which reflects its structural features, its values, as well as its 
objectives and limits as a supranational organisation with powers conferred on it by 
its Member States (see Articles 4, para. 1 and 5, para. 1 TEU).
On this basis, one might applaud, for instance, the EU’s decision to adopt a 
directive on combating trafficking in human beings  17. As a form of labour or sexual 
exploitation of human beings either through deception or compulsion, human 
Strafrechtsdogmatik vor der Jahrtausendwende aus der Sicht eines Mitglieds der griechischen 
Strafrechtswissenschaft”, in A. eser, W. hAsemer and B. burcKhArdt (eds.), Die deutsche 
Strafrechtswissenschaft vor der Jahrtausendwende. Rückbesinnung und Ausblick, München, 
Beck, 2000, p. 263. It is true, of course, that there is disagreement as to the exact content of 
the concept of ‘fundamental interest’. Some think of them as objects, while others prefer to 
describe them as interests, functional units or cultural values. Whatever its precise content, as 
long as the notion of ‘fundamental interest’ remains attached to the empirical-social reality (at 
p. 265f.), it will constrain criminalisation in a manner ensuring citizens’ rights against state 
abuse. See though  questioning this ability s. mir puig, “Der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz als 
Verfassungsgrundlage der materiellen Grenzen des Strafrechts”, in Festschrift für W. Hassemer, 
op. cit., p. 521. 
15 See Article 4, para. 5 TEU and Article 49, para. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
For a presentation of the case law of the ECJ see A. Klip, European Criminal Law, Antwerpen, 
Intersentia, 2009, p. 70, at p. 298-299; cf. Article 5, para. 4 TEU as well as Protocol no. 2 on 
the application of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. For a critical approach to 
the principle of proportionality – as applied by the ECJ and the ECHR – see p.-A. Albrecht, 
Die vergessene Freiheit, Strafrechtsprinzipien in der Europäischen Sicherheitsdebatte, Berlin, 
Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003, p. 83f.
16 For a description of the content and elements of the principle of proportionality see, 
inter alia, Σ. ΟρφανΟυδακης, Η αρχή της αναλογικότητας, Μελέτες Συνταγματικού Δικαίου και 
Πολιτειολογίας, τευχ. 11, Αθήνα-Θεσ/νίκη, Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα, 2003, p. 62.
17 Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in 
human beings, OJ, no. L 101, 15 April 2011, p. 1. 
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trafficking constitutes a grave breach of multiple facets of one’s liberty and, potentially, 
other important rights (including bodily integrity or even the right to life), which are 
explicitly enshrined in the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. On the positive side, 
one should also mention that the EU has stopped short of dictating criminal action 
against the personal use or possession for personal use of narcotic drugs, confining 
itself to intervention in the field of illicit drug trafficking alone  18. This shows a certain 
degree of consideration towards the constitutional traditions of those Member States 
that do not punish harm to one-self or condone any form of legal paternalism that 
would erode an individual’s autonomy  19.
Nevertheless, there are further examples demonstrating that the EU has yet 
to fully comprehend the importance of a requirement to rely on conduct causing 
significant harm to a fundamental interest when making it compulsory for action to 
be taken in the field of criminal law. This is clearly illustrated, for example, in the 
Framework Decision on the fight against organised crime  20, which requires Member 
States to proscribe a criminal offence either participation in a criminal organisation 
(Article 2, sec. a) or an agreement with one or more persons to commit certain 
criminal acts (Article 2, sec. b), modeled on the common law crime of ‘conspiracy’. 
Any potential harm resulting from these acts is indeterminate, and hence there is no 
discernible legal interest worthy of protection. It is true, of course, that the underlying 
offences should incur a minimum-maximum penalty of at least four years. However, 
the Framework Decision provides no information about the nature of these offences. 
The only hint offered is the purpose of those taking part in a criminal organisation, 
which should be to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. 
Even that element, however, only relates to the motive behind the act as opposed to a 
concrete fundamental interest, which is harmed by it. As a result, there are no concrete 
criteria to assist Member States in deciding what conduct to proscribe other than the 
Framework Decision’s vague objective of fighting organised crime, which is in stark 
contradiction to the latter’s importance in the common area of freedom, security and 
justice. Such legal uncertainty is liable to allow invasive and exceptional procedural 
measures designed for organised crime to be applied to other completely unrelated 
criminal acts. In other words, the lack of a clearly identifiable object of protection 
might entail and does in fact entail a cumulative negative impact on civil liberties. 
Another negative example can be found in the recent Directive for combating sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography  21. According to the directive, child 
pornography also includes material that visually depicts any person appearing to be a 
18 Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum 
provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking, OJ, no. L 335, 11 November 2004, p. 8. 
19 On paternalism generally see K. Χατζηκωςτας, Εισαγωγή, σε D. von der  pFordten, g. 
ellscheid, u. neumAnn and A. von hirsch (eds.), O πατερναλισμός στο δίκαιο και στην Ηθική, 
Αθήνα, Εκδόσεις Αντ. Σάκκουλα, 2010, p. 19.
20 Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised 
crime, OJ, no. L 300, 11 November 2008, p. 42.
21 Directive 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children, OJ, no. L 335, 17 December 2011, p. 1. For its evaluation see ECPI – 
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child engaged in real or simulated sexually explicit conduct (Article 2, c, iii). However, 
any potential harm caused by acts related to such material referred to in the directive is 
indeterminate and hence in this case the EU does not specify a legal interest worthy of 
protection seemingly harmed or jeopardised by relevant acts pending criminalisation.
The requirement for there to be a fundamental interest that is harmed in a socially 
significant way would be particularly useful in determining when the EU would be 
entitled to use criminal law to implement its policies effectively under Article 83, 
para. 2 TFEU. In other words, it offers a method of distinguishing between criminal 
harm (which justifies the imposition of criminal sanctions) and administrative 
infractions, which are nothing, more than regulatory offences. The Union’s failure 
to draw a clear dividing line between the two is palpable in the Directive on the 
protection of the environment through criminal law  22, which compels Member States 
to criminalise conduct that violates mere administrative regulations too  23.
Applying the said requirement in actual practice would mean that any legislative 
initiative applied by the EU would have to follow the principle of good governance, 
i.e. outline the fundamental interests protected and ascertain that the proscribed 
conduct causes substantial harm to them. This is the only way for the Union to 
discharge its duty to set clear obligations for its Member States (as well as provide 
the rationale behind these obligations) in the context of what has aptly been portrayed 
as a European Sympoliteia [League of States]  24 founded on transparency and the rule 
of law. It would also support and benefit Member States themselves in their effort to 
transpose European legislation into their domestic legal order.
Last but not least, it is worth noting that the requirement of a fundamental 
interest worthy of protection under criminal law is not posed differently to the EU 
(as opposed to individual States); indeed, both the EU and its Member States are 
obliged to establish substantive grounds – based on a concrete object of protection 
justifying criminal punishment – for resorting to the harshest form of social control 
in a democratic society  25. That being said, one can identify certain special parameters 
surrounding the said requirement, which are particularly relevant to the EU. The first 
one is the source of the fundamental interests protected by the EU, which is identified 
European Criminal Policy Initiative (Rapporteurs: n. bitzileKis/e. symeonidou-KAstAnidou), 
www.crimpol.eu.
22 Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law, OJ, no. L 328, 6 December 2008, p. 28.
23 For instance, Article 3, sec. c of the said directive proscribes the shipment of waste when 
carried out without prior notification of authorities (Article 2, para. 35, sec. a of Regulation 
(EC) no. 1013/2006 on shipments of waste) or when such notification was not accompanied by 
proper documentation (Article 2, para. 35, secs. d and f (iii) of Regulation (EC) no. 1013/2006 
on shipments of waste). See Regulation (EC) no. 1013/2006 of 14 June 2006 on shipment of 
waste, JO, no. L 190, 12 July 2006, p. 1. 
24 For the conception of the EU as a European Sympoliteia see Δ. τςατςΟς, Η έννοια της 
δημοκρατίας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Συμπολιτεία, Αθήνα, Εκδόσεις ΠΟΛΙΣ, 2007, p. 107. 
25 See R. HeFendel, “European criminal law: how far and no further”, in B. schünemAnn 
(ed.), A Programme for European Criminal Justice, Köln, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2006, p. 456, 
affirming that the notion of ‘fundamental interest’ could artlessly be transposed at a European 
level as it is not merely a product of national legislation but directly derives from social reality.
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with the Union’s primary legislation. Besides, the latter has offered the ground for 
the inclusion of novel protected interests of the EU itself  26. Another crucial question 
is whether it is possible for those fundamental interests protected by the EU to be 
imported into the domestic legal order of each Member State bearing its own legal 
and especially its own constitutional tradition. In the absence of a genuine possibility 
for such a transposition, opting for criminal suppression within a given Member State 
will inevitably run contrary to the rule of law and thus lack legitimacy. Although this 
latter remark reveals the difficulty of satisfying the requirement under discussion, the 
regime established under the Treaty of Lisbon might offer a way to overcome such a 
difficulty by virtue of its provisions governing consultation with national parliaments 
in the Union’s lawmaking function. Understanding and overcoming similar difficulties 
is of crucial importance as it touches upon the very rationale underlying the legitimacy 
of resorting to criminal law rules.
B. The ultima ratio principle
Due to its particularly invasive nature with respect to citizens’ fundamental rights, 
the application of criminal law must always rely on a ‘limiting principle’ lest it spirals 
out of control. Of all principles limiting criminal law, the least ambiguous one is 
the ultima ratio principle  27. The concise adage “to the exceptional case the ultimate 
means”  28 denotes both a quantitative and a qualitative element  29 since exceptional cases 
are limited in number and they concern serious breaches of fundamental interests  30. 
Fittingly, it has been said that the ultima ratio principle leaves room for criminal law 
measures in situations resembling a state of necessity, i.e. when something needs to be 
done and there is no other solution to be found by society or the State  31.
From a normative perspective, the ultima ratio principle is closely linked to 
the principle of proportionality, which allows for the adoption of the legal means 
necessary to achieve a certain goal; and indeed, in the absence of any other solution, 
the ultimate means would be necessary in that sense  32. One notable difference is to 
be observed though: while the principle of proportionality presupposes a goal against 
which to evaluate whether the means chosen are proportionate (‘ultimate means’), the 
26 As for example protecting citizens’ interests by preventing and suppressing corruption 
within the EU apparatus. For a discussion of European fundamental interests see n. bitzileKis, 
m. KAiAFA-gbAndi and symeonidou-KAstAnidou, “Theory of genuine European Legal 
Interests”, in B. schünemAnn, A programme for European Criminal Justice, op. cit., 2006, 
p. 467; r. heFendel, ibid., p. 214. 
27 Compare with the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ or even the so-called ‘fragmentary character 
of criminal law’: see C. PrittWitz, “Der fragmentarische Charakter des Strafrechts-Gedanken 
zu Grund und Grenzen gängiger Strafrechtspostulate”, in H. Koch (ed.), Herausforderungen an 
das Recht: Alte Antworten auf neue Fragen?, Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, Berlin, 1997, p. 145f.
28 “Ιm äußersten Fall das äußerste Mittel”: W. nAucKe, Strafrecht, Eine Einführung, 6. 
Aufl., Alfred Metzner Verlag, Neuwied-Kriftel-Berlin, 1991, p. 53.
29 c. prittWitz, “Der fragmentarische Charakter”, op. cit., p. 151.
30 See W. nAucKe, op. cit., p. 53 (‘bei besonderes schwerwiegenden Verletzungen’).
31 c. prittWitz, “Der fragmentarische Charakter”, op. cit., p. 166 (“Staat und Gesellschaft 
sich nicht anders zu helfen wissen”).
32 Cf. fn. 16.
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ultima ratio principle as portrayed above claims a stake at describing the goal itself 
(‘to the exceptional case the ultimate means’)  33. It is thus linked to the justification of 
punishing conduct by criminal sanctions, a matter discussed in the previous section.
Associating the ultima ratio principle with the principle of proportionality also 
reveals that it is firmly founded in principles of EU law  34. A Union which places 
the individual at the heart of its activities – as per the preamble of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights – cannot possibly compel its Member States to criminalise 
conduct that can be addressed through milder means. This is because criminal 
sanctions are per se an infringement of the fundamental rights of citizens due to their 
socio-ethical implications and the stigmatisation that they bring about  35.
Besides, there are also empirical grounds hinting at an ‘ultima ratio-abiding’ 
criminal law within the EU. The lack of resources to enforce ever-expanding criminal 
statutes, the weakening of their deterrent force and effectiveness as well as the 
emasculation of other mechanisms to address social problems  36 are all symptoms that 
are already in evidence in Member States, which cannot be ignored by the Union 
when intervening in the field of criminal law.
With particular regard to the activities of the EU – especially after the Treaty of 
Lisbon, recognising its competence in both, harmonising criminal law rules of Member 
States and establishing rules of its own  37 – it should be remarked that the application 
of the ultima ratio principle is anything but certain, particularly when it comes to 
the approximation of criminal law rules in Member States. Although approximation 
normally implies already existing rules within Member States, it might also entail 
the adoption of new ones so that certain Member States may fulfill their obligations 
vis-à-vis the Union. The stricter or broader a criminal rule is, the more pressing the 
need for justification, through empirical data, that criminalisation was the last resort. 
In that sense, the Council’s allusion to the application of the ultima ratio principle ‘as 
a general rule’ (declared in relation to the future lawmaking function of the EU in the 
field of criminal law)  38, albeit notable, cannot be deemed sufficient per se.
A case in point is the crime with a cross-border dimension (Article 83, para. 1 
TFEU). The mere reference to ‘particularly serious’ crime in the text of the said article 
is not sufficient to guarantee respect for the ultima ratio principle. Indeed, even in the 
field of particularly serious crimes (e.g. terrorism), one cannot exclude the possibility 
that there were other – milder – means, which were not used to address the conduct in 
question. This is demonstrated in Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA on combating 
terrorism, which extensively opts for the criminalisation of a broad array of acts, 
33 c. prittWitz, “Der fragmentarische Charakter”, op. cit., p. 158.
34 Cf. fn 15.
35 Cf. the Appendix to Recommendation no. R(92)17 of the Council of Europe, which 
clearly states that custodial sentences should be regarded as a sanction of last resort (Β. 5a). 
See Recommendation no. R(92)17 of 19 October 1992 concerning consistency in sentencing. 
36 c. prittWitz, “Der fragmentarische Charakter”, op. cit., p. 161. 
37 Cf. fn. 3.
38 See Council doc. 16542/09, 23 November 2009, p. 4, which reads in relevant part: “As 
a point of departure the European Union should as a general rule adhere to the principle of use 
of criminal law as a last resort”.
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including ‘recruitment’ and ‘training’ of terrorists through the internet, as opposed 
to introducing restraints to those administering the respective websites. The said 
Framework Decision directs Member States to adopt criminal law rules anticipating 
potential risks to fundamental interests, thus criminalising conduct, which merely 
generates or supports criminal intent of third persons. In so doing, it contributes to 
the establishment of a pre-preventative criminal law  39. Such premature application of 
criminal rules, devoid of any discernible link to any risk of a fundamental interest  40 
– even on an abstract level – runs counter to the ultima ratio principle as well as the 
principle of proportionality as accepted in European law. To the extent that a given 
act does not pose a significant and clear risk to interests worthy of protection, it is 
hard to find justification for criminal prosecution of that act and even harder when 
milder means of addressing the problem were overlooked. A similar argument can 
be made with regard to the Framework Decision on combating corruption in the 
private sector  41. The latter contains no convincing reasons as to why obviously milder 
means of tackling corruption have been set aside, such as introducing a streamlined 
procedure for tort claims or adopting broad measures of compliance in the workplace 
(inter alia the ‘four eyes’ principle, staff rotation, etc.). The recent Directive on 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography  42 is also problematic from the 
same perspective: e.g. criminalising obtaining access to pornographic material via 
the internet (Article 5, para. 3) does not seem necessary if the Member States are 
in a position to block access to all the relevant websites. On the other hand, in the 
proposal for a Directive on attacks against information systems  43, the EU also refrains 
from the ultima ratio principle, as for example, one can deduce from illegal access to 
information systems (Article 3) where the act is to be criminalised even without an 
infringement of a security measure. 
This need becomes even more pressing when the approximation of criminal 
laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential to ensure the effective 
implementation of a Union policy in an area which has already been subject to 
harmonisation measures (Article 83, para. 2 TFEU). The recognition of such a 
competence is in direct conflict with the ultima ratio principle as the need for ‘effective 
implementation’ – particularly in the field of Union policies – is liable to produce a 
lack of self-restraint until other measures prove efficient. Still, the unique identity of 
39 See m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, “Terrorismusbekämpfung in der Europäischen Union und das 
vor-präventive Strafrecht: Neue Vorgaben für strafbare Taten nach dem Rahmenbeschluss 
2008/919/JI”, in Festschrift für W. Hassemer, op. cit., p. 1165; cf. F. zimmermAnn, “Tendenzen 
der Strafrechtsangleichung in der EU – dargestellt anhand der Bestrebungen zur Bekämpfung 
von Terrorismus, Rassismus and illegaler Beschäftigung”, ZIS, 2009, p. 2f.
40 m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, “Terrorismusbekämpfung”, op. cit., p. 1171-1172 and p. 1176-1777.
41 Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the 
private sector, OJ, no. L 192, 31 July 2003, p. 54.
42 Cf. fn. 21.
43 Proposal for a directive on attacks against information system (COM (2010) 517 
final, 30 September 2010). Cf. Draft Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE) of the European Parliament (Rapporteur: m. hohlmeier) 2010/0273, 24 
November 2011.
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criminal law cannot allow it to be reduced to a mere tool for the implementation of 
any policy. In order to use criminal law, as previously noted, an EU policy should 
be about the protection of fundamental interests and the problems arising during the 
implementation of such a policy should be no less than seriously harmful acts which 
cannot be addressed through any other means (as established empirically). It is only 
by conceiving of the need for a truly exceptional application of criminal rules that the 
approximation envisaged in Article 83, para. 2 TFEU can properly take place (based 
on the apt remarks of the German Federal Constitutional Court)  44. This is why the 
Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law  45 has missed 
its mark since it imposes the criminalisation of regulatory offenses even though 
administrative sanctions would be equally – if not more – effective to ensure the 
effective implementation of the Union’s policy in this field.
That same logic also applies to those areas where the EU possesses competence to 
adopt criminal rules in its own right, as for instance in the case of fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the Union under Article 325, para. 4 TFEU. 
It becomes clear that, when it comes to the EU, there is consistency in the essence of 
the fundamental ultima ratio principle. This only makes sense since the said principle 
concerns the use of criminal law as a last resort regardless of the legislator, no matter 
whether his competence is exclusive or shared (in this case between the Union and 
its Member States). At the same time, the novel institutional framework introduced 
in the Treaty of Lisbon calls for even more caution with respect to the application 
of this principle. The EU has indeed assumed greater responsibility in ensuring that 
criminal law is used as a last resort due to its competence to impose minimum rules 
and to provide for the requisite sanctions  46. Setting minimum standards for criminal 
suppression in Member States presupposes that the Union has confirmed that these 
measures are a ‘necessary evil’, i.e. that there was no other way; otherwise, any step 
it takes will inevitably destabilise the foundations of a proportionality-based criminal 
law. In other words, the fact that the EU now has the competence to bind its Member 
States to minimum standards of criminal suppression implies a responsibility to ensure 
that criminal law shall only be used as a last resort to protect fundamental interests. 
This would be equally applicable for any sector where the Union is competent to 
adopt, by itself, criminal rules for protecting fundamental interests of its own.
Unfortunately the practical post-Lisbon reality demonstrates that the EU’s 
legislative proposals present different alternative solutions (called policy options), 
which are surprisingly identical in all the different proposals of directives introduced 
following the Lisbon Treaty  47. This proves that alternative solutions are not based on 
44 See BVerfG 2 BvE 2/08, BvR5/08, BvR1010/08, BvR1022/08, BvR1259/08, BvR182/09 
of 30.6.2009, margin no. 361-362; for a doctrinal discussion of the decision see fn. 11.
45 Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008; cf. (from a critical standpoint) F. 
zimmermAnn, “Wann ist der Einsatz von Strafrecht auf europäischer Ebene sinnvoll ? – Die 
neue Richtlinie zum strafrechtlichen Schutz der Umwelt”, ZRP, 2009, p. 75f.
46 On the function of ‘minimum rules’ in substantive criminal law see m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, 
“Die Entwicklung”, op. cit., p. 520-521.
47 Cf. e.g. COM (2010) 517 final, 30 September 2010, p. 5; COM (2010) 94 final, 29 
March 2010, p. 5; COM (2010) 95, 29 March 2010, p. 5f. and the evaluation by ECPI, www.
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a significant evaluation that would help access the different characteristics and special 
requirements of every specific field of examined behaviors that call for criminal 
sanctions to be an ultima ratio.
A careful assessment of legislative initiatives adopted by the EU shows that there 
have been cases in which the EU has managed to effectively discharge its duty to 
respect the ultima ratio principle. One pertinent example is the Directive providing 
for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally 
staying third-country nationals  48: under Article 9 of the said directive, the obligation 
to criminalise does not extend to the employment of illegally staying third-country 
nationals per se (id., Article 3, para. 1), but requires an additional aggravating 
circumstance (e.g. continuous or persistent repetition of the act, simultaneous 
employment of a significant number of illegally staying third-country nationals, 
illegal employment of a minor, etc.). Another example is the proposal for a Directive 
on attacks against information systems  49, which obliges Member States to criminalise 
illegal access to information systems (Article 3), illegal system interference (Article 4) 
as well as certain forms of illegal data interference (Article 5), all the while excluding 
insignificant acts to avoid excessive application of criminal sanctions. Although it is 
dubious whether this is enough to actually forestall excessive criminalisation, it is 
definitely an important step towards preserving the ultima ratio principle.
Full respect for this principle, however, would require a number of other 
important steps, even in those cases where criminal law does appear to be the last 
resort. Adopting milder means as a matter of priority, as well as justifying criminal 
suppression as a last resort based on empirical data are the necessary prerequisites to 
ensuring genuine respect for the ultima ratio principle, coupled with the principle of 
good governance  50.
C. The principle of legality
The principle of legality (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege) requires that crime 
must be proscribed under law and occupies a central place among the fundamental 
principles of criminal law as it aspires to keep state power in check with respect to what 
exactly is punished and how  51. It is not surprising, then, that it enjoys constitutional 
status in a number of legal orders. Beyond the description of the object of punishment, 
the principle is also linked to the legislative process  52. Specifically, criminal rules are 
crimpol.eu.
48 Directive 2009/52 of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and 
measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ, no. L 168, 30 June 
2009, p. 24.
49 COM (2010) 517 final.
50 Concerning the use of such data, see the conclusions included in “Assessment of the 
need for criminal provisions”, Council doc. 16542/09, 23 November 2009, point (3).
51 See inter alia i. mανωλεδακης, m. Kαϊαφα-Γκμπαντi And e. ςυμεωνίδΟυ-καςτανίδΟυ, 
Ποινικό Δίκαιο-Επιτομή Γενικού Μέρους, Αθήνα-Θεσ/νίκη, Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 7η έκδ., p. 18; 
p.-A. Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, op. cit., p. 47-48.
52 Cf. p.-A. Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, op. cit., p. 48-49, associating the principle 
with substantive criteria as to what may be punished by the State (not any conduct that is 
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only then legitimised when they are passed by parliament following public debate 
(nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege parlamentaria)  53. This requirement connotes a 
public process involving the complete awareness of the potential consequences by the 
citizenry (‘Demos’). It also includes the participation of citizens – represented by their 
delegates in parliament – i.e. the ones who will ultimately suffer the consequences.
In the European context, the principle is enshrined in Article 7, para. 1 ECHR  54, 
Article 49, para. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and Article 6, 
para. 3 TEU  55, which goes beyond the fundamental rights guaranteed under the 
ECHR, requiring respect for the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, which tend to be more elaborate when it comes to legality. This parameter 
raises an issue that merits our attention. Because the principle of nullum crimen nulla 
poena sine lege constitutes the trigger for a whole array of fundamental rights, the 
process of European unification cannot be allowed to shrink it to a ‘least common 
denominator’ principle found in all Member States. This means that those Member 
States, which do not attach so much importance to this particular principle, cannot 
become a role model for the EU  56 lest respect for the constitutional traditions of other 
members be compromised. In other words, the reference to constitutional traditions 
common to Member States in Article 6, para. 3 TEU should not be interpreted so 
as to denote that any given fundamental right should derive from the constitutional 
traditions of all Member States so as to be recognised on a European level. Rather, it 
would suffice that the traditions in question be common in some Member States. Here 
lies the particular significance of Article 6, para. 3 TEU with respect to the principle 
of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. By alluding to fundamental rights emanating 
from constitutional traditions common in Member States, the said provision essentially 
guarantees a maximum degree of protection of those rights, drawn from a comparative 
appraisal of the various legal orders. Thus, the constitutional traditions common in 
troublesome or risky may be criminalised; rather, criminal law should target conduct that 
constitutes denial of the fundamental rights of others, lest it itself become a liability for liberty). 
53 See n. AνδρΟυλακης, Ποινικό δίκαιο- Γενικό Μέρος, Θεωρία του Εγκλήματος, 
Αθήνα, Δίκαιο και Οικονομία Π. Ν. Σάκκουλας, 2000, p. 95; cf. i. mανωλεδακης, Άρθρο 7 
του ΣυντΆγμΆτοΣ, ςε Γ. Kαςίματης- K.-Γ. mαυρίας (επιμ.), Ερμηνεία του Συντάγματος, Αθήνα, 
Εκδόσεις Αντ. Σάκκουλα, 1999, p. 18-20.
54 Cf. Recommendation no. R (98) 6 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, sec. Ι. a. 1. Articles 7, para. 1 ECHR and 49, para. 1 of the Charter do not guarantee 
the principle to its full extent; unlike most Member States, they require criminalisation by law, 
including customary law. For a critical  survey of the case law of the ECHR and the ECJ see 
s. brAum, Europäische Strafgesetzlichkeit, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 2003, 
p. 47-48.
55 See m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, “The development towards harmonisation within criminal law 
in the European Union – A citizen’s perspective”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice, 2001, p. 250f.
56 These would include, for instance, the United Kingdom and France: p.-A. Albrecht, 
Die vergessene Freiheit, op. cit., p. 58. Nonetheless, even common law now recognises the 
principle (see G. DAnnecKer, para. 1 Rn 5 and f., 43f., in Leipziger Kommentar StGB, Band I, 
Einleitung, para. 1-31, 12. Aufl. 2007) with a few exceptions (see G. DAnnecKer, op. cit., para. 
1, Rn 45).
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certain Member States are sufficient to engender protection of a fundamental right at 
a European level  57.
Beyond the association with law enacted by parliament, the substantive content 
of the principle discussed can be broken down into three separate requirements, 
addressed to the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary respectively. These are: 
the lex certa requirement, the non-retroactivity requirement, and the prohibition of 
applying criminal rules by analogy  58. The first one is exclusively addressed to the 
legislature, the second concerns all three branches, while the third is exclusively 
addressed to the judiciary. This explains why this paper – just like the Manifesto on 
European Criminal Policy – is only concerned with the first two requirements, which 
are addressed to the European legislator, i.e. our main point of reference, as he is the 
one deciding on European Criminal Policy. Adding to the picture, the main problems 
arising out of the application of the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege principle at 
a European level are related to the requirement of law enacted by parliament and the 
‘clarity’ of criminal provisions. On the other hand, the non-retroactivity requirement 
and the concomitant principle of lex mitior do not appear to cause particular problems. 
Last but not least, the contemporary institutional framework within the EU entrusts 
Member States with the task of enforcing criminal law and meting out sanctions 
via their national court system. Hence, the prohibition of applying criminal rules by 
analogy could not be transposable before bodies of the EU save perhaps for the ECJ 
when interpreting EU law  59 (e.g. in the case of a Directive establishing minimum 
rules concerning the definition of a crime).
1. The requirement of law enacted by parliament (nullum crimen nulla poena sine 
lege parlamentaria)
It has already been emphasised that the principle in question requires the 
enactment of a criminal law by parliament because the most invasive form of state 
control should derive its legitimisation from the people as directly as possible. In 
the EU context, there are admittedly problems regarding this principle due to the 
Union’s democratic deficit  60, which has been reduced but not completely eliminated 
by the Treaty of Lisbon  61. In fact, some voices argue that eliminating this democratic 
57 On this issue generally see M. KAiAFA-GbAndi, Memorandum, in House of Lords-
European Union Committee, 10th Report of Session 2007-08, “The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact 
assessment”, Volume I: Evidence, HL Paper 62-II, E 160. 
58 For a presentation of the constituent elements of the principle see p.-A. Albrecht, Die 
vergessene Freiheit, op. cit., p. 49f.
59 This field will gain increasing significance under the Treaty of Lisbon, since the ECJ 
now possesses the competence to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of Union law 
in criminal matters as well without prior authorisation by Member States (Articles 19, para. 3, 
b, TEU and 267 TFEU).
60 See inter alia r.-A. lorz, “Das Problem des demokratischen Defizits”, in D. tsAtsos 
(ed.), Die Unionsgrundordnung-Handbuch zur europäischen Verfassung, op. cit., p. 311; for 
the application of the principle on a European level see inter alia U. Sieber, “Die Zukunft des 
Europäischen Strafrechts”, ZStW, 2009, at p. 13-14, p. 50f., p. 53f.
61 On the possibility of an act passing without a majority vote by the European Parliament 
in the course of ordinary legislative process and its ramifications in the field of criminal law 
100     trAnsversAl ApproAch
deficit by attempting to institutionally transform the European Parliament into a ‘full-
fledged parliament’ will not work until and unless an ‘identity of a European citizen’ 
is developed with which the people of Europe could identify themselves in relation 
to a decision-making process at a European level  62. In addition, it is often argued 
that the Union itself, as a European Sympoliteia of both States and nations  63, seems 
to be premised on a unique structure, which could at best sustain equal lawmaking 
powers for the Council and the European Parliament  64. One should also not neglect 
other matters, such as the interaction between EU bodies in general, and in particular 
between the Council and the European Parliament, which delineate the problem at 
an empirical level. Indeed, Member States appear quite reluctant to give up their 
influence over the supranational organisation they have created in favour of an ever-
stronger European Parliament  65. It becomes apparent that the institutional regime 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is here to stay for years to come. Aside from its 
future improvement, then, attention should also shift towards expanding democratic 
legitimisation under the Treaty of Lisbon as it stands, at least with respect to sensitive 
areas such as criminal law.
Under these circumstances, the question remains as to whether and how the EU 
can satisfy the basic requirement of a criminal law enacted by parliament in those 
fields where it possesses the competence to act.
At this point, one should once more recall the types of criminal competence 
assigned to the EU. On the one hand, the Union may establish minimum rules 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions through directives, 
which shall then be transposed into the domestic legal order (article 83 TFEU)  66. 
On the other, it has the authority to establish criminal rules even by itself under such 
provisions as Article 325 TFEU.
As regards the former, there appear to be grounds for the application of the 
requirement of a law enacted by parliament. Although some scholars point out that 
the participation of the European Parliament in the ordinary legislative procedure 
(Articles 289 and 294 TFEU) – under which minimum rules concerning the definition 
of criminal offences and sanctions are established through directives – does leave 
a certain amount of democratic deficit (at least in the sense that certain scholars 
see m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, “The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and challenges for 
criminal law at the commencement of 21st century”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice, 2005, p. 500. Also see the decision by the BVerfG 2BvE 2/08, BvR5/08, 
BvR1010/08, BvR1022/08, BvR1259/08, BvR182/09 of 30 June 2009, margin no. 276f. Cf., 
however, H. SAtzger, “Das Strafrecht als Gegenstand europäischer Gesetzgebungstätigkeit”, 
KritV, 2008, p. 25, adding certain reservations at p. 36. Also see criticism towards the decision 
of the BVerfG by m. böse (ZIS, 2010, p. 82f.), in relation to the democratic deficit in the EU.
62 See R.-A. lorz, op. cit., p. 343.
63 See Δ. τςατςΟς, op. cit., p. 98 and p. 103-114.
64 Ibid., p. 1110-1112.
65 See R.-A. lorz, op. cit., p. 343-344.
66 Note the narrow interpretation proposed by the BVerG in view of the democratic deficit: 
2 BvE 2/08, BvR5/08, BvR1010/08, BvR1022/08, BvR1259/08, BvR182/09 of 30 June 2009, 
margin no. 358-363.
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perceive the notion of ‘democratic deficit’ in relation to the EU’s  competence in 
the field of criminal law)  67, requiring that national parliaments already take part in 
lawmaking at the consultation stage  68 is admittedly an important step. As long as 
national parliaments remain active in actual practice and their input is taken into 
account, the directives produced will attain a higher degree of legitimisation as 
opposed to those issued under a simple co-decision procedure involving the European 
Parliament alone. Such legitimisation would indeed derive from the European 
citizenry, represented in their respective parliaments. Needless to say, the procedure 
adopted for the involvement of national parliaments remains rather loose compared 
to lawmaking in the domestic context. Some have suggested the adoption of national 
rules binding the representatives of each Member State to vote for or against a directive 
establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offenses based on 
a prior determination by their respective national parliament  69. This would indeed 
contribute towards satisfying the requirement of a criminal law enacted by parliament, 
since the binding effect of each directive would be democratically legitimised through 
the participation of national parliaments  70. It is of course true that a single Member 
State can now be bound by a directive even when it has voted against it due to the 
majority principle. Thus, the only way for a Member State to free itself of the relevant 
obligation is to claim that a draft directive would affect fundamental aspects of its 
criminal justice system, hence invoking the emergency break clause of Article 83, 
para. 3 TFEU. Although the allusion to ‘fundamental aspects’ of a criminal justice 
system is somewhat vague  71, one could identify at least one circumstance in which 
the emergency brake clause could undoubtedly be invoked: a breach of one of the 
67 Cf. F. meyer, Demokratieprinzip und Europäisches Strafrecht, Zurich-Saint Gallen, 
Nomos, 2009, p. 122f. 
68 See Protocol no. 1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. It is 
true, of course, that national parliaments may submit a reasoned opinion on whether a draft 
legislative act complies with the principle of subsidiarity under Article 3 of the said Protocol. 
However, it would be erroneous to deduce that the role of national parliaments is confined to 
these ‘reasoned opinions’ alone. Otherwise Article 12(a) TEU on the active contribution of 
national parliaments referring to their information by institutions of the EU on draft legislative 
acts would have no meaning. Even without an explicit clause, a proper reading of the Protocol 
would lead to the conclusion that national parliaments are not precluded from submitting their 
opinion on any draft; indeed, such a broadening of the consultation process is likely to expose 
problems justifying use of the emergency break clause.
69 See BVerfG, 2 BvR 2/08, BvR5/08, BvR1010/08, BvR1022/08, BvR1259/08, 
BvR182/09 of 30 June 2009, margin no. 365. At the same time, it is argued that exceptional 
circumstances may occasionally warrant departure from the decision made in the national 
parliament (e.g. due to political considerations weighed up during negotiations leading to 
the adoption of a given directive); in those cases, it is suggested that the representative in 
the Council modify his/her Member State’s position subject to subsequent ratification by the 
Parliament: see h. sAtzger, “Das Strafrecht als Gegenstand”, op. cit., p. 36.
70 Cf. the objections expressed by M. Böse, ZIS, 2010, p. 83, as well as the lower threshold 
accepted by u. sieber, “Die Zukunft des Europäischen Strafrechts”, op. cit., p. 55 with respect 
to the democratic legitimisation of criminal rules in the EU. 
71 See h. sAtzger, Internationales und Europäisches Strafrecht, op. cit., p. 124-125.
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fundamental principles of criminal law outlined above as well as of those that will be 
presented further on.
In conclusion, it could easily be argued that, when it comes to the criminal 
competence of the EU with a view to the approximation of national laws, respect for 
the requirement of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege parlamentaria hinges on the 
degree of involvement of national parliaments in the consultation process. Accordingly, 
the EU should make sure that it encourages such involvement based on the principle 
of good governance. For their part, national parliaments should not hesitate in actively 
engaging in the function assigned to them while Member States would be wise to 
examine the possibility of linking their vote in the Council to a prior decision by 
their parliament, at least in the field of criminal law. Moreover, the emergency break 
clause of Article 83, para. 3 TFEU can be interpreted so as to safeguard fundamental 
principles of criminal law and is thus crucial for democratic legitimisation; and indeed, 
the said clause in effect ensures against binding criminal law rules being adopted that 
would only be legitimised at the EU level (i.e. insufficiently) and would contradict 
fundamental aspects of a Member State’s criminal justice system.
That being said, more serious problems are likely to arise if and when the EU 
sets about adopting criminal rules by itself. Even with certain improvements, such 
as linking votes in the Council to a prior determination by the respective national 
parliament  72, the co-decision procedure does not seem fit to accommodate autonomous 
criminal competence, at least not as long as the European citizenry (‘Demos’) finds 
itself in statu nascendi  73. Notwithstanding the competence entrusted with it in the 
Treaty of Lisbon, I believe that the EU should confine itself to the context of regulatory 
offences for now and abstain from adopting criminal rules by itself until such time has 
come in which the institutions have evolved in such a way as to bring about a further 
improvement in the democratic deficit that currently exists  74. Whenever the exercise 
of criminal competence appears to be necessary as a last resort, the approximation of 
criminal laws of Member States via directives would emerge as a viable alternative  75, 
72 For instance, linking votes in the Council to a prior determination by national parliaments 
would appear plausible in another case where the ordinary legislative procedure applies, namely 
Article 325 TFEU concerning fraud against the financial interests of the Union. Nonetheless, 
the principle of majority on the one hand and the non-applicability of the emergency break 
clause on the other indicate that Member States cannot absolve themselves of the rules 
adopted by the EU even if they invoke fundamental principles of theirs. Besides, applying the 
emergency break clause by analogy in those cases is refuted based on arguments related to 
functional differences between directives and regulations: see h. sAtzger, Internationales und 
Europäisches Strafrecht, op. cit., p. 125-126.
73 See, e.g., F. meyer, op. cit., p. 123-124. With respect to Article  325 TFEU see u. sieber, 
“Die Zukunft des Europäischen Strafrechts”, op. cit., p. 59.
74 See p.-A. Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, op. cit, p. 167, arguing that the EU should 
confine itself to means outside criminal law. Also see S. BrAum, op. cit., p. 473-474, criticising 
the abuse of criminal sanctions for the sake of efficiency.
75 For an analysis of the institutional regime before Lisbon see ν. Bitzilekis, M. kaiafa-
gbAndi and e. symeonidou-KAstAnidou, op. cit., p. 230f.; see, however, r.heFendel, op. 
cit., p. 214f., advocating a European criminal law free from intervention by Member States 
(though stopping short of discussing the democratic legitimisation of the rules produced). In 
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because nothing in the Treaty of Lisbon precludes that option (see Articles 325 and 
79, para. 2, sec. d, TFEU, which allude to measures in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, thereby implying, inter alia, the adoption of directives).
2. The ‘lex certa’ requirement
This particular facet of the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege 
requires that a criminal rule contain a precise description of the objective and subjective 
elements of an offence as well as the sanction to be imposed. It also requires that every 
offence comprise a human act, thereby ruling out punishment for people’s thoughts. In 
addition, the description must be clear enough so that the ordinary citizen can predict 
which actions will make him criminally liable. In the absence of such foreseeability, 
the principle of legality would indeed be rendered moot  76.
It goes without saying that the ‘lex certa’ requirement would apply without 
any distinction to criminal rules introduced by the EU itself, i.e. without the need 
for transposition by Member States, as provided for certain cases in the Treaty of 
Lisbon  77. That being said, the main type of criminal competence provided in the latter 
is the one to be exercised through directives establishing minimum rules concerning 
the definition of offences and sanctions (Article 83, para. 1 and 2 TFEU). Therefore, 
the ‘lex certa’ requirement is more intricate in this case due to the two distinct stages 
of criminalising conduct (a European and a national one).
A mere look at the case law of the ECJ  78 (predating the Treaty of Lisbon) shows 
that the Court has indeed followed the ECHR by requiring that the criterion of 
foreseeability emanates from the text of the rule itself  79. In the field of criminal law, 
the Court has also emphasised, that the obligation of Member States to interpret the 
law in accordance with a directive  80 (or a framework decision)  81 cannot lead to the 
establishment or aggravation of criminal liability. This would appear to imply that 
it is the national criminal rule that should abide by the principle of nullum crimen 
that same vein, see the proposals of the programme ‘Ein Gesamtkonzept für die Europäische 
Strafrechtspflege’, in B. schünemAnn (ed.), op. cit., p. 59-60.
76 See, e.g., p.-A. Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, op. cit., p. 49-50. 
77 Note, however, the reservations expressed in the previous chapter. For related questions 
to the lex certa principle in the Union law see c. peristeridou, “The principle of lex certa in 
national law and European perspectives”, in A. Klip (ed.), Substantive Criminal Law of the 
European Union, p. 85f.; cf. also e. clAes, “Legality and lex certa in the Criminal Law-Reply 
to Christina Peristeridou”, ibid., p. 95f., and especially p. 102.
78 See extensively A. Klip, European Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 167f.
79 Ibid., p. 169; ECJ, 7 June 2007, Judgement C-76/06, Britannia Alloys & Chemicals Ltd 
v Commission of the European Communities (Agreements, decisions and concerted practices), 
ecr, p. I-04405. 
80 See A. Klip, European Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 168; ECJ, 12 December 1996, Joined 
cases C-74/95 and C-129/95, Criminal proceedings against X, ECR, p. I-06609, para. 22; ECJ, 
22 November 2005, Judgement C-384/02, Criminal proceedings against Knud Grøngaard and 
Allan Bang, ECR, p. I-09939, para. 30.
81 See A. Klip, European Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 168; ECJ, 16 June 2005, Judgement 
C-105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, ECR, p. I-05285, para. 45.
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nulla poena sine lege certa rather than the legislative act through which the EU has 
compelled its adoption  82.
However, that kind of reasoning fails to take into account certain factors affecting 
EU law, particularly since the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. Through its directives 
addressing cross-border crime or ensuring the effective implementation of its policies, 
the EU seeks to establish a minimum content of the definitions of crimes, which shall 
bind Member States  83 under threat of sanctions in the event of their failing to be 
incorporated into the domestic legal order  84. Such minimum content should clearly 
derive from each legislative act of the Union despite the fact that it is up to each 
State’s legislature to specify the elements of crimes for the purposes of its criminal 
justice system. By contrast, the sanction to be imposed does not need to be determined 
by the European legislator. That task could indeed be performed more appropriately 
at the domestic level, in accordance with the principle of proportionality and the 
particularities of each criminal justice system  85.
There are two important parameters when it comes to the matter of requiring 
the EU to clearly stipulate a minimum content of the conduct to be proscribed. First 
of all, the lack of such a clear stipulation poses a dilemma to national legislators: it 
means that they will either unilaterally adopt a precise definition and risk diverging 
from the EU’s actual objective, which the European legislator did not adequately 
describe or they will fail to give a clear description of the offence, thereby violating 
the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege certa, which would amount to a 
breach of the Constitution in numerous Member States. It becomes clear that the ‘lex 
certa’ requirement is addressed to the European legislator as well, in as much as the 
latter may bind Member States to adopt minimum elements of an offence. Otherwise, 
it would become impossible for national legislators to abide by their obligation to 
transpose EU law without violating the ‘lex certa’ requirement  86. Even worse, fear 
of possible sanctions might lead Member States to opt to transpose the relevant 
directives verbatim, which would constitute an outright breach of the principle of 
legality  87. Besides, missing a clear delineation of a minimum core of the conduct to be 
82 See A. Klip, European Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 171.
83 For a discussion of the function of ‘minimum rules’ in substantive criminal law see 
m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, “The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, op. cit., p. 498f.
84 See Article 260 TFEU.
85 According to the case law of the ECJ, the principle of legality does not require that 
EU law provide for a specific penalty for each offence: see A. Klip, European Criminal Law, 
op. cit., p. 172; ECJ, 15 October 2002, Joined cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-250/99 P to 
C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, ECR, 
p. I-08375.
86 See A. Klip, European Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 172, referring to specific examples 
of EU legislative acts causing problems, and suggesting the annulment of the act as the only 
solution in these cases.
87 On the adverse effect of international law on the principle of legality in general see 
B. JAhnKe, “Zur Erosion des Verfassungsgrundsatzes ‘Keine Strafe ohne Gesetz’”, ΖIS, 2010, 
p. 463f., esp. p. 469-470; μ. KAiAFA-gbAndi, “Die allgemeinen Grundsätze des Strafrechts im 
Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs: Auf dem Weg zu einem rechtsstaatlichen Strafrecht 
der Nationen?”, in Festschrifts für H.-L. Schreiber, Heidelberg, C. F. Müller, 2003, p. 204f.; 
s. gless, “Strafe ohne souverän?”, ZStrR, 2007, p. 436-437 and p. 442-443.
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proscribed by the EU, neither national parliaments nor States’ representatives would 
be able to contribute to the consultation process or appraise the proposed norms in the 
light of fundamental principles inherent in their respective criminal justice systems as 
the vagueness of the content may conceal serious deficiencies. As a result, this would 
drastically diminish the potential ambit of the emergency break clause provided under 
Article 83, para. 3 TFEU. Since the consultation process and the emergency break 
clause are both associated with the democratic principle, one can easily perceive a link 
between the latter and the ‘lex certa’ requirement.
Aside from indirectly furthering the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine 
lege certa within a national context, introducing specific directives regarding the 
minimum content of criminal rules to be adopted by Member States also concerns 
European citizens. This is because the directive itself, coupled with the national piece 
of law implementing it, can shed light on what exactly is punishable, thus ensuring 
foreseeability. Of course, this does not mean that the directive – or at least one 
interpretation thereof – can lead to the establishment or aggravation of offences that 
the national legislator has not proscribed as such by virtue of domestic rules. 
A much more pressing need to preserve the ‘lex certa’ requirement arises when a 
European piece of legislation compelling Member States to criminalise conduct refers 
to other provisions of EU law  88. This kind of situation might bring about practical 
problems as the ‘lex certa’ requirement must be observed with respect to every single 
provision involved. Otherwise, it would become unfeasible to adopt national rules 
incorporating EU law in a sufficiently unambiguous manner.
Evaluating the practice of the EU in the light of the principle in question –which also 
applied by analogy to Framework Decisions issued under the third pillar, considering 
that they too are designed to bind Member States in terms of the result to be achieved 
– would churn out conflicting examples (as was the case with the other principles 
discussed above). For instance, where the EU wishes to proscribe any type of conduct 
occurring within a certain field, it does so through detailed descriptions of offences 
covering virtually every imaginable situation, such as in the case of drug trafficking  89 
or the protection of the euro against counterfeiting  90. Regrettably, these examples 
constitute evidence of the exception rather than the rule. The latter is expressed in 
such cases as the Framework Decision on combating corruption in the private sector, 
by virtue of which Member States are bound to criminalise both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ 
corruption  91. The central element of the offence is that a person employed in the 
private sector requests or receives an undue advantage in exchange for breaching his/
her duties. Nonetheless, such a breach of duty is only vaguely circumscribed under 
Article 1, sec. b and has to “cover as a minimum any disloyal behaviour constituting a 
88 On this issue see h. sAtzger, Internationales und Europäisches Strafrecht, op. cit., 
p. 133f.; and F. zimmermAnn, “When is resort to criminal law in the European context useful?”, 
op. cit., p. 76.
89 Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA. 
90 Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by 
criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction 
of the euro, OJ, no. L 140, 14 June 2000, p. 1f.
91 Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA.
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breach of a statutory duty, or, as the case may be, a breach of professional regulations 
or instructions (...)”. Thus, the Framework Decision would apply to a breach of duties 
arising out of contractual arrangements or even mere orders in the workplace. Since 
the uncertainty emanates from the Framework Decision itself, Member States are 
bound to get entangled in it. Although Article 2, para. 3 of the Framework Decision 
allows the Member States to limit the scope to conduct involving a distortion of 
competition in relation to the purchase of goods or commercial services, this does not 
address the vagueness related to the breach of duty  92. Similar flaws have surfaced in 
other EU legislative acts  93: another case in point is the recent Directive on combating 
the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography  94. Article 
2, sec. b (iii) of the said proposal alludes to visual depictions of any (adult) person 
appearing to be a child, disregarding the fact that no criterion in law can possibly 
determine when an adult would “appear to be a child”, since appearances may in fact 
vary significantly from person to person (an eighteen-year-old could easily appear 
to be seventeen, whatever this may mean). On the other hand wording like ‘sexually 
explicit conduct’, which defines the pornographic material in the same directive, is 
extremely vague. Even the Council of Europe’s memorandum of the respective Treaty 
specifies that the exact meaning of this conduct should be clarified and provides a 
minimum interpretation  95. It becomes evident, then, that stipulations of this kind 
cannot satisfy the requirement of foreseeability and should therefore be left outside 
the realm of criminal law. Similar flaws also surface in other EU legislative acts. In the 
proposal for a directive on attacks against information systems  96 e.g. the requirement 
of the legality principle is not fulfilled because the proposed directive does not even 
attempt to define the notion of ‘interception’ (Article 6)  97 or ‘device which is primarily 
designed or created to commit an offence’ (Article 7), nor does it define the notion of 
‘minor cases’ which are excluded from criminalisation  98. 
92 On the problem of transposing this framework-decision into the Greek legal order see m. 
KAiAFA-gbAndi, “Punishing corruption in the public and the private sector: the legal framework 
of the European Union in the international scene and the Greek legal order”, European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2010, p. 178f.
93 See the Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism 
and xenophobia by means of criminal law, 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008, OJ, L 328, 6 
December 2008, p. 55f., as well as the Directive on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law, 2008/99/EC. See pertinent comments in Manifesto on European Criminal Policy, 
ZIS, 2009, p. 711.
94 Cf. fn. 21. 
95 See para. 143 of the Memorandum of the Treaty of the Council of Europe on the 
Protection of Children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, 25 October 2007.
96 COM (2010) 517 final and for its evaluation see m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, “Criminalizing 
attacks against information systems in the EU: the anticipated impact of the European legal 
instruments in the Greek legal order”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice, 2012, p. 59 f.
97 See however a definition by the Draft Report of LIBE, doc. 2010/0273 (COD), 
24 November 2011, Amendment 21, p. 19.
98 Ibid., Amendment 18, p. 17.
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In conclusion, the EU still has a long way to go towards ensuring actual respect 
for this facet of the principle of legality as well.
3. The prohibition of retroactive application of criminal laws  
and the principle of lex mitior
Last but not least, we need to examine yet another facet of the principle of legality, 
namely the requirement of non-retroactivity and its corollary, i.e. the principle of lex 
mitior. The obvious import of the said requirement is that criminal rules establishing 
offences or introducing aggravating circumstances thereto shall not apply to acts 
committed prior to their adoption as this would indeed violate the very core of the 
principle of legality, i.e. ‘no punishment without law’  99. The requirement is explicitly 
contained in both Article 7, para. 1 ECHR and Article 49, para. 1, sec. a, of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which has now attained binding status  100. 
Accordingly, under no circumstances may the EU require its Member States to apply 
their criminal laws retroactively.
The requirement of non-retroactivity acknowledges one notable exception, which 
– albeit not always constitutionally guaranteed – can be found in virtually every 
domestic legal order  101. Criminal law provisions not only can but actually should 
apply retroactively when they benefit the offender (i.e. either render the act not 
punishable or mitigate the sanction). This is explicitly provided for under Article 49, 
para. 1, sec. c, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, under which the Union 
may not compel States to apply the law in force at the time of the offence as long as 
it was amended thereafter (until the decision is made final) in a manner favourable 
to the defendant. To the extent that the Charter is binding on Member States, this 
exception is also to be applied by the legislature and judiciary of all Member States. 
Thus, the principle of lex mitior enjoys a more elevated status on a European level 
compared to certain Member States, presenting an excellent example of how a more 
comprehensive protection of fundamental rights within the EU can be achieved.
This analysis demonstrates, first and foremost, that the principle of legality in 
all its aspects presents certain particularities at an EU level and from an institutional 
perspective, calling for the contribution of Member States in order to leave the core 
of the principle intact. At the same time, the application of the principle in actual 
practice (the active involvement of national parliaments in the lawmaking process 
before EU bodies, faithful application of the ‘lex certa’ requirement with respect to 
the transposition of minimum rules concerning definitions of offences and sanctions) 
as well as its future institutional form (lex parlamentaria) requires further support. 
Guaranteeing the principle of legality indeed turns the spotlight on the citizen as it 
serves to limit the power of government to impose criminal sanctions and safeguards 
99 With regard to European law see, e.g., A. Klip, European Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 173f.
100 Even before the Charter attained binding status, the ECJ had recognized the principle. 
See ECJ, 3 May 2005, Joined cases C-387/02, C-391/02, C-403/02, Criminal proceedings 
against Silvio Berlusconi and others, ECR, p. I-3565, margin no. 69, 75, and 78.
101 See, e.g., Article 7, para. 1 of the Greek Constitution, which enshrines the requirement 
of non-retroactivity but stops short of guaranteeing the principle of lex mitior (the latter 
introduced in Article 2 CC).
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civil liberties. In that sense, the principle of legality provides the citizen with security 
as well  102.
D.	 The	principles	of	guilt	and	proportionality
The principle of guilt is another cornerstone of every liberally oriented criminal 
justice system  103. Individual guilt for one’s act is indeed an absolute prerequisite 
legitimising the imposition of any criminal sanction. According to this principle, a 
criminal sanction can be imposed when a criminal act has affirmatively been proven 
to be, inter alia, the product of a ‘guilty mind’, i.e. it was carried out voluntarily (with 
the requisite mens rea)  104. Only then shall the individual deserve to bear the blame 
expressed through punishment. Such substantive content of the principle evidences its 
association with the principle of proportionality, as well as its function as a limit to the 
deterrent and/or the rehabilitative orientation of punishment. Penalties are incurred to 
address acts committed with ‘a guilty mind’. Hence they should be proportionate to 
the ‘guilt’ and never exceed it for any reason  105. Thus, the principle of guilt becomes 
a constraint of state power, protecting against otherwise unbridled deterrent policies, 
ensuring respect for the human being as an individual and constituting an expression 
of respect for human dignity.
At a European level and particularly relating to criminal law, the said principle 
derives from Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, encompassing 
the presumption of innocence in the following words: “everyone who has been 
charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”; moreover, 
Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaims the inviolability of human 
dignity  106. It becomes evident, then, that the EU subscribes to the principle of guilt to 
its full extent.
102 See p.-A. Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, op. cit., p. 53.
103 The principle of guilt has so far withstood every doctrinal objection against it: see 
p.-A. Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, op. cit., p. 65. On the content of the principle of guilt 
see BVerfG 2 BvE 2-08, BvR5-08, BvR1010-08, BvR1022-08, BvR1259-08, BvR182-09 of 
30.6.2009, margin no. 364.
104 Cf. BVerfG. Even if the affirmation of guilt inevitably entails an evaluation, the 
ontological foundation of guilt, i.e. the actual expression of the offender’s mental state vis-à-vis 
the act, which can only be approached by the judge based on empirical evidence, constitutes a 
guarantee for the citizen. On the limits set to approaching the concept of guilt through empirical 
sciences by due process rights see p.-A. Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, op. cit., p. 67f.
105 See ν. ανδρΟυλακης, Άρθρο 79 ΠΚ, σε Συστηματική Ερμηνεία του ΠΚ, Αθήνα, Δίκαιο 
και Οικονομία Π. Ν. Σάκκουλας, p. 1038; m. Kαϊαφα-Γκμπαντί, Οι σκοποί της ποινής και 
η επίδρασή τους στην επιμέτρηση, σε m. Kαϊαφα-Γκμπαντί/n. μπίτζίλεκης/e. ςυμεωνίδΟυ-
καςτανίδΟυ, Tο δίκαιο των ποινικών κυρώσεων, Αθήνα, Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη, 2008, p. 298-
299, n. παραςκευΟπΟυλΟς, σε Λ. μαρΓαρίτη-N. παραςκευΟπΟυλΟυ, Ποινολογία, Αθήνα-Θεσ/
νίκη, Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα, 7η  εκδ., 2005, p. 325. 
106 The case law of the ECJ attests to this conclusion, requiring the affirmation of guilt 
for the enforcement of administrative sanctions: see A. Klip, European Criminal Law, op. cit., 
p. 189.
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It follows that the EU is bound to abstain from compelling its Member States 
to introduce strict liability crimes or introduce them itself  107. Another ramification 
of the principle of guilt is the difficulty of transposing it in those cases where legal 
persons are responsible for violating fundamental interests in the course of their 
activities. This is because a number of Member States reject criminal responsibility 
of legal persons on the grounds, inter alia, of its incompatibility with the fundamental 
principle of guilt  108. Consequently, the EU had better respect each State’s right to 
choose whether it will introduce criminal liability of legal persons or not (based on 
their own understanding of the principle of guilt, which varies according to the culture 
of each people), as has been the case with every framework decision or directive on 
responsibility of legal persons so far  109.
Having recalled the self-restrained practice of the EU with respect to the principle 
of guilt, one should also take note of the fact that the Union’s legislative acts so far 
steadily associate criminal responsibility with a requisite mens rea and in fact require 
intent. Beyond rejection of strict liability, this also clearly shows the EU’s reticence to 
uphold criminal negligence, insisting on intent as the basis of criminal responsibility. 
This position is affirmed by the ultima ratio principle – as delineated above – which 
only leaves room for negligent crimes in exceptional cases, i.e. when the significance 
of the interest harmed and the gravity of the act render them a necessity  110.
Nevertheless, there are further examples indicating the lack of respect for the 
principle of guilt on the part of the EU. For instance, one should mention Article 1, 
para. 4 of the PIF Convention on the Protection of the European Union’s financial 
interests, which provides that “the intentional nature of an act or omission (...) may 
be inferred from objective, factual circumstances”. This tends to oversimplify the 
dispositive nature of intent, which cannot be automatically inferred from ‘objective 
circumstances’ connected with the act alone. Likewise, Article 3 of the said Convention 
concerning the criminal liability of heads of businesses provides that “each Member 
State shall take the necessary measures to allow [these persons] to be declared 
criminally liable in accordance with the principles defined by its national law” in 
cases of fraud affecting the European Communities’ financial interests when a person 
under their authority is acting on behalf of the business. However, this provision does 
not seem to require the ascertainment of a criminal omission or subjective elements 
despite the fact that the crime of fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests requires 
intent on the perpetrator’s part.
Similar problems arise under a number of EU legislative acts which fail to associate 
the principle of guilt with proportionality. Indeed, in the absence of a requirement of 
‘personal guilt’, there is no measure by which to evaluate the penalty to be imposed. 
107 Cf., however, A. Klip, European Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 189, not excluding the 
compatibility of strict liability offenses with EU law.
108 See, e.g., m. KAiAFA-gbAndi, “Ein Blick auf Brennpunkte”, op. cit., p. 277f.
109 See indicatively Articles 5 and 6 of the Framework-decision on the fight against 
organized crime (2008/841/JHA) as well as Articles 5 and 6 of the proposal for a directive on 
trafficking in human beings, COM (2010) 95, of 29 March 2010.
110 Cf. Council conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal law 
deliberations, doc. 16542/09 of 23 November 2009 under the title ‘Intent’, points 6-8.
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There are other examples  111, including the Framework Decisions on terrorism and 
organised crime, which require Member States to significantly broaden criminal 
suppression and should therefore be in line with the principle of guilt. At this point, 
it is sufficient to mention some examples derived from recent EU legislative acts. 
One could mention in this respect the Directive on combating trafficking in human 
beings  112, which punishes behaviours of totally different levels of wrongfulness with 
the same level of penalties (e.g. Article 2, para. 1, many preparatory and supportive 
acts are being ‘upgraded’ to acts of direct principality)  113. The same is true for the 
proposal of a directive on attacks against information systems  114. Under the proposed 
directive, preparatory acts (Articles 7 and 9) are threatened with the same penalty as 
the directly offensive conduct itself, while Member States have to ensure that every 
offence mentioned in the directive is punishable by criminal penalties of a maximum 
term of imprisonment of at least two years (Article 9, para. 2). Aside from undermining 
the principle of proportionality, such a provision signifies that the EU leans towards 
inflexible penalties, although the principle of culpability and proportionality are better 
served by granting a certain amount of room for manoeuvre  to the individual Member 
States, thus allowing them to align each sanction to the corresponding gravity of the 
respective offences. Overall, it has become clear that the current EU trend leans 
towards the establishment of stricter penalties while reducing Member States’ room 
for manoeuvre to define them  115.
These conflicting (positive and negative) examples from the practice of the 
EU concerning the principle of guilt reveal that one cannot count on the Union’s 
commitment in placing restraints on suppressive measures in the form of minimum 
rules to be adopted by States in the field of criminal law. As long as this remains so, 
the security that the common European area aspires to achieving cannot be attained in 
a way that respects liberty and justice.
3. The Commission’s Communication on an EU Criminal Policy (COM (2011) 
573 final) and the relevant European Parliament resolution (2010/2310 
(INI)) in light of the Manifesto of the ECPI 
The above analysis based on the Manifesto on European Criminal Policy of the 
ECPI-group helps us reveal the merits but also the shortcomings of the Commission’s 
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on “Ensuring the effective 
implementation of EU policies through criminal law”  116. This document enhances the 
111 See the Manifesto on European Criminal Policy, ZIS, 2009, p. 711-712.
112 Directive 2011/36/EU.
113 See the relevant evaluation of this directive by ECPI (Rapporteurs: H. satzger/ 
F. zimmermAn), www.crompol.eu.
114 COM (2010) 517 final.
115 See the relevant evaluation of this directive by M. KAiAFA-gbAndi, European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2012, p. 69-70.
116 COM (2011) 573 final.
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Council’s decisions on “Model criminal provisions” and on “The approximation of 
penalties” (adopted in 2009 and 2002 respectively)  117 in a variety of aspects.
First of all one should stress the utmost importance of the Commission’s 
Communication as it tries to express an EU institutional body’s understanding with 
regard to European criminal policy and to clarify its objectives even though the 
Communication is restricted to the adoption of criminal law directives to ensure the 
implementation of EU policies that have been subject to harmonisation measures 
(Article 83, para. 2 TFEU). In other words, the importance of the Communication 
lies in its attempt to set up a general framework that answers questions such as ‘if’ 
and ‘when’ the EU can employ its harshest means – i.e. criminal law – by binding its 
Member States to criminalise conduct in areas where it has competence  118. Thus the 
Commission’s Communication initiates a Union-wide discussion that needs to be held 
in considerable detail. Especially worth mentioning is the general acknowledgement 
in the Communication of principles that are to be respected by the EU, such as the 
subsidiarity principle, the application of criminal law as a last resort, the proportionality 
principle as well as respect for fundamental rights  119.
I will now focus on certain central issues in the Communication, which generate 
questions or could be highlighted from another point of view, in comparison with the 
European Parliament’s relevant resolution on an EU approach to criminal law, trying 
to serve the main objective – documented as such in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU  120 – i.e. to place the individual at the heart of its activities. 
A.	 The	added	value	of	EU	criminal	law
First of all it should be stressed that the added value of EU criminal law is 
unilaterally determined in the Commission’s Communication. This added value should 
not be seen only as “tackling gaps and shortcomings (...) in view of the cross border 
dimension of many crimes, ensuring that criminals can neither hide behind borders nor 
abuse differences between national legal systems for criminal purposes”  121, but  also 
in safeguarding the fundamental rights of suspects and defendants, whose prosecution 
is now greatly facilitated on a Union-wide basis. In other words, the Commission’s 
vision for an EU criminal law as “an important tool to better fight crime (...) and 
ensure the effective implementation of EU policies”  122 is too feeble compared to the 
117 Council docs 16452/2009, 16798/2009, 16826/2/2009 and 9141/2002. The Council’s 
text on “Model criminal law provisions” aimed at achieving coherent and consistent criminal 
law provisions, is characterised by flexibility and is meant to be only a starting point for further 
development, see also H. Nilsson, “25 years of Criminal justice in Europe”, EuCLR, 2012, 
p. 106-122. 
118 See also “Editorial”, EuCLR, 3/2011, p. 209-211.
119 COM (2011) 573 final, 6-7. Cf. the European Parliament’s resolution on a EU approach 
on criminal law, 2010/2310 (INI), 22 May 2012 (see also the report of the Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs A7-0144/2012, Rapporteur: Cornelis de Jong), which deals 
with the fundamental principles for European criminal legislation much more substantially 
(para. 1-6, 12). 
120 See the Preamble of the Charter.
121 COM (2011) 573 final, p. 2-3.
122 Ibid., p. 12.
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European legal civilization and also stands in opposition to the rule of law, according 
to which criminal law should be a tool for protecting fundamental interests as well as 
civil freedoms at the same time. This double function of criminal law should expressly 
determine its added value in the framework of the EU and is much better served in 
the framework of the European Parliament’s recent resolution on an EU approach on 
criminal law.
B. The function of common minimum rules:  
serving	more	than	strengthening	mutual	trust
On the other hand, according to the Commission, common minimum rules are 
essential to enhance mutual trust between Member States and national judiciaries  123. 
Their importance, though, should be seen primarily as determining a minimum 
punishability of certain behaviours according to the ultima ratio principle for 
protecting fundamental legal interests and in simultaneously safeguarding all the 
basic principles of a liberal criminal law, which I have referred to. In other words, 
mutual trust between Member States and judiciaries can be derived from the respect 
expressed in common minimum rules for fundamental principles of criminal law and 
is not independent from the quality of such rules  124. Thus it would be a great loss for 
the European legal system to come up with common minimum criminal law rules 
simply as a tool for strengthening mutual trust and facilitating the mutual recognition 
of judicial measures. Fortunately, the European Parliament’s resolution adopts a wider 
view on the matter than the Commission’s stance. 
C.	 Safeguarding	coherence	and	consistency	of	criminal	law	rules	on	both	levels	
(European	and	national)
The coherence and consistency of criminal law rules  125 is also a key issue in the 
Commission’s Communication. However it is imperative to stress that coherence and 
consistency of criminal law provisions is not only a fundamental principle for the EU 
legal order. It is also a fundamental value that should be respected by the EU when 
intervening in the criminal law system of its Member States. For this purpose, prior 
to any EU approximation of criminal law rules for a specific field of criminality, a 
detailed and carefully adjusted analysis of existing national criminal law provisions 
in the respective field is needed so that the EU avoids compelling individual Member 
States to constantly increase sanctions, broaden punishability or disregard the 
proportionality principle in their national framework. 
123 Ibid., p. 5.
124 Similarly the European Parliament’s resolution on an EU approach on criminal law, 
para. 2-3. 
125 Ibid. See also the European Parliament’s resolution on an EU approach on criminal law, 
recitals H, N, O and para. 6, 11, 13.
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D.	 The	Commission’s	two	step	approach	in	EU	criminal	law	legislation
With regard to the proposed two-step approach to EU criminal law legislation 
that the Commission introduced in its Communication of 2011  126, the methodological 
structure of this approach can be evaluated in a positive way. 
Nevertheless, the first step, i.e. referring to the decision as to whether to 
adopt criminal law measures at all  127, reveals a serious shortcoming. The question 
regarding the conditions under which to employ criminal law as a last resort for 
the implementation of a EU policy cannot be sufficient. Prior to such a question, 
we need to pay heed to the existence and need for the protection of a fundamental 
interest, which can be derived from the EU’s primary legislation and which should 
be significantly damaged or jeopardised through punishable activities  128 as criminal 
law is not supposed to be reduced to a mere instrument for the implementation of any 
policy, even when used as a last resort. One can deduce the same basic stance from 
para. 3 of the European Parliament’s recent resolution.
Through the second step, referring to the principles guiding the decision on the 
kind of criminal law to adopt  129, aside from the general assessment that the Commission 
downgrades the actual implementation of fundamental principles of criminal law 
when describing its view on the possible concrete content of EU minimum rules  130, 
five critical remarks are in order:
– When introducing common minimum criminal law rules, the EU legislator is 
obliged to respect the principle of legal certainty as far as the minimum content 
of punishability is concerned to such a degree that its provisions leave no doubt 
about it and thus satisfy the lex certa requirement  131. Otherwise the national 
legislators will not be able to transpose the EU common minimum rules into their 
domestic legal order correctly.
– Regard should be paid to the fact that in the frame of introducing common 
minimum rules, the EU is not granted competence to introduce a general part of 
European criminal law  132.
126 COM (2011) 573 final, p. 7f.
127 Ibid., p. 7.
128 Compare also the European Parliament’s resolution on an EU approach on criminal 
law, para. 3.
129 COM (573) final, p. 7-9.
130 Cf. “Editorial” of EuCLR, 3/2011, p. 210, referring to a two-fold strategy of the 
Commission as the Communication makes clear that criminal law has to serve other – political 
and economic – ends. 
131 See COM (2011) 573 final, p. 8. Cf. the European Parliament’s resolution on an EU 
approach to criminal law, para. 4. 
132 Böse, “Die Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts”, p. 76 and p. 86; M. Heger, 
“Perspektiven des Europäischen Strafrechts nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon”, ZIS, 2009, p. 406 
and p. 412. Cf. for this matter A. Klip, “Towards a general part”, op. cit., p. 30f. as well as 
r. sicurellA, “Some reflections on the need for a general theory of the competence of the 
European Union in criminal law”, in A. Klip (ed.), Substantive Criminal Law of the European 
Union, op. cit., p. 234f.
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– There is an urgent need for the EU to set up a proportionality scale of penalties 
with reference to the fundamental interests protected on an EU level, which will 
serve as a benchmark against the national scale of sanctions for the relevant 
field of offences. National legal systems will thus not face the prospect of being 
dismantled through the EU’s intervention in terms of their internal proportional 
nature. In other words, a mere decline in the degree of variation between the 
national systems  133 cannot establish itself as a key rationale of an EU effort to 
tailor sanctions to crimes.
– It is doubtful whether the EU is acknowledged a relevant competence for laying 
down rules of jurisdiction  134. In any case the EU statutes on jurisdiction should 
be very ‘discreet’ and abstain from instigating additional conflicts of jurisdiction 
as long as no European-wide system of a single transnational criminal procedure 
respecting the rule of law is introduced.
– Mere statistical data outlining the status and trend of criminality in particular 
fields within individual national legal orders  135 does not suffice as adequate proof 
for the definite requirement of a new set of EU rules for criminal law. One also 
has to take notice of the reasons for the respective situation in every Member State 
and be aware of the fact that these reasons are often related to the implementation 
of the relevant rules and not to the existing legislation itself. 
E.	 EU	policy	fields	and	the	possible	inevitability	of	EU	criminal	law
Lastly, let me proceed to make some observations addressing the Union’s 
policy areas where harmonised EU criminal law rules might be needed. According 
to the Commission’s Communication: “Where the discretion of Member States in 
implementing EU law does not lead to the desired effect enforcement, it may be 
necessary to regulate, by means of minimum rules at EU level which sanctions Member 
States have to foresee in their national legislation. Approximating sanction levels will 
in particular be a consideration, if an analysis of the current sanction legislation of 
administrative or criminal nature reveals significant differences amongst Member 
States and if those differences lead to an inconsistent application of EU rules”  136. 
However, such a situation does not at all render the approximation of criminal laws 
in different EU policy fields essential as the Treaty provides. The relevant decisive 
questions here are the ones concerning the fundamental interests to be protected 
and the punishable activities causing significant damage to society or individuals. 
Unfortunately these questions are not discussed in the Commission’s Communication. 
133 However, in this way the Commission, COM (2011) 573 final, p. 9.
134 See German Bundesrat Drucksache 582/11 v. 4.11.2011, 3-4 (Allgemeine 
strafrechtliche Rechtsinstitute einer auf Article 83 AEUV gestützten Gesetzgebung sind nur 
insoweit zugänglich als dies mit der Schaffung von Mindestvorschriften für die Festlegung von 
Straftaten und Strafen verbunden ist); A.-s. mAssA, “Jurisdiction in England and Wales and 
the Netherlands: A comparative appraisal with a European touch”, in A. Klip (ed.), Substantive 
Criminal Law of the European Union, p. 118f.; cf. though p. cAeiro, “Commentary on the 
‘European Touch’ of the comparative appraisal”, ibid., p. 125f.
135 COM (2011) 573 final, p. 8.
136 COM (2011) 573 final, p. 10.
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Besides, it is important to stress that a common understanding of the guiding principles 
underlying EU criminal law legislation – as opposed to the Commission’s view  137 – 
goes far beyond the interpretation of basic legal concepts used in criminal law and 
the added value that criminal law sanctions can provide, as I have already tried to 
make clear in the first part of this text, referring to the safeguarding of fundamental 
principles of criminal law and respect for human rights. 
4. Conclusions
The above analysis allows us to deduce the following general conclusions:
(i) Even within an international or supranational environment, such as the EU, 
criminal law will always retain its particular nature since it constitutes the sternest 
mechanism of social control, which deeply affects fundamental civil liberties.
(ii) Highlighting such a particular aspect does not have the aim of sustaining anti-
European sentiment or insulating Member States’ criminal justice systems from 
the EU’s legal order. On the contrary, the goal is to emphasise the importance of 
fundamental principles of criminal law in restraining counter-crime policies so 
that they are implemented in a manner that respects civil liberties and benefits 
citizens. The EU ought to apply these principles without altering their substantive 
content, as it subscribes to the same values as the ones that gave rise to these 
principles in the first place.
(iii)  At this point in history, the institutional identity and political agenda of the EU 
as outlined after the Treaty of Lisbon present an opportunity that should not be 
missed, particularly since guaranteeing the fundamental rights of citizens already 
emerges as a declared goal of the Union. The practical difficulty, of course, is 
to move from verbally guaranteeing civil liberties to ensuring respect for them 
in actual practice, an endeavour that has often proven to be quite arduous for 
Member States themselves.
(iv) True safeguarding of fundamental rights, a task primarily focused on the 
sensitive field of criminal suppression, hinges on the EU’s day-to-day activities, 
and especially on its legal tools, by which it imposes its decisions to criminalise 
various types of conduct on Member States. The long and winding path towards 
preserving civil liberties within a common European area – pursued thus far 
with the preservation of ‘security’ in mind – can only be traversed if the liberal 
fundamental principles governing when and under which circumstances the State 
may impose criminal punishment are placed at the centre of attention. A first 
step in this direction is surely made with the Communication of the Commission 
referring to an EU Criminal Policy and my hope is that there will be many positive 
steps to follow, not only made by the European Parliament  138 and the Council, but 
also by an inter-institutional agreement between all these legislative EU actors  139 
as well as by a wider academic discussion, the outcome of which could support 
137 Ibid., p. 12.
138 See the European Parliament’s resolution 2010/2310.
139 Ibid., para. 15 and 16.
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the Union’s path towards a liberal criminal law system governed by the rule of 
law and respect for human rights.
The way forward: A general part  
of European criminal law
Jeroen h. blomsmA & christina peristeridou *
1. Introduction
Many interesting suggestions have been made about how to move ahead in the area 
of European substantive criminal law. However, these reflections almost exclusively 
concern the definitions of and penalties for specific offences. By contrast, not much 
attention has been paid to the general principles of criminal law, such as intent, 
attempt and participation. This tendency reflects the current state of EU legislation, 
which deals predominantly with the special part of criminal law. Both EU legislator 
and academia seem to be less concerned with the general part of criminal law.
In this contribution, we argue that the fact that insufficient attention has been paid 
to the general part of criminal law has led to various problems. In our view, the way 
forward in substantive criminal law is therefore to establish a general part of criminal 
law for the EU. The authors are part of a research team from Maastricht University 
which has taken up this task. The article is structured as follows. First, we will explain 
why European criminal law needs a general part. Subsequently, we will explain how 
the Maastricht research team has been constructing this general part. Finally, given 
that the Maastricht project is nearly completed, we will also address the question of 
whether or not such a general part should be codified.
2. The need for a general part of criminal law for the EU
When we speak of the ‘general part’ of criminal law, we are referring to a 
certain structural dichotomy whereby criminal provisions are divided up into general 
and special rules. Traditionally, while the special part of criminal law includes the 
* The opinons expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Institutions they work for.
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definitions of the different offences, the general part incorporates certain generally 
applicable principles and concepts, which are common throughout the criminal 
system. The nature of the general part and the advantages of it being kept separate 
from the special part can be seen in national criminal law systems. Given the fact that 
the European criminal justice system is based on national legal systems, we should 
first take a look at the rationales for the general part in national law.
A. The general part in national law
The distinction between the general and special parts of substantive criminal law 
is a well-embedded, if not self-evident, feature found in continental traditions. All 
systems which have been historically influenced by the Germanic and Napoleonic 
traditions have adopted a general part of criminal law  1. The general part is quite 
heterogeneous as it comprises different kinds of norms, including provisions that 
determine the scope of criminal liability, principles of justice, norms regarding 
punishment et cetera  2.
The normative role of the general part in criminal law depends on the different 
provisions at hand. Thus, principles of justice such as the principle of legality oversee 
the application of criminal norms and legitimise the exercise of state power in this 
regard. Norms on actus reus, mens rea and defences determine the scope of criminal 
liability. Although they describe criminal conduct, the formulation of these norms 
in the general part comes with a certain Rechtsgutsblindheit, i.e. they are stipulated 
without considering different protected legal interests  3. This means that the general 
part is not an informative introduction or a mere academic generalisation of special 
offences. The true relationship between the general and special part is not one of lex 
generalis-lex specialis but a complimentary relationship. The judge applies general 
principles of criminal liability in order to determine the exact scope of criminal liability 
of the special offences. The judge determines the scope of criminal liability in an ad 
hoc case by reading together, for example, the definitions of intention, participation 
and robbery. Therefore, there is a sort of ‘clip-function’ between the general concepts 
of criminal liability and special offences (Klammerfunktion)  4.
The general part owes its existence to the hypothesis that its provisions are 
common features of criminal liability with a stable meaning, irrespective of specific 
offences. The general part is not only based on this hypothesis but it also promotes this 
1 For example, in France, Livre 1er: Dispositions générales, Articles 111-1 à 133-17, 
Code pénal; in the Netherlands, Boek 1: Algemene bepalingen, Αrtikels 1 tot 91, Wetboek van 
Strafrecht; in Germany, Allgemeiner Teil § 1-79b Strafgezetzbuch (StGB); in Greece, Γενικό 
Μέρος, άρθρα 1-133, Ποινικός Κώδικας.
2 m. FincKe, Das Verhältnis des Allgemeinen zum Besonderen Teil des Strafrechts, Berlin, 
J. Schweitzer Verlag, 1975, p. 22-26. See for an English approach, J. gArdner, “On the General 
Part of the Criminal Law”, in A. duFF (ed.), Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principle and 
critique, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 207-209.
3 m. FincKe, supra note 2, p. 90. This feature, according to Fincke, is the element that 
distinguishes norms that belong to the General Part from the norms of the Special Part as 
opposed to other features such as ‘abstractness’.
4 Ibid., p. 8.
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idea as a thesis: there should be certain common and stable principles and features of 
criminal liability in a legal system. The question as to whether or not this is a correct 
and appropriate thesis can be explored by comparing it with a legal system in which 
this hypothesis is not (fully) shared. 
A similar distinction between a general and special part of criminal law cannot 
be seen in common law systems. In English criminal law, there is no general part, 
but merely “a set of aspirational principles (...)”  5. The English system has opted for 
a ‘special-part approach’, where different concepts, belonging to the continental 
general part of criminal law, are developed within specific offences either by the 
legislator or judicially. Thus, there are statutes that deal with certain aspects of the 
general part, such as the Serious Crime Act 2007 and the Accessories and Abettors 
Act 1861 as amended by the Criminal Law Act 1977. At the same time, concepts such 
as omission, recklessness and defences are either developed judicially or they are 
defined by statutes only in connection with specific criminal offences  6. 
The reason for such a development can be attributed mainly to the fact that 
traditionally the powers of the judiciary were increased  7. The legality principle and the 
separation of powers doctrine have been developed in different ways in England and 
on the continent. The continental function of the legality principle, which sets limits 
to judicial interpretation and legitimises the jus punendi through the prevalent role of 
the parliamentary statute did not exist as such in England. Historically, English judges 
enjoyed a lot of discretion in the development of new criminal liability offences and 
the interpretation of prior-existing norms, while the legislator was rarely involved in 
criminal law-making  8. Therefore, certain constructive elements of criminal liability, 
such as recklessness and participation, have been developed over a period of many 
decades through judicial interpretation  9.
Nowadays, the courts have fewer powers  10. The principle of legality is more 
widely accepted in the English system and the English legislator has produced 
criminal liability statutes covering a wide net of common law offences. However, 
the intervention of the legislator in the area of criminal liability has not led to more 
consistency  11. There is still a lack of a unified definition of mens rea and actus reus 
requirements that would be applied by the courts with relative consistency to special 
5 A. AshWorth, Principles of Criminal law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, 
p. 84-85.
6 Ibid., p. 98-101 and p. 408-413; see also the Corporate Manslaughter Act 2007 on the 
definition of the ‘duty to care’.
7 A. sAmuels, “Why do we not have a Criminal Code”, The Journal of Criminal Law, 
2003, p. 214-219, where he identifies as reasons the unwillingness of the legislator, the lack of 
interest of the public opinion, the complexity and controversies and the attitude of the judges. 
8 See J.R. spencer, Nulla poena sine lege in English Criminal law, The Cambridge-
Tilburg Law Lectures, Third Series, Deventer, Kluwer, 1980, p. 38-39.
9 E.g. the debate in defining the element of recklessness and the term ‘malicious’ in R. 
v. Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 and for an overall overview see A. AshWorth, 2009, supra 
note 5, p. 177-189.
10 E.g. R v. Rimmington and R v. Goldstein (joined cases) [2005] UKHL 63.
11 A. AshWorth, 2009, supra note 5, p. 47.
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offences. The legislator does not seem very concerned with the consistency of criminal 
law. By contrast, the legislative output is aimed at codifying specific offences and 
therefore there are various actus reus and mens rea requirements that may be relevant 
only for some offences. One may find various mens rea requirements throughout 
English criminal law, such as intention, recklessness, maliciousness, knowledge and 
belief, reckless knowledge, negligence and wilfulness. In addition, these terms might 
carry different meanings depending on the offence at hand  12. For example, the term 
‘wilfully’ has been interpreted as ‘intentionally or recklessly’ in the context of the 
wilful neglect of a child, but in other offences, the term did not generate a mens rea 
requirement  13. In the end, it is the English academia that is attempting to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the theory of criminal liability  14.
The fragmented and inconsistent development of criminal liability has fuelled 
discussion about the potential need for codification and the need to establish common 
definitions for the requirements of actus reus and mens rea. Some have argued that, 
despite the benefits of uniform definitions of the constructive elements of criminal 
liability, the presumption that criminal law would become more rational and 
principled with the creation of a general part could be challenged  15. However, the 
English ‘special-part approach’ has drawn more criticism than support. In particular, 
the lack of a general part has led to inconsistency and legal uncertainty as courts 
are left with a considerable margin of appreciation  16. The labyrinth of different 
elements of criminal liability and lengthy, complicated statutes inhibit accessibility 
while the administration of justice suffers as well  17. There have been pleas to bring 
accessibility, comprehensibility, consistency and certainty to the criminal law 
system and turn towards a more ‘principled’ approach: “Matters of this kind (…) 
should be resolved only after a thorough and methodical consideration of how the 
components of the offence relate to the general principles (…) [T]here is a pressing 
need to develop a theory of criminal legislation that establishes a set of principles 
(...)”  18. The Law Commission took up the task of codifying criminal law by producing 
several codification documents, including a Draft Penal Code in 1989  19. Whilst the 
12 Ibid., p. 170-191.
13 Ibid., p. 190.
14 Such as the work of A. AshWorth, 2009, supra note 5; G. WilliAms, Criminal Law: The 
General Part, London, Stevens & Sons, 1961; A.P. simester et G.R. sullivAn, Criminal Law: 
Theory and Doctrine, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010.
15 J. gArdner, supra note 2, p. 247.
16 Lord binghAm, “A Criminal Code: Must we wait for ever?”, Criminal Law Review, 
1998, p. 695.
17 P. Alldridge, “Making Criminal Law Known”, in S. shute et A.P. simester, Criminal 
Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 103 and 
p. 111-113; S. gArdner, “Reiterating the Criminal Code”, Modern Law Review, 1992, p. 839-
847.
18 A. AshWorth, “Towards a Theory of Criminal Legislation”, Criminal Law Forum, 1989, 
p. 42-43.
19 See for the Law Commission’s output in http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/
legislating-the-criminal-code.htm, accessed 28 June 2012.
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codification process was welcomed by many  20, it drew criticism as well  21. In the end, 
the codification process as such was abandoned  22.
The analysis of the English ‘special-part’ approach shows that the hypothesis on 
which the general part is based (namely that there should be certain common and 
stable features and principles governing criminal liability) is supported by some 
strong arguments.
First of all, common and stable definitions of the conditions and requirements of 
criminal liability support the protective finality of criminal law as they safeguard legal 
certainty and the separation of powers  23. Certainly, there is a margin of appreciation 
as to how the constitutive elements of criminal liability apply in different cases. 
However, stable and common definitions of the elements of mens rea and actus reus 
for the plurality of offences restrain the courts from applying arbitrary concepts of 
criminal liability in a casuistic manner. The legislator is also restricted in this regard. 
For example, the preference for ‘intention’ as the main mens rea requirement obliges 
the German legislator to refer explicitly to the commission of offences by negligence. 
As such, it also acts as a brake on the frequent criminalisation of negligent behaviour. 
Criminal liability also becomes more accessible and comprehensible because 
individuals can foresee the evaluation of their involvement in an offence and the 
conditions under which such a prohibited act would be excused or justified with more 
certainty  24.
Secondly, the establishment of a general part also benefits the instrumental finality 
of criminal law, namely the administration of justice. There is a practical reason for 
the establishment of common and stable criminal liability concepts  25. It is simply 
more practical and reasonable to concentrate all the rules and principles that show 
a similar pattern in a structured manner rather than repeating them for every single 
specific criminal offence. That would amount to criminal codes and legislation of such 
length and complexity that it would diminish the expediency of justice, efficiency and 
enforcement of criminal liability by the authorities. 
Thirdly, the general part also has benefits at the philosophical level. Feuerbach 
has referred to the general part as a philosophical part  26 because it is a manifesto of 
the theoretical approach of the legislator towards criminal liability and punishment 
phenomena as it attaches an ideological colour and character to the criminal law 
20 Mrs Justice Arden, “Criminal Law and the Crossroads: the Impact of Human rights 
from the Law Commissions’ Perspective and the Need for a Code”, Criminal Law Review, 
1999, p. 439; Lord binghAm, supra note 16, p. 694.
21 G. de búrcA and S. gArdner, “The Codification of the Criminal Law”, Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, 1990, p. 559-571; A. AshWorth, 2009, supra note 5, p. 47; G. WilliAms, 
“What should the Code do about omissions?”, Legal Studies, 1987, p. 92-118.
22 Law Com no. 311; Editorial, “RIP: the Criminal code (1968-2008)”, Criminal Law 
Review, 2009, p. 1-2. 
23 M. FincKe, supra note 2, p. 4.
24 P. Alldridge, supra note 17, p. 111-119. 
25 M. FincKe, supra note 2, p. 8-9. 
26 Ibid., p. 18.
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system as a whole  27. In the general part we find answers to certain very fundamental 
questions of criminal liability that mirror the stance of every system vis-à-vis human 
rights and the Rule of Law. Who is the subject of criminal liability? Can an animal, a 
firm or the mind be a perpetrator? What is a criminal act made of? Are there different 
levels of involvement in the crime? How are individuals with an incapacitated state of 
mind treated? The general part thus represents the orientation framework of criminal 
liability on which further legislation and case law is based. It crystallises the criminal 
policy and criminal theory of a system and facilitates the development of a consistent 
body of criminal science  28.
B.	 A	general	part	for	European	criminal	law?
Having seen the benefits and reasons that underpin the existence of a distinct 
general part with defined fundamental concepts at the national level, the question that 
arises is how much added value such a development represents for European criminal 
law. 
European criminal law is an area of law in transition and is still developing  29. 
On the one hand, the European criminal system has an instrumental finality whose 
aim is to harmonise certain criminal offences, enforce European policies and create 
a European order where individuals can exercise the four freedoms. Articles 83(1) 
and (2) TFEU establish jus punendi powers for the European legislator, which are 
shared with the national legislators. However, such harmonisation is in practice quite 
incomplete due to vague prescriptions in European instruments as well as considerable 
differences in criminal liability rules from one national system to another  30. 
Directives and Framework Decisions focus on the elements of specific offences and 
pay very little attention to definitions of the actus reus and mens rea concepts that 
are mentioned in these instruments  31. While the European legislator requests that the 
aiding, abetting or negligent commission of a criminal offence is criminalised, there 
are no explanations of what these terms mean  32. In national systems, the same terms 
of actus reus and mens rea might correspond to different concepts whilst certain terms 
used in Directives as such might not exist in a national system  33. Given the normative 
27 I. μanoledakis, Ποινικό Δίκαιο: επιτομή γενικού μέρους, Θεσσαλονίκη, Σάκκουλας, 
2001, p. 46. 
28 M. FincKe, supra note 2, p. 6.
29 A.H. Klip, European Criminal law: an Integrative approach, Antwerp, Intersentia, 
2012, p. 1.
30 C. peristeridou, “The principle of lex certa in national law and European perspectives”, 
in A.H. Klip (ed.), Substantive Criminal Law of the European Union, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2011, 
p. 88-89.
31 K. Ambos, “Is the development of a Common Substantive Criminal Law for European 
Possible?”, Maastricht Journal, 2005, p. 175.
32 Framework Decisions and Directives refer to criminal liability notions such as attempt, 
aiding and abetting without any further explanation on their scope, e.g. Article 4 of Directive 
2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, 
OJ, no. L 328, 6 December 2008, p. 28.
33 See for example, J. Keiler, “Towards a European concept of participation in crime”, 
p. 135-159 and J.H. blomsmA, “Fault elements in EU Criminal law: the case for recklessness”, 
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influence of these concepts in the determination of the scope of criminal liability 
(the clip-function), the harmonisation of criminal offences at the European level has 
therefore only been half-achieved  34. The minimum scope of criminal liability that the 
European legislator requests to be criminalised is incomplete without any definitions 
of actus reus and mens rea. This results in discrepancies in the implementation as 
national legislators and courts employ national concepts of criminal liability  35. For 
example, helping out a friend to commit theft of credit cards would imply a different 
scope of criminal liability in England in comparison to Germany given the different 
approach and definitions of participation and perpetration in the two systems  36.
While the national legislators are obliged to transpose only the minimum scope 
of criminal liability prescribed in the Directive, how are Member States to fulfill 
this obligation if they cannot know what the minimum requirements are supposed to 
encompass? The instrumental finality of European criminal law presupposes a clear 
mandate to national legislators to achieve the minimum scope of criminalisation. 
Furthermore, one can argue that knowing what the minimum scope encompasses 
facilitates also a more transparent decision-making and dialogue within the national 
parliaments. In particular, the choice to criminalise beyond the minimum scope of 
the Directive should be consciously made by the national parliament after a thorough 
debate on whether stricter rules would be in line with the principles of ultima ratio and 
proportionality at the national setting.
On the other hand, there is also a protective finality of European criminal law, in 
which the individual/accused is protected against arbitrary state power through the 
establishment of principles of justice that legitimise and limit criminal liability. The 
protective finality of European criminal law is relatively underdeveloped  37. Despite 
the codification or judicial recognition of certain criminal law principles (principle 
of legality, guilt, proportionality, etc.), these have not received a European context 
within which they can unfurl their protective function in the multilevel European 
criminal justice system. Does the legality principle acknowledge only statutes as a 
source of criminal liability or also case law precedent? What is the level of precision 
that implementing legislation of criminal law Directives should reach in order to be 
considered in compliance with European obligations? The general part does not only 
incorporate these principles but it also puts them into practice by reflecting the extent to 
which they are respected in the conceptualisation of the criminal phenomenon and its 
constitutive elements. The choices made in a general part are a way of applying certain 
principles of justice and human rights. For example, a system that does not distinguish 
between perpetrators and participants respects the principle of proportionality to a 
different degree than a criminal liability model that does. An analysis of these 
p. 135-106, both in A.H. Klip (ed.), supra note 30.
34 E.g. Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Report from the Commission of 
Council Framework decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, SEC (2004) 688, 8 May 
2004, p. 20.
35 R. sicurellA, “Some reflections on the need for a general theory of the competence of 
the European Union in criminal law”, in A.H. Klip (ed.), supra note 30, p. 243.
36 J. Keiler, supra note 33, p. 135-159.
37 See e.g. The Manifesto on the European Criminal law Policy, http://www.crimpol.eu/.
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principles that also shows their relationship with criminal liability choices has not 
been made at the European level: “There should be a common understanding on the 
guiding principles underlying EU criminal law legislation, such as the interpretation 
of basic legal concepts used in EU criminal law”  38.
The underdeveloped status of the instrumental and protective finalities of 
European criminal law can be attributed to a more general and ongoing deficiency, 
namely the lack of a deep political, philosophical and theoretical debate on the goals of 
harmonising criminal liability, the position and nature of the subjects towards criminal 
law and the general philosophical framework within which the criminal phenomenon 
in Europe functions. What has been criticised over the years is the lack of a European 
criminal policy: “The European institutions making criminal policy decisions on a 
large scale have failed to acknowledge criminal policy as an autonomous European 
policy. As a consequence they do not follow a coherent concept of criminal policy”  39. 
The fact that European criminal policy has no autonomy mirrors a lack of autonomy of 
criminal law per se. In essence, the philosophical value of the general part in national 
systems is that it attributes an autonomous character to criminal law by creating an 
ideological platform for the criminal system. Hidden within the general part is a 
choice for a criminal justice model for every system. Answers to the questions about 
the criminal liability of legal entities or about the relationship between the mind and 
the criminal act should not be susceptible to short-term policy decisions. The EU 
institutions have recognised this and taken the first steps in this direction  40. However, 
much work remains to be done. With the development of a general part for European 
criminal law, Europe will be forced to confront the relationship between criminal 
liability choices and the Rule of Law. 
From a more practical point of view, the development of a European general part 
of criminal law seems to be already on the way. Already in Intertanko, the ECJ gave an 
autonomous definition of serious negligence  41. It is likely that, in the future, when the 
ECJ takes on full competence in this field, more judicial definitions of these concepts 
will be produced. Concepts borrowed from national law always gain an ‘autonomous 
interpretation’ in European law by the ECJ  42. What this autonomous meaning might 
be for the different concepts of the general part used in Directives remains to be seen. 
Certain choices have already been made in the area of competition law. In that context, 
38 Commission Communication, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective 
implementation of EU policies through criminal law, Brussels, COM (2011) 573, 20 September 
2011, p. 3 and 12.
39 From the Preamble of the Manifesto, see supra note 37.
40 Council document, Draft Council conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s 
criminal law deliberations, Brussels, 16542/2/09 REV 2, 27 November 2009; Towards an EU 
criminal policy?: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law, 
Commission Communication of 20 September 2011 COM (2011) 573 and European Parliament 
resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal law (2010/2310 (INI)) (see annex to 
the present book).
41 ECJ, 3 June 2008, C-308/06, Intertanko, ECR, I-4057, para. 71.
42 ECJ, 16 November 2010, C-261/09, Mantello, ECR, I-11477, para. 38.
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the ECJ has already defined certain elements of liability, such as participation  43. In 
addition, the principle of legality has been slowly developing within the European 
context: for example, in competition law cases, the ECJ has accepted the notion of 
droit as opposed to loi and it praised the increased role of case law in the development 
of the scope of statutory criminal liability  44.
The question therefore is not whether there should be definitions of elements 
of criminal liability at the European level but what these might be. The process of 
constructing a European general part and developing a European concept of criminal 
liability necessitates a thorough consideration of different parameters. In the next part, 
we will deal with the question of how certain common elements of liability belonging 
to a general part should be identified. 
3. The ‘Maastricht Project’ 
In order to establish a general part of criminal law for the European Union, a 
research project was set up at Maastricht University in 2007. Under the supervision of 
Professor André Klip, four PhD researchers originating from different Member States 
began working on the establishment of the general principles of criminal law. Opting 
for a thematic approach, these general principles were divided into four areas. In 2007, 
Johannes Keiler (AT) started his research on actus reus and participation  45, Jeroen 
Blomsma (NL) began investigating mens rea and defences  46, Christina Peristeridou 
(EL) started her study on the principle of legality and Anne-Sophie Massa (BE) started 
her research on locus delicti and jurisdiction. In this way, one individual gathered and 
compared the data and construed the general principles out of that comparison. 
A. Two stages
In short, the research was conducted in two stages. In a first stage, general 
concepts of criminal law were deduced from the legal systems of the Member States 
and that of the EU. In other words, the Maastricht general part is established from the 
acquis commun and the acquis communautaire. In a second stage, a synthesis was 
put together from these similar and different principles, thus establishing the general 
principles of criminal law for the EU. Later on, we will explain what sources were 
used and according to which criteria the synthesis was produced.
The selection of the sources for the project followed from the Treaties. After 
all, Article 6(3) TEU reads: “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union’s law”. Article 67(1) TFEU reads: “The 
Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for 
43 CFI, 8 July 2008, T-99/04, AC Treuhand v. Commission, ECR, II-1501.
44 ECJ, 28 June 2005, Joined Cases C-189/02 P and Others, Dansk Rørindustri and others 
v. Commission, ECR, II-1681, para. 217.
45  J. Keiler, Actus reus and participation in European criminal law (dissertation), 
Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2013.
46 J.H. blomsmA, Mens rea and defences in European criminal law (dissertation), 
Antwerpen, Intersentia 2012.
126     trAnsversAl ApproAch
fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member 
States”. Thus, in establishing a general part of criminal law for the European Union, 
several sources should be taken into account: first, the fundamental rights as can be 
found in, most notably, the ECHR and secondly, the legal traditions of the Member 
States. 
It is also logical to take into account EU law when establishing general principles 
for European criminal law. This includes those general principles or aspects thereof 
that have already been identified by the ECJ. The aforementioned articles lay down the 
method the ECJ has used for decades to identify the general principles of Union law. 
As explained in the previous section, the ECJ has established some general principles 
of EU law by considering the legal traditions of the Member States and the guidelines 
supplied by the international treaties on human rights  47. Unfortunately, the ECJ has 
only identified some principles of criminal law and with limited guidance. Until now, 
there are thus only fragments of a general part of European criminal law.
B.	 Comparative	legal	research
The reference to the constitutional and legal traditions of the Member States gave 
rise to comparative legal research. Ideally, comparative research should be conducted 
in all relevant Member States. It was, however, impossible to deal with all 29 legal 
systems of the European Union  48 because of the lack of the linguistic skills required 
when dealing with 23 different European languages. After all, most legal terms cannot 
be translated without losing their unique meaning. Similar terms can have different 
meanings and different terms can have a very similar meaning. In order to avoid 
errors, the sources of law were therefore studied in their original language. This meant 
that the researcher had to master the languages of the Member States being researched. 
This was one reason to limit the number of States that were studied. Another reason is 
that it was impossible to carry out an in-depth study into all legal systems within the 
four years allocated for this research.
The Member States were therefore divided into four ‘legal families’. The term 
‘legal family’ serves to designate groups of legal systems with similar legal features, 
enabling one to speak of the relative unity of those systems  49. The following division 
was made: a first group of states consists of ‘Common law States’, including England 
and Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Malta and Cyprus. A second group 
can be called ‘Germanic and Scandinavian States’. This group includes Germany, 
Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Portugal, Greece and Austria. A third 
group consists of ‘Napoleonic States’, which are the Netherlands, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Italy. England was chosen to represent the states with a common 
law tradition, Germany was chosen to represent the Scandinavian and Germanic 
states and the Netherlands was selected to represent the Napoleonic States. The risk 
of not incorporating relevant aspects of a specific domestic system was reduced by 
47 ECJ, 28 March 2000, C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski, ECR, I-1935.
48 The United Kingdom consists of three separate jurisdictions that each have their own 
legislator and judiciary.
49 K. zWeigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to Comparative Law, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 40-42.
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a conference held on 20-21 January 2011, where some of the results were presented 
to legal experts from many different nationalities. The comments made during this 
conference and at other points during the research were taken into account  50.
4. Conditions of a European general part of criminal law
In a second stage of this research, each researcher compared the concepts of 
national and Union law and made a synthesis of the investigated general principles. 
The synthesis is based on fundamental rights and the common ground of these general 
principles in national and Union law. Clearly, there are also many differences in the 
content, nature and focus of these principles between the investigated legal systems. 
When choosing between competing approaches to legal concepts, certain criteria were 
applied, such as that a general part of European criminal law should be consistent, 
coherent and enforceable. We will now explain why these requirements were selected 
and what they entail.
A.	 Consistency	and	coherency
Consistency and coherency have been explicitly recognised as core values 
of future European criminal law by the Council, Commission and Parliament  51. 
Consistent means that the general principles of criminal law must be in line with each 
other and should not conflict. Coherency requires that there can be no logical gaps in 
their construction. These conditions of coherency and consistency follow from the 
attempt to identify a general part. A general part presupposes a logical, consistent and 
coherent ordering of legal principles. Without this, there would be no general part and 
no legal system. By identifying general principles of criminal law and by separating 
those from the mistakes and anomalies that do not fit in this whole, a logical, coherent 
whole can be constructed. Such a general part can further the clarity and understanding 
of the law and make it more rational, predictable and fair  52.
Applying the criteria of consistency and coherency ensures that inconsistent legal 
concepts are set aside. For example, the inconsistency inherent in the concept of dolus 
eventualis, or bedingter Vorsatz was one reason to favour the functional equivalent of 
‘recklessness’ over this lowest form of intent  53. For example, it frequently occurs that 
a driver of a vehicle is ordered to stop by a police officer but he refuses and continues 
to drive, whereby the officer has to jump to one side to avoid being hit by the vehicle. 
Whereas this is generally charged and often accepted as attempted intentional killing 
in the Netherlands  54, it is not considered to constitute this offence in Germany. The 
difference is remarkable considering that both States apply a similar concept of dolus 
eventualis.
50 See A.h. Klip, 2011, supra note 30.
51 Supra note 40.
52 C. elliott and C. de thAn, “The Case for a Rational Reconstruction of Consent in 
Criminal Law”. Modern Law Review, 2007, p. 225-227; P. cAne, “The General/Special 
Distinction in Criminal Law, Tort Law and Legal Theory”, Law and Philosophy, 2007, p. 474. 
53 For other reasons, see J.H. blomsmA, 2011, supra note 33, p. 135-159.
54 See for example HR 15 January 2008, NJ 2008, 609 and HR 6 February 1951, NJ 1951, 
475.
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German courts generally argue that the defendant relies on the policeman reacting 
to the moving vehicle. The defendant accepts that he is putting the police officer’s 
life in danger but does not actually contemplate the possibility that he might kill him. 
He is thought to have considered the likelihood of death as being improbable as he is 
confident that the officer will anticipate such actions and is mentally prepared to jump. 
This is confirmed by the fact that these situations hardly ever lead to fatalities. There 
is therefore no acceptance of death and no intentional liability  55. Such reasoning is not 
present in Dutch law, where the acceptance of the risk, required for dolus eventualis, 
is easily deduced from the circumstance according to which the defendant, whilst 
being aware of the risk, did not stop or avoid a collision.
It may be argued that this divergence is due to national differences. However, 
on a purely national level, cases can also be identified in which, apparently without 
any good reason, dolus eventualis is accepted in one case but rejected in an almost 
identical case. For example, in two cases, the defendant hit a person on the head 
with a firearm. As a result of this action, in both cases the firearm went off and killed 
the victim. The Dutch Supreme Court quashed the conviction based on intent in one 
case but upheld the conviction in another  56. It can be claimed that dolus eventualis is 
dependent on the precise circumstances of the case and the manner in which a court 
gives its reasons for its decision, but it can also be argued that eventualis is prone to 
judicial whim. Elsewhere, it is explained in more detail why this concept leads to 
inconsistency. It is almost impossible to draw a clear line between taking the results 
for granted and trusting everything will turn out all right. It is therefore very difficult 
to state where dolus eventualis does and does not apply in theory, let alone in practice. 
The divergent case law is testament to this  57.
B. Enforceability 
The criterion of enforceability aims to establish a balance between dogmatic 
complexity and practical application. A general part of European criminal law needs 
to be comprehensible, accessible to and useable by lawyers from all legal traditions  58. 
Criminal law is all about communication. It aims to send a message to the defendant 
and the general public. A simple message often conveys the message of the law to those 
addressed by it much more effectively. It makes what is criminal more foreseeable. 
Hence, a simple and straightforward solution in our general part may be favoured 
over a needlessly complex one. By balancing the divergent interests of dogmatic 
consistency, communication and practical application, a choice can be made. The law 
should not make overly complex distinctions. A general part must be conceptually 
rich enough to enable a judge to make all those distinctions that must play a role in 
the administration of criminal justice and at the same time be simple and easy enough 
to apply  59.
55 See for example BGH 21 November 1995 NStZ-RR 1996, 97.
56 HR 9 June 1998, NJ 1998, 731 and HR 24 February 2004, NJ 2004, 375 respectively.
57 See J.H. blomsmA, 2011, supra note 33.
58 K. Ambos, “Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2006, p. 661.
59 Jareborg according to K. Ambos, 2005, supra note 31, p. 178, cited almost literally.
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An example of such complexity is the issue of perpetrators who were intoxicated 
when they committed a crime and therefore may not have had the required mens 
rea or cannot be considered to have been a responsible agent at that time. Different 
doctrines have been devised to deal with this problem. In English law, the defendant 
who voluntarily intoxicated himself cannot be convicted of a crime of ‘specific 
intent’ but he can be convicted of a crime of ‘basic intent’  60. However, no principled 
distinction can be made as to which crimes are basic and which crimes are specific. 
Moreover, there is controversy on what the requirements for liability of such a basic 
intent offence should be. In German law, a defendant who was drunk at the time 
when he committed a crime can benefit, in terms of his defence, if the estimated 
level of alcohol reaches a specific threshold. His sentence will then be reduced to a 
lower level  61. However, in more recent times, other factors have also been taken into 
account, making it hard to predict when the defendant will be excused and when he 
will be held liable. This type of defence is sometimes rejected due to the voluntariness 
of the intoxication, but there is no consensus about the precise legal basis and criteria.
The abovementioned complex approaches to intoxication and the controversy 
surrounding them support the conclusion that it may be more appropriate to simply 
accept that intoxicated perpetrators are not allowed to rely on their voluntary 
intoxication as a legitimate exception to principles of criminal law. The conclusion 
is backed up by the fact that, even in Germany, there is a strict fall-back offence 
available, which creates the possibility of punishing a defendant who relies on a 
defence of intoxication. Even in a state where dogmatic consistency is considered 
a virtue, an exception is therefore made to the principle that a blameless person 
cannot be punished when the reason for this blamelessness was alcohol or drugs. This 
illustrates that, whereas important legal distinctions should be taken into account, 
complexities devised solely to bring a solution into line with other legal principles 
should be avoided. Complete dogmatic consistency is unattainable and should thus 
not be considered a goal in itself.
C.	 Compatibility	with	fundamental	rights
Any general part of criminal law and especially one designed for the European 
Union should be compatible with fundamental rights. This follows from the 
aforementioned articles in the Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (hereafter CFR) and the case law of the ECJ. After all, the ECJ has 
held that human rights form an integral part of the general principles of law protected 
by the Court  62. A violation of a human right is therefore incompatible with Union 
law  63. As an example, in some cases, for instance when a very serious offence is 
charged, strict liability will violate Article 6 ECHR and is therefore rejected.
The requirements under the ECHR are generally regarded as minimum criteria, 
implying a threshold that may not be crossed. It is in this context that the supremacy 
of Union law, specifically the requirements of the ECHR, becomes apparent. The 
60 DPP v. Majewski [1976] UKHL 2.
61 22 November 1990 BGHSt 37, 231.
62 ECJ, 12 November 1969, C-29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, ECR, 00419.
63 ECJ, 13 July 1989, C-5/88, Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECR, 26069.
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principles identified here may not be contrary to the ECHR. The rights guaranteed by 
the ECHR are not all absolute but exceptions to those rights can only be made under 
the strict conditions set out by the Eur. Court HR. A general part of criminal law for the 
EU may therefore offer more protection than required by the ECHR, but never less. 
According to its Article 52(3), the CFR may provide for more extensive protection 
than the ECHR. As an example of how this criterion operates in construing the general 
part in our project, consider lex mitior. This principle of the retroactive application of 
the more lenient provision was recognised by the ECJ and the Eur. Court HR  64. As a 
result, it must be included in a general part of criminal law for the EU.
D.	 Compatibility	with	legal	traditions
It also follows from the already mentioned Union legal sources that a general 
part needs to be in line with the legal traditions of the Member States. Although 
Article 6(3) TEU refers to the constitutional traditions, this should be interpreted as 
fundamental principles of criminal law common to the EU Member States. These 
principles need not necessarily be guaranteed by a Constitution  65. The possibility of 
a so-called emergency break procedure under Article 83 TFEU also forms a practical 
argument in favour of this criterion. When a Member State considers an EU legislative 
proposal to be at odds with the fundamental aspects of its legal system, it can suspend 
the legislative procedure.
Sometimes legal traditions differ between Member States. This begs the question 
as to what to do when these legal traditions differ. On the one hand, it can be argued 
that a general principle can only be adopted in a general part of criminal law for the 
EU if it is compatible with all the legal traditions of the Member States. The ECJ 
clearly sets great store by the popularity of a legal concept. Considerable differences 
make it difficult to identify general principles  66. What is important for the ECJ is not 
that a concept exists in all legal systems but that it is popular in many national legal 
systems. If a principle is common to the law of most Member States, the ECJ will 
recognise it as a general principle of Union law. 
On the other hand, the TFEU already takes into account the possibility that a 
solution may not be in line with all legal traditions. Even if a Member State with a 
different legal tradition were to ‘pull’ the emergency break, other States may still use 
the method of enhanced cooperation to continue with the adoption of the Directive. 
The possibility of differing traditions or principles is unavoidable. This is not a 
problem if one considers that legal traditions are hardly ever absolute in nature. They 
develop and change over time. For example, the principle or legal tradition that only 
individual natural persons can be punished is interpreted very differently by Member 
64 ECJ, 3 May 2005, Joined cases C-387/02 and others, Silvio Berlusconi and others, ECR, 
I-3565 and Eur. Court HR, 17 September 2009, Scoppola v. Italy, appl. no. 10249/03.
65 ECJ, 14 October 2004, C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen, ECR, I-9609, para. 34. See also 
Article 67(1) TFEU.
66 ECJ, 21 September 1989, Joint Cases C-46/87 and C-227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission, 
ECR, 2859.
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States. For example, the Belgian legislator dropped its objections to the criminal 
liability of legal entities in 1999  67.
Furthermore, it is impossible to construct a general part of criminal law that is 
in line with all domestic legal systems. In dealing with different legal approaches, 
solutions and rules, choices have to be made. A choice in favour of one legal system 
is automatically a choice that may be at odds with another. If the synthesis would 
need to be in line with the criminal legal traditions of all the Member States, only 
lowest common denominators could be identified, consisting of the similarities of, for 
example mens rea, between the legal systems under investigation. In such a case, we 
could only establish the most serious forms of mens rea, such as purpose, and the least 
serious forms of mens rea, such as negligence. Since legal systems approach the mens 
rea of foreseeing the risks of one’s actions differently, no choice could be made that 
would be in line with all legal traditions. The result would be an incomplete spectrum 
of mens rea, which does not define any other mental elements besides purpose and 
negligence. This would not bring about a coherent set of conditions for criminal 
liability and would therefore not be in line with this criterion of the synthesis. The 
ECJ does not seek the lowest common denominator either but is looking for the most 
appropriate solution with a view to meeting the Union’s objectives  68.
Compatibility with legal traditions can therefore not be applied as an absolute 
criterion. This brings about that, when constructing the general part of criminal 
law for the EU, no choices should be made based on the majority. The choice in 
favour of national legal solutions in the synthesis is not based on the popularity or 
political feasibility of such choices but is based on what is considered to be the most 
appropriate option, as determined by other conditions. By separating this academic 
task from political negotiations, it was possible to keep any political considerations 
out when constructing the synthesis. For instance, in the context of foreseeing risks, 
recklessness was adopted even though dolus eventualis is the more popular concept. 
The aim of the Maastricht general part is to provide for an extensive and complete 
discussion on what general principles of criminal law should look like. These results 
will offer political bodies a set of arguments to evaluate what formal legislation on a 
general part should look like.
The difference in weight between the two compatibility conditions can be 
illustrated by strict liability, which is liability that does not require proof of fault as 
to each and every single element of an offence. It ranges from offence definitions 
that only criminalise objective conduct, such as straightforward speeding on the road 
to offence definitions that criminalise intentional conduct but not the accompanying 
circumstance or consequence. For example, it is possible in Dutch law to be liable 
for indecent acts with a minor without proof that the defendant knew or should 
have known that the other person was a minor  69. In German law, the possible lethal 
67 D. roeF, Strafbare overheden – Een rechtsvergelijkende studie naar de strafrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid van overheden voor milieuverstoring, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2001, p. 134-
162.
68 See T. tridimAs, The General Principles of EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2006, p. 21.
69 Article 245 of the Dutch CC. By contrast, see paragraph 176 of the German CC.
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consequences of taking part in a brawl are strict elements. Intention only needs to 
relate to the brawl itself and not the consequence  70.
Although this form of liability should be kept within appropriate limits, neither 
the ECJ, nor the Eur. Court HR have precluded it  71. In other words, strict liability is 
compatible with fundamental rights and the fragments of the general part identified 
by the ECJ. Strict liability does not exceed the limit set by these courts. In assessing 
the compatibility of strict liability with the legal traditions of the Member States, 
however, this is at least at odds with the German legal tradition of the principle of 
guilt, which is protected by the constitution. Under German law, this principle is 
interpreted as ‘no punishment without mens rea’, which arguably creates an injunction 
on the use of strict liability in criminal law  72. Even though Dutch and English scholars 
criticise strict liability, it is frequently used in criminal law. The European courts use 
a similar approach, which implies that the principle is understood as ‘no punishment 
without blameworthiness’. This means that, under those legal systems, as long as the 
defendant is able to rebut a presumption of mens rea, as long as he is able to avoid 
conviction for a strict offence by advancing an exculpating defence of, for example, 
due diligence, the principle of guilt is not violated.
Accepting strict liability in a general part of criminal law for the EU may therefore 
violate the constitutional tradition of German law but, since this compatibility is not 
an absolute condition, it is not precluded. This is not to say that in our general part 
of criminal law, strict liability is advocated as a proper tool of criminalisation  73. It 
is simply argued that strict liability is not precluded under the first two conditions 
of the general part. It illustrates that legal traditions are interpreted differently in the 
different legal systems of the EU.
E. Scope of the general part of criminal law
As a rule, the general principles of criminal law should be interpreted uniformly in 
the context of each single offence definition. However, the special part of criminal law 
does influence the general part. For example, if a general part of criminal law for the 
EU were to only relate to offences against the EU’s financial interest, it would make 
little sense to include a justification such as self-defence. It would also be unlikely 
that insanity and duress would ever be relevant. Against charges of budgetary fraud, 
a defendant is most likely to raise a mistake of law, a necessity type defence or enter 
a plea of due diligence. 
On the one hand, such a limited application of a general part of criminal law for 
the EU may be read into Article 86(1) TFEU, which enables the establishment of 
a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter EPPO) for the protection of the 
financial interests of the Union. The general part in the Corpus Juris was established 
with a view to applying only to these offences. Ever since the debate on this EPPO 
70 Paragraph 231 of the German CC.
71 ECJ, 10 July 1990, C-326/88, Anklagemyndigheden v. Hansen and Søn I/S, ECR, I-2911 
and Eur. Court HR, 7 October 1998, Salabiaku v. France, appl. no. 10519/83.
72 Nevertheless, some exceptions to this rule can be identified, such as the offence 
mentioned above.
73 For our view on strict liability, see J.H. blomsmA, 2012, supra note 45.
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started, it has been related to the EU’s financial interests  74. The case for an EPPO 
is strongest in relation to offences affecting these interests. Besides the difficulty of 
prosecution because of the often complex nature and transnational character of the 
crimes, the fight against these crimes is hampered by a lack of ownership. Because 
it is not the national budget that is affected, national authorities appear to be more 
reluctant to prosecute offences relating to the EU budget. 
On the other hand, Article 86(4) TFEU stipulates that the European Council 
may also extend the competency of the EPPO to serious crimes with a crossborder 
dimension. Moreover, it is not just the creation of the EPPO that warrants the 
identification of a general part of European criminal law. As explained, the current 
technique of harmonisation requires such general principles too. In that respect, Article 
83(1) TFEU refers almost exclusively to serious crime. These crimes include terrorism, 
trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug 
trafficking and so on. Under Article 83(2) TFEU, the Union is also competent for 
approximating criminal law relating to areas of a much more regulatory nature, such 
as road transport and environmental protection, provided that this is essential in order 
to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been 
subject to harmonisation.
Hence, the possible scope of application of a general part of criminal law for the 
EU is quite broad, ranging from criminal penalties for not properly documenting the 
number of hours one has driven to terrorist offences. The general principles of mens 
rea and defences in this research are therefore not established to apply merely to a 
certain type of offences. They are established, as in national law, to apply to crimes of 
a diverging nature and of diverging gravity. The general part could be applied to the 
prosecution of both human trafficking and violations of fishing quotas  75.
Nevertheless, the pertinent offence does influence the general principle of 
criminal law, which can be illustrated again by reference to strict liability. This may 
be out of the question when it concerns a traditional offence, mala in se, and/or it 
concerns an element essential to the offence, such as the intention to kill in murder or 
the lack of consent in rape. However, this is far less controversial when it concerns 
regulatory offences relating to norms in professional contexts. If such offences are to 
be prosecuted, including fraud against the EU, much more of the justifications and 
pragmatic reasons in favour of strict liability apply. For example, it can be imagined 
that financial offences would be very hard to prosecute if intention had to relate to 
each and every single element of the offence. Strict liability is also justified by an 
appeal to protect particularly vulnerable interests, such as the interests of children 
against sexual exploitation or the victims of trafficking in human beings. Given the 
focus of European criminal law on both categories of offences, strict liability should 
perhaps not be dismissed too easily. This third criterion of establishing a general part 
of criminal law thus brings about that the question of whether or not strict liability 
74 See the Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the 
Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM (2001) 715, 11 December 
2001.
75 Of course, criminal penalties to enforce fishing quotas should be available and imposed 
only as a last resort.
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should be allowed in European criminal law and is a matter that is to be assessed in 
the context of every offence. 
In the end, the construction of a general part of criminal law for the EU requires 
an assessment of competing values, including the defendant’s right to a fair trial and 
the interests of the criminal justice system in securing convictions. Any criminal 
justice system should strike a proper balance between its functions as a shield and 
as a sword. When discussing these criteria, it became clear that most debate on the 
content of the general principles of European criminal law is the result of a different 
focus on the instrumental or protective finality of criminal law. For example, does 
one focus on the effective protection of EU financial interests or on the safeguards of 
criminal law that protect the defendant  76? In our opinion, criminal law ensures that the 
citizen is protected against the State but also against other citizens. Justice is served by 
balancing security with freedom.
5. What about the codification of a general part for the EU?
The question as to whether to codify a general part of criminal law for the EU is a 
logical consequence of this discussion. In the Maastricht project, however, we do not 
aim at codification. We do not create a ‘European Model Code’  77. Our purpose is to 
provide the necessary theoretical framework and constructive dialogue for a European 
general part of criminal law. These results will offer political bodies a set of arguments 
to evaluate what formal legislation on a general part should look like. In this last part 
of our contribution we will limit ourselves to a brief discussion of the possibilities for 
codification and its implications. 
A.	 The	need	for	codification	
One could question whether formal codification is even necessary. The codification 
of a general part is not a precondition for the existence of common concepts of 
criminal liability  78. General principles and common criminal liability concepts can 
also exist in the form of soft law. As explained, the ECJ develops certain autonomous 
definitions of criminal liability in its case law. However, leaving the ECJ to continue 
this development without any legislative initiative can result in certain problems. 
First, there are concerns about the separation of powers. The allocation of tasks 
between the ECJ and the European legislator is already critical as the ECJ has, over the 
years, demonstrated quite strong powers and ambitions when interpreting legislation. 
In criminal law though, the separation of powers between the courts and legislators 
is an important principle that safeguards the democratic legitimacy of criminal law. 
We cannot and should not expect from the ECJ that it replaces the European legislator 
in this matter. Moreover, leaving the development of European concepts of criminal 
liability entirely to the ECJ may result in casuistry and inconsistency.
76 Compare A.A.G. peters, “Het rechtskarakter van het strafrecht”, in Y. burumA (ed.), 
100 Jaar Strafrecht: Klassieke Teksten Van De Twintigste Eeuw, Amsterdam, Amsterdam 
University Press, 1999 (reprint 1972).
77 See C.J. enschedé, Een Uniform Europees Strafrecht?, Arnhem, Gouda Quint, 1990.
78 A.H. Klip, “Towards a General Part of Criminal Law for the European Union”, in 
A.H. Klip (ed.), supra note 30, p. 31.
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In addition, it appears that the ECJ does not always do a thorough comparative 
analysis and there is little transparency in terms of the reasoning behind certain 
choices  79. Therefore, it cannot be guaranteed that a general part would emerge from a 
proper consideration and balancing of the diverging national traditions. Neither should 
we expect that the ECJ will conduct an in-depth dialogue with regard to the character 
and theory of criminal liability in European law. Finally, there is also a danger that 
certain jurisprudence in competition law will also be employed in criminal law. 
Certainly, competition law and criminal law may share some features. However, in 
competition law we have a different balance between the instrumental and protective 
finalities of liability. 
B.	 Possibilities	of	codification
Whether we choose to acknowledge the need for a general part for European 
criminal law or not, its development is already happening, as we have demonstrated. 
The issue as to the codification of the general part is therefore a question of how we 
want to establish the common concepts. In practice, the choices for the development 
of common definitions are as follows: (i) the codification of common concepts in a 
separate Directive or Regulation by the European legislator, a sort of ‘general part 
Directive/Regulation’; (ii) the codification of common concepts in every Directive 
that deals with the criminalisation of specific offences.
The first possibility, namely to establish common definitions in a separate legal 
instrument, comes closer to the nature and structure of a general part as we know 
it in national law. In this way, Rechtsgutsblindheit can be ensured, while it is also 
much more practical to gather together all these notions which are common for the 
Directives criminalising specific behaviours. Certainly, a general part Directive or 
a general part Regulation is a far-fetched initiative as it may create serious turmoil, 
especially in terms of considerations relating to national sovereignty. The general part 
of criminal law is a topic very close to the heart of national traditions. In addition, one 
may wonder how a Regulation on substantive criminal law would be reconciled with 
the principle of lex parliamentaria. 
The second possibility seems more feasible given the current political climate of 
European criminal law. Each Directive could provide its definitions of actus reus and 
mens rea requirements. However, this possibility does not safeguard a clear contextual 
demarcation between the general and special part, which would be the case with a 
general part Directive or Regulation. Directives would be rather long in their content 
and to some extent confusing, while the definitions of the constructive elements of 
criminal liability could be influenced by the specific legal good protected with every 
instrument. Perhaps the first disadvantage may be less problematic at this stage as 
there are not many Directives harmonising criminal liability. The second problem, 
however, may be of great concern. If the European legislator defines the constructive 
elements of criminal liability such as perpetration and mens rea in different ways in 
the various Directives, problems of inconsistency will occur. One of the benefits of 
79 See the Opinion of AG Kokott of 20 November 2007 in ECJ, 3 June 2008, C-308/06, 
Intertanko, ECR, I-4057. 
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the separation of the general part in a codification is that this dichotomy safeguards 
a coherent and harmonic theory on criminal liability. Questions on perpetration, 
participation, mens rea and defences cannot and should not be answered differently 
in a criminal system. Especially with Directives based on Article 83(2) TFEU, the 
European legislator might be more eager to deviate from pre-established criminal 
law principles in order to adjust the criminal liability model to the European policies 
protected. As a result, the only way to avoid a piecemeal general part in this second 
option is for the legislator to be committed to repeating the same definitions for the 
same terms in every instrument. 
Finally, one could wonder whether the EU has the competence to define concepts 
of mens rea and actus reus in European instruments. In the case of a Directive based 
on Article 83 TFEU, there is nothing to preclude the possibility of defining terms such 
as recklessness and attempt  80. We have already explained that the harmonisation of 
these offences is incomplete as the core notions of the general part play a necessary 
normative role in the determination of criminal liability. However, in the case of a 
Regulation based on Articles 86 or 325 TFEU, the competence of the EU to harmonise 
elements of substantive criminal law have been questioned  81. Nevertheless, especially 
with Article 86 TFEU, it might become necessary to define certain substantive 
elements of criminal liability – such as participation in fraud – in order to demarcate 
the competences of the EPPO.
To conclude, we hope that, through our contribution we can offer a way forward 
for European criminal law. Certainly, the development of a Europeanised criminal 
system raises the question of the constitutional relationship and interrelations 
between European and national legal systems. Our goal is to raise awareness of 
the important role that a general part could play in giving a direction and a more 
principled framework to European criminal law. The tasks of developing common 
concepts of criminal liability, of readdressing the principle of legality and of finding 
solutions for the allocation of jurisdiction are not to be taken lightly. They involve a 
certain ‘rethinking’ of criminal liability and balancing of the finalities of criminal law. 
We have to ‘go back to the basics’ and face up to the uncomfortable question of the 
true relationship between principles of justice and criminal liability concepts. We are 
convinced that working in this direction will make it possible for the academia and 
the European institutions to engage in a constructive dialogue regarding the purpose, 
idiosyncrasy and future of European criminal law. 
80 R. sicurellA, supra note 35, p. 243-244. 




Introductory reflection on evaluation  
and its lacunae
Gisèle vernimmen-vAn tiggelen
1. Introduction: why is evaluation necessary?
In the context of the approximation of substantive criminal law within the 
European Union, evaluation is not only relevant but is absolutely essential. It is a 
crucial part of fostering the credibility needed for the EU to take action in this field. 
Action at EU level must be strictly justified. Its necessity must be demonstrated and 
its scope must be proportionate to its aim. Article 5, para. 3 and 4 TEU specifies what 
must be understood by the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity: “Under the 
principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by Member States, either at central level or at regional and local 
level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level” (Article 5, para. 3). “Under the principle of proportionality, 
the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties” (Article 5, para. 4). These proportionality and subsidiarity 
tests are overseen by the European Court of Justice. 
Meeting these requirements nowadays presupposes following a procedure 
detailed in Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, to which Article 5 TEU refers, involving 
national parliaments too. The protocol explains the different aspects under which a 
potential initiative must be contemplated in terms of proportionality and subsidiarity. 
It underlines the need to provide, together with any draft legislative act, a detailed 
statement containing some assessment of the proposal’s financial impact as well 
as, in the case of a directive, its implications for domestic national legislation. The 
reason for acting at Union level should be substantiated by qualitative indicators (and 
quantitative ones where possible) and the burden, whether financial or administrative, 
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for the Union but also for national governments, local authorities, operators and 
citizens, minimised and commensurate with the objective to be achieved. 
2. Current situation
A.	 Evaluation	ex ante
The European Commission often conducts broad consultations, issuing green 
papers, inviting all the stakeholders to preparatory meetings, mandating preliminary 
studies, etc. The result is summarised in an impact assessment attached to any 
new Commission proposal. A very good and recent example is to be found in the 
Commission staff working paper accompanying the proposals for a regulation on 
insider dealing and market manipulation and for a directive on criminal sanctions for 
insider dealing and market manipulation  1. The analysis is extremely detailed and very 
well documented. An executive summary has therefore been provided in a separate 
document  2.
The requirements explained above are equally applicable to initiatives submitted 
by a group of Member States. It is therefore expected that any such draft be supported 
by a similar though often less in-depth analysis. While Article 75 TFEU allows a 
quarter of the Member States to take an initiative in any of the areas covered by chapter 
4 of Title IV TFEU, no example can be found in relation to the approximation of 
substantive criminal law. But indicators regarding compliance with the proportionality 
and subsidiarity requirements were presented, for instance, together with the initiative 
for a Directive regarding the European Investigation Order (EIO) in criminal matters  3.
Whether or not the principles are fully observed remains an issue. The Manifesto 
on European Criminal Policy  4 challenges their compliance with respect to a series of 
instruments, including, for instance, the directive on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law  5. According to the authors, a group of academics constituting the 
European Criminal Policy Initiative, “the criminalisation of administrative offences 
does not comply with the principle of proportionality and its sub-principle, the principle 
of ultima ratio”. This example is worth mentioning since another author, in an article 
on criminal sanctions in the field of EU environmental law concludes, on the contrary, 
1 Commission staff working paper – Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse) and the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation (SEC (2011) 
1217 of 20 October 2011, accompanying COM (2011) 615).
2 SEC (2011) 1218 of 20 October 2011.
3 Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Slovenia and the Kingdom of 
Sweden for a Directive of the European Parliaent and of the Council regarding the European 
Investigation Order in criminal matters – Detailed Statement (Document of the Council 9288/10 
ADD 2 of 23 June 2010).
4 The Manifesto can be found on site of the European Criminal Policy Initiative (ECPI): 
https://sites.google.com/site/eucrimpol/
5 Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law, OJ, no. L 328, 6 December 2008, p. 28.
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that “criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, are more dissuasive in nature 
because it is the only sanction that cannot be passed on to customers, shareholders 
or other third parties”  6. While this example points to divergent interpretations of the 
requirements, it does not by any means permit one to conclude that the Union may 
spare itself from complying with the principles. It only shows that the criteria must 
be, progressively, refined, that more and better evidence should be gathered, that 
the necessity for Union action should be better corroborated by empirical and less 
disputable arguments and based on more solid data.
B.	 Evaluation ex post
Prior assessment of the likely impact of a considered action is of course not the 
end of the evaluation process. It would not make sense to estimate the need, impact, 
result and effect of a measure before it is taken as carefully as possible without then 
looking at the outcome it has effectively produced when implemented. The truth, 
however, is that so far very little has been done to carry out an ex post assessment of 
the real impact of EU instruments or policies in the area of criminal law and criminal 
justice.
1) Commission reports
The methodology followed by the Commission to produce reports on the 
implementation of framework decisions has drawn a considerable amount of 
inspiration from the Commission’s experience in checking that directives have 
been correctly transposed into national law. The same criteria are also used in the 
methodology for framework decisions and directives because of the similarities 
which exist between the two types of instruments. As explained, for instance, in the 
report on the Framework Decision on attacks against information systems, “the rules 
implementing the FD must function effectively taking account of its aims, must satisfy 
the requirements of clarity and legal certainty, must assure full application of the text 
in a sufficiently clear and precise manner and must be implemented within the period 
prescribed”  7. The main difference is obviously that, up to the end of the transitional 
period, i.e. up to December 2014, failure by a Member State to fulfill its obligations 
under a framework decision cannot be brought before the European Court of Justice.
The analysis underpinning the reports is essentially based on information 
provided by the Member States themselves and deals almost exclusively with the 
transposition stricto sensu, in other words whether or not the Union instrument has 
been introduced into national law fully, correctly and in time. No attention is paid 
to the instrument’s practical use and effect and no assessment is made as to whether 
the measures adopted in national law meet the intended objectives, specific as well 
6 J. öberg, “Criminal sanctions in the field of EU environmental law”, NJECL, 2011, 
vol. 2, p. 402.
7 Report from the Commission to the Council based on Article 12 of the Council Framework 
Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems (COM 
(2008) 448, 14 July 2008, p. 3).
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as general  8. The aforementioned report, for example, expressly recalls that “actual 
application of those rules is beyond the scope of this report”  9.
As to the follow-up, nothing systematic can be said. While some reports identify 
issues requiring further action  10, discussion of the reports in Council seldom takes place 
despite the often explicit wording of the instruments themselves  11 and parliamentary 
questions on Commission reports are not commonplace.
2) Peer evaluation
A mechanism inspired by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) model has 
been put in place by the Council Joint Action of 5 December 1997  12 and is still 
functioning. While the Commission also takes part, it is essentially a peer-evaluation 
method, which presents interesting features. Firstly, it involves a learning process 
both for the evaluators and for those subject to evaluation. Moreover, these roles are 
interchangeable. Secondly, it does not normally concentrate on one given instrument 
but rather covers a wider, specially identified area where the Union has developed, or is 
developing, a common policy, or has established deeper cooperation mechanisms. Five 
rounds of evaluation have been conducted so far, namely on mutual legal assistance, 
on the fight against drug trafficking, on the exchange of information between law 
enforcement bodies and Europol, on the functioning of the European arrest warrant 
and on investigations against financial crimes. The last one, dealing with the national 
interface with Eurojust, started in June 2011. Thirdly, it is not a paper-based exercise 
but is based on on-the-spot visits and interviews, looking at the practical operation of 
instruments, and ending up with conclusions being issued, including best practices and 
concrete recommendations  13. Actions and measures taken or planned in response are 
8 S. de biolley and A. Weyembergh, “L’évaluation dans le cadre du troisième pilier du 
traité sur l’Union européenne”, in A. Weyembergh and S. de biolley (ed.), Comment évaluer le 
droit pénal européen ?, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2006, p. 80.
9 COM (2008) 448, p. 3.
10 COM (2008) 448, p. 10. The Commission has since then proposed a directive which 
addresses some issues identified in the 2008 report (COM (2010) 517, 30 September 2010). 
See also Report from the Commission based on Article 12 of the Council Framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography, COM (2007) 716, 16 November 2007, p. 9. The FD has thereafter been replaced 
by Directive 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 (OJ, no. L 335, 17 December 2011, p. 1).
11 See for instance Article 9, para. 2 of the Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating 
corruption in the private sector (OJ, no. L 192, 31 July 2003, p. 54). Two Commission’s reports 
have been published: COM (2007) 328, 18 June 2007; COM (2011) 309, 6 June 2011.
12 Joint Action 97/827/JHA of 5 December 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the 
application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight 
against organized crime (OJ, no. L 344, 15 December 1997, p. 7).
13 See e.g. the final report of the fourth round of evaluation (Document Council 8302/4/09 
REV 4 of 28 May 2009), and the final report of the fifth round of evaluation (Document Council 
12657/2/12 REV 2 GENVAL 51).
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in turn discussed and periodically reviewed within the Council structures  14. However, 
the mechanism has not so far been used in the area of the approximation of substantive 
criminal law. 
3) Schengen evaluation
Although the matter is outside the topic of substantive criminal law, a brief 
examination of the situation with regard to the Schengen acquis is of some relevance. 
A Standing Committee was set up in 1998 by the Schengen executive committee with 
a twofold task regarding evaluation  15. The first was to verify that all preconditions for 
the application of the Schengen acquis have been met by Member States wanting to 
join the Schengen area: a verification process which has yet to be completed regarding 
Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania for instance. The same mechanism also applies to 
third countries wanting to take part in the Schengen area  16. The second task was to 
check that the Schengen acquis was being correctly applied by Member States or third 
countries implementing the acquis. 
The evaluation mechanism is a peer review mechanism for both these tasks. So 
far, the mechanism continues to be entirely within the hands of States participating in 
the Standing Committee.
On 16 November 2010, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Regulation 
modifying the evaluation mechanism to verify application of the Schengen acquis  17, 
leaving the first part of the Standing Committee mandate as it stands. Under the 
original proposal, responsibility for implementing the evaluation mechanism in the 
future would have rested with the Commission, in close cooperation with Member 
States and with the support of European bodies such as FRONTEX  18, which would 
provide risk analyses. The proposal was amended by the Commission in September 
2011, in particular by introducing the possibility of imposing specific measures to 
address and remedy serious shortcomings in the way in which external border control 
or return procedures identified in the evaluation report were carried out. The new 
proposal contained, as a last resort, the possibility of a Union-based mechanism for the 
temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders where a Member State 
14 See e.g. the follow-up to the evaluation reports on the fourth round of mutual evaluations: 
practical application of the European arrest warrant and the relevant surrender procedures 
between Member States (Document Council 15815/11 of 28 October 2011).
15 Decision of the executive committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing 
Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen (OJ, no. L 239, 22 September 
2000, p. 138).
16 See e.g. Recital 3 of Council Decision on the full application of the provisions of the 
Schengen acquis in the Principality of Lichtenstein (OJ, no. L 334, 16 December 2011, p. 27).
17 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify application of the Schengen acquis (COM 
(2010) 624, 16 November 2010).
18 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union OJ, no. L 349, 25 November 2004, amended by Regulation (EC) 
no. 863/2007 (OJ, no. L 199, 31 July 2007, p. 30) and by the Regulation (EU) no. 1168/2011 
(OJ, no. L 304, 22 November 2011, p. 1).
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was persistently neglecting its obligation to monitor its section of the external border 
and “the circumstances would be such as to constitute a serious threat to public policy 
or to internal security at the Union or national level”  19. The draft instrument was hotly 
debated, in particular with regard to the proposed legal basis. For the Commission, 
in view both of the ambition of the future instrument and of its close link with border 
controls, the Regulation should be based on Article 77, para. 2 (e) TFEU. However, the 
Council unanimously agreed to replace the legal basis: the future instrument should 
be based on Article 70 TFEU since this is the only Treaty provision dealing explicitly 
with evaluation. The choice has further implications. On the one hand, Article 70 
does not involve a co-decision procedure  20. On the other hand, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, who do not participate in the part of the Schengen acquis falling within 
the ambit of Article 77, would not have been bound by the proposed Regulation, 
while they would have been involved in an evaluation process based on Article 70  21. 
The text currently on the table also departs from the Commission’s proposal in other 
aspects, in particular as the evaluation mechanism would also be used to verify that 
countries wanting to join the Schengen area meet all the conditions to start applying 
the acquis and as the responsibilities would be shared between the Member States and 
the Commission. 
3. Expected improvements: can the lacunae be remediated?
The need for dedicated effort towards a more in-depth and systematic evaluation 
of all types of measures in the freedom, security and justice area, especially with regard 
to the approximation of substantive criminal law, has already been emphasised in the 
Hague Programme  22. The essential nature of evaluating implementation was seen as 
“essential to the effectiveness of Union action” and the Hague Programme called for 
the evaluations to be “systematic, objective, impartial and efficient, while avoiding 
too heavy an administrative burden on national authorities and the Commission”. 
A practice-oriented approach to evaluation was favoured as the goal was not only 
to check whether a measure decided at Union level had been implemented but also 
to “address the functioning of the measure and to suggest solutions for problems 
encountered in its implementation and/or application”. 
ECLAN launched the debate with a conference in October 2005 entitled ‘Evaluate 
the implementation of criminal law in the EU: which method?’ and published the 
contributions the year after  23. The main conclusion was that EU policy in the field of 
criminal law lacked a comprehensive and consistent approach and that the evaluation 
19 See Recital 14 and Articles 14 and 15 of the amended proposal (COM (2011) 559, 
16 September 2011). 
20 Council has decided to consult the European Parliament and to take its opinion into 
consideration “to the fullest extent possible” (Press release of Council meeting “Justice and 
Home Affairs” 7-8. VI.2012 (10760/12, p. 9).
21 Under conditions to be fixed: see Article 3, para. 1 of Protocol 21 to the Lisbon Treaty.
22 See section 3 of the general orientations of The Hague Programme : strengthening 
freedom, security and justice in the European Union, OJ, no. C 53, 3 March 2005, p. 12.
23 A. Weyembergh and S. de biolley (ed.), Comment évaluer le droit européen ?, Brussels, 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2006.
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of the impact of earlier instruments was not moving forward. Lessons were learnt 
from these substantial exchanges and comparisons and the resulting product took the 
form of an evaluation model which was further tested on the Framework Decision 
of 19 July 2002 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings  24. Under 
the ECLAN model and in line with the general orientation of the Hague Programme 
itself, evaluation should not only deal with the correct and timely transposition of EU 
law into domestic legislation but should encompass its practical implementation i.e. 
to what extent the norm is used by the relevant authorities, including the available 
means at their disposal for making use of it. In addition to that, the effectiveness of the 
instrument should be assessed by measuring the extent to which the intended objective 
has been achieved. The efficiency of the instrument should also be estimated. This 
refers to its cost (financial or non-financial) including possible negative side effects, 
incurred by the measure, compared with its benefits. In other words, the question is 
whether the legal instrument, alone or together with flanking measures, provided ‘the’ 
or at least ‘an’ adequate response to the common concerns that it sought to address, 
and also how different instruments complement each other.
The aforementioned observations clearly illustrate the fact that ex ante and ex 
post evaluations are intrinsically linked: benchmarks for assessing proportionality 
must be identified when designing the instrument or measure whereas the observed 
practical impact must be taken into consideration whenever reviewing the adopted 
measure is contemplated and must influence the way it is amended, complemented or 
replaced. Without a permanent monitoring cycle covering the various but combined 
aspects identified in the methodology, there can be no genuine EU criminal policy in 
any field and directives whose aim is to approximate substantive criminal law will 
always appear as one-off measures dictated by circumstances instead of parts of a 
comprehensive, consistent and global strategy. 
However, the testing exercise conducted by ECLAN on Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA  25 shed some light as to how hard it is to evaluate a legal instrument 
of that kind. Clearly domestic laws have been approximated and this should by 
itself facilitate cooperation, thereby stepping up the fight against this serious type of 
crime. But such statements remain rather abstract as they could not be supported by 
specific observations. A common finding was that the law of Member States was often 
more severe, particularly at the level of sanctions, but sometimes also regarding the 
definition of the crime, than what was required under the framework decision. This 
would suggest that the increased severity of sanctions is not the direct effect of the 
EU instrument, which introduces a minimal amount of harmonisation. If a common 
trend toward more severity in the sanctions is ascertained, the reason for this must lie 
in media or political pressure and not in the approximation of Member States’ laws as 
a result of the framework decision. It also proved difficult in some cases to distinguish 
24 Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human 
beings, OJ, no. L 203, 1 August 2002, p. 1. The FD has thereafter been replaced by Directive 
2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011, OJ, no. L 101, 15 April 2011, p. 1.
25 A. Weyembergh and V. sAntAmAriA (ed.), The evaluation of European criminal law: 
the example of the framework decision on combating trafficking in human beings, Brussels, 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009.
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the criminal phenomenon covered by the 2002 framework decision, i.e. trafficking in 
human beings, from migrant smuggling, pimping or other forms of criminal activity. 
Finally, given that other international instruments had been adopted and ratified on the 
same or a similar subject, especially within the ambit of the UN  26, the precise impact 
of the EU instrument was even harder to pinpoint.
Responding to the action plan implementing the Hague Programme  27, where 
the establishment of an evaluation system was the first measure to be mentioned, 
the Commission submitted, in 2006, a communication  28 proposing a fully-fledged, 
permanent method focusing, beyond the implementation of legal instruments (the 
so-called ‘Scoreboard plus’ concept), on the tangible results of the application of 
the legislation in practice. The idea was that this would make it possible to assess 
interventions according to their results and measured against the needs that they 
aimed to satisfy. The combination of both would ultimately improve policymaking 
by encouraging systematic feedback into the decision-making process. In selected 
priority areas, an in-depth strategic policy evaluation was to be conducted. The idea 
was that the overall system would be designed to deliver substantial added value, 
notably by assessing entire policies and analysing consistency between different 
measures within a given policy. 
The annex to the communication contained proposed factsheets for all justice, 
freedom and security policies, examining for each of them the factors influencing 
(positively or not) the evaluation mechanism, indicating the objectives pursued within 
each sub-area as well as identifying, for the main instruments relevant for the area, 
possible indicators of the immediate results, outcomes and impacts achieved. 
From 2006 to 2009, the Commission issued a yearly review of the progress made 
in the implementation of the Hague Programme by the European institutions and by the 
Member States  29. The exercise has not been pursued since the Stockholm Programme 
was published  30. The annexes to the reports present, respectively, an implementation 
scoreboard, an institutional scoreboard giving a general overview of the instruments 
and deadlines provided in the programme and action plan and an extended report 
on the evaluation of the Hague programme  31. The extended report sets out the main 
achievements and the future challenges by policy area. Some indications and estimates 
26 United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime, Protocol to prevent, 
suppress and punish trafficking of persons, especially women and children, and Protocol 
against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the UN Convention, 
15 November 2010.
27 Council and Commission action plan implementing the Hague Programme on 
strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union (OJ, no. C 198, 12 August 
2005, p. 1).
28 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Evaluation of EU Policies on Freedom, Security and Justice (COM (2006) 332, 28 June 2006).
29 See COM (2006) 333, COM (2007) 373, COM (2008) 373, COM (2009) 263. 
30 The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens 
(OJ, no. C 115, 4 May 2010, p. 1). The situation following the Stockholm Programme will be 
considered below.
31 The 2009 evaluation (COM (2009) 263, 10 June 2009) is accompanied by three 
documents: SEC (2009) 765, SEC (2009) 766 and SEC (2009) 767.
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can be found in the reports concerning the scope of, and trend in, particular types of 
crimes, such as sexual exploitation of children, cybercrime or corruption. Information 
is gathered from various sources, but remains piecemeal and random. The exercise 
runs into considerable difficulties, which may not be unique for criminal policies but 
which are nevertheless felt particularly acutely here. To begin with, it goes without 
saying that a comprehensive evaluation system of this size requires significant 
amounts of resources. Secondly, the communication on evaluation itself admits that it 
may be difficult to measure causal links between outputs, outcomes and impacts. This 
statement cannot be denied. How could one assess, for instance, the degree to which 
the application of a particular instrument, such as the directive on combating sexual 
exploitation of children  32, led to more successful prosecutions, better deterrence 
and ultimately reduced sexual exploitation? Are the numbers of complaints or the 
numbers of detected and closed illicit child pornography websites key indicators of 
the relevance and quality of the legal instrument? Is it possible to observe a lower 
level of illicit waste and pollution and to conclude from that that the directive on the 
protection of environment through criminal law  33 is a success? Surely other factors 
may have played a role, including the legal, political and administrative framework in 
which Member States have implemented the Union instrument. Questions arise such 
as: Do the Member States apply the legality or opportunity principle? Do they know 
the rule about the criminal liability of legal persons? Is this criminal phenomenon a 
priority area in all of the Member States? How much money and time do the Member 
States devote to fighting it? In addition, the possibility that criminal activities may 
have shifted to other, more lenient jurisdictions needs to be factored in… Establishing 
causal links between EU interventions and reductions in levels of crime will always 
be problematic. 
The main difficulty, however, relates to the collection of data. In this respect, 
the communication on evaluation acknowledged that substantial improvements in the 
quality and availability of statistical information were needed. Soon afterwards, the 
Commission adopted a five-year EU action plan for the development of a comprehensive 
and coherent EU strategy to measure crime and criminal justice  34. Two experts’ 
groups were created: One, under the auspices of DG Justice, Freedom and Security 
(JLS) and, as of 2010, DG Home Affairs (HOME), is about the policy needs for data 
on crime and criminal justice; the second, in parallel, is a Eurostat working group 
whose task is to implement the findings and recommendations of the first experts’ 
group. Although significant efforts have produced some positive developments, the 
results continue to have gone largely unnoticed and substantial progress is still to be 
achieved. There are a number of reasons for these shortcomings. We have picked out 
two of these reasons. The first is the difference in the reporting systems. The fact that 
different reporting rules apply among Member States, for instance as to the criterion 
32 Directive 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, replacing Council Framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003, OJ, no. L 335, 17 December 2011, p. 1.
33 Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law, OJ, no. L 328, 6 December 2008, p. 28.
34 COM (2006) 437, 7 August 2006.
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(offender or offence) or as to the point in time where offences are recorded often 
leads to double counting, and in all cases, to a lack of comparability. The second is, 
in a sense paradoxically, the superabundance of requests for data collection from EU 
and other international organisations. National authorities frequently face similar but 
slightly different demands and this no doubt increases their administrative burden. 
At this stage, information on traditional forms of crime, such as theft or homicide, 
is of relatively good quality, reliable and comparable, whereas in the area of more 
interest at EU level, that of crossborder organised crime and especially the so-called 
‘euro-crimes’ listed under Article 83, para. 1, TFEU, very little statistical material is 
available despite there being some encouraging trends for cybercrime, trafficking in 
human beings or money laundering. The second action plan runs from 2011 to 2015  35. 
It will put the emphasis on the quality of collected data, the analysis and dissemination 
of results. An important aspect of the analysis will be to gather additional information 
on the context and quality of collected figures, i.e. ‘metadata’, to prevent misleading 
interpretation and comparison.
The Stockholm Programme confirms  36 the need for an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of legal instruments adopted at EU level. It points to judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters as the first area for evaluation, prior to EU substantive criminal law, 
while the latter is obviously not excluded. The programme issues a direct invitation 
to the Commission to submit proposals under Article 70 TFUE and formulates the 
framework and basic elements that they should be based on. Article 70 TFEU opens 
the way for a new monitoring procedure, which could extend to any of the Union 
policies under Title V TFEU. The arrangements, as the provision calls them, would 
build on the practice of peer evaluation, with the involvement of the Commission. 
Article 70 TFEU provides for information from the European Parliament and national 
parliaments as well. The system is of course notwithstanding possible infringement 
procedures, which are regulated under Articles 258 to 260 TFEU. It is mainly a 
consensual method, not oriented towards sanctions, but rather envisaged as an 
informative and supporting tool for a better implementation of EU policies and a 
backbone for a full application of the mutual recognition principle. The mechanism 
could encompass entire policies instead of being limited to single instruments. Even 
where they have not exercised their opt-in right and have not taken part in some 
or all legal instruments relevant for a given evaluation round, the United Kingdom 
and Ireland would be allowed to take part in it  37. However, no initiative of that kind 
has been tabled by the Commission so far  38. The only activity linked to the concern 
35 COM (2011) 713, 18 January 2012.
36 The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens, point 1.2.5. (OJ, no. C 115, 4 May 2010, p. 1).
37 See Article 3, para. 1, second indent of Protocol 21 to the Lisbon Treaty. Nothing similar 
is provided in relation to Denmark, however where the evaluation under Article 70 TFEU deals 
with Schengen matters, and therefore builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark could decide, 
within six months of the adoption of the instrument, whether it will implement it in its national 
law, and thus participate in the mutual evaluation.
38 The text currently under discussion on evaluation of the Schengen acquis was originally 
based on Article 77 TFEU, it is the Council which decided afterwards to refer instead to Article 
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of improving full and timely implementation of EU legal acts relates to the mutual 
recognition instruments. In October 2010  39, the Council endorsed a methodology  40 
ensuring, on the one side, regular exchange of information among Member States, 
through Council working groups or the network for legislative cooperation set up by 
Council Regulation in 2008  41. On the other side, the European Judicial Network  42 
was required to upload on its website, for each mutual recognition instrument, the 
state of play of implementation, national fact sheets that were available, the handbook 
where a handbook exists (as is the case for the European arrest warrant), the certificate 
or warrant in electronic format and the updated Judicial Atlas, which provides the 
relevant information as to the competent local authorities to which the mutual 
recognition instrument should be sent. While all of this implies some monitoring, it is 
still far from the fully-fledged evaluation mechanism envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty 
and the Stockholm Programme. 
To sum up, although some mechanisms have been developed to assess and 
enhance, on the one hand, the degree of compliance by Member States with certain 
EU policies or areas of intensified cooperation, and on the other hand, the global 
impact of the Union’s achievements in these areas, a truly systematic and thorough 
assessment of the effect of the initiatives and activities of the Union in the fields of 
criminal law where approximation instruments have been implemented is still largely 
missing. 
As we have already seen, the effectiveness and efficiency of EU action against 
a given criminal sector also depends on the legal and administrative environment in 
which the domestic legal rules implementing EU law operate. This is particularly the 
case with regard to the quality of justice and of the judiciary. 
There are very good reasons to evaluate the quality of justice in Member States. 
After all, creating a single area for EU justice was the first of the EU objectives set out 
in Article 3, para. 2, TEU. It is an area in which all citizens – indeed all persons living 
on EU territory – should be able to take advantage of “free movement of persons 
(…) in conjunction with the prevention and combating of crime”. Individuals should 
therefore logically be entitled to receive the same protection (as an offender, if that 
were to be the case, but also as a potential victim), to be dealt with according to the 
same standards and to benefit from the same treatment wherever they are in the EU. 
While there is no methodical system of checking if Member States respect the values 
on which the Union is founded, which are enumerated in Article 2 TEU and include 
70 (see Council document 5754/6/12 REV 6, 4 June 2012).
39 Council conclusions of the JHA Council of 7-8 October 2010 (see Council document 
13403/1/10 REV 1, 27 September 2010).
40 Council document 13405/1/10 REV 1, 27 September 2010.
41 Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council (2008/C 326/01), on the establishment of a Network for 
legislative cooperation between Ministries of Justice of the European Union (OJ, no. C 326, 
20 December 2008, p. 1).
42 Joint Action (98/428/JHA) of 29 June 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the creation of a European Judicial Network 
(OJ, no. L 191, 7 July 1998, p. 4).
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the rule of law, quite radical sanctions are foreseen under Article 7 in the, hopefully 
unlikely, case of serious and persistent breach of these values by a Member State. 
A specific paragraph of the Hague Programme dealt with the issue of the quality 
of justice  43. The Stockholm Programme is less explicit but refers to improving 
evaluation mechanisms and the training of judges as measures to strengthen mutual 
trust  44. It may be going too far to assume from that that all Member States are ready 
to agree to institutional supervision or even to start mutually assessing their respect 
of the rule of law and the quality of their respective judicial systems. This has never 
been done within the Union. Some thinking along those lines was carried out by 
the Dutch Ministry of Justice, culminating in a conference held in Maastricht in 
June 2009  45. The European Commission for the efficiency of justice (CEPEJ) also 
regularly evaluates the judicial systems of the Council of Europe’s Member States  46. 
It has recently agreed to prepare, for the Commission, a study on the impact of the 
functioning of justice systems of EU Member States on their economic situation  47. 
Monitoring the quality of justice in EU Member States would not only be helpful 
for the principle of mutual recognition. It would also contribute to an effective and 
efficient EU criminal policy whatever the area of substantive law the Union decides to 
legislate on. It cannot be denied that the effect of a law is largely contingent on access 
to justice, the length of procedures and, more generally, the means, resources, learning 
and ethics of the judiciary. 
In the context of the accession of new Member States, a pre-accession verification 
process is carried out on the basis of the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’  48. They have 
been progressively refined and cover in particular political stability, democracy and 
the rule of law as well as human rights protection. During accession negotiations, 
issues such as the independence, impartiality, quality and efficiency of the judiciary, 
fundamental rights and anti-corruption policy form part of a particular chapter. 
Several sources are exploited in order to measure the degree of compliance of the 
applicant country with the requirements. A safeguard clause for the first three years 
following accession was included in that respect within the accession acts of Bulgaria 
and Romania  49. The Commission undertook to assist both Member States  50 to remedy 
43 “In an enlarged European Union, mutual confidence shall be based on the certainty 
that all European citizens have access to a judicial system meeting high standards of quality” 
(section 3. 2. of the Hague Programme, OJ, no. C 53, 3 March 2005, p. 11).
44 Section 3.2. of the Stockholm Programme (OJ, no. C 115, 4 May 2010, p. 13).
45 M. dAne and A. Klip (ed.), An additional evaluation mechanism in the field of EU 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters to strengthen mutual trust, Tilburg, Celsus, 2009. 
46 The 2012 report, based on figures from 2010, was published on 20 September 2012.
47 CEPEJ-BU (2012)1 of 15 February 2012.
48 See Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen European Council 21-22 June 1993 
(SN180/1/93 REV 1, p. 13).
49 Article 31 of the Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of 
the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union (OJ, no. L 157, 21 June 2005, 
p. 41).
50 Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation 
and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the area of judicial 
reform and the fight against corruption (OJ, no. L 354, 14 December 2006, p. 56), and 
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weaknesses or shortcomings and to regularly verify progress against a number of 
interlinked benchmarks, forming part of a broad reform of the judicial system and 
of the fight against corruption. The Commission reports twice a year under this 
cooperation and verification mechanism (CVM). The latest reports  51 were issued in 
July. They still confirm weaknesses and express concerns.
In September 2012, Commissioner Reding announced to the European 
Parliament  52 that she wanted to extend annual reports to the other Member States. 
She made the proposal, prompted by claims about the deterioration of the rule of law 
in both Romania and Hungary, to add a mechanism for measuring and comparing 
the strength, efficiency and reliability of justice systems in all Member States to the 
economic and social benchmark in the European semester. The idea was to introduce 
this scoreboard as an extension to the Commission’s annual growth survey. Given 
the mainly economic perspective of the survey, it is not sure that the reports would 
deal exhaustively with those aspects of quality of justice which are the most relevant 
in the context of sectoral EU criminal policies. Nevertheless, it would provide food 
for thought and contribute to a better global assessment of the effectiveness of Union 
action in substantive criminal law. 
4. Conclusion
Evaluation is needed more than ever, particularly to support the credibility of 
Union action. It should go well beyond formal implementation of EU instruments 
and cover their harmonious integration into the national legal framework of each 
Member State as well as their practical use by national competent authorities with 
due consideration for the legal, administrative and factual environment in which they 
apply. And not only should the evaluation process be looked at from the perspective 
of the Member States’ duty to put the instruments in practice. The evaluation should 
also assess the relevance of the EU instruments themselves vis-à-vis their declared 
purpose. By so doing, these instruments may not be seen in isolation but as part of 
a global policy together with all the flanking measures and supportive mechanisms. 
Their consistency with other instruments, whether or not they deal with the same 
criminal phenomenon, should be considered as well. 
The first task is probably to combine the various evaluation exercises in order to 
build up the widest possible picture when assessing the impact of EU harmonisation in 
the field of substantive criminal law. The second is to try to set up more homogeneous 
indicators to evaluate the prevalence of ‘euro-crimes’ so as to draw reliable conclusions 
both in terms of assessing past actions and deciding on future ones. The task is a very 
demanding one. It is a long-term learning process and results will continue to be 
unsatisfactory for some time to come. That is why there is no time to lose.
Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and 
verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in the area of judicial reform 
and the fight against corruption and organized crime (OJ, no. L 354, 14 December 2006, p. 58). 
51 COM (2012) 410 (Romania) and 411 (Bulgaria) of 18 July 2012.




Content and impact of approximation:  
The case of terrorist offences  
(Council Framework Decisions of 2002 and 2008)*
Pedro cAeiro and Miguel Ângelo lemos
1. Context
On 5 September 2001, the European Parliament passed a recommendation on the 
role of the European Union (EU) in “combating” terrorism, calling on the Council 
to adopt a framework decision with a view to, inter alia, “approximating legislative 
provisions establishing minimum rules at European level relating to the constituent 
elements and penalties in the field of terrorism”  1. Less than a week later, the attack 
on New York was carried out and, within two weeks, the European Commission 
presented a Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism  2, 
which was adopted, with modifications, in June the following year  3. As expected, 
the proposal made extensive reference to the attacks in the USA and recalled that the 
“legal rights affected by [terrorist offences] are not the same as legal rights affected 
by common offences”. Consequently, the criminalisation of terrorist offences as 
autonomous crimes was deemed indispensable for “preventing and combating (…) 
* The authors wish to thank Prof. Anne Weyembergh for her useful critical remarks on an 
earlier version of this text. 
1 European Parliament recommendation on the role of the European Union in combating 
terrorism (2001/2016 (INI)), OJ, no. C 72 E, 21 March 2002, p. 135. For a more detailed 
analysis of the background of European law on terrorism, see F. gAlli and A. Weyembergh, 
“Introduction”, in id. (eds.), EU counter-terrorism offences. What impact on national 
legislation and case-law?, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2012, p. 13, with 
further references. 
2 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, COM (2001) 521 
final, 19 September 2001.
3 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, 
OJ, no. L 164, 22 June 2002, p. 3. 
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terrorism”, as a means of achieving the EU objective of providing citizens “with a 
high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice”  4.
The proposal observed that there were significant differences in the national 
legal frameworks for the prevention and repression of terrorist offences in several EU 
Member States (MS). In fact, according to the Commission, only six MS punished 
terrorist offences as such. Hence, taking into consideration the competence provided 
for in Articles 29 and 31(1)(e) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which 
already referred explicitly to terrorism, the adoption of a framework decision for the 
approximation of the substantive laws of MS was both legitimate and necessary so 
as to establish a common EU response to a common problem and also to facilitate 
judicial and police cooperation among the MS in that regard  5.
The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002 
FD) included a definition of the minimum elements of crimes (terrorist offences and 
terrorist group offences) and minimum thresholds for maximum penalties. It is clear 
that the EU was competent to legislate on those issues under Article 31(1)(e) since 
the “field” of terrorism certainly includes terrorist group offences as well as public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruiting and training for terrorism, which 
were later introduced in Article 3 of the 2002 FD  6. It also imposed minimum grounds 
of jurisdiction and the obligation for MS to investigate and prosecute those offences 
ex officio (i.e. irrespective of a report or accusation by possible victims), pursuant to 
Article 34 (2)(b) TEU  7.
Concerning the original terrorism-linked offences (aggravated theft, extortion 
and drawing up false administrative documents with a view to the perpetration of a 
terrorist offence), the situation is different as they are not terrorist offences and cannot 
be seen as pertaining to that “field”. The 2002 FD does not define their constituent 
elements but imposes on MS the duty to consider them as “terrorism-linked offences”, 
which is, to say the least, an obscure obligation. In practical terms, the FD purported 
to extend to those offences the norms relating to penalties (Article 5(1) – but not 5(2)) 
and (optional) mitigation, liability of legal persons, jurisdiction and prosecution ex 
officio. 
4 Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union, in the version then in force (TEU).
5 See g. de Kerchove, “Impact de l’incrimination de terrorisme sur la coopération 
européenne en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme”, in F. gAlli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), 
op. cit., p. 216; and r. genson, “How far do the new EU counter-terrorism offences facilitate 
police cooperation?”, ibid., p. 222.
6 See infra.
7 Under Article 34(2)(b), the EU was competent to approximate, through framework 
decisions, the “laws and regulations of the Member States”, including procedural and 
jurisdictional rules, whenever that might contribute to “the pursuit of the objectives of the 
Union” (Article 34(2) TEU), except for the incriminations and sanctions, the approximation of 
which was restricted to the domains designated in Article 31(1)(e). Through interpretation, it 
should be concluded that the imposition of minimum grounds of jurisdiction was also limited 
to those domains, unless the EU acted under Article 31(1)(d), with a view to preventing 
negative conflicts of jurisdiction (see p. cAeiro, “Commentary on the ‘European touch’ of the 
Comparative Appraisal”, in A. Klip (ed.), Substantive Criminal Law of the European Union, 
Antwerp, Maklu, 2011, p. 125).
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Even if such an extension applies only when those crimes are committed with a 
view to perpetrating terrorist offences, one might question the competence of the EU 
to legislate in this area pursuant to Articles 31(1)(e) TEU and 34(2)(b), since they 
retain their status as “non-terrorist” offences both in their legal definition and in its 
application (convictions for common offences). On the other hand, it might be argued 
that the EU could legitimately legislate on the punishment of preparatory acts of 
terrorist offences and terrorist group offences in general (as they are still “constituent 
elements of criminal acts” in the “field” of terrorism) and it would therefore seem 
nonsensical that such competence ceased when those acts are also crimes per se. 
However, for a given conduct to qualify as preparatory acts for a concrete 
offence, all the required subjective elements of the prepared offence must be present 
(in most cases, those elements are actually essential to determine which offence is 
being prepared). Consequently, terrorism-linked offences can only be considered 
as preparatory acts of terrorist or terrorist group offences – and, hence, under the 
prescriptive jurisdiction of the EU – when the aggravated theft, extortion, etc., are 
already part of a plan to commit a concrete terrorist or terrorist group offence. If that 
is not the case, the acts should be deemed not to be included in the scope of the FD.
Finally, according to the minimum rules scheme, the states retained the power 
to maintain or pass new legislation containing broader incriminations or grounds of 
jurisdiction as well as higher penalties. 
In 2007, the Commission submitted a Proposal for a Framework Decision 
amending the 2002 FD  8. The new instrument aimed at criminalising public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment and training for terrorism. 
In the Commission’s view, that kind of conduct had become particularly dangerous 
because it now had global reach thanks to the use of modern technologies such as the 
internet.
Although the duty to criminalise those acts already existed under the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005), the Commission found 
it “important” to include them in the FD so that they would be subject to “the more 
integrated institutional framework of the European Union (…), the specific legal 
regime [of the FD], in particular in respect of the type and level of criminal penalties 
and compulsory rules on jurisdiction” and the “cooperation mechanisms referring to 
the Framework Decision”.
The second Framework Decision was eventually adopted by the Council in 2008 
(2008 FD)  9, pursuant to Article 31(1)(e) TEU  10.
8 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision amending Framework Decision 2002/475/
JHA on combating terrorism (presented by the Commission), COM (2007) 650 final, 
6 November 2007.
9 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008, amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ, no. L 330, 9 December 2008, 
p. 21.
10 See supra.
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2. Content of the 2002 FD (as amended)
A.	 Elements	of	the	offences	(mandatory	minimum	incrimination)
1. Terrorist offences
The 2002 FD was quite “ambitious”  11, since it could not base itself on a pre-
existing, comprehensive and commonly agreed definition of terrorism as a criminal 
offence, either at the European or at the international law level  12. Nevertheless, the 
structure of the terrorist offences established in the FD seems to have taken inspiration 
from Article 2(1)(b) of the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (1999).
In fact, Article 1, 2002 FD provides for a comprehensive definition of terrorist 
offences, according to which the intentional acts referred to in Article 1(1)(a) to (i) 
(the list of “underlying offences”, harming or endangering life or limb, or personal 
freedom, as defined in MS criminal law) shall be deemed to be terrorist offences if two 
other elements are present. The objective element consists of the requirement that the 
acts, given their nature or context, be capable of seriously damaging a country or an 
international organisation. Regarding the subjective element, the acts must be guided 
by one of the following specific purposes (“terrorist intent”): seriously intimidating a 
population; unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform 
or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the 
11 e. dumitriu, “The E.U.’s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism”, German Law Journal, 5, 2004, p. 585 f. 
12 The eight United Nations conventions and protocols passed between the early 1960s 
and the early 1990s concerning conduct that might be deemed as terrorist offences do not even 
use the term ‘terrorism’ (see A. cAssese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., 2008, p. 169 f.). 
As the 1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 
has never entered into force, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977) 
was the first international binding normative instrument explicitly directed against terrorism. 
However, in spite of that, it did not provide for a specific and autonomous definition of terrorism 
as a discrete criminal offence. Terrorism is a crime under customary international law when 
it amounts to a war crime or a crime against humanity (A. cAssese, ibid., p. 171 f.). Save for 
those cases, the question of whether terrorism qualifies as an international offence in time of 
peace under customary law remains controversial: for an affirmative answer, see A. cAssese, 
ibid., p. 162 f., as well as the recent decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), Interlocutory Decision 
on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 
STL-11-01/I, 16 February 2011). This stance has been convincingly criticised by a number of 
authors: see, before the decision of the Special Tribunal, g. Werle, Principles of International 
Criminal Law, 2nd ed., The Hague, TMC, 2009, p. 30, marginal number 85, and t. Weigend, 
“The Universal Terrorist. The International Community Grappling with a Definition”, JICJ, 4, 
2006, p. 915; and, afterwards, b. sAul, “Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism”, LJIL, 
24, 2011, p. 677. In a similar direction, K. Ambos, “Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon: Is There a Crime of Terrorism under International Law?”, LJIL, 24, 2011, p. 670, 
to whom terrorism is not (yet) a crime under international law, but may be “on the brink” of 
becoming one.
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fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an 
international organisation.
The use of the indefinite article “a” to indicate the possible targets of terrorist 
offences (a population, a country, a government or an international organisation) 
significantly widens the ambit of protection of traditional anti-terrorism law, which 
was bound, in most jurisdictions, to the nation state and its population. Together with 
the common (minimum) definition of terrorist offences, the punishment of European 
and international terrorism – directed against the Union itself (its institutions, bodies 
and agencies), as well as other states, together with their nationals and residents – is 
certainly one of the most relevant features of the FD. 
In this regard, the foreign or transnational nature of the protected interests (relating 
to the contents of the fattispecie) should not be confused with the extraterritorial scope 
of the norms (relating to the reach of a given penal law system).
2. Terrorist group offences 
Article 2 provides for a definition of terrorist group offences. MS have the 
obligation to incriminate the act of directing or participating (including funding) 
in the activities of a structured group of more than two persons, established over a 
period of time, acting in concert to commit terrorist offences. The same norm defines 
“structured group” as one that “is not randomly formed for the immediate commission 
of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, 
continuity of its membership or a developed structure”.
3. Terrorism-linked offences
Article 3 contains a list of offences linked to terrorist activities comprising 
aggravated theft or extortion with a view to committing a terrorist offence as well 
as forgery of administrative documents with a view to committing a terrorist offence 
(except where the underlying offence is threats) or to participate in a terrorist group.
In the view of the drafters of the FD, the ultimate terrorist purpose of those acts 
justifies that they be treated, in some aspects, as if they were terrorist offences.
The 2008 FD has extended this list so as to encompass the offences set out in 
the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005), i.e. public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence; recruitment for terrorism (soliciting another 
person to commit terrorist offences or terrorist group offences); and training for 
terrorist offences. The obvious (and dangerous) proximity of those “new offences” 
to the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms has led the drafters to state 
emphatically, in Article 2, that measures to be taken by the MS cannot contradict 
fundamental principles relating to freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
4. Incitement, complicity and attempt 
Article 4 of the FD establishes that MS shall provide for the punishment of inciting 
(except for the “new offences”), aiding or abetting any of the previous offences, as 
well as the attempt to perpetrate terrorist offences (except where the underlying 
offence consists of possession of weapons or explosives, or of threats to commit a 
terrorist offence) or terrorist-linked offences (except for the “new offences”). 
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5. Legal persons
Article 7 of the 2002 FD provides for the (criminal or administrative) liability of 
legal persons for the preceding offences, entailing the penalties set forth in Article 8, 
as long as they are committed for their benefit by “any person (…) who has a leading 
position within the legal person”, based on “a power of representation of the legal 
person, an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person [or] an authority to 
exercise control within the legal person”.
B.	 Sanctions	(mandatory	features	and	minimum	levels)
The sanctions applicable to all three categories of crimes should be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive, allowing for extradition proceedings. 
In the case of terrorist offences, they should also be heavier than those applicable 
to the underlying offences (common murder, kidnapping, etc.) so as to reflect the 
specificity of the terrorist (objective and subjective) elements, save where the former 
are already punishable with the maximum penalties provided for by national law.
As for terrorist group offences, the European legislator set minimum maximum 
custodial sentences: not less than fifteen years imprisonment for “directing” the 
terrorist group (or eight years in the case where the group purports only to produce 
threats with terrorist intent), and not less than eight years for “participating” in its 
activities.
C.	 Jurisdiction	(mandatory	grounds	of	jurisdiction)
Article 9 imposes on MS the duty to establish certain grounds of jurisdiction: 
territoriality; flag (of the vessel) or registration (of the aircraft); active nationality 
or residence of the offender, or place of establishment of the legal person for whose 
benefit the offence is committed; protection (institutions or population of the MS 
and European institutions and bodies based in that MS); and surrogate (vicarious) 
jurisdiction (on refusal of extradition or surrender). 
D.	 Investigation	and	prosecution
The 2002 FD imposes on MS the duty to investigate/prosecute the three categories 
of offences ex officio, i.e. irrespective of a report, complaint or accusation by possible 
victims.
E.	 Powers	conferred	on	Member	States	
Alongside the preceding obligations, the FD includes some options for the 
MS, namely the powers to extend their jurisdiction over offences perpetrated in the 
territory of another MS (a sort of European territoriality); to reduce the punishment 
for offenders who renounce their activity and cooperate with the authorities; and to 
incriminate the attempt to recruit or to train for terrorist offences.
3. Impact on domestic law
The impact of a framework decision (or a directive) on the criminal law of a 
particular MS should not be assessed through a straight comparison between the text 
of the European act and the relevant national law and case law, examining semantic 
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correspondence to ascertain compliance. Impact is better described as a process, 
which encompasses all the decisions taken by national authorities regarding the 
implementation of European law. 
In fact, the specific feature of framework decisions and directives (in criminal 
matters) is that MS are called upon to: (i) check whether their laws make it possible 
for the (binding) “results” set in these legal acts to be achieved and, if that is not the 
case, (ii) adopt the adequate legislative measures to that effect, choosing the “form 
and methods”. Both moments are part of the impact process and were deliberately 
designed for the MS to interpret the European acts, assess their own legal system and 
proceed with legislative action. 
Section A below addresses two problematic issues in the transposition of the 
2002 FD. In the first case, national authorities and the European Commission have 
actually expressed divergent views on the binding content of the FD. In the second 
one, a thorough interpretation of the FD in the light of the Treaties might have led 
to the same result. Under the legal framework then in force, disagreement about the 
interpretation of FDs in general could not be adjudicated by the European Court 
of Justice in infringement proceedings  13. The absence of an impartial third party 
endowed with the power to state the correct interpretation of secondary legislation 
with authority left the disagreement unsettled at a normative level: MS might stick 
to their own construction of what the “binding results” were, as they actually did, 
covered (at least at a formal level) by the exercise of their legitimate powers. At worst, 
this stance could only be subject to a political assessment by the Council  14. Hence, 
from an EU perspective, it could be upheld that the margin of discretion left to the MS 
in the implementation of framework decisions should be as narrow as possible so as 
to avoid ‘legitimate’ discrepancies to the maximum extent.
On the other hand, the obligation to put in place hard-hitting norms whose impact 
cannot be “cushioned” and adapted to national environments has sometimes prompted 
imbalances rather than harmonisation. Section B describes one of these cases.
The Treaty of Lisbon has abolished framework decisions and has replaced them 
with directives. This means that defective transposition of EU acts in criminal matters 
can now give rise to infringement proceedings. In the current legal context, there 
is much less of a risk of the defective transposition of an EU act continuing for a 
13 Regarding framework decisions, the Commission observes: “Whereas the Commission 
has within the first pillar the authority to start an infringement procedure against a Member 
State this possibility does not exist within the TEU. (…) Nevertheless, as the Commission fully 
participates in third pillar matters, it is coherent to confer on it a task of a factual evaluation of 
the implementation measures enabling the Council to assess the extent to which Member States 
have taken the necessary measures in order to comply with this Framework Decision” (Report 
from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council FD of 13 June 2002 on combating 
terrorism, COM (2004) 409 final, 8 June 2004, p. 5). 
It should be noted that the tighter scrutiny by EU bodies to which the implementation 
of directives is subject does not affect the existence of MS powers in that realm, only the 
competence to define their scope and boundaries.
14 See Article 11(2) 2002 FD and Council document 11687/2/04 REV 2 DROIPEN 40, 
12 October 2004.
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long period of time. Hence, it is argued that such a risk should not play a role in 
determining the extent to which MS should be accorded a margin of discretion in the 
implementation of directives in criminal matters. 
A.	 Construing	“binding	results”
1. Labelling terrorist offences
The sharing of competence between the EU and the MS described above might 
attract divergent views on what should be deemed as a “binding result”, especially when, 
as is the case, framework decisions/directives are designed to set a comprehensive 
common regime, where partial lack of transposition might compromise the “result” 
as a whole  15.
A good example is the debate over the existence of an obligation to incriminate 
terrorist offences as a separate set of crimes and branding them with that label  16. 
Article 1(1) of the 2002 FD establishes that “each Member State shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that [the designated acts] shall be deemed to be terrorist 
offences”. In this particular case, the several linguistic versions of the norm seem to 
have, ne varietur, the same meaning  17: the FD requires MS to consider the listed acts 
to be terrorist offences as soon as the specific elements are present. In other words, 
domestic legislation cannot limit itself to punishing those acts: it must reflect the 
change of nature of common offences to terrorist crimes and name them as such. 
In the authors’ view, there is merit in the contention that this is a “result” that 
is binding on MS. Singling out terrorist offences and giving them an autonomous 
status vis-à-vis the underlying ‘common’ offences plays a threefold role. In the first 
place, it differentiates, at a normative level, conduct that is inherently different – not 
only in its subjective elements, but also in respect of the harmed or endangered legal 
interests  18 – and should be treated as such. In the second place, and as a consequence, 
it allows for the expression “terrorist offences” to become an essential “anchorage 
15 “Partial or inexistent implementation of an article or part of an article will also reflect on 
linked provisions that considered independently might seem to comply with the requirements of 
the Framework Decision and will affect the system as a whole” (Report from the Commission, 
2004, op. cit., p. 5). Nevertheless, the circumstance that the result intended is a “system as a 
whole” does not preclude the need to establish the competence of the EU to legislate on each 
“partial” result (constituent elements of the offences, penalties, jurisdiction, etc.). 
16 See Report from the Commission, 2004, op. cit., p. 5; and m. böse, “The impact of the 
Framework Decision on combating terrorism on counterterrorism legislation and case law in 
Germany”, in F. gAlli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), op. cit., p. 66 f., with further references.
17 “(…) als terroristische Straftaten eingestuft werden (…)”; “(…) pour que soient 
considérés comme infractions terroristes (…)”; “(…) siano considerati reati terroristici 
(…)”; “(…) worden aangemerkt als terroristische misdrijven (…)”; “(…) sejam considerados 
infracções terroristas (…)”; “(…) skall betraktas som terroristbrott (…)”.
18 See supra.
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point” to which other norms (on penalties  19, jurisdiction  20, judicial cooperation, etc.) 
refer  21. Last but not least, naming terrorist offences as such helps in ensuring that the 
special (or even exceptional) rules that apply to them do not extend to the “common” 
underlying offences – provided, of course, that the label is not subject to manipulation 
and abuse  22.
Nevertheless, the negative effects of not incriminating terrorist offences as 
such on the establishment of a common regime on the prevention and repression of 
terrorism should not be overestimated. Despite the extensive approximation sought 
by the FDs, national laws remain significantly different because many of them go 
beyond the scope of the European definition. In some cases, the existing domestic 
notion of terrorist offences already complied with the 2002 FD and needed no specific 
amendment  23. In other cases, MS took the opportunity to pass laws that reach far 
beyond that concept  24.
Consequently, if it is true that the failure to single out terrorist offences and name 
them as such can hamper the creation of a European core regime of terrorist offences, 
it is nonetheless also true that domestic legal systems might contain other terrorist 
offences subject to other rules, leading to a sort of dual regime on terrorism (European 
versus national sources of law), which clearly undermines harmonisation. When such 
a dual regime does not exist, the broader definition of terrorist offences in national 
law ends up making the ‘European regime’ applicable to an array of criminal acts 
considerably wider than those intended by the FD. In this respect, it should be noted 
that this spillover effect is of immediate European concern, namely the extended 
application of the rules on (optional) extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts committed 
19 As said, the FD imposed the obligation to punish terrorist offences more severely than 
the underlying offences, which means that the sanctions applicable to the former should be 
separate and higher than those applicable to the latter so as to ensure that a terrorist offence 
can be punished more harshly than the gravest act subsumable to the corresponding underlying 
offence.
20 See infra.
21 J. vestergAArd, “Denmark: criminal law as an anchorage point for proactive anti-
terrorism legislation”, in F. gAlli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), op. cit., p. 169.
22 p. cAeiro, “Concluding remarks”, ibid., p. 308 f.
23 Namely, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom – see, respectively, the 
assessments of the national rapporteurs, in F. gAlli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), op. cit.: 
h. lAbAyle, “Les infractions terroristes en droit pénal français. Quel impact des décisions-
cadres de 2002 et 2008?”, p. 62 ; m. böse, “The impact of the Framework Decision on combating 
terrorism on counterterrorism legislation and case law in Germany”, p. 77; m. cAncio meliá, 
“The reform of Spain’s antiterrorist criminal law and the 2008 Framework Decision”, p. 108; 
and J. spencer, “‘No thank you, we’ve already got one!’ Why EU anti-terrorist legislation has 
made little impact on the law of the UK”, p. 119.
24 E.g., Austria: see r. Kert, “Austrian counter-terrorism legislation and case law”, in 
F. gAlli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), op. cit., p. 134.
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in the territory of other MS  25 and on surrender not subject to the control of dual 
criminality  26.
In short, failure to incriminate terrorist offences separately and label them as such 
may lead to the defective transposition of the FD as a whole, but it should be seen 
as relatively minor damage inflicted on a common regime on terrorist offences that 
barely exists. 
2. Interpreting framework decisions in the light of the EU Treaties
Transposition is primarily about interpretation. As with any other legal act, 
framework decisions and directives must be interpreted in the light of the constitutional 
setting to which they belong. In this respect, one of the most challenging features 
of the framework decisions’ impact on national law is the need to put together (i) 
the incrimination of domestic, European and international terrorist offences, (ii) the 
required grounds of jurisdiction and (iii) the competence of the EU to legislate on 
those matters.
As outlined above, according to Article 1 of the FD, the intentional acts listed 
in Article 1(1)(a) to (i), as defined under national law, shall be deemed terrorist 
offences if, given their nature or context, “they may seriously damage a country or 
an international organisation” (objective element) and if “they are committed with 
the aim of seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling a government or 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act or seriously 
destabilising or destroying” the fundamental structures of a country or an international 
organisation (subjective element)  27. 
The legal interests protected by this incrimination seem to range from traditional 
internal public peace within a country to world peace, where the entities against 
which the offences are perpetrated  28 bear no link whatsoever with the EU or the MS. 
However, the universal dimension of the protection apparently provided by the FD 
must be confronted with the powers assigned to the EU in criminal matters, bearing 
in mind the principle of conferral  29. In fact, and notwithstanding the growing external 
25 Article 9(1)(a) 2002 FD.
26 Article 2(2) of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the 
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ, no. L 190, 
18 July 2002, p. 1.
27 The argument developed in the following considerations also applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to terrorist group offences, since they are defined as groups of persons who “act in concert to 
commit terrorist offences”.
28 Traditionally, the analysis of terrorist offences distinguishes between primary targets 
(the concrete victims against whom the violent act is directed) and secondary targets (the state 
or populations that the act is intended to threaten or terrorise). In the past, the latter equalled 
the nation state and the resident population. Yet, with the criminalisation of international 
terrorism, the entities that can be “seriously damaged” might not coincide with the ones that 
the offender intends to compel, terrorise, etc.: a terrorist bombing directed against a state 
(secondary “immediate” target) might be intended to compel, say, the International Monetary 
Fund (secondary “ultimate” target) to take a certain decision, and vice-versa. 
29 In Lindqvist the European Court of Justice ruled: “Consequently, it is for the authorities 
and courts of the Member States not only to interpret their national law in a manner consistent 
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dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ)  30, there is considerable 
doubt as to whether the EU can impose on MS the obligation to protect third states or 
international organisations through criminal law without further requirements. 
The Union’s powers relating to the prevention and repression of crime in general, 
and terrorism in particular, are exercised with the purpose of providing citizens with a 
high level of security within a common area of freedom, security and justice  31. Unlike 
certain international organisations that enjoy an unrestricted scope of action (e.g. the 
United Nations) – but not legislative powers of the same kind – the EU must bind its 
intervention to the protection of the AFSJ. In this sense, the AFSJ is a parameter that 
serves both to justify and to limit the obligations deriving from the FDs.
Therefore, the EU has a legitimate claim to impose on MS the incrimination of 
terrorist offences that jeopardise the AFSJ in any way: those that might impinge upon 
the MS and their population or the EU institutions or bodies (either as primary or 
secondary, immediate or ultimate targets), wherever they are committed, and those 
that, albeit targeting third states, are committed in European territory. In all those 
cases, it can be said that the terrorist offences affect, directly or indirectly, the AFSJ – 
or, more accurately, the public peace that should be enjoyed by the population residing 
in that space. It should be stressed that this reasoning does not relate, at all, to the 
jurisdictional issues dealt with in Article 9 of the 2002 FD: at this stage, we are still in 
the process of characterising the powers of the EU to define the ambit of protection of 
MS criminal law against terrorist offences (the content of the incriminations).
If we take one step further, ‘international terrorism’ (whatever the content of that 
expression might be) is said to endanger every state and international organisation, 
which would offer a sound basis for EU action in this field as an indirect way to 
protect the AFSJ. Nevertheless, one might question whether the EU enjoys the 
competence to impose on MS the obligation to punish concrete terrorist offences 
perpetrated outside the AFSJ that do not affect, in one way or the other, the MS, 
European institutions or population. In fact, if one assumes that terrorism is not a 
discrete crime under international law  32, the punishment of terrorist offences that 
do not have the remotest link to the AFSJ can only rely on an offender-centred (as 
opposed to act-centred) type of criminal law: “a terrorist is a terrorist”, etc.  33. Apart 
from being inherently illegitimate, such an approach is arguably outside the scope of 
with Directive 95/46 but also to make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of it which 
would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order or 
with the other general principles of Community law” (emphasis added). See ECJ, 6 November 
2003, Judgement C-101/01, Lindqvist, ECR, p. I-12971, para. 87. 
30 See J. monAr, The External Dimension of the EU´s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. Progress, potential and limitations after the Treaty of Lisbon, SIEPS, 2012, 1; and 
v. mitsilegAs, “The European Union and the Globalisation of Criminal Law”, Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 12, 2009-2010, p. 337 f. 
31 Article 67 TFEU.
32 See supra.
33 See m. cAncio meliá, Los Delitos de Terrorismo: Estructura Típica e Injusto, Madrid, 
Reus, 2010, p. 23.
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EU legislative competence in criminal matters even if it might guide certain political 
initiatives directed against international terrorism at large  34. 
In sum, should the answer to the competence question be in the negative, 
Article 1(1) of the 2002 FD would be partly ultra vires and could be construed 
restrictively by the legislators of the MS, in accordance with the competence assigned 
to the EU in Articles 29 and 31(1) TEU.
In light of the preceding considerations and turning now to the jurisdictional rules 
laid down in Article 9 of the 2002 FD, which define the reach of the substantive norms, 
there should be no obstacles to the transposition into national law of Article 9(1)(a), 
(b) and (e) of the 2002 FD, which embody, respectively, the rules of territoriality, 
flag (of the vessel) / registration (of the aircraft) and national / European protection. 
In respect of the latter, one might regret that the FD has limited extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by reserving it to the MS in which the European institution or body is 
based  35. This is one of the few cases where an EU-wide assignment of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to all MS would be clearly justified: all MS should be able to prosecute 
and try extraterritorial offences perpetrated against the Union because all are affected 
by them in the same manner  36. 
Yet, if we accept the answer suggested supra, regarding the lack of competence 
of the EU to protect third states against terrorist offences committed in non-European 
territory, a different conclusion might be drawn in respect of Article 9(1)(c) and (d) 
(respectively, extraterritorial jurisdiction over offences committed by nationals or 
residents, or for the benefit of a legal person established in the MS). Both suppose 
offences perpetrated outside the area of freedom, security and justice, with no link to 
European targets (the full protection of the latter is provided already by the protective 
principle). Consequently, it can be argued that the jurisdictional rules referring to 
that part of the incrimination have no object and cannot be seen as a “binding result” 
either.
Member States may, if they deem it adequate, implement (or even go beyond) 
the solutions provided by the EU without the necessary competence, as long as, in 
doing so, they do not contravene international law. But, in that case, they will be 
implementing their own law, which will remain at their disposal for modification or 
repeal.
34 See v. mitsilegAs, op. cit., p. 407: “The abolition of the pillars does not avoid uncertainty 
with regard to whether EU external action on terrorism falls under criminal law or foreign and 
security policy (…)”.
35 Arguably, MS can extend, on their own, the protection rule to (extra-European) terrorist 
offences against the EU, which would certainly be seen as compatible with international law.
36 Instead, the optional ground of jurisdiction provided for in Article 9(1)(a) (offences 
committed in the territory of other MS) should have been avoided because it constitutes a 
useless violation of Article 31(1)(d) TEU, which sets the prevention of conflicts of jurisdiction 
as an objective (or a feature, depending on the linguistic versions of the Treaty) of the “common 
action in judicial cooperation in criminal matters”: see p. cAeiro, op. cit., p. 130.
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B.	 Minimum	sanctions
Although this is not the place to delve into a general theory of punishment, 
some of its aspects are of direct interest here. It is well known that the establishment 
of applicable penalties is determined via a normative “calculation” that relates the 
offence and the sanction according to the fundamental principle of proportionality. 
In a sense, this judgement has an absolute nature because it represents a (normative) 
correspondence between two entities and does not therefore refer to a third party: 
e.g. life imprisonment (or twenty-five years imprisonment) as a maximum applicable 
penalty might be seen as proportional to the gravity (lato sensu)  37 of genocide. 
However, within a legal system that provides for the punishment of offences 
of diverse gravity, proportionality also has a “relative” dimension  38, comparing the 
penalties applicable to those offences so as to attain a balanced – and, thus, just  39 
– global result  40. Each system sets its own minimum and maximum thresholds for 
punishment and all the offences have their place on that scale, in a (potentially) 
coherent whole  41. 
Article 5(3) 2002 FD 2002 provides for quantitative minimum (maximum)
thresholds of the penalties applicable to directing or participating in a terrorist group 
(respectively, fifteen years  42 and eight years imprisonment). The obligation for the 
MS to implement those minimum penalties is clear and definitive.
Still, one is left to wonder how the EU legislator has reached those values. Why 
fifteen years imprisonment, and not twenty, or ten? The question is relevant because 
the EU cannot follow the same procedure applicable in domestic law as there is no 
such thing as a European system of penal sanctions, i.e. a European parameter that 
might endow those penalties with a position – a meaning – in the proportionality scale. 
True, these offences are defined by European law and the EU is certainly entitled to 
express its (binding) view on the severity of the applicable punishment. However, the 
norms that actually punish terrorist offences are also part of twenty-seven national 
legal systems with quite diverse penal scales. A maximum penalty of fifteen years 
37 For the purpose of this study, it is irrelevant whether proportionality of the penalty should 
refer to the gravity of the offence/guilt of the offender (as propounded by retributive theories), 
or rather, as the authors would prefer, to the prevention of crime (deterrence, restatement of 
the validity of the violated norm, etc.): in a system governed by the rule of law, all punishment 
should be subject to the principle of proportionality, irrespective of the theoretical approach 
one might follow. 
38 J. de FAriA costA, Direito Penal Especial. Contributo a uma Sistematização dos 
Problemas “Especiais” da Parte Especial, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2004, p. 57.
39 In Dante’s famous formula, “ius est realis et personalis hominis ad hominem proportion” 
(d. Alighieri, De Monarchia, Liber II, 5.1).
40 This is what Romance languages call perequação (péréquation, perequazione), from 
the latin peræquatio (equal distribution): see J. de FAriA costA, op. cit. A similar argument is 
developed by p. Asp, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence of the EU, Stockholm, 2012, 
p. 199 f., using the concepts of “ordinal” (relative) and “cardinal” (absolute) proportionality.
41 On the principle of coherence (rectius: the principle of respect for the coherence of 
national systems), see europeAn criminAl policy initiAtive, “A Manifesto on European 
Criminal Policy”, ZIS, 2009, p. 709; and, in more detail, p. Asp, op. cit., p. 206 f.
42 Or eight years if the group purports to commit terrorist threats only.
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imprisonment is unlikely to have the same meaning in Italy or Portugal as in Sweden 
or the Netherlands. 
If differences in the concrete application and execution of the penalties among 
the MS (and the inherent “unequal” treatment) can be written off as costs of (limited) 
harmonisation (as opposed to unification) – they are not concerned by approximation 
–, the same cannot be said when a European act sets a minimum maximum penalty 
that, in the abstract, corresponds to the harshest sanctioning level in one MS and to the 
lower half of the scale in the other. In short, setting minimum quantitative thresholds 
can lead to fake harmonisation because the relevance given to the same offence will 
vary from MS to MS, according to each one’s penal scale  43.
As the first signatory of this study has argued elsewhere, European legislation 
on applicable penalties could avoid those shortcomings by following a three-step 
procedure. 
In the first place, the EU should establish, by means of a directive, a three or 
four-position general penal scale (light, medium, serious and most serious penalties), 
imposing on MS the obligation to pass legislation in order to fill in those categories 
with values drawn from their own systems  44. Once this equivalence is implemented in 
the MS, the EU will be able to impose on MS the obligation to ascribe, e.g. (at least) 
“serious penalties” for a given offence, and this assessment will prevail over any 
possible national evaluation tending to provide for more lenient penalties. Finally, the 
European concept of “serious penalties” will be transposed, in each MS, according to 
the previously defined national parameters. 
The obvious advantage of such a mechanism of double qualification, or double 
determination, lies in the circumstance that the European assessment of the gravity of 
punishment would still be uniform and binding on the MS, ensuring at the same time a 
kind of peræquatio at the European level. Actually, this mechanism is already present 
in the definition of some elements of criminal offences: for instance, if a European act 
provides for the punishment of attempt, or complicity, it is for the national systems to 
fill in those forms  45. At the end of the day, depending on the applicable national law, 
the same conduct can be considered as (punishable) attempt or as (non-punishable) 
43 h. sAtzger, Internationales und Europäisches Strafrecht. Strafanwendungsrecht. 
Europäisches Straf- und Strafverfahrensrecht. Völkerstrafrecht, 4. Aufl., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
2010, p. 123, marg. nº 45.
44 E.g. the category ‘light penalties’ corresponds to imprisonment for a maximum of one 
year or a fine, ‘medium penalties’ to imprisonment for a maximum of five years and so forth. 
This mechanism is conceived for minimum maximum penalties, but can also be adapted, 
mutatis mutandis, to minimum minimum thresholds – or, should there be a most welcome 
change in the “minimum rules” competence set in the Treaties, to maximum (minimum and 
maximum) penalties.
45 Double qualification might even be required for a proper construction of the relationship 
between jurisdiction (of an internationalised court) and the applicable (domestic) substantive 
norms: see p. cAeiro, “Commentary”, in A. Klip and g. sluiter (eds.), Annotated Leading 
Cases of the International Criminal Tribunals. Timor Leste. The Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes 2001-2003, vol. 13, Louvain-la-Neuve, Anthemis, 2008, p. 823. 
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preparatory acts – but that does not hamper the European law’s aim of punishing 
attempt. 
It might be objected that the EU has no competence for adopting a directive aimed 
at the harmonisation of penal sanctions in the abstract, but solely for establishing 
“minimum rules” concerning the applicable penalties in the fields designated in 
Article 83(1) and (2). The authors do not share that view. First, a directive with the 
said content could certainly be seen as a minimum rule (in the sense of a pre-condition) 
concerning “the definition of (…) sanctions” in the fields subject to approximation. 
Secondly, the general scope of the directive would not infringe upon that material 
limitation because it would not entail per se, in any sense, an obligation to modify the 
penalties provided for by the MS systems, which would first emerge with the specific 
definition, by the means of a directive, of actual sanctions applicable to the offences 
under the EU’s (prescriptive) jurisdiction. 

Content and impact of approximation 
The case of drug trafficking
Robert Kert & Andrea lehner
1. Introduction
In 2004, the Council of the European Union adopted the Framework Decision 
(FD) 2004/757/JHA laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking  1. The provisions of 
the FD had to be transposed into national legislation by 12 May 2006. The European 
Commission is now exploring the possibility of replacing the FD in order to step up 
the fight against illicit drug trafficking. In September 2011, the Commission therefore 
gave the European Criminal Law Academic Network (ECLAN) the task of preparing, 
together with the consultancy Ecorys, a Preparatory study for an impact assessment 
on a new legislative instrument on illicit drug trafficking. A key element of the study 
was an evaluation of the functioning of the FD across EU Member States (MSs) and 
at the EU level. The study not only focused on the Framework Decision but also 
analysed the way in which the legal framework in the field of illicit drug trafficking 
functions in general and identified strengths and gaps, including elements that are 
related to the FD but are primarily covered by horizontal legislation (e.g. participation 
in criminal organisations or confiscation). The data in the following chapters is based 
on information which was collected while this study was being put together  2.
1 OJ, no. L 335, 11 November 2004, p. 8.
2 The two reports with the results of the study (Report on the evaluation of the transposition 
and impacts of the FD 2004/757/JHA on drug trafficking; Preparatory study for an impact 
assessment on a new legislative instrument replacing the Council Framework Decision on illicit 
drug trafficking) were published by the Commission in the EU bookshop (http://bookshop.
europa.eu).
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Using the ECLAN network, national experts in all 27 MSs wrote reports in 
response to a comprehensive questionnaire on their national drug trafficking legislation 
systems. The aim was to identify the strengths of and the gaps in the different drug 
trafficking legislation systems. To answer the questions, national experts were obliged 
to carry out at least four interviews with practitioners from different legal professions 
in their MS. The starting point for the study was the Report from the Commission on 
the implementation of the Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA, laying down minimum 
provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of 
illicit drug trafficking  3 from 2009. But the study was expected to be more detailed 
and to fill in the gaps in the aforementioned report and to go further by looking not 
only at the implementation of the FD but also at the legal framework surrounding the 
implementation legislation and what happened in practice in the prosecution of illicit 
drug trafficking and the anti-drug trafficking legislation of the MSs as a whole.
2. Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA on illicit drug trafficking  
and the international drug control treaties
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA on illicit drug trafficking  4 lays down 
minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the 
field of illicit trafficking of drugs in order to facilitate a common approach at EU level 
to the fight against illicit drug trafficking  5. 
The term drug is defined in Article 1 FD as substances listed under the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 (Single Convention) and the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances 1971 (Convention 1971). In order to fill existing gaps 
within the international control mechanism, Article 1 also includes new psychoactive 
substances which are subject to control under Community legislation, i.e. Council 
Decision 2005 on the information exchange, risk-assessment and control of new 
psychoactive substances  6. The European Commission is currently conducting an 
assessment of Council Decision 2005 to see if it is still an appropriate instrument to 
cope with the rapidly changing market for new psychoactive substances  7. Precursors 
are defined as substances scheduled in Community legislation  8 giving effect to the 
3 Report from the Commission on the implementation of Framework Decision 2004/757/
JHA laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug trafficking, COM (2009) 669 final.
4 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum 
provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking, OJ, no. L 335, 11 November 2004, p. 8.
5 Third Recital, OJ, no. L 335, 11 November 2004, p. 8.
6 Council Decision 2005/387/JHA of 10 May 2005 on the information exchange, risk-
assessment and control of new psychoactive substances, OJ, no. L 127, 20 May 2005, p. 32 
replaced Joint Action 97/396/JHA of 16 June 1997 concerning the information exchange risk 
assessment and the control of new synthetic drugs, OJ, no. L 167, 25 June 1997, p. 1.
7 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/anti-drugs/new-drugs/index_en.htm (status as of 
20 December 2012). 
8 See Article 2(a) and Annex 1 of Regulation (EC) no. 273/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on drug precursors, OJ, no. L 47, 18 February 2004, 
p. 1 and Article 2(a) and the Annex of Council Regulation (EC) no. 111/2005 of 22 December 
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obligations deriving from the United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 1988 (UN Convention 1988). Thus, the 
term precursor is primarily based on Community legislation but arises indirectly out 
of the UN Convention 1988  9.
In Article 2 the FD defines offences linked to trafficking in drugs and precursors. 
Article 2(1) (a) FD lists, in essence, the production  10, distribution  11 and transport  12 of 
drugs as criminal offences. Furthermore the mere cultivation of opium poppy, coca 
bush and cannabis plant is forbidden (Article 2(1) (b) FD), which means that it is 
not necessary for the purpose of the cultivation to obtain narcotic substances from 
the cultivation of these plants  13. The purchase and possession of drugs, if the aim 
of the perpetrator is to distribute or transport these drugs, is also a behaviour that is 
punishable (Article 2(1) (c) FD). As regards precursors, Article 2(1) (d) FD criminalises 
the manufacture, transport and distribution of precursors if the perpetrator knows that 
they are to be used in or for the illicit production of drugs. All the acts mentioned are 
only punishable when they are committed intentionally and without the person having 
the right to carry out the act. A right to, for example manufacture or distribute drugs, 
may only exist if the Single Convention or Convention 1971 provides for permission 
to do so  14. If the conduct mentioned is exclusively committed for the perpetrator’s 
own personal consumption, it is not included in the scope of the FD. Thus, petty 
offences are excluded from the scope of the FD  15 and it is up to the discretion of the 
MSs whether to punish activities committed for personal consumption or not.
A comparison with the UN Convention 1988 shows that Article 2 FD reproduces, 
nearly in identical terms, the provisions laid down in the first four paragraphs of 
Article 3(1) (a) UN Convention 1988. However, there are some differences. Under 
the UN Convention 1988 the cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis 
plant shall only be punishable if it is done for the purpose of producing narcotic 
drugs. As regards precursors, the parties shall, according to the UN Convention 
1988, also criminalise the manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment and 
materials when this is done in the knowledge that they are to be used in or for 
the production of drugs. Pursuant to Article 3(1) (c) (ii) UN Convention 1988 the 
parties shall – subject to their constitutional principles and basic concepts of their 
2004 laying down rules for the monitoring of trade between the Community and third countries 
in drug precursors, OJ, no. L 22, 26 January 2005, p. 1.
9 m. böse, “para. 20 Drogenhandel”, in U. sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, 
Baden-Baden, 2011, p. 353.
10 Next to production Article 2(a) FD also lists the manufacture, extraction and preparation 
of drugs.
11 Next to distribution also offering, offering for sale, sale, delivery on any terms 
whatsoever and brokerage are defined as offences.
12 Furthermore, dispatch, dispatch in transit, importation and exportation of drugs are 
listed.
13 m. böse, supra note 8, p. 355.
14 Ibid., p. 355 f. For example under Articles 29 and 30 Single Convention the manufacture 
and distribution of drugs is permitted, if a license to manufacture or distribute drugs has been 
issued.
15 Compare b. hecKer, Europäisches Strafrecht, Berlin Heidelberg, 2010, p. 389 and 
M. böse, supra note 8, p. 356.
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legal systems (the so-called ‘safeguard clause’)  16 – also criminalise the possession of 
equipment, materials or precursors. The possession, purchase or cultivation of drugs 
for personal consumption is also included in the Convention. However, the parties 
have to implement these activities as criminal offences only if such provisions do not 
contradict their constitutional principles and basic concepts of their legal systems.
Article 3 FD obliges the MSs to make incitement to commit, aiding and abetting 
and attempting one of the offences referred to in Article 2 a criminal offence. Regarding 
offering, preparation or possession of drugs, it is up to the discretion of the MSs to 
decide if they make the attempt to carry out any of these offences a criminal offence. 
Article 3(1) (c) (iv) UN Convention 1988 foresees a similar provision.
Moreover, MSs are obliged to take the measures necessary to ensure that the 
offences are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties 
(Article 4 FD). Beside this general obligation, minimum levels for the upper limit of 
prison penalties are provided for. Furthermore, the FD contains different aggravating 
circumstances which change the range of penalties. Thus, higher penalties are foreseen 
if the offence either involves large quantities of drugs, drugs which cause the most 
harm to health, the offence has resulted in significant damage to the health of a number 
of persons or has been committed as part of the activities of a criminal organisation. 
UN Convention 1988 also contains circumstances which shall make the commission 
of the offence particularly serious. Aside from the involvement in the offence of an 
organised criminal group to which the offender belongs – which is contained both in 
the FD and the Convention – the Convention contains a lot of other circumstances 
which are not included in the FD, such as the use of violence or arms or the fact that 
the offence is committed in, for example, an educational institution (see Article 3(5) 
(a)-(h) UN Convention 1988). In Article 5 the FD contains a mitigating circumstance 
which can be described as a so called ‘leniency notice’  17. According to that provision, 
a MS may reduce the penalties foreseen if the offender renounces criminal activity 
and provides the authorities with information which they would not otherwise have 
been able to obtain. However, there is no obligation for the MS to introduce such a 
provision.
According to Article 4(5) FD, MSs are obliged to take the necessary measures 
to enable the confiscation of drugs and precursors, instrumentalities used or intended 
to be used for these offences and proceeds from these offences or the confiscation 
of property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, substances or 
instrumentalities. The UN Convention 1988 in principle contains the same provision 
on confiscation (see Article 5(1) (a)-(b)) but foresees further rules containing 
procedural aspects in order to secure confiscation.
Article 6 FD provides for a general provision on the liability of legal persons, 
which is foreseen in many European legal instruments  18. Generally speaking, it 
16 See united nAtions, Commentary on the United Nations Convention against illicit 
trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 1988, UN Doc. E/CN.7/590, New 
York, 1998, p. 72.
17 M. böse, supra note 8, p. 357.
18 See for example Second Protocol, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial 
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obliges a MS to take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held 
liable for all offences defined in the FD if they are committed for their benefit by 
a representative of the legal person or by a person under its authority (in the latter 
case only if the commission of the offence has been made possible due to lack of 
supervision by a representative). However, the liability of legal persons shall not 
exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators 
or accessories in any of the mentioned offences. As penalties for legal persons, MSs 
shall foresee criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other sanctions (e.g. 
exclusion from entitlement to tax relief or other benefits, temporary or permanent 
disqualification from the pursuit of commercial activities) (Article 7 FD).
The provisions on jurisdiction (Article 8 FD) provide for the obligation to 
establish jurisdiction over all offences listed in the FD where the offence is committed 
in whole or in part within the MS’s territory (territoriality principle). Noteworthy is 
the fact that situations in which offences are committed on vessels or aircrafts of a 
MS are not governed by this provision. In addition, a MS should, but is not obliged 
to, establish jurisdiction over offences which are committed outside their territory and 
where the offender is one of its nationals or the offence is committed for the benefit of 
a legal person established in the territory of that MS. In those cases of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, the FD allows the MS to waive or limit its jurisdiction (Article 8(2) FD). 
If a MS makes this decision, it shall inform the General Secretariat of the Council 
and the Commission about its decision to do so (Article 8(4) FD). Compared to the 
UN Convention 1988 the standards set in the FD are relatively low. In contrast to 
the FD, Convention 1988 foresees the mandatory establishment of jurisdiction by a 
State when the offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or on an aircraft 
which is registered under its laws at the time the offence is committed. Furthermore, 
the parties to the Convention should, but are not obliged to, establish jurisdiction 
over offences when they are committed not only by one of states’ nationals but also 
by a person who has his habitual residence in their territory. However, as regards 
jurisdiction relating to legal persons, the FD introduced a new element compared to 
the UN Convention 1988.
Article 8(3) FD provides that a MS which, under its laws, does not extradite 
its own nationals, shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over 
and to prosecute, where appropriate, an offence referred to in Articles 2 and 3 when 
it is committed by one of its own nationals outside its territory. After the adoption 
of the European arrest warrant this provision has lost most of its significance, since 
the FD 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between MSs  19 do not foresee that own nationals are not surrendered. Moreover 
illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is an offence listed 
in Article 2 FD on the European arrest warrant, for which it is foreseen that MSs 
give rise to surrender without verification of the double criminality of the act if the 
offence is punishable in the issuing MS by a custodial sentence or a detention order 
interests, OJ, no. C 221, 19 July 1997, p. 12.
19 OJ, no. L 190, 18 July 2002, p. 1.
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for a maximum period of at least three years  20. However, it is unsure whether MSs 
transposing the FD on the European arrest warrant foresaw ways not to surrender their 
own nationals. In these cases the provision might have some relevance.
3. Legislation to implement the Framework Decision on illicit drug trafficking
A.	 Introduction
The report by the Commission on the implementation of the FD indicated that, by 
the year 2009, the implementation of the FD had not been completely satisfactory  21. 
Many MSs reported that they had not amended their current legislation in spite of the 
requirements of the FD. The majority of the MSs already had provisions in their laws 
and saw no reason to amend their legislation due to the FD. Thus, the Commission 
concluded that the FD has had only relatively little impact in the alignment of national 
measures in the fight against drug trafficking  22. 
B.	 Definitions
1. ‘Drugs’
All MSs comply with the definition of the term ‘drugs’ contained in Art. 1(1) 
FD. However, MSs have different ways of transposing this provision. Half of them 
refer to definitions of the relevant UN Conventions  23 and the other half have lists 
of prohibited substances, which are amended by the parliament or by government 
regulations if new international or European legislation is adopted  24. Some of those 
MSs which refer to UN Conventions and Community legislation also have lists of 
substances in government regulations making the general definitions more specific.
2. ‘Precursors’
The definition of the term ‘precursors’ according to Article 1(2) FD is sufficiently 
implemented in the vast majority of the MSs. Similarly to the way in which the MSs 
have dealt with the implementation of the term ‘drugs’, one group of MSs provides for 
a general definition of the term ‘precursors’ and in the other group of States laws or 
government regulations contain lists of substances. Only one MS  25 does not criminalise 
trafficking in precursors at all and thus does not have a definition of ‘precursor’ in 
20 For more details see Report from the Commission on the implementation of Framework 
Decision 2004/757/JHA laying down provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts 
and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, COM (2009) 669 final, p. 8. According to 
Article 9(2) FD the Commission had to submit – on the basis of MS’ information – a report to 
the European Parliament and to the Council on the functioning of the implementation of the 
FD, including its effects on judicial cooperation in the field of illicit drug trafficking by 2009.
21 The Commission had received information on the implementation of the FD from 21 
MSs.
22 COM (2009) 669 final, p. 10.
23 AT, BE, BG, CZ, DK, FI, HU, IE, LU, LV, RO and SE. ES only mentions “toxic drugs, 
narcotics and psychotropic substances” in their laws, but this is interpreted by the Spanish 
courts as covering all substances included in the Single Convention 1961 and Convention 1971.
24 CY, DE, EE, FR, GR, IT, LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, SI, SK and UK.
25 FR.
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its laws. Another MS  26 has no concept of precursors as such, but provides only a 
schedule of banned substances which (also) contains precursor chemicals in its laws.
C.	 Offences	linked	to	trafficking	in	drugs	and	precursors
The laws of most of the MSs are consistent with the offences listed in the FD. 
Disparities compared to the FD can be found more in the details of the national 
provisions rather than in fundamental considerations of the MS.
As regards the definition of offences, all MSs provide for criminal provisions 
on drug trafficking and nearly all MSs provide for criminal provisions on precursor 
trafficking  27. Concerning drug trafficking offences, the majority of MSs  28 already 
contained criminal offences as defined in the FD in their laws. As a result, they did 
not regard it as being necessary to transpose this part of the FD. In some national 
laws  29 minor changes were necessary in order to comply with the FD. Most of the 
MSs go even further than the FD and provide for possession of drugs as an offence, 
including where they are intended exclusively for their own personal consumption. 
With regard to illicit trafficking in precursors, the majority of MSs  30 provide for 
separate provisions against precursor trafficking. In some MSs this is treated in the 
same way as illicit trafficking in drugs by criminalising the same activities  31. That is 
why these MSs go further than the FD and criminalise more activities (e.g. import, 
export, possession or storage of precursors) than necessary. 
In general it is interesting to note that not all national laws list all the activities 
mentioned in Article 2 FD. However, often certain terms imply other activities as 
well so that in only a few cases does a MS’s provision not comply with Article 2  32. 
For example, several laws do not list each of the following terms – ‘production’, 
‘manufacture’, ‘extraction’ and ‘preparation’ but list only the term ‘production’ or 
‘manufacture’. However, these terms are regarded as broad enough to cover the other 
mentioned activities as well.
D. Penalties
1. General considerations
Special problems had already been identified in the Commission’s report from 
2009  33 referring to penalties. Whereas, for example, most of the definitions of offences 
in the FD are similar to the UN Conventions and therefore provisions of most MSs 
had already been in compliance with the FD before it came into force, with regard 
to penalties, the UN Conventions only provide quite general requirements. In this 
respect the FD introduced some new elements. As already mentioned, alongside the 
26 MT.
27 As already mentioned, FR does not criminalize trafficking in precursors.
28 BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FR, HU, IE, IT, LU, LV, MT, PT, RO, SI, SK and 
UK.
29 AT, FI, GR, LT, NL, PL and SE.
30 AT, CY, DE, EE, ES, FI, GR, HU, IT, LV, LT, NL, PL, PT, RO and SE.
31 BE, BG, CZ, IE, LU, SI and SK.
32 Only five MSs (DK, IT, MT, PL and SK) do not comply with Article 2 FD.
33 Report from the Commission, COM (2009) 669 final, p. 4 f.
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general obligation to provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, the 
FD provides minimum maximum sentences for the offences linked to trafficking in 
drugs and precursors and certain aggravating circumstances. 
As a first result, the study shows that in nearly all MSs the penalties foreseen 
in the national laws in principle comply with the provisions of the FD. As the 2009 
report indicated, most of the MSs provide significantly higher sentences than the 
FD. One main difference between the system of the FD and the system of criminal 
penalties in most national laws is that the MSs’ systems are more differentiated than 
the one in the FD. In most States there are various levels of sanctions depending on 
different activities and different factors such as, for example, different quantities or 
different purity and/or weight, specific addressees or specific means of commission 
(e.g. force, weapons). 
For all the following explanations about criminal sanctions it must be considered 
that sanctioning legislation is difficult to compare since it is not enough to take into 
account only the sanctions foreseen for the specific offences but also other provisions 
which are not contained in the specific provisions for criminal offences (‘special part’), 
but in the general part or in procedural law (e.g. suspended sentences, conditional 
release, measures of diversion) need to be taken into account. To evaluate the impact 
of an EU instrument providing criminal sanctions on national legal systems it is also 
important to consider which sentences are imposed in practice. This is a task which 
cannot be done in a short-term study, but would need an empirical long-term study. 
Therefore only tendencies can be presented. However, it is obvious and well known 
that there are big disparities in sentencing practice between the various MSs but also 
within the MSs  34.
2. Imprisonment penalties
Regarding the basic offences referred to in Article 2 FD, maximum penalties 
of at least between one and three years of imprisonment are provided for in the FD 
(Article 4(1) FD). The MSs’ provisions vary regarding maximum penalties between 
less than one year and life imprisonment. Only one MS  35 does not fully comply with 
this requirement since it provides sentences lower than one year for certain offences of 
cannabis trafficking. Most other MSs provide significantly higher maximum penalties 
than one year of imprisonment. Regarding precursor trafficking (Article 2(1) (d) FD), 
in all MSs which have provisions on precursor trafficking, the penalties comply with 
the FD’s requirements although the level of penalties in the MS is in general lower for 
precursor trafficking than for trafficking in drugs (the FD provides the same penalties 
for the basic offences).
A general look at the maximum imprisonment sanctions for drug trafficking 
shows the differences between the different MSs’ laws and between the national laws 
and the FD. As mentioned above, the FD provides a maximum of at least ten years 
34 See e.g. the differences within Germany between courts in the South and in the North or 
Austria between courts in the East and in the West, compare e.g. m. burgstAller et F. csAszAr, 
“Zur regionalen Strafenpraxis in Österreich”, Österreichische Juristenzeitung, 1985, p. 1.
35 BE.
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imprisonment. Regarding drug trafficking, twelve MSs  36 provide for life imprisonment 
in severe cases (in nine MSs when the offences are committed in the framework of a 
criminal organisation, in six MSs for trafficking of large quantities of drugs, in three 
MSs, if drugs cause most harm to health). Three MSs  37 foresee as maximum sentences 
imprisonment of more than twenty years, three  38 between fifteen and twenty years and 
six  39 more than ten years. Only two MSs  40 provide ten years as a maximum. With 
regard to precursor trafficking, four MSs  41 provide life imprisonment, four  42 more 
than fifteen years, whereas in five MSs  43 not more than five years imprisonment are 
provided for. 
The big differences between the MSs’ penalties are mainly due to different 
sanctioning systems. Whereas some MSs stipulate different penalties for differentiated 
levels of severity of the offence depending on the existence of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, others foresee high penalties for the basic offence and such 
circumstances are considered by the court in the sanctioning process. Therefore these 
figures do not say anything about the penalties actually imposed in practice.
Since the Framework Decision ‘only’ contains minimum maximum sentences, 
higher sentences are admissible. Therefore there is no problem of MSs’ laws not 
complying with the FD if their penalties are higher than the ones in the FD. When 
the FD came into force, only a few MSs had to raise their penalties to bring their 
legislation into line with the FD. As penalties in many MSs were higher before the 
adoption of the FD, this was not a reason for them to amend their legislation with 
regard to the level of prison sentences. As a result, there are still legislative disparities 
between the MSs and the FD has not had an approximating effect since most MSs 
have not amended their sentences after the adoption of the FD.
The MSs’ reports also show how difficult – or nearly impossible – an approximation 
of penalties is since the principles and concepts not only of drug law, but also of 
criminal law in general are very different in the various MSs. The research findings 
have confirmed that individual MSs approach sanctioning in a variety of ways. 
Regarding drug law there are MSs which provide harsh sentences in their criminal 
provisions in drug law and also use them while others have lower sentences and use 
alternative ways to combat drug trafficking  44. But all of them report that, in principle, 
their system works well. It is not therefore possible to conclude from the MSs’ reports 
36 AT, CY, EE, FR, GR, HU, IE, LT, LU, MT, SK and UK.
37 IT, PT and RO.
38 BE, CZ and DK.
39 BG, DE, ES, LV, NL, PL and SI.
40 FI, SE.
41 GR, LT, SK and UK.
42 DK, IT, LU and PT.
43 AT, CY, PL, RO and SE.
44 E.g. in PT repression of drug trafficking was significantly downgraded in the agenda 
of police and prosecutors over the last 10 years. Public agencies and bodies were created to 
deal with the prevention and treatment of drug addiction and the society at large learned to 
live with and manage its addicts and dealers. According to the prosecutors interviewed, the 
decriminalisation of consumption did not lead to an increase in the number of trafficking cases.
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that penalties in drug law are too high or too low in the MSs to combat drug trafficking 
successfully. 
3. Financial penalties
Besides prison sentences, nearly all MSs also provide for financial penalties for 
individuals, which are not foreseen in the FD. In all of these MSs, these financial 
penalties are of  a criminal nature. However, the provisions and the extent of the 
fines differ considerably. The maximum amount of financial penalties in cases of drug 
trafficking is between around € 23,000  45 and an unlimited amount  46. An important 
and fundamental difference is the system of determining financial penalties. Whereas 
one group of MSs  47 provides systems of daily fines for financial penalties, other MSs 
provide absolute amounts of financial penalties. In the latter group the basis for the 
determination of the financial penalty differs and depends on various factors (e.g. the 
situation of the offender, the value or sort of drugs). In some national laws, financial 
penalties are foreseen as an alternative to prison sentences whereas in others they can 
be imposed cumulatively together with prison sentences. These groups differ from 
the ones with or without a daily fine system. Finally, there are significant differences 
when financial penalties are applied. In most of the MSs they are only foreseen for or 
only applied to minor offences, but there are some MSs where they are used in cases 
of major drug trafficking. In these States, financial penalties seem to have another 
(additional) function as compensation for gains made by trafficking activities. 
These fundamental differences between the national provisions on financial 
penalties for drug trafficking offences make it clear why an approximation of financial 
penalties has not taken place up until now. The systems are more differentiated and 
complex than the systems of imprisonment. An approximation only in the field of drug 
trafficking is difficult since in most national laws these systems are not only applied 
to drug trafficking offences but to all criminal offences. Therefore specific systems of 
financial penalties for drug trafficking would come into conflict with national legal 
systems.
4. Aggravating circumstances
The FD provides as aggravating circumstances for drug trafficking offences 
that the offence involves large quantities of drugs or that the offence either involves 
drugs that cause the most harm to health or has resulted in significant damage to 
the health of a number of persons (Article 4(2) FD). For these cases, the MS shall 
provide for criminal penalties of a maximum of at least between five and ten years 
of imprisonment (precursors are excluded). If such an offence is committed in the 
framework of a criminal organisation, penalties of a maximum of at least ten years 
of imprisonment shall be provided for (Article 4(3) FD). If an offence of precursor 
trafficking is committed within the framework of a criminal organisation, criminal 
45 SE.
46 DK, ES, FI and UK.
47 AT, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, HU, PL, PT and SE.
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penalties of a maximum of at least between five and ten years of deprivation of liberty 
shall be foreseen (Article 4(4) FD). 
In this regard the provisions of the FD have not been transposed to the full extent 
by all MSs. Only ten MSs  48 have transposed all of the aggravating circumstances 
provided for in the FD and in eight of these the level of penalties fulfils the requirements 
of the FD. This does not mean that in the other MSs these circumstances are not 
considered, but in contrast to the FD, which provides that such circumstances change 
the range of penalties, they are only respected in the determination of penalties as 
aggravating or mitigating factors. 
a) Quantity of drugs
Regarding the quantity of drugs, nineteen MSs  49 foresee it as an aggravating 
circumstance that influences the range of penalties. In some other MSs, the quantity is 
an aspect which can influence sentencing. There is no consensus as to what is a large 
quantity. The FD does not define that and leaves this decision to the MSs’ legislators. 
In the MSs, various definitions can be found but a common understanding is missing. 
Some refer to the total weight of drugs, others to the weight of the pure substance or 
the value of drugs. That is why even if MSs have transposed these provisions into 
national laws, there are differences when this aggravating circumstance is applied. 
The penalties foreseen in the MSs that have a provision on large quantities are all 
in compliance with Article 4(2) FD. Since in the other MSs the maximum penalties 
for the basic offence are at least five years (or higher), the penalties in all MSs are in 
compliance with Article 4(2) FD.
b) Harm to health
The aspect of harm to health as an aggravating circumstance is only contained in 
the drug trafficking legislation of seventeen MSs  50. In some  51, harm to health is only 
a factor which influences sentencing by the judge. Some MSs have lists of different 
categories of drugs which are more or less dangerous  52.
Regarding the maximum penalties, all MSs that provide this aggravating 
circumstance foresee penalties which are in compliance with the FD. In most other 
States, the maximum penalties for the basic offence are so high that they are in 
compliance with the FD. In three MSs  53 the maximum penalties are lower than five 
years and do not comply with the FD.  
c) Commission in the framework of a criminal organisation
Even the fact that the offences have been committed within the framework of a 
criminal organisation is not foreseen as an aggravating factor in all MSs. 
48 CY, CZ, DE, ES, FI, GR, IT, LV, NL and SK.
49 AT, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, NL, PL, SE, SK and UK.
50 BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GR, IE, IT, LU, LV, NL, PT, SK and UK.
51 E.g. AT, EE, FR, LT, SI, UK.
52 E.g. NL.
53 EE, PL (for some activities) and SE.
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Regarding illicit trafficking in drugs, this is contained in twenty-four MSs’ laws  54. 
Whereas the FD provides that large quantities of drugs or drugs that cause the most 
harm to health are involved, the MSs’ provisions do not require this precondition. In 
those States which contain this aggravating circumstance, there are big discrepancies 
concerning penalties. Nine MSs  55 provide for penalties up to life imprisonment and 
three other States a maximum penalty of more than twenty years imprisonment. Five 
MSs foresee imprisonment of up to twenty years, eight of up to fifteen years and 
two MSs a maximum penalty of up to ten years. One MS  56 provides for a maximum 
penalty of less than ten years and does not therefore fulfil the requirements of the FD. 
Regarding precursor trafficking in the framework of a criminal organisation, only 
eighteen MSs provide such provisions  57. With the exception of one State  58, all of them 
foresee maximum penalties of more than five years and fulfil the requirements of the 
FD.
Aside from the provisions on trafficking in illicit drugs, most of the MSs’ laws 
contain specific provisions on the participation of individuals in criminal organisations 
independently of drug trafficking. In most of these MSs these are rarely used in cases 
of drug trafficking, since the penalties foreseen for participation alone are significantly 
lower than the ones for trafficking in drugs. 
d) Other aggravating circumstances
By comparison with the FD, national laws contain a wide variety of other 
aggravating factors: e.g. the possession or use of dangerous means, the commission 
of drug offences for commercial gain, serious consequences of the offence or specific 
addressees like minors. In some States there is a long list of aggravating circumstances 
while others do not provide any other circumstances than those provided for in the FD. 
Most of the additional aggravating circumstances are listed in the UN conventions  59.
5. Mitigating circumstances
As a mitigating circumstance, the FD stipulates that penalties may be reduced 
if the offender renounces criminal activity relating to illicit trafficking in drugs and 
precursors and provides the administrative or judicial authorities with information 
which they otherwise would not have been able to obtain, helping them to prevent 
or mitigate the effects of the offence, identify or bring to justice other offenders, find 
further evidence or prevent further drug and precursor trafficking offences (Article 5). 
These provisions are not mandatory but MSs may take these measures to ensure that 
the penalty may be reduced. Particularly in cases of drug trafficking, which is usually 
committed within the framework of criminal groups, such a so-called leniency notice 
is often necessary and helpful for the investigation of the structures of the groups.
54 It is missing in DK, IE and SE.
55 AT for leaders, CY, EE, FR, GR, LT, MT, SK, UK.
56 NL.
57 BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, ES, FI, GR, HU, IT, LT, LU, LV, NL, PT, SI, SK and UK.
58 CY.
59 See Article 3(5) UN Convention 1988.
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Eleven MSs  60 provide for such provisions in their drug laws and foresee a 
reduction of the penalty or even the possibility for the prosecutor to cease the 
proceedings against the perpetrator. Not all of these regulations provide for exactly 
the same and all the requirements as foreseen in Article 5 FD. The reason for that 
is that none of the MSs has amended its legislation in this respect as a result of the 
FD. These States had such provisions already before the adoption of the FD. Other 
MSs take these aspects into account in other ways. Some national laws take them 
into account when determining the sentence  61, others provide special regulations in 
procedural law. The requirements differ in the various MSs and do not completely 
comply with the ones in the FD.
6. Concluding remarks
Regarding penalties we have a situation where, on the one hand, the penalties in 
most of the MSs in general are in compliance with the FD, but that, on the other hand, 
there are still big disparities between the MSs. The FD did not therefore have much of 
an approximating effect. With regard to aggravating circumstances, only eight MSs 
provide all the aggravating circumstances contained in the FD. However, the penalties 
of nearly all MSs are in compliance with the FD in this regard since the penalties for 
basic offences are already very high. In the light of these observations, the aim of 
the FD could be questioned given that an amendment of the national laws was not 
necessary to be in compliance with the FD.
The results of this analysis show the problems of approximation of penalties 
within the EU. Sentencing systems are so different that more approximation causes 
problems in the MSs’ legislation since penalties do not fit into the national legal 
systems. The study shows that even approximated penalties in national legislation 
only have limited effects on the imposed penalties. The sentences actually imposed 
have not significantly changed even if MSs have amended their legislation after the 
adoption of the FD. Judges are used to their national sanctioning systems and therefore 
use sanctions in a way that they fit into the whole system of sanctions.
Considering the rationale of sentencing, this is not very surprising. The sentencing 
process in criminal matters aims at the individualisation of criminal justice reactions 
to undesirable and criminalised behaviour of individuals found guilty by a court. 
The proper and adequate application of sanctions therefore requires high degrees of 
flexibility and judicial discretion as well as proportionality between the seriousness 
of the criminal act, the personal situation and history of the offender and the sentence 
applied. For reasons of fairness and proportionality, sanctioning systems require 
a balance to be struck between the different penalties depending on the gravity of 
the offence. The definition of criminal offences often covers a rather wide diversity 
of actions with varying levels of gravity. Most definitions of offences, even of the 
more serious offences, include cases where the individual fault of a certain offender 
participating in the offence may be minor. Criminal justice systems in the MSs take 
that into account by providing broad penalty ranges or different penalty levels with 
60 BE, EE, ES, FR, GR, HU, IT, LU, LV, MT and RO.
61 AT, CY, CZ, DE, DK, IE, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI, SK and UK.
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generally low minima or no minimum at all. Additionally, fines, suspended sentences 
or diversionary measures are provided for. Taking into account the different functions 
of penalty frames and punishment levels, national legal systems have developed 
multi-tier structures and scales of penalty frames – some systems preferring more 
general and broad frames, others rather sophisticated multiple tiers. The sentences 
actually imposed depend on so many factors that sentencing practice often deviates 
from the prescribed scales for a variety of reasons and can also change over time, 
independently of activities by the legislator.
The consequence of these different developments are quite different sanctioning 
systems in the MSs which are in all consistent, but difficult to combine with other 
systems. Approximation of penalties always requires some flexibility for the national 
legislation and for national courts to avoid unsolvable conflicts and imbalances within 
the national sanctioning systems. Considering these aspects of sentencing, the question 
must be answered as to why more approximation of penalties is necessary. It is not 
sufficient to approximate penalties only with the aim of raising penalties in the MSs. 
The punitive tendency alone is not a sufficient reason for an approximation because 
there is no evidence that higher levels of penalties act as more of a deterrent  62. An 
obligation to introduce higher penalties can only be justified by additional goals, as 
for example to facilitate cooperation and legal assistance between MSs. Otherwise 
the introduction of minimum-maximum penalties is of quite limited value since it 
generates, on the one hand, problems with the implementation and conflicts with 
sanctioning systems for some MSs, and on the other hand does not really change 
sentencing practice, which is more related to the specific national sanctioning 
systems. When introducing (higher) penalties the proportionality principle (Article 
49(3) Charter of Fundamental Rights) must always be kept in mind.
E. General Rules
1. Incitement, aiding and abetting and attempt
Rules on criminalising incitement to commit and the aiding and abetting of 
offences referred to in Article 2 FD are part of the general criminal law provisions 
in all MSs and not specifically designed for drug trafficking offences. In principle 
there are two different systems. Some MSs differentiate between principal offenders 
and accomplices  63 while others treat all participants to a criminal offence equally as 
perpetrators  64. In order to comply with Article 3 FD, it is sufficient that MSs apply 
their own systems of incitement and aiding and abetting to drug trafficking offences. 
Thus all MSs comply with the FD in this regard.
Concerning the criminalisation of the attempt to carry out offences referred to 
in Article 2 FD MSs’ approaches vary. This is again not a specific problem of drug 
62 A. Kreuzer, “Mehr Sicherheit durch strengeres Strafen?”, KrimPäd, 43, 2004, p. 4 (8 
f.); A. hArrel and J. romAn, “Reducing Drug Use and Crime among Offenders: The Impact 
of Graduated Sanctions ”, Journal of Drug Issues, 31/1, 2001, p. 210; s. snAcKen And d. 
vAn zyl smit, “Europäische Standards zu langen Freiheitsstrafen: Aspekte des Strafrechts, der 
Strafvollzugsforschung und der Menschrechte”, Neue Kriminalpolitik, 2/2009, p. 58.
63 E.g. DE, EE and LU.
64 E.g. AT, DK, FI, IE, IT and SE.
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trafficking law, but in most MSs’ laws  65 a question of the general part which applies 
to all criminal offences. Just over half of the MSs  66 provide that their rules on attempt 
are automatically applicable to all criminal offences. Other States have slightly 
different approaches to the conditions for the criminalisation of attempt. Generally 
speaking, they foresee that the attempt to commit a felony is always punishable, but 
in cases of misdemeanours the law has to explicitly foresee the criminalisation of the 
attempt. Such an approach may cause problems in terms of  full compliance with the 
FD if a State does not, for example, explicitly criminalise the attempt to carry out  a 
drug trafficking offence which is of lesser gravity and does not constitute a felony. 
Therefore three MSs  67 do not completely fulfil the prerequisites of the FD regarding 
the criminalisation of the attempt to carry out drug trafficking offences.
2. Liability of and sanctions for legal persons
All MSs contain provisions on the liability of legal persons. Since this obligation 
was already part of previous EU legal acts, rules on the liability of legal persons 
already pre-existed or were not introduced specifically because of the FD on illicit 
drug trafficking. There are many differences between the systems of corporate liability 
and sanctions foreseen for legal persons. Twenty-two States provide for a criminal 
liability for legal persons and five States  68 an administrative or civil liability, which 
in principle is admissible according to the FD. The main sanction is the imposition 
of fines, which is foreseen in almost all MSs  69. Further sanctions include dissolution, 
banning business activities, disqualification of directors, exclusion from tenders, bans 
on advertising, bans from grants or public subsidies, confiscation or publication of the 
sentence. In conclusion, it can be said that eighteen MSs  70 are in overall compliance 
with Articles 6 and 7 FD.
3. Jurisdiction
All national laws provide for provisions on the establishment of jurisdiction 
where the offence has been committed in whole or in part within the MSs’ territories.
On the contrary, there is considerable variety between the MSs under which 
prerequisites they have established the exercise of jurisdiction if the offence has been 
committed outside their national territories. As already mentioned, the FD requires 
that a MS has to establish extra-territorial jurisdiction in two cases: where the offender 
is one of its nationals (Article 8(1) (b) FD) and where the offence is committed for the 
benefit of a legal person established in the territory of that MS (Article 8(1) (c) FD). 
Most MSs foresee extra-territorial jurisdiction in these two cases but require additional 
prerequisites in order to establish jurisdiction. Examples of additional prerequisites 
65 Note that in CY, IE, SE and UK punishability of the attempt of drug trafficking offences 
is foreseen in the drug laws.
66 AT, BG, CZ, DK, EE, ES, GR, HU, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL and SK.
67 BE, PT and RO.
68 BG, DE, IT, GR and SE.
69 Fines are not foreseen in GR and not for all offences according to Article 2 FD in CY 
and PT.
70 AT, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, RO, SI and UK.
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are that the act has to be criminalised in the MS establishing jurisdiction and in the MS 
where the offence has been committed (principle of double criminality), the offence 
must be punishable with a certain minimum penalty or the alleged offender has to be 
present in the country. As such prerequisites are not foreseen in the FD, this leads to 
the consequence that many States do not provide sufficient rules for the establishment 
of extra-territorial jurisdiction in the sense of the FD. Sixteen MSs  71 foresee extra-
territorial jurisdiction for offences where the offender is one of their nationals without 
any further requirements and therefore fully comply with Article 8(1) (b) FD. Another 
16 MSs  72 fully comply with Article 8(1) (c) FD as they establish extra-territorial 
jurisdiction when the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established 
in the territory of the MS. However, as also mentioned above, the States may decide 
that they will not apply, or apply only in specific cases, the rules on extra-territorial 
jurisdiction set out in the FD. Up to now three MSs  73 have informed the Council 
and the Commission that they will waive or limit the jurisdiction rules set out in 
Article 8(1) (b) FD and seven MSs  74 have informed them that they will waive or limit 
the jurisdiction rules set out in Article 8(1) (c) FD.
Due to the mobility of people in Europe, nationality is not the only ground to 
establish extra-territorial jurisdiction. The study showed that several MSs foresee 
jurisdiction also for habitual residents, if the offence has been committed outside their 
territory, either without any further requirements  75 or under certain conditions  76.
F. Summary of results
As an overall conclusion it can be said that there were no major changes in 
legislation in any of the twenty-seven MSs because of the FD and that therefore the 
added value of the FD has been limited. Approximately half of the MSs  77 did not 
amend their drug trafficking legislation at all and the other half made only minor 
amendments. The reason behind this is that most MSs regarded their laws as being 
in line with the FD. Although nearly all national laws are largely compliant with the 
FD, only five MSs  78 are in overall compliance. The question is whether this is a real 
problem since, despite this fact, cooperation between national authorities, which is 
seen as essential in drug trafficking cases, in general works well, although the degree 
of cooperation certainly varies.
4. Future perspectives for drug trafficking law
What could a new directive under the Lisbon Treaty regulate in another way than 
the FD to enhance the fight against illicit drug trafficking? The following examples 
71 BE, BG, CZ, EE, ES, FI, GR, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, RO, SI, SK and UK.
72 BE, BG, CZ, ES, FI, GR, LT, LU, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK and UK.
73 AT, DE and FR.
74 AT, DE, DK, EE, HU, FR and SE.
75 BE, FI, GR, LV, LT, MT, NL and SK.
76 AT, BG, CY, DK, ES, IE, SE and UK.
77 BE, DE, EE, FR, IE, IT, LU, LV, MT, PT, SI and UK.
78 DE, ES, FI, GR and LV.
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are only initial thoughts of the authors which could be directly drawn from the results 
of the study. They are not political options from the European Commission.
The legal basis for a directive on illicit drug trafficking would be Article 83(1) 
TFEU. Illicit drug trafficking is a particularly serious crime as enumerated in 
Article 83(1) TFEU (‘Euro-Crime’). 
MS level research shows that MSs have different approaches in how they deal with 
low level drug trafficking offences. Whereas some MSs have decriminalised some of 
these acts or provide for diversionary measures (e.g. therapy instead of penalties), 
others provide for severe criminal sanctions even where only personal consumption 
is involved  79. An approximation of offences on this low level is neither necessary nor 
useful, since in principle the cross-border dimension which would require cooperation 
between the MSs is missing. Therefore the scope of the FD should only comprise 
major drug trafficking and be narrower than the one in the current FD which excludes 
only conduct when it is committed exclusively for the perpetrators’ own personal 
consumption. This could increase the acceptability of a new instrument in the various 
MSs, since it would allow them to choose their own specific models of how to deal 
with street dealers, petty sellers or couriers.
The question of approximation (e.g. increasing) of penalties is – as pointed out 
above – a quite difficult one and needs to be looked at with care and sensitivity. As 
already pointed out, it is not clear what the added value of higher penalties would be 
and there are also doubts that increasing penalties would overcome all the existing 
disparities between national laws. It can also be seen that States which provide for 
harsh penalties for drug trafficking have not as yet solved their problems concerning 
drug abuse and crime  80. In order to reduce these problems more effectively, money 
should be spent on drug treatment rather than simply introducing higher penalties  81. 
Portugal offers a good example in showing that even the decriminalisation of the use 
and possession of all illicit drugs combined with the use of alternative therapeutic 
responses did not lead to an increase in drug use but that use remained at a level 
consistent with other countries with similar situations  82.
As regards aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the introduction of a core 
set of additional aggravating and mitigating circumstances could be considered. 
Possible aggravating circumstances could be: the use of illegal weapons or other 
dangerous means; the commission of the offence for the purpose of commercial gain; 
a material link to the commission of other criminal acts; the fact that the offender 
holds a public office and that the offence is connected with the office in question. 
These circumstances can be found in the UN Convention 1988 and/or the MS laws. 
All these circumstances (except the commission for the purpose of commercial gain) 
79 See also European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Annual Report 
2011, p. 23 f.
80 See e.g. s. n. hermAn, “Measuring culpability by measuring drugs? Three reasons to 
reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laws”, Albany Law Review, 63/777, 2000.
81 See J. p. cAulKins et al., “Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences – Throwing away the 
Key or the Taxpayers’ Money?”, RAND, 1997, p. 75 f.
82 c.e. hughes and A. stevens, “What Can We Learn from the Portuguese Decriminalization 
of illicit Drugs?”, British Journal of Criminology, 50/6, 2010, p. 999.
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had also initially been included in the proposal for the FD by the Commission from 
2001  83. The so called leniency notice, as stipulated in Article 5 FD, could be considered 
as a mandatory provision in a new directive. Such a provision could enhance the 
fight against drug trafficking effectively and – as already mentioned – there are big 
discrepancies between the national provisions. 
In order to raise the standard of the provisions on jurisdiction, the territoriality 
principle could be extended to offences committed on aircrafts and vessels. This 
rule is obligatorily foreseen in the UN Convention 1988. In order to avoid negative 
conflicts of jurisdictions – meaning situations where no State establishes jurisdiction 
over a specific case – the existing provisions on extra-territorial jurisdiction should 
be made binding and it should be considered if the active personality principle, 
meaning if the offender is one of its nationals, shall be extended to habitual residents. 
Other new instruments under the Lisbon Treaty, such as Directive 2011/629/JHA on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, 
stipulate mandatory jurisdiction rules for extra-territorial offences where the offender 
is one of the MSs’ nationals.
5. Conclusions for the future approximation of criminal law drawn from  
the experience with the FD on drug trafficking
The FD on illicit drug trafficking and its transposition into the MSs’ laws show 
several important aspects of approximation. Some of them are typical examples of 
the old legal system of the FD. Others are still relevant for the new regime under the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
In some respects, the FD did not bring new elements, but adopted – as shown 
supra – provisions from the relevant UN conventions. With regard to these aspects, 
approximation through EU instruments was not really necessary since most MS had 
already transposed the UN conventions which they had ratified. Concerning these 
matters, it is no wonder that the FD had no approximating effect since MSs’ laws were 
already in line with the FD. The added value of the EU instrument was therefore very 
limited. 
In some other respects, the FD went further than existing international instruments. 
In particular the provisions on penalties and partly the ones on jurisdiction brought 
new aspects. However, even in these respects the impact of the FD was very limited. 
Inter alia, the limited impact of the FD was caused by the ‘Framework Decision’ 
instrument. The adoption of a FD required unanimity in the Council on the one 
hand, and on the other hand the implementation was not under the control of the 
European Court of Justice. What was the consequence of these characteristics of this 
instrument? The content of the FD was in large parts the lowest common denominator. 
Regarding the development of the text from the proposal to the final legal act, a 
drop in standards, particularly of the new content compared to other international 
instruments, could be observed. In the end, standards were adopted that were so low 
83 Proposal for a Council framework decision laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, COM 
(2001) 259 final, OJ, no. C 304 E, 30 October 2001, p. 172.
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that they had been fulfilled by most of the MSs before the adoption  84. The proposal 
by the Commission from 2001  85, for example, contained a significantly longer list of 
aggravating circumstances which were subsequently deleted although most of them 
had also been in the UN conventions but had not been implemented into national laws. 
Only those aggravating circumstances were adopted in the FD where no problems 
regarding the implementation in the MSs had been expected. Also the penalties, which 
were adopted in most MSs did not require an amendment of national legislation since 
the levels of national laws were already in line with the provisions. The MSs agreed 
on levels which did not require too many changes in their national laws.
On the other hand new provisions, which had required changes in national laws, 
were not made mandatory and the decision to implement them was left to the MSs. 
The provisions on mitigating circumstances or on extra-territorial jurisdiction were 
only introduced as facultative provisions. The consequence was that no MS amended 
its legal provisions on mitigating circumstances (leniency provisions) and that several 
MSs’ provisions on extra-territorial jurisdiction are still not in accordance with the 
FD. 
The change from the Framework Decision instrument in the former third pillar 
to directives made it possible to introduce provisions without the consent of all MSs. 
This makes it possible to establish higher common standards, since individual MSs 
cannot block the adoption of new instruments to reach lower standards and less severe 
provisions.
Besides these problems, which are linked with the legal instrument of the FD, 
the more general question emerges as to when and under what circumstances an 
approximation is useful and can bring added value. As a conclusion from the case of 
the FD on illicit drug trafficking, the following key aspects should be observed: 
– The adoption of an instrument of approximation has only limited or no added 
value if it only takes over the content of international conventions which have 
already been implemented in the MSs’ laws and does not set specific (higher) 
EU standards. Only if provisions of international conventions have not been 
implemented yet does an additional EU legal instrument make sense. The same is 
true if provisions are introduced by an EU instrument, which have already been 
foreseen in the MSs’ laws (independently of the implementation of international 
instruments). The use of such EU legislation has only symbolic value.
– Before the approximation of criminal law by EU legal instruments political 
leaders need to answer the question about what the use of criminal law and the 
use of approximation in a certain field will be. Specific goals to be reached with 
approximation must be identified before the adoption of new EU legal instruments 
approximating national criminal laws. Adopting an instrument without a specific 
84 See e.g. Report by the European Parliament on the proposal for a Council Framework 
Decision laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and 
penalties in the field of drug trafficking, A5-0095/2004.
85 Proposal for a Council framework decision laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, COM 
(2001) 259 final, OJ, no. C 304 E, 30 October 2001, p. 172.
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goal and therefore without a clearly defined scope of application results in an 
instrument which does not bring any added value, as the FD on drug trafficking 
shows. Approximation only for approximation’s sake is not sufficient as MSs will 
not easily accept and subsequently not implement such an instrument.
– Grounds for an approximation of national laws can be, for example, better means 
to fight trans-border and organised crime, particularly to facilitate cooperation 
between MSs. Harmonised definitions of offences, penalties and rules of 
jurisdiction are justified if they particularly enable the application of mutual 
recognition instruments and instruments of mutual legal assistance.
– The approximation of criminal penalties requires particular sensitivity and 
justification. The introduction of minimum maximum penalties in areas where all 
MS themselves have already foreseen high penalties does not have an added value, 
as the FD on drug trafficking shows. An approximation of penalties only makes 
sense if existing (low) penalties in the MS make the application of instruments of 
mutual recognition or mutual assistance difficult or impossible.
The content and impact of approximation:  
The case of trafficking in human beings
Francesca GAlli  1
1. Introduction 
A.	 The	phenomenon	of	trafficking	in	human	beings	within	the	European	Union	
Trafficking in human beings  2 is a problem that is prevalent throughout Europe. 
Several hundred thousand people are trafficked into the EU or within the EU every 
year  3.
As a result, academic and legislative interest in this subject has risen markedly in 
the last two decades. However, the scale and nature of this criminal phenomenon is 
1 The author would like to sincerely thank Chloé Brière and Anne Weyembergh for their 
in depth and valuable comments on earlier drafts of this contribution. In addition, she would 
like to express her appreciation to the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS) for its 
generous financial support over the years of her post-doctoral research at the Institut d’Etudes 
Européennes (ULB), focusing on ‘L’Union européenne et la prévention du terrorisme : impact 
sur le droit pénal et redéfinition de la relation entre le droit pénal européen et les droits pénaux 
nationaux’. 
2 The concept must be distinguished from that of human smuggling. A.A. AronoWitz, 
“Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: The Phenomenon, The Markets that Drive It 
and the Organisations that Promote It”, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 
9/2, 2001, p. 263 f. ; J. sAlt, “Trafficking and human smuggling : a European perspective”, 
International Migration, 38/3, 2001, p. 31 f. ; h.m. Ali, “Data Collection on victims of human 
trafficking : an analysis of various sources”, Journal of Human Security, 6/1, 2010, p. 55 f. 
3 See centre pour l’égAlité des chAnces et lA lutte contre le rAcisme, La traite et le 
trafic des êtres humains: rapport annuel 2011. L’argent qui compte: Traite des êtres humains 
et flux financiers criminels, Bruxelles 2012 ; F. cArchedi and i. orFAno (eds.), La tratta di 
persone in Italia. Evoluzione del fenomeno e ambiti di sfruttamento, Milano, Franco Angeli, 
2008; g. Wylie and p. mcredmond, Human trafficking in Europe. Character, causes and 
consequences, New York, Palgrave and McMillan, 2010. 
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not easy to define or to study because trafficking is often investigated or recorded as 
other forms of crime (such as prostitution, illegal immigration and labour disputes). 
In addition, for a long time there were no standardised guidelines for data collection 
at the EU level  4. The issue has been partially addressed with the recent publication of 
an Eurostat Report on human trafficking  5, based on the data collected and provided 
by national rapporteurs (or equivalent mechanisms). Many victims are however still 
not identified nor reported and they constitute the so-called “dark number” which is 
yet a significant problem. 
Europol updates a report every year in which it provides a general overview of 
trafficking in human beings, with a specific focus on the EU situation  6. According 
to this report, social vulnerability is a major root cause of the phenomenon, with 
people from diverse backgrounds becoming victims of trafficking because they 
are deceived by promises of employment, good working conditions and a salary. 
Recruiting individuals has become easier thanks to greater freedom of movement 
and travel, low cost international transport and global communication links combined 
with opportunities to work that had not previously been available and self-confidence. 
Besides, thanks to the perceived anonymity and mass audience of online services, the 
use of the Internet is growing fast. It is being used both to recruit victims (e.g. via 
online employment agencies or marriage agencies or via chat forums, spam emails 
and internet dating) and to advertise the traffickers’ services  7.
At the international level, the most common form of trafficking is trafficking for 
sexual exploitation (43%). Most trafficked victims are women (56%, and 98% in the 
case of sexual exploitation) and children. Some victims are knowingly recruited into 
prostitution. However, through deception or coercion, they have sometimes ended 
up in situations where they have been exploited. When it comes to children, parents 
themselves are sometimes complicit with traffickers  8. Labour exploitation is also an 
extremely relevant dimension of the phenomenon. According to the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), there are at least 2,45 million people in the world who 
are in forced labour situations as a result of having been trafficked  9. Another form of 
4 A.A. AronoWitz, “Overcoming the challenges to accurately measuring the phenomenon 
of human trafficking”, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 3/4, 2010, p. 493 f.; s. steFAnizzi, 
“Measuring the unmeasurable: towards the development of indicators for measuring human 
trafficking”, in e. sAvonA and s. steFAnizzi (eds.), Measuring human trafficking. Complexities 
and pitfalls, New York, Springer, 2007. 
5 Eurostat, Trafficking in human beings, 2013. 
6 See e.g. Europol, Trafficking in human beings in the European Union, The Hague, 2011. 
Data on trafficking are also available within a more general Europol Report, EU serious and 
organised crime threat assessment (SOCTA), last published in 2013. 
7 A.P. syKiotou, Trafficking in human beings: Internet recruitment. Misuse of the Internet 
for the recruitment of victims of trafficking in human beings, Strasbourg, Council of Europe 
Publishing, 2007. 
8 ILO action against trafficking in human beings, Geneva, 2008. In the EU 68% of victims 
are women and 62% are trafficked for sexual exploitation purposes. For key findings concerning 
the EU specifically please see Eurostat, Trafficking in human beings, 2013.
9 ILO action against trafficking in human beings.
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trafficking that is growing fast and is a lucrative area of criminal activity is trafficking 
in humans to use their organs, in particular kidneys  10.
EU enlargement and the gradual lifting of restrictions on employment in many 
EU Member States (MS) has led to an increase in the number of instances of human 
trafficking where people have subsequently been exploited in work situations.
Organised crime groups, often acting in small groups that operate both 
independently and in cooperation with other criminal groups, are involved in human 
trafficking. The trafficking generates massive profits (of up to 125,000 euro per 
month, the third biggest source of illicit profits after drug trafficking and trafficking 
in weapons). The most frequently reported criminal groups in the EU area are, in 
descending order, ethnic Roma, Nigerian, Romanian, Albanian speaking, Russian, 
Chinese, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish organised crime groups  11.
Trafficking in the EU used to be a criminal phenomenon that mainly came from 
outside the EU. However, successive enlargements of the EU and the dismantling 
of internal borders have led to flows of human trafficking within the EU area  12. 
Most Member States are destination countries but some are also countries of origin 
or transit. A number of criminal hubs exists on the continent: the Iberian peninsula 
is both a region of exploitation (Chinese people working in the textile industry and 
shops, Eastern Europeans in agriculture, South Americans in the sex industry and 
Roma children being used as beggars and thieves) and of transit where victims of 
trafficking are redistributed throughout the EU according to market demand (e.g. 
domestic servants in Portugal). West and North Africans, Eastern Europeans, Balkan 
people and Chinese people are used as prostitutes and exploited in the agricultural, 
construction, textile and healthcare sectors and as domestic servants in the southern 
criminal hub. Victims also move to other countries. The north-east and south-east 
criminal hub provide wealthier Member States with victims that they can exploit 
and facilitate the transit and distribution of victims from outside Europe. The north-
west criminal hub manages trafficking from other Member States and from outside 
Europe  13.
The complexity of the phenomenon described above is mirrored by the plethora 
of measures adopted at the international and European level to cope with it. 
10 A. chAplAn et al., Trafficking in organs, tissues and cells and trafficking in human 
beings for the purpose of the removal of organs, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 
2009; s. meyer, “Trafficking in human organs in Europe”, Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. 
Just., 2006, p. 208 f.
11 Europol, op. cit., p. 10-14; UNODC, Trafficking in persons to Europe for sexual 
exploitation, 2010; Eurostat, Trafficking in human beings, 2013. 
12 J. vocKs and J. niJboer, “The Promised Land: A Study of Trafficking in Women from 
Central and Eastern Europe to the Netherlands”, European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research, 8, 2000, p. 383 f.
13 unodc, Global report on trafficking in persons 2012, Vienna, 2012.
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B.	 The	plethora	of	international	measures	on	combating	trafficking	 
in human beings 
Action has been taken to tackle the phenomenon at the international level ever 
since the 1940-50s  14. Hence the European Union’s instruments to combat trafficking 
in human beings have not developed in a complete legal vacuum. The existence of the 
international measures can be traced back to a number of key international and regional 
initiatives in the years leading up to the adoption of the EU’s instruments  15. In fact, in 
terms of both speed and substance, the development of trafficking-related norms and 
standards in the past few years has been almost unprecedented in international law. 
As explained below, this plethora of international measures has had a major impact on 
both the shape and effectiveness of the 2002 FD. 
The most important instrument at the international level is the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (also 
referred to as the Trafficking Protocol) adopted by the UN in 2000 (supplementing 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (TOC)). The Protocol has 
been in force since 25 December 2003  16. 
The stated purpose of the protocol is threefold: first, to prevent and combat 
trafficking in persons, with a particular focus on the protection of women and children; 
second to protect and assist victims of trafficking; third to promote and facilitate 
cooperation among states parties  17.
This instrument encompassed, for the first time, a clear definition of the 
phenomenon and established minimum obligations for states. Indeed its Article 3 
provides that trafficking comprises three separate elements: an action (recruitment, 
14 See for instance the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of 
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949). 
15 s. FArrior, “The international law on trafficking in women and children for prostitution: 
making it live up to its potential”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1997, p. 213 f.; m.y. 
mAttAr, “Incorporating the five basic elements of a model anti-trafficking in persons legislation 
in domestic laws: from the UN Protocol to the European Convention”, Tulane Journal of 
International & Comparative Law, 2006, p. 357 f.; s. scArpA, Trafficking in human beings: 
modern slavery, Oxford, OUP, 2008; A. gAllAgher and p. holmes, “Developing an Effective 
Criminal Justice Response to Human Trafficking. Lessons From the Front Line”, International 
Criminal Justice Review, 18, 2008, p. 318 f. 
16 Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women 
and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against transnational organised 
crime, 2000. m. ditmore and m. WiJers, “The negotiations on the UN Protocol on trafficking 
in persons”, Nemesis, 2003, p. 79 f.; h. AbrAmson, “Beyond consent, towards safeguarding 
human rights: implementing the UN Trafficking protocol”, Harvard International Law Journal, 
2003, p. 473 f. ; J. doezemA, “Who gets to choose? Coercion, consent and the UN Trafficking 
Protocol”, Gender and Development, 10, 2002, p. 20 f.; A. gAllAgher, “Human rights and the 
new UN protocols on trafficking and migrant smuggling”, Human rights quarterly, 2001, p. 975 
f.; d. mc leAn, Transnational organized crime: a commentary on the UN Convention and its 
protocols, Oxford, OUP, 2007; l.g. potts, “Global trafficking in human beings: assessing the 
success of the United Nations Protocol to prevent trafficking in persons”, Geo. Wash. Int’l L. 
rev, 35, 2003, p. 227 f. 
17 Article 2 2000 Trafficking Protocol. 
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transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons); means (threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or abuse 
of a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having the control over another person); and a purpose 
(exploitation). Exploitation is defined as including, as a minimum, exploitation via 
prostitution, other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery 
or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. Remarkably, the 
definition includes a provision to the effect that the consent of a victim to the intended 
exploitation is irrelevant and cannot be used as a defence, when the means described 
above have been used  18.
Article 5 requires state parties to establish as a criminal offence the conduct set 
forth in Article 3 of the protocol, when committed intentionally. Article 4, however, 
specifies that the protocol applies only where those offences are transnational in nature 
and involve an organized crime group. 
In the absence of a specific provision on penalties for trafficking, the relevant 
provisions of the 2000 TOC convention apply: State parties are required to ensure that 
sanctions adopted within domestic law take into account the gravity of the offence  19. 
Special provisions are included to address the problem of victims’ assistance and 
support  20. A number of provisions address the issue of prevention, requesting state 
parties to: establish policies, programmes and other measures aimed at preventing 
trafficking and protecting trafficked persons from re-victimisation (e.g. cooperation 
with NGOs, relevant organisations and other elements of civil society); adopt 
legislation to discourage the demand (e.g. for prostitutes or slaves) that fosters all 
forms of exploitation of persons and that leads to trafficking  21. 
At the European level, the Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings was opened for accession in Warsaw on 16 May 2005  22. 
The Council of Europe’s work on trafficking can be traced back to the late 1980s 
when the issue was still marginally relevant for international organisations and 
national governments. The proposal for a convention on trafficking first emerged in 
2002 and was limited to the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation  23. The 2005 
Convention was clearly intended to bring an added value to the Palermo Protocol, 
and to address its deficiencies. Trafficking in human beings was recognized as a 
18 Article 3(b) 2000 Trafficking Protocol. 
19 Article 11 2000 TOC Convention.
20 Articles 6-8 2000 Trafficking Protocol. See for a comment A. gAllAgher, “Using 
International human rights law to better protect victims of trafficking: the prohibitions on 
slavery, servitude, forced labour and debt bondage”, in l.n. sAdAt and m.p. schArF (eds.), 
Essays in honor of M.C. Bassiouni, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, p. 397. 
21 Article 9 2000 Trafficking Protocol. 
22 Council of Europe Convention on action against trafficking in human beings and its 
explanatory report, Warsaw, 16 May 2005, Council of Europe Treaty Series, no. 197. 
23 See Council of Europe Recommendation 1542 (2002) on a campaign against trafficking 
in women. 
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human rights’ violation, and the guidelines provided insisted on the need to focus on 
assistance to and protection of victims  24. 
In the end, the 2005 Convention relates to all forms of trafficking. It applies to 
both national and transnational trafficking, whether or not related to organized crime  25; 
as a consequence the 2005 Convention is wider in scope than the 2000 Trafficking 
Protocol.
Its stated purposes are: to prevent and combat trafficking; to protect the human 
rights of victims; to ensure effective investigation and prosecution; and to promote 
international cooperation  26. The Convention contains several provisions on victims’ 
protection and assistance, going well beyond the Protocol’s provisions  27. Remarkably, 
these provisions do not require victims to cooperate with law enforcement authorities 
in order to obtain support and protection. Finally, the convention provides for the 
setting up of an effective and independent monitoring mechanism capable of 
controlling the implementation of the obligations contained in the convention  28. 
This is described as its added value and one of its main strengths  29. The Council of 
Europe thus established a Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings (GRETA) with recognised competences in the field, which monitors the 
implementation of the convention through country reports evaluating the measures 
taken by the parties. 
C. The EU response
Alongside the international instruments described above, the European Union has, 
over the years, adopted a number of measures that are related to human trafficking in 
the framework of the third pillar  30. As many human trafficking cases have a cross-
24 A. gAllAgher, “Recent Legal Developments in the Field of Human Trafficking: A 
Critical Review of the 2005 European Convention and Related Instruments”, European Journal 
of Migration and Law, 8, 2006, p. 163 f.
25 Article 2 2005 Convention. 
26 Article 1 2005 Convention. 
27 Articles 10-16 2005 Convention. 
28 Article 36 2005 Convention. 
29 See the Explanatory Report to the 2005 Convention, points 59 and 354. 
30 A. Weyembergh, “La lutte contre la traite des êtres humains dans le cadre du 3e pilier 
du traité sur l’Union européenne”, Cahiers de droit européen, 1-2, 2000, p. 215 f. ; h. AsKolA, 
Legal responses to the trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in the EU, Oxford, Hart, 
2007; c. riJKen, Trafficking in persons – prosecution from a European prospective, The Hague, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003; e. guild, “Immigration and criminal law in the European Union: the 
legal measures and social consequences of criminal law in Member States on trafficking and 
smuggling in human beings” and t. oboKAtA, “EU action against trafficking in human beings: 
past, present and the future”, in e. guild and p. minderhoud (eds.), Immigration and criminal 
law in the European Union, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 1 and p. 387; 
A. middelburg and c. riJKen, “The EU legal framework on combating trafficking in human 
beings for labour exploitation”, in c. riJKen (ed.), Combating trafficking in human beings for 
labour exploitation, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publisher, 2011, p. 355; t. oboKAtA, “Trafficking 
of human beings from a human rights perspective: towards holistic approach”, International 
Studies in Human Rights, 2006, p. 89 f.; s.h. Krieg, “Trafficking in human beings: The EU 
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border dimension, requiring intensive cross-border cooperation for the investigation 
and prosecution of traffickers, there is a need to harmonise national offences and 
sanctions. Thus, trafficking in human beings has been mentioned in the treaties since 
the origins of the cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs field. The Union 
started taking initiatives in the 1990s, with the first major study conducted by the 
Commission in 1996  31.
The EU’s Joint Action of 24 February 1997 was the first EU approximating 
instrument in the EU’s fight against human trafficking and smuggling  32. Of particular 
importance is the fact that trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation has been 
made a criminal offence within the EU context. Through the Joint Action, EU Member 
States agreed to review relevant national laws and practices with a view to improving 
judicial cooperation and ensuring appropriate penalties (including confiscation of the 
proceeds of trafficking, investigations and technical assistance). Member States were 
also to ensure protection for witnesses and assistance for victims and their families 
but, in this regard, no specific obligations were detailed. 
This Joint Action was followed by Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 
2002 on combating trafficking in human beings  33. 
The Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA was an additional step towards 
addressing the crime of trafficking in human beings at the EU level  34. As set out in 
detail below, it was based on three key elements: a common definition of Trafficking in 
Human Beings (Article 1); a uniform threshold for minimum penalties to be imposed 
(Article 3(2)); and (limited) protection and assistance to victims (Article 7). According 
to the Commission, as the Framework Decision focuses on criminal law provisions, 
implementation of a comprehensive anti-trafficking policy in Member States is still 
unsatisfactory, particularly as regards the effectiveness of law enforcement activities 
to detect and prosecute trafficking, victim protection and assistance and the monitoring 
of trends and anti-trafficking policies. In 2004 the EU also enacted the Directive 
2004/81/EC on the possibility to introduce a residence permit for victims of human 
trafficking, who cooperate with law enforcement authorities in their investigations  35. 
However, as explained below, this text did not manage to fully address the lack of 
approach between border control, law enforcement and human rights”, European Law Journal, 
15/6, 2009, p. 775 f. 
31 Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on trafficking 
in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation, COM (96) 567 final, 20 November 1996. 
32 Joint Action 97/154/JHA of 24 February 1997 concerning action to combat trafficking 
in human beings and sexual exploitation of children, OJ, no. L 63, 4 March 1997, p. 2. Its legal 
basis was Article K.3 TUE.
33 Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human 
beings, OJ, no. L 203, 1 August 2002, p. 1.
34 Its legal basis was Article 29 TEU. 
35 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-
country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject 
of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities, OJ, 
no. L 261, 6 August 2004, p. 19.
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protection granted to trafficking victims. The situation called for a substantive 
improvement in the EU’s rules  36.
In March 2009, increased awareness of the limited repressive approach of the 
2002 Framework Decision on trafficking in human beings led the Commission to 
issue a proposal to repeal and replace it. When the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 
1 December 2009, the proposal was put to one side as the new legal basis provided 
by this Treaty offered considerable advantages for new legislation to be adopted 
in the field of justice and home affairs from then on  37. As a consequence, an EU 
directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings was proposed 
by the Commission, negotiated rapidly and adopted in April 2011  38. Member States 
had to implement it by April 2013. But to date, only six out of the twenty-seven 
Member States have fully transposed it, and three countries have reported only partial 
transposition  39. 
The 2011 Directive has been supplemented by the adoption by the EU Commission 
of an EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings (2012-
2016) on 19 June 2012  40. The strategy lists a number of measures to be implemented 
over the next five years and is based on five key priorities: identifying, protecting and 
assisting victims of trafficking; stepping up the prevention of trafficking in human 
beings; more prosecution of traffickers; boosting coordination and cooperation among 
key actors and policy coherence; increasing knowledge of and effectively responding 
to emerging concerns relating to all forms of trafficking in human beings. The Council 
has welcomed the strategy and invited Member States and the relevant EU agencies 
to further develop and strengthen existing action on the basis of the Commission’s 
guidelines  41. 
36 See Proposal for a Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings 
and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, COM (2010) 95 final, 
29 March 2010.
37 Legislation will no longer need to be approved unanimously by the EU Council of 
Ministers (i.e. national governments). Instead, it will be adopted by a majority of Member 
States at the Council together with the European Parliament. A single country will not be able to 
block a proposal. Implementation at national level will also be improved. The Commission will 
be able to monitor how Member States apply EU legislation. If it finds that EU countries violate 
the rules, it will be in a position to refer the case to the European Court of Justice.
38 Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ, no. L 
101, 15 April 2011, p. 1. 
39 Commission, Press Release, Trafficking in human beings: more victims but Member 
States are slow to respond, 15 April 2013, IP/13/322, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-322_en.htm. 
40 Communication from the Commission, The new EU Strategy towards the Eradication of 
Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-2016, COM (2012) 286 final, 19 June 2012.
41 Council conclusions on the new EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in 
Human Beings 2012-2016, 3195th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting Luxembourg, 
25 October 2012. 
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D.	 Research	purpose	and	scope	of	the	contribution
This contribution will assess the content and impact of the approximation of 
the EU’s instruments on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings on 
Member States’ national legislation. 
Considering the insufficient transposition of the 2011 Directive, and the short 
time elapsed since the expiration of the transposition period, it is not yet possible to 
wholly evaluate the impact of this directive. As a consequence, this contribution will 
first focus on the approximation resulting from the 2002 Framework Decision  42. It 
will analyse to what extent the 2002 Framework Decision has managed to achieve 
its objective of enhancing the approximation of the legislation of Member States, 
thereby strengthening mutual trust. In particular, an assessment will be made of the 
shortcomings of such approximation. For the purpose of this analysis, both the EU 
instruments and national legislation are being taken into account. 
The contribution will then discuss to what extent the evaluation of the 2002 
Framework Decision has been taken into account in the drafting of the 2011 directive. 
It will first describe what exactly is required of Member States under the new directive 
in terms of specific actions and responses. It will then assess how these obligations 
compare to those contained in the 2002 Framework Decision and how they relate 
to other agreements developed at the international level. Finally it will evaluate to 
what extent the new EU directive has remedied weaknesses in the previous legal 
regime, especially those related to protection of victims of trafficking and prevention 
measures. 
In conclusion, some hypotheses will be elaborated on the potential impact of the 
new instrument on the basis of its more effective nature as well as the scope and 
content of the new provisions. The author will identify the main challenges ahead and 
evaluate whether the directive and its various implementing mechanisms can meet 
these challenges and thereby contribute to a more effective European law on the issue 
of trafficking in human beings. 
2. The content and impact of approximation: the Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA
The aim of this Framework Decision is to “reduce disparities among different 
judicial approaches of Member States and contribute to the development of police and 
judicial cooperation against trafficking in human beings”  43. In fact, the approximation 
of criminal law boosts the protection of legal interests via criminal law because it 
makes it harder for perpetrators of human trafficking crimes to take advantage of legal 
diversity by choosing the most convenient legal system  44. It facilitates cooperation in 
criminal matters by ensuring that cooperation is based on parallel (or at least similar) 
42 See also t. oboKAtA, “EU Council Framework Decision on combating trafficking in 
human beings: a critical appraisal”, Common Market Law Review, 40, 2003, p. 917 f. 
43 Report from the Commission based on Article 10 of the Council Framework Decision 
of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, COM (2006) 187 final, 2 May 2006. 
44 K. Ambos, “Is the development of a common substantive criminal law for Europe 
possible? Some preliminary reflection”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 12, 2005, p. 173 f.
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criminal law provisions. This is attempted via the adoption of minimum standards 
with regard to criminal offences and penalties  45.
The 2002 Framework Decision aimed at promoting a harmonised EU response to 
human trafficking. Although it marked a significant improvement in the EU provisions 
for combating the phenomenon (A), the instrument has a number of limitations (B). 
A.	 A	significant	improvement	in	the	EU	provisions	for	combating	trafficking	 
in human beings 
As things stand, there is no reliable data from which safe conclusions can be 
drawn regarding the degree of cooperation between law enforcement or prosecuting 
authorities subsequent to the adoption of the 2002 Framework Decision but this 
instrument does constitute a major change both in practical and symbolic terms  46.
1. The symbolic value of the 2002 Framework Decision: raising awareness  
about the phenomenon 
Some national legislation already contained provisions that could be used for 
combating trafficking even before the 2002 Framework Decision and can still be 
used  47. 
The real problem faced by those seeking to combat trafficking was not the 
presumed dearth of criminal law provisions. Instead, what was lacking was a complete 
awareness of the contours of the problem. The changes introduced by the Framework 
Decision contributed to drawing attention to the issue of trafficking at a symbolic 
level, leading to increased awareness of the phenomenon and stimulating the political 
will needed to combat it. Although not completely successful, the 2002 Framework 
Decision constitutes a timid attempt to shift the attention and interest of the criminal 
justice system from controlling flows of migrants – which used to be understood as the 
legal interest at stake  48 – to considering also the need to protect and assist victims  49. 
45 See Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU 
policies through criminal law, COM (2011) 573 final, 20 September 2011. 
46 A. Weyembergh and v. sAntAmAriA, The evaluation of European Criminal Law. The 
example of the Framework Decision on combating trafficking in human beings, Bruxelles, 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009. 
47 For instance, in Belgium detailed provisions already existed in relation to the 
extraterritoriality and liability of legal persons. 
48 J. sAlt and J. stein, “Migration as a business: the case of trafficking”, International 
Migration, 35/4, 1997, p. 467 f.; m.v. mccreight, “Smuggling of migrants, trafficking in 
human beings and irregular migration on a comparative perspective”, European Law Journal, 
12/1, 2006, p. 106 f. 
49 c. riJKen and e. de volder, “The European Union’s struggle to realize a human rights’ 
based approach to trafficking in human beings”, Connecticut Journal of International Law, 25, 
2009, p. 49 f. 
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2. Approximation of offences and penalties 
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a new legal basis (Article 31 TUE) allowing 
for the progressive adoption of measures establishing minimum rules relating to the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the field or organised crime. 
In this context, the 2002 Framework Decision has certainly been a step forward 
with regard to the approximation of EU criminal law in the field and the creation 
of a common EU approach to trafficking in human beings as it provides a common 
definition as well as an approximation of the level of punishment for perpetrators of 
trafficking. The provision on the protection of victims included in the Framework 
Decision, although limited in scope, contributes to this aim as the ways in which 
victims are protected used to vary considerably from one Member State to another. 
The definition of trafficking included in the 1997 Joint Action was rather narrow  50: 
it placed considerable emphasis on the migration aspects and envisaged the sexual 
exploitation of women and children outside their country of origin as the only possible 
result of trafficking  51. 
By comparison, it is worth noting that the changes in content of the 2002 
Framework Decision have to be seen in the context of other international instruments 
and especially of the 2000 Trafficking Protocol, which has influenced its scope. 
The EU 2002 Framework Decision, in its Article 1, makes human trafficking an 
explicit and specific criminal offence,  52 thus encouraging effective investigations 
and the prosecution of suspects. In addition, it provides for additional clarity as it 
avoids the previous situation in which numerous offences overlapped. It also brings 
50 Article I.A. – In the context of this Joint Action: (i) ‘trafficking’ [is understood] as any 
behaviour which facilitates the entry into, transit through, residence in or exit from the territory 
of a Member State, for the purposes set out in point B (b) and (d); (ii) ‘sexual exploitation’ 
in relation to a child, as the following behaviour: (a) the inducement or coercion of a child to 
engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of a child in prostitution or other 
unlawful sexual practices; (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances 
and materials, including the production, sale and distribution or other forms of trafficking in 
such materials, and the possession of such materials; (iii) ‘sexual exploitation’ in relation to an 
adult, as at least the exploitative use of the adult in prostitution.
51 See 1997 Joint Action but also the Hague Ministerial declaration on European guidelines 
for effective measures to prevent and combat trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation (1997).
52 Article 1 – Offences concerning trafficking in human beings for the purposes of labour 
exploitation or sexual exploitation – “1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures 
to ensure that the following acts are punishable: the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring, subsequent reception of a person, including exchange or transfer of control over 
that person, where: (a) use is made of coercion, force or threat, including abduction, or (b) use 
is made of deceit or fraud, or (c) there is an abuse of authority or of a position of vulnerability, 
which is such that the person has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse 
involved, or (d) payments or benefits are given or received to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation of that person’s labour or 
services, including at least forced or compulsory labour or services, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery or servitude, or for the purpose of the exploitation of the prostitution of others or 
other forms of sexual exploitation, including in pornography. ” 
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together the treatment of trafficking-related activities into one EU legal act. Under the 
2002 FD, the scope of the offence has been extended to cover not only sex-related 
trafficking but also forced labour. Thus, the EU seems to have acknowledged that 
trafficking is not only related to prostitution and sexual exploitation. Hence, the 
definition enshrined in the 2002 FD is broader than the definition within the 1997 
Joint Action with regards to the means of exploitation. However, whereas the 1997 
Joint Action made no difference between trafficking in human beings and smuggling, 
the 2002 FD follows the approach of the 2000 Trafficking Protocol and concerns only 
trafficking in human beings. As a consequence, its scope of application is narrower 
and more specific than the scope of the preceding EU instrument. 
Although the initial idea was to improve the implementation of the protocol and 
go beyond its provisions, differences in the definition of trafficking were smoothed 
out over time and the final version reflected the definition set out in the protocol in 
relation to all but a few minor elements  53. For instance, the definition left out the 
removal of organs, which was included in the 2000 Trafficking Protocol definition. 
The three elements of the definition have been in any case retained: material acts, 
means and aims. 
The inclusion of a rule with regard to penalties (Article 3), as well as their broad 
application to legal persons (Article 5), constituted a general strengthening of the 
relevant provisions of the 2000 Trafficking Protocol. For example, in addition to 
establishing a standard of “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” criminal penalties 
(Article 3(1)), the 2002 Framework Decision introduced the concept of aggravated 
offences in relation to which the stated minimum penalties are to apply (Article 3(2)). 
The aim of approximating the level of penalties is to prevent situations in which some 
traffickers receive lower punishment than others depending on the Member State in 
which they are convicted. 
As all Framework Decisions on the approximation of national legislation, the 
2002 Framework Decision on trafficking encompasses also provisions on the liability 
of legal persons (Article 4) and sanctions on legal persons (Article 5) as well as on 
Member States’ jurisdiction. 
The jurisdiction clause is broader than that of the protocol  54: for instance, 
establishing jurisdiction when the offender is a Member State’s national becomes an 
obligation, whereas it remains in the discretion of the State Party in the case of the 
53 See with the 2000 Trafficking Protocol’s definition: Article 3 – “For the purposes of 
this Protocol: (a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of 
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, 
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour 
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.
54 In the absence of a specific provision, Article 15 TOC Convention applies to the 
Trafficking Protocol as well. 
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Trafficking Protocol. However, Member States partially retain the right to opt out of 
these innovative aspects  55. 
3. First steps towards providing effective assistance for and protection of victims 
Most national legislation used to have shortcomings in terms of assistance to 
victims and victim protection  56. Asymmetries in national legislation created situations 
where some of those trafficked were protected more than others depending on where 
they were trafficked to. For instance, only a few Member States provided, in 2002, 
for the issuance of temporary residence permits as a basis for long-term protection. 
Moreover, a difficulty in providing protection is the fact that many of those trafficked 
into or through Member States are illegal immigrants who are likely to be arrested, 
detained or deported in accordance with national immigration laws and regulations. 
The 2002 Framework Decision provisions and the corresponding implementing 
legislation constitute an improvement (although timid) in this respect. 
The victim’s consent is rendered irrelevant if elements of force, coercion or 
abuse of authority are present  57. There is also an acknowledgement that differences 
between trafficking in adults and children should be reflected in the definition itself. 
In fact child exploitation does not require the use of violent means to be identified as 
trafficking  58. 
Moreover, Member States are required to ensure that, at least for offences 
committed on their territory, investigations and prosecutions do not rely on victims’ 
complaints (all Member States’ implementing legislation are compliant with these 
requirements)  59. The stipulation that investigations and prosecutions can proceed ex 
officio is clearly intended to address the problem of intimidation of victims, which 
compromises efforts to come up with an effective criminal justice response to 
trafficking  60. 
B.	 Areas	of	concern	hindering	the	added	value	of	the	2002	Framework	Decision	
The potential of the 2002 Framework Decision has been recognised as it has 
proven influential in promoting approximation. However, it is difficult to say whether 
any perceived degree of the approximation process can be attributed solely to the 
implementation of the 2002 Framework Decision or should also be attributed to 
55 Article 6(2) 2002 FD “A Member State may decide that it will not apply or that it will 
apply only in specific cases or circumstances, the jurisdiction rules set out in paragraphs 1(b) 
and 1(c) as far as the offence is committed outside its territory.”
56 V. Roth, Defining Human Trafficking and Identifying Its Victims: A Study on the Impact 
and Future Challenges of International, European and Finnish Legal Responses to Prostitution-
Related Trafficking in Human Beings, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2012. 
57 Article 1(2) 2002 FD. The issue of consent was not mention in the 1997 Joint Action 
whereas the provision already existed in the 2000 Protocol (Article 3(b)). 
58 Article 1(3) 2002 FD. 
59 Article 7(1) 2002 FD. 
60 A. conFAlonieri, “The role of the victim in administrative and judicial proceedings”, 
Revue Internationale de droit pénal, 81/3-4, 2010, p. 529 f. 
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the impact of the aforementioned international instruments  61. All these instruments 
contribute to a certain extent to the approximation of national legislation in this field. 
The impact of the 2002 Framework Decision cannot be analysed in isolation from 
that of other international instruments. Besides, there are areas of concern, which may 
limit its contribution because of what has been left out of its scope. 
1. Implementation à géometrie variable and over-criminalisation  
of the phenomenon 
Firstly, the “harmonising effect” is limited because the 2002 Framework Decision 
only sets out minimum standards of criminal protection. As a consequence, the 
implementation at the national level has been “à géométrie variable” and has led to a 
general over-criminalisation of the phenomenon, i.e. implementation at the national 
level has been accurate but more severe than the FD itself. 
National legislation has, in many cases, exceeded the 2002 Framework Decision 
requirements on a number of issues, such as the definition of the offence (wider when 
implemented into national law), the penalties prescribed (which go beyond those 
envisaged by the Framework Decision and can even go as far as life imprisonment if 
aggravating circumstances apply) as well as the jurisdiction over trafficking  62. 
As regards the definition of the offence, the 2002 Framework Decision establishes 
only minimum standards. Many Member States have decided to go beyond the 
requirements of the 2002 Framework Decision defining the criminal offences more 
broadly.
Some states have reduced the number of constituent elements of the criminal 
offence. 
In Belgium there are only two main constituent elements of the offence, namely 
the action of exploitation and its purpose. The means of exploitation are aggravating 
circumstances. As a consequence the scope of the offence is much broader. Hungary  63 
and Spain  64 incriminate all forms of trafficking without there being any need 
an underlying purpose of concrete exploitation (exploitation is considered as an 
aggravating circumstance). 
Some states have expanded the aims of exploitation. For example, in France, 
human trafficking is very broadly defined as the exploitation of a person for the 
purpose of committing any serious offence (crime or délit). Such a broad definition 
is meant to cover any possible practice that could develop in the future but also has 
serious implications for the principle of legality and could create major difficulties 
61 A. Weyembergh and v. sAntAmAriA, op. cit. 
62 For details on the national legislation of Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Lithuania, Poland, The Netherlands, Slovenia and the United Kingdom see A. Weyembergh and 
v. sAntAmAriA, op. cit.
63 Article 175B Criminal Code. See K. ligeti, “Trafficking in human beings in Hungary”, 
ibid., p. 197 f., at p. 205-207. 
64 Article 318bis, para. 1 Criminal Code. See F.J. de leon, m. mAroto and m.A. rodriguez, 
“Spanish legislation on combating trafficking in human beings”, ibid., p. 315 f., at p. 320-321.
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when it comes to interpreting it in practice.  65 Italian legislation refers to any kind of 
activity implying victim exploitation – the list is left open in order to cover forms of 
exploitation that may appear in the future  66.
In addition to the introduction of a common definition of the phenomenon, the 
2002 Framework Decision provides for a minimum threshold for maximum penalties 
applicable to trafficking in human beings. The threshold only applies to offences 
involving aggravated circumstances. In relation to ordinary offences, Article 3(1) 
2002 FD only refers to effective, appropriate and dissuasive penalties. The 2002 
Framework Decision did not require Member States to prescribe the same penalty 
for each type of circumstance of trafficking, leaving this matter to their discretion. 
These choices run the risk of promoting divergence rather than approximation of 
national laws. In fact, penalties in the Member States vary significantly. Moreover, it 
has favoured the development of a particularly repressive approach  67. 
Implementing legislation has led to a rigorously punitive framework. For countries 
where trafficking was already criminalised, the implementing legislation has increased 
the lengths of prison sentences compared to the situation beforehand. Trafficking in 
human beings is, at the national level, one of the most severely punishable offences 
in criminal codes. As a general rule, the punishment is exclusively imprisonment  68. 
Maximum sentences provided by national legislation are much higher than what is 
required by the 2002 Framework Decision, in some cases even when aggravated 
circumstances are not present  69. A maximum penalty of no less than eight years – as 
required by the 2002 FD – is often simply a medium range of the sanctions envisaged 
for trafficking at the national level. 
Because of the Member States’ perceived need to strengthen their arsenal of 
repressive measures in order to stop crimes from being committed, the severity of 
65 Article 225(4)(1) Code Pénal. See m. poelemAns, “La transposition en France de la 
Décision-cadre 2002/629/JAI du 19 juillet 2002 sur la traite des êtres humains”, ibid., p. 85 f., 
at p. 90-93.
66 Articles 600 Codice Penale. g. grAsso and A. luciForA, “Evaluation of the impact in 
Italy of the 19th July 2002 Framework Decision against trafficking in human beings”, ibid. 
p. 219 f., at p. 221-227. 
67 Remarkably, in the 2002 Framework Decision the minimum required as maximum 
penalty for aggravated offences is eight years whereas it was ten years in the original proposal. 
The original proposal contained also a minimum for non-aggravated offences, which is 
not included in the final 2002 Framework Decision. Was there maybe a concern during the 
negotiations that the approach retained could be too repressive? 
68 Specific sanctions are however provided for legal persons (see Article 5 2002 FD). 
69 The maximum sentence in Belgium is of 10 years (15 years in the case of aggravated 
circumstances); in France the maximum sentence is 10 years, in the case of organized crime 
involvement it is brought to 20 years, torture or inhuman treatments lead to the applicability of 
life imprisonment and other complementary penalties; in Germany the maximum sentence is 10 
years without any aggravating circumstance; in Greece the maximum sentence is 5 to10 years, 
brought to 10-20 in the case of aggravated offence, if the victim dies life imprisonment becomes 
applicable. Certain aggravated circumstances included in Greek law were not even in the text of 
the 2002 Framework Decision. A. Weyembergh and v. sAntAmAriA, op. cit.
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penalties has dramatically increased the use of deterrence as the main instrument to 
combat the problem. 
Compared to national scales of criminal penalties, as provided for other serious 
offences, the penalties for trafficking in human beings are certainly effective and 
dissuasive. However, implementation raises doubts about whether the proportionality 
requirement of the new provisions is being met. In fact, the prescribed penalties do 
not always reflect the harm inflicted by the proscribed conduct, especially in view 
of the fact that mere intent of exploitation is enough for a charge under the relevant 
provisions  70.
In certain cases, the criminal sanctions provided at the national level are patently 
disproportionate and legal scholars are highly critical of their disproportionately 
punitive nature  71. 
2. Weak and narrow provision on the protection of victims 
Secondly, approximation is limited due to the limited content of the 2002 
Framework Decision in certain respects. 
The provision concerning respect to victims is both weak and narrow in scope. 
Regrettably, the measures identified in the victim protection provision are limited to 
children, who are considered to be particularly vulnerable victims when it comes to 
EU standards on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings. By contrast, the 
2002 FD says nothing about the protection of adult victims (except that investigations 
should not be dependent on their report or accusation)  72. Member States are required 
to take measures to ensure that child victims and their families receive appropriate 
assistance  73. Besides, there are no provisions on victims’ repatriation or remedies 
(such as compensation). This limited approach to victims’ rights and interests appears 
to be a backward step by comparison with both the 1997 Joint Action’s provisions 
(Article II.F) and the 2000 Trafficking Protocol’s provisions (Articles 6-8).
The EU argued that some of the more obvious weaknesses would be addressed at a 
later stage. For example, the EU made use of the competences granted by the EC Treaty 
with regard to irregular migration to further address the question of victims’ assistance 
and support in the EU Directive 2004/81/EC on short term residence permits, which is 
meant to enable victims of trafficking to cooperate with law enforcement authorities by 
providing assistance  74. Trafficked victims are given a reflection period during which 
they cannot be subject to any expulsion order and Member States are required to give 
them access to subsistence and medication, translation services, etc. First, this directive 
has been criticised as a minimum standards’ version of existing national regimes  75. 
70 The act of trafficking must have occurred but the exploitation in itself must not 
necessarily have taken place.
71 See A. Weyembergh and v. sAntAmAriA, “Conclusions”, op. cit., p. 379. 
72 This avoids the need for victims to testify at trial and thus protects them for a 
re-victimisation process. 
73 Article 7(3) 2002 FD. 
74 Legal basis: Article 63(3) TEC (measures on immigration).
75 r. piotroWicz, “European Initiatives in the Protection of Victims of Trafficking who 
Give Evidence Against Their Traffickers”, Int. J. Refugee Law, 14/2-3, 2002, p. 263 f. 
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Member States are only requested to “consider” granting a residence permit. Secondly, 
victims’ assistance and protection is disappointingly only provided if they cooperate 
with the judicial authorities. This is not a desirable approach. Victims who are outside 
criminal proceedings are unable to benefit from the process. This may be a reasonable 
and justified response from the point of view of a Member State. Moreover, problems 
arise when criminal proceedings are terminated, for example due to lack of sufficient 
evidence, or come to an end when traffickers are convicted or acquitted. In these 
circumstances, Member States can withdraw their support to victims, as they have no 
further value from a criminal justice point of view. Another issue is that those who 
do not cooperate may face enforcement action such as deportation. Finally, residence 
permits may not be invoked by victims who are nationals of another Member State, 
which may result in a problem given that some of the new states after the last round 
of enlargement may still be considered as countries of origin. In the end, the main aim 
of the 2004 Directive was to combat illegal immigration, including trafficking. It was 
not designed to create a victim protection scheme. 
Connecting the protection of victims to the prosecution of specific defendants 
demonstrates the problem engendered by viewing trafficking as nothing but a problem 
of criminal law. The trade-off between protection and cooperation proves that the 
EU’s main concern is not (yet) the protection of fundamental rights. 
Instead, the provisions on protection and assistance should be considered from 
a human rights perspective. Victims should benefit from an unconditional right to 
protection. Protection should be given to all victims equally, even when they are not 
willing to participate in criminal proceedings for example because of fear of reprisals 
from the traffickers. A victim of trafficking who cannot or will not assist authorities in 
the prosecution of traffickers deserves no less protection than any other victim! The 
protection of the victim needs to be dissociated from the prosecution of the offender. 
In the end, and in spite of the adoption of the 2003 Directive, we can say that the 
protection of victims is not sufficiently covered by the 2002 Framework Decision. 
The EU has not sought to implement comprehensive policies aiming at protecting 
victims along with its simple rationalisation of existing criminal law provisions (the 
2005 Council of Europe Convention is much more advanced in this respect)  76. During 
the drafting stages, the UN High Commissioners for human rights and refugees jointly 
expressed concern that the provision on victims’ protection was minimal  77. 
Many Member States have no specific provisions relating to the protection of 
victims of human trafficking and they simply rely on the general provisions in their 
criminal codes. In most states there is no systematic catalogue of the rights and duties 
of the victims and assistance to the children’s families is not provided  78. 
76 Article 12(6) of the 2005 Convention states that “Each Party shall adopt such legislative 
or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that assistance to a victim is not made 
conditional on his or her willingness to act as a witness”. 
77 un high commissioner For reFugees, Observations by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
on the Proposal for an EU Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human 
Beings, 27 June 2001. 
78 A. Weyembergh and v. sAntAmAriA, op. cit.
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Besides, regrettably, many Member States have no specific provisions on victim’s 
consent as a reason for excusing the offender of his/her responsibility. The general 
appreciation of victims’ consent differs broadly according to each Member State’s 
general criminal law. In some Member States, victim’s consent excuses the offender 
from liability except for serious crimes whereas in others it does not do so unless the 
offence involves the recourse to mental or physical violence  79. 
3. Specific measures on prevention missing
The 2002 Framework Decision may have had an indirect impact on the 
development of prevention measures in some Member States. However, although they 
had already been introduced in the 2000 Trafficking Protocol, there are no specific 
provisions on the prevention of trafficking by addressing its root causes and the 
demand feeding the phenomenon. 
The 2002 Framework Decision is merely a criminal law response to the trafficking 
of human beings in that its aim is to prohibit trafficking and to punish traffickers. This 
could hinder the effectiveness of the instrument. The balance between prevention and 
repression needs to be improved. For action to be successful, it needs to go beyond 
criminalisation of the act and punishment of traffickers and address a range of issues  80. 
The causes of trafficking must be taken into account as the demand for cheap 
labour forces or for sexual services is an important factor in the development of the 
phenomenon. 
On the one hand, national legislators must strengthen law to punish forced labour 
as a deterrent to potential employers but also establish a good working relationship 
with states of origin to control the supply side. On the other hand, they should open 
channels for legal migration for employment purposes. Immigration law is sometimes 
so strict that it encourages trafficking to move into illegal labour markets. 
3. To what extent has the evaluation of the 2002 Framework Decision been 
taken into account in the elaboration of the directive? 
Research and consultations pinpointed a number of shortcomings of the existing 
legal framework. First, there has not been a net increase in investigations and in the 
prosecution of trafficking in Member States following the implementation of the 
2002 Framework Decision compared to the estimated scale and the gravity of the 
offence. Secondly, the 2002 Framework Decision focused on criminal law provisions 
as the implementation of a comprehensive anti-trafficking policy in Member States 
was still unsatisfactory. Victims are not receiving adequate assistance; protection or 
compensation and prevention measures are insufficient. Thirdly, the situation has 
been poorly monitored, leading to a lack of knowledge and coordination  81.
79 Ibid., p. 384. 
80 Opinion no. 7/2010 of the Group of Experts on Trafficking in Human Beings of the 
European Commission Proposal for a European Strategy and Priority Actions on combating 
and preventing trafficking in human beings (THB) and protecting the rights of trafficked and 
exploited persons, 2010.
81 See Report from the Commission based on Article 10 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, COM (2006) 187 final, 2 
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The impact assessment identified a number of options, eventually coming out 
in favour of the most expansive one: new legislation on prosecution, victim support, 
prevention and monitoring, accompanied by a series of non-legislative options (such 
as training, preventative measures in countries of origin and destination and victim 
support schemes) that would support the effective implementation of the Framework 
Decision  82.
Thus, in March 2009, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Framework 
Decision on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings  83, aiming at 
strengthening the provisions of the previous instrument. The proposed Framework 
Decision was not adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. Under the new decision-making process, the draft was 
scrapped. 
However the parts that are relevant to the discussion have received general 
support and the substance of them has been resubmitted for further negotiation. A new 
proposal for a directive on preventing and combating human trafficking was tabled in 
March 2010  84. Its content is essentially the same as the previous 2009 proposal for a 
Framework Decision. 
A new instrument was considered necessary because, according to the Commission, 
the existing framework suffered from insufficient or erratic implementation in 
Member States  85. Moreover, there was a willingness to introduce a more effective 
instrument after the Lisbon Treaty had come into force. The reforms introduced by the 
new treaty allow the European Parliament to be more involved and therefore to deal 
with previous doubts about the democratic legitimacy of the instrument and would 
include the possibility of launching infringement proceedings at the European Court 
of Justice  86. 
The Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting victims was formally adopted in April 2011. Member States had to 
implement it by 6 April 2013. It is one of the first instruments adopted in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice under the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), 
it replaces the 2002 Framework Decision and its legal bases are articles 82(2) and 
83(1) TFEU. 
May 2006; Commission working document – Evaluation and monitoring of the implementation 
of the EU Plan on best practices, standards and procedures for combating and preventing 
trafficking in human beings, COM (2008) 657 final, 17 October 2008; 2009 Proposal for a 
Framework Decision on preventing and combating human trafficking.
82 Commission Staff Working Document – Accompanying document to the Proposal for 
a Council Framework Decision on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and 
protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA – Impact Assessment, SEC 
(2009) 358, 25 March 2009. 
83 Proposal for a Framework Decision on preventing and combating trafficking in human 
beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, COM (2009) 
136 final, 25 March 2009. 
84 Proposal for a Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, 2010. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See Anne Weyembergh’s contribution in this same publication. 
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The Council of Europe Convention signed in 2005 had a profound impact on 
the partial shift in the EU policy against trafficking from the adoption of purely 
law enforcement measures to a more careful consideration of victim protection and 
assistance. The renewed EU attention on implementation and monitoring mechanisms 
has also been influenced by the relevant Council of Europe convention provisions as 
well as the work done in the framework of GRETA. 
The evaluation of the 2002 Framework Decision has been partially taken into 
account and in many respects the 2011 Directive is considerably better than its 
predecessor, although ameliorations have some limits (A). However, concerns have 
still been raised and the new instrument has been sharply criticised (B)  87. 
A.	 Major	improvements	by	comparison	with	the	2002	Framework	Decision	
In the Preamble trafficking in human being is identified as a gross violation of 
fundamental rights  88. In addition, the Preamble highlights that the Directive “adopts 
an integrated, holistic, and human rights approach to the fight against trafficking in 
human beings”. 
These constitute very significant elements witnessing the shift from a criminal 
justice approach to a human rights-based approach in the EU approach to trafficking in 
human beings, finally combined within an integrated and multidisciplinary approach 
to the phenomenon  89. This approach is meant to address the phenomenon of human 
trafficking in all its dimensions (protection, prevention, prosecution). In addition, it 
aims at the coordination of actions conducted and measures adopted within different 
fields that have an impact on trafficking in human beings, such as criminal law, 
migration law, labour law or external relations. 
Such development has been deeply influenced by the drafting of the 2005 Council 
of Europe Convention as well as the case-law of the Strasbourg Court on the matter  90. 
87 For a detailed commentary of the 2011 Directive see t. oboKAtA and b. pAyne, 
“Implementing action against trafficking of human beings under the TFUE: a preliminary 
analysis”, New Journal of European Criminal Law, 3/3-4, 2012, p. 298 f. See also Joint UN 
Commentary on the EU Directive – A Human rights-based approach, 2011. 
88 “Trafficking in human beings is a serious crime, often committed within the framework 
of organised crime, a gross violation of fundamental rights and explicitly prohibited by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” (recital 1). 
89 On this shift see t. oboKAtA, “A human rights framework to address trafficking of 
human beings”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 24/3, 2006, p. 379 f.
90 In the Siliadin case the Strasbourg Court mentioned trafficking in human beings, and 
explicitly recognised that Article 4 ECHR (prohibition of servitude) entails positive obligations 
for states to penalise and prosecute effectively any act aimed at maintaining a person in a 
situation of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. In the Rantsev case, the ECtHR 
better specified the constituent elements and means of such a positive obligation highlighting 
that trafficking in human beings falls within the scope of Article 4 ECHR. As a consequence, 
states must estasblish a legal framework to prevent and prosecute the phenomenon, take 
protective measures, investigate situations of trafficking (cooperating with foreign authorities 
in the context of transnational cases). See Eur. Court HR, 26 July 2005, Siliadin v France, 
Application no. 73316/01 and Eur. Court HR, 7 January 2010, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 
7 January 2010, Application no. 25965/04. For academic comments see h. cullen, “Siliadin v 
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1. Extended definition of trafficking in human beings 
Article 1 introduces a comprehensive statement of purpose by which the directive 
clearly defines its objectives: establishing minimum rules concerning the definition 
of criminal offences and sanctions and strengthening prevention aspects and the 
protection of victims.
In order to enhance the approximation of legislation, the directive provided a 
definition of trafficking identical to the one set out in the 2000 Trafficking Protocol  91 
except that it extended the open-ended list of practices that are to be included as 
“exploitation” to “exploitation of activities associated with begging or of criminal 
activities”. This choice promotes consistency and legal certainty and facilitates the 
tasks of both national legislators and judicial authorities that will have to interpret 
the law. Broadening the understanding of the concept of exploitation is also of great 
importance. In fact, this allows to encompass different situations and to adapt EU 
instruments to the evolving threat with the consequent emergence of new forms of 
trafficking (diversification of activities of exploitation). In addition, exploitation now 
includes begging and removal of organs and an open formulation of the forms of 
force is used  92. Following the position of the Experts Group on its predecessor  93, the 
definition of human trafficking is more comprehensive than both the 2002 FD and the 
2000 Trafficking Protocol. 
2. Deeper approximation of sanctions and broader jurisdiction
With regard to sanctions and reflecting the European Commission’s view that 
penalties had to be strengthened, the 2011 directive introduces a minimum common 
threshold of five years for the maximum penalty for all trafficking related offences, 
regardless of aggravated circumstances  94. The minimum common threshold for the 
France: Positive Obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, 
Human Rights Law Review, 23, 2006, p. 592 f.; v. stoyAnovA, “Dancing on the borders of 
Article 4: Human trafficking and the European Court of Human Rights in the Rantsev case”, 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 30/2, 2012, p. 164 f.
91 Article 2(1) – “Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the 
following intentional acts are punishable: The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or reception of persons, including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving 
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, 
for the purpose of exploitation”.
92 Article 2(1) – “… by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of 
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation”.
93 Opinion no. 1/2008 of the Expert Group on Trafficking in Human Beings of the 
European Commission, on the Revision of the Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on 
Combating trafficking in human beings. 
94 Article 4(1). Remarkably, the 2009 Framework Decision proposal suggested 6 years. 
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maximum penalty in the case of aggravated circumstances has been raised from the 
eight years of the 2002 Framework Decision to ten years  95. 
The introduction of a common threshold for all trafficking related offences is a 
significant novelty because the 2002 FD only provided such threshold for aggravated 
offences. This choice certainly has a beneficial impact in deepening the approximation 
process at the EU level. The impact on the approximation of legislation is however 
limited because the 2011 directive (as the 2002 FD) only defines minimum common 
thresholds for the maximum penalty (and not also a minimum for the minimum 
penalty), leaving a wide discretion in the hands of the national legislator to go beyond 
the minimum provided for. In addition, as further explained in the upcoming pages, 
the increased level of sanctions is a negative element. 
For offences of incitement, aiding and abetting and attempt (as defined in 
Article 3), the 2011 directive simply reaffirms the need for penalties to be “effective, 
dissuasive and proportionate to the gravity of the crime” and to contribute to a more 
effective investigation and prosecution and international cooperation  96. 
Besides, a new provision on penalties completes the existing framework, requiring 
Member States to ensure that competent authorities are entitled to seize and confiscate 
the instruments and proceeds of trafficking  97. 
The provisions on jurisdiction have been partially amended. 
Firstly, whereas the 2002 FD provided that a Member State may have decided not 
to establish its jurisdiction over an offence where the offender was one of its nationals 
(derogating from its Article 6(1)), the exercise of the active nationality principle has 
been made mandatory by the 2011 Directive. 
Secondly, in relation to offences committed outside their territory, Member States 
is required to ensure that the principle of double criminality is not used to hamper the 
establishment of jurisdiction  98. The establishment of jurisdiction does not depend on 
the complaint of the victim in the state where the offence occurred or on a positive 
action of that state with regard to the offence  99. The 2002 FD did not encompass 
such a two-fold provision on offences committed outside the state’s territory. The 
need not to rely on the victim’s complaint was then mentioned not in a provision 
on “jurisdiction” but in a provision on “protection of and assistance to victims” and 
the requirement was limited to cases where the offence had been committed at least 
partially on the territory of the MS. 
With regard to prosecution, a problem may be that, in certain states, periods of 
limitations are placed on trafficking and related offences so that prosecution may 
not be instituted after a certain amount of time has elapsed. This can lead to legal 
loopholes and the impunity of traffickers  100. In this context, Member States are also 
95 Article 4(2). 




100 t. oboKAtA and b. pAyne, op. cit., p. 316. 
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required to allow the prosecution of the offence for a sufficient period of time even 
after child victims have reached the age of majority  101.
3. Increased protection and assistance of victims
The most radical departure from the 2002 Framework Decision concerns victims’ 
protection and assistance  102. 
First, a number of measures provide the protection of victims in the context of 
investigations and prosecutions. 
The 2002 Framework Decision’s requirement that investigations and prosecutions 
should not be dependent on victims’ complaints has been retained. In addition, the 
2011 directive provides that criminal proceedings might continue even if the victim 
withdraws their complaint  103. 
Investigators and prosecutors must be trained and a full range of effective 
investigative tools made available to them  104. According to the impact assessment, this 
provision was prompted by a concern that trafficking investigations were carried out 
at an inappropriately low level and Member States required encouragement to ensure 
that investigations were tackled in the same way as serious and organised crimes, by 
especially trained law enforcement officials who have appropriate investigative means 
at their disposal  105. The appropriate training of officials ensures a better identification 
of trafficking victims and consideration of their specific needs at an early stage. 
Member States are required to establish appropriate measures aimed at the early 
identification of and providing support for victims  106.
Another major improvement of the 2011 directive is a general de-criminalisation 
provision requiring Member States to provide for the possibility of not prosecuting 
and not imposing penalties on victims for their involvement in unlawful activities that 
they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of their having been 
trafficked  107. This claim is a reaction to a problem in relation to victims of human 
trafficking, which is that they are often detained, prosecuted or punished for minor 
offences typically associated with the victimisation process, such as violation of 
immigration laws and involvement in unlawful activities such as prostitution (status-
related offences)  108. 
This clause clarifies the position of the victim in criminal proceedings, recognising 
that the victim was not free to choose between committing or participating in unlawful 
activities that are a direct consequence of being trafficked. However, it attracted 
criticism during scrutiny of the draft proposal in the Council, with some delegations 
expressing the view that introduction of non-punishment clauses entails certain risks. 
101 Article 9(2). 
102 Articles 11, 12 and 13. See the EU Commission publication, The EU rights of victims 
of trafficking in human beings, 2013. 
103 Article 9(1). 
104 Preamble, considerant 15. 
105 Impact Assessment, SEC (2009) 358. 
106 Article 11(4). 
107 Article 8. 
108 See Joint UN Commentary on the EU Directive.
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As a consequence, the provision only requires Member States to provide for the 
possibility of non-punishment. The ultimate decision rests with national authorities! 
The provision is rather weak in the end and has merely symbolic value. However, it 
has the merit to draw attention to the problem.
A very significant novelty in respect of both the 2002 Framework Decision and 
the 2009 Framework Decision proposal is that Member States are required to ensure 
that victim support and assistance is not made conditional on their willingness to 
cooperate in the criminal investigation, prosecution or trial of traffickers. However, 
the 2011 directive highlights that this provision should not prejudice the 2004 
Directive, which makes a link between victim protection and their cooperation with 
authorities  109. Thus the granting of a residence permit is still made conditional on 
victim’s cooperation with law enforcement. 
Secondly, detailed measures provide for a “hard-core” protection to victims 
beyond the context of investigations and prosecutions, granting them substantial 
rights. 
A victim will be treated as such as soon as there is an indication that she/he has 
been trafficked and will be provided with assistance before, during and after criminal 
proceedings  110. 
Minimum assistance and support measures are listed and special attention is 
required for victims with special needs  111. A major improvement is certainly that all 
victims of trafficking, and not only vulnerable victims as in the 2009 Framework 
Decision proposal, must have access to legal counselling and legal representation, 
including for the purpose of claiming compensation. This should be free of charge 
when the victim does not have sufficient financial resources  112. 
Member States are also required to ensure that victims receive appropriate 
protection on the basis of an individual risk assessment  113. During criminal 
proceedings, identity protection measures and alternatives to direct testimony must be 
provided in order to avoid secondary victimisation.
Children are entitled to extensive protection. The directive’s provisions are 
extremely detailed, both in relation to measures for their physical and psycho-social 
recovery and their participation in criminal investigations and proceedings  114. For 
example, video recordings of interviews of a child victim may be used as evidence 
at trial. 
Of particular relevance is also the fact that the directive requires states to ensure 
that victims of trafficking have access to existing compensation schemes  115. 
109 Article 11(3). 
110 Articles 11(1) and 11(2). 
111 Article 11(7). 
112 Article 12(2). 
113 Article 12(3)
114 Articles. 13, 14, 15 and 16. 
115 Article 17. 
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4. Introduction of prevention provisions
The 2011 directive also contains several detailed prevention provisions  116. 
In an effort to promote rapid and accurate victim identification as well as the 
provision of immediate support to the most vulnerable, Member States are required to 
promote regular training for officials that are likely to come into contact with victims 
and potential victims of trafficking  117. 
Member States are also required to take appropriate measures, such as education 
and training, to discourage the demand that fosters “all forms of exploitation related 
to trafficking”  118. 
The 2011 directive includes a further provision requiring Member States to take 
appropriate action, including “information and awareness raising campaigns, research 
and education programmes, where appropriate in cooperation with civil society 
organisations and other stakeholders” in order to raise awareness and reduce the risk 
of people, especially children, becoming victims of trafficking  119.
Finally, and most controversially, Member States are required to “consider taking 
measures” to establish, as a criminal offence, the use of the services of a victim of 
trafficking with the knowledge that the individual is a victim of a trafficking-related 
offence  120. It was not possible to find EU-wide consensus on this issue because 
legislation and policies on prostitution vary considerably from one Member State 
to another. The provision is the result of a compromise and has been seen by some 
authors as a missed opportunity to reduce the demand for human trafficking for the 
purposes of sexual exploitation  121. 
5. New monitoring mechanisms
A major concern in relation to the 2002 Framework Decision was also that the 
implementation and monitoring arrangements for that instrument were rather quick 
and led to the drafting of a thin and rather inconclusive report  122. 
As a substantial added value to the existing regime, the 2011 directive requires 
Member States to establish national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms to carry 
out assessments of trends in trafficking, measure the results of anti-trafficking actions, 
including the gathering of statistics in close cooperation with relevant civil society 
organisations and the related report  123. 
116 Article 18. 
117 Article 18(3).
118 Article 18(1). 
119 Article 18(2). 
120 Article 18(4). 
121 t. oboKAtA and b. pAyne, op. cit., p. 312-313.
122 Report of the Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings, Brussels, 22 December 
2004. 
123 Article 19. In 2009 the Council had already invited all Member States to participate 
in an informal and flexible EU network of National Rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms in 
order to improve the understanding of the phenomenon of trafficking in human beings and to 
provide the Union and its Member States with objective, reliable, comparable and up-to-date 
strategic information in the field of trafficking in human beings. The Council, however, did 
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The impact assessment (attached to the 2009 Framework Decision proposal) noted 
that this measure is crucial as “better knowledge of the situation of trafficking is the 
necessary starting point for the establishment of effective anti-trafficking policy”  124. 
For the purpose of effective scrutiny, the national rapporteur should be established as 
an independent structure. 
However, up to January 2013, only two Member States out of twenty-seven have 
appointed independent national rapporteurs (Finland and the Netherlands), whereas 
others only have non-independent specialised anti-trafficking bodies or coordinators 
who are attached to the relevant government departments  125. 
The 2011 Directive also requires Member States to transmit to the EU anti-
trafficking coordinator  126 information such as assessments of trends in trafficking or 
the results of anti-trafficking actions (e.g. gathering of statistics). On this basis the 
coordinator will contribute to the regular reporting carried out by the Commission  127. 
The Commission has to prepare a consolidated report not only in the first four years 
but also every two years thereafter. 
B.	 Major	limitations	of	the	improved	instrument	
As explained above, the 2002 Framework Decision had been strongly criticised for 
favouring a ‘variable geometry’ situation in EU Member States in the implementation 
of offences and sanctions. This has led to a lack of compliance with the principle of 
legality and the development of a repressive approach. The European legislator has 
not fully addressed this issue and the 2011 directive still adopts minimum standards 
for both the definition of offences and sanctions. 
Firstly, the list of acts to be considered as purposes of exploitation is not exhaustive. 
They are to be seen as minimum standards. Member States are free to broaden the 
scope of the EU definition in the implementing legislation and go beyond the directive 
requirement, with the resulting negative impact on the level of approximation  128. 
not request at the time to establish a national rapporteur in Member States where it did not 
exist nor mentioned the criteria of independence. See Council conclusions on establishing an 
informal EU network of national Rapporteurs or Equivalent Mechanisms on Trafficking in 
Human Beings. 2946th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 4 June 2009. 
124 Impact Assessment, SEC (2009) 358, p. 29.
125 For more details on the situation in each MS see the regularly updated Commission 
page: http://ec.europa.eu/antitrafficking/section.action?sectionPath=National+Rapporteurs&
sectionType=MAP&page=1&resetBreadcrumb=false.
126 The EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, is responsible for improving coordination and 
coherence among EU institutions, EU agencies, Member States and international actors and 
developing existing and new EU policies to address trafficking in human beings. The EU 
Anti-Trafficking Coordinator also monitors the implementation of the new and integrated “EU 
Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings (2012-2016)” and provides 
overall strategic policy orientation for the EU’s external policy in this field. Its establishment 
was first foreseen by the Stockholm Programme and the first coordinator, Myria Vassiliadou 
(who still holds the role), has been appointed in December 2010. 
127 Article 20. 
128 For example, in Belgium the Bill which is under discussion in relation to the transposition 
of the 2011 Directive includes within the list of purposes of exploitation also illegal adoption 
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Secondly, as underlined above, the 2011 directive introduces a minimum common 
threshold of five years for the maximum penalty for all trafficking related offences, 
regardless of aggravated circumstances  129. The minimum common threshold for the 
maximum penalty in the case of aggravated circumstances has been raised from the 
eight years of the 2002 Framework Decision to ten years  130. The introduction of a 
minimum common threshold for all trafficking related offences and not only for 
aggravated offences (and the more severe minimum sanctions provided for aggravated 
offences) risks to favour even further the repressive approach described in relation to 
the implementation of the 2002 FD. In addition, penalty provisions may be severely 
criticised because of the severity of the penalties and the lack of differentiation in the 
level of penalties according to the types and gravity of the offences (as the principle 
of proportionality would require).
Disappointingly, “serious violence” or “serious harm” to the victim, listed as 
aggravated circumstances, are not defined. In addition, in the context of aggravating 
circumstances, only children are mentioned as “vulnerable victims” and not also 
adults, who may be considered vulnerable on the grounds of pregnancy, their health 
conditions and disability  131.
4. Concluding remarks: the potential impact on approximation  
of the 2011 directive
The limitations of the 2002 Framework Decision and its implementation in the 
assistance and protection of victims and in the over-criminalisation/over-sanctioning 
of the phenomenon witnessed a public order approach to tackling the phenomenon for 
a long time whereas the prevention of the phenomenon and the assistance and support 
of victims was treated as being outside the scope of states’ interest.
The 2011 directive has been more ambitious and certainly constitutes a positive 
contribution to a more balanced and comprehensive anti-trafficking legal regime which, 
in several elements, goes beyond other international standards. The most innovative 
elements of the proposal attracted criticism, particularly from Member States. Some 
even queried whether the new instrument was necessary given the existing plethora of 
instruments and argued that the full implementation of the 2000 Trafficking Protocol, 
the 2002 EU Framework Decision and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention might 
be a more effective way to counter trafficking in human beings and help victims than 
creating new legislative requirements. 
Member States were required to implement the directive’s provisions by 6 April 
2013, with the Commission’s first report due in April 2015. A significant evaluation of 
the impact on approximation of the 2011 directive cannot yet be established because 
of the short period of time since it has entered into force. The new instrument still 
and forced marriages. See Projet de loi visant à modifier l’article 433quinquies du Code pénal 
en vue de clarifier et d’étendre la définition de la traite des êtres humains, 5-711/1.
129 Article 4(1). Remarkably, the 2009 Framework Decision proposal suggested 6 years. 
130 Article 4(2). 
131 See Commission Proposal, p. 10. 
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has to prove its worth  132. In May 2013, only six out of twenty-seven countries have 
fully transposed the 2011 directive and three countries have reported only partial 
transposition! Despite the fact that the deadline has expired, much still depends on the 
way in which individual states interpret and apply their legal obligations. 
Possible future results of the implementation of the 2011 directive would be of 
interest for further research. However, the difference in content and in nature of the 
2011 directive with respect to the 2002 Framework Decision does not make it possible 
to come up with many hypotheses on future impacts. 
First, it has now become accepted at the EU level that trafficking is a gross 
violation of human rights. By comparison with the 2002 Framework Decision, the 
2011 directive constitutes a significant improvement in terms of recognition of the 
rights of victims and of the connection between the protection of those rights and 
improved criminal justice responses to trafficking. Except for the granting of residence 
permits, support and assistance are provided irrespective of the vicitms’ willingness to 
cooperate with the criminal justice authority. 
However, some fear the extensive provisions on assistance to victims could be 
subject to fraudulent claims by economic migrants. During the negotiations, Member 
States have thus been cautious and drafted provisions in a manner that could not 
lead victims to claim specific rights  133. De facto, victims who participate in criminal 
proceedings are probably more likely to receive substantial assistance and support and 
to be provided with a long-term residence permit  134. Moreover, despite the inclusion 
of a non-punishment clause, there is still nothing to stop states from treating victims 
of trafficking as criminals and from arresting and prosecuting them for violations of 
labour and migration laws.
The 2011 directive has also attempted to create a consistent and complete system 
of prevention and control of trafficking in human beings to influence the demand side. 
The willingness to find a balance between prevention and repression is clear from 
the title of the instrument, which is now “on preventing and combating trafficking”. 
The 2011 directive adopts the so-called “3Ps obligations”, focusing on prosecution, 
protection and prevention  135. In this context, it thus aims at facilitating a more joined 
up approach through cooperation among Member States as well as other stakeholders 
such as civil society organisations.
With regard to implementation and monitoring, the establishment of national 
rapporteurs and their contribution to the work of the EU anti-trafficking coordinator, 
which we have mentioned above, could partly offset the weak implementation 
132 K. gromeK-broc, “EU Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human 
beings and protecting victims: will it be effective?”, Nova et Vetera, 20, 2011, p. 227 f. 
133 t. oboKAtA and b. pAyne, op. cit.
134 Member States are strongly reluctant to issue residence permits on humanitarian 
grounds and, despite many being eligible, only few have been issued. See Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 
2004/81 on the residence permit issued to third country nationals who are victims of trafficking 
in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who 
cooperate with the competent authorities, MIGR 103, 15197/10, 19 October 2010.
135 t. oboKAtA and b. pAyne, op. cit.
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structure around the 2002 FD. Moreover since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the European Court of Justice is fully competent for measures adopted in the 
areas of police cooperation and judicial cooperation for criminal matters and it is thus 
possible for the European Commission to launch infringement proceedings in cases 
of non-compliance and non-implementation of a directive. These are both welcome 
developments in strengthening the enforcement of the anti-human trafficking legal 
framework. 
Regrettably, the choice of the EU legislator to keep the minimum standards’ 
approach stands in the way of an in-depth harmonisation of criminal offences 
and sanctions as Member States are free to go beyond the required limits and, as 
underlined, this leads to a more repressive approach. The wide margin of appreciation 
left to Member States may make an effective response to human trafficking under the 
TFUE more difficult. 
Implementing legislation is still likely to broadly define the offences disregarding 
the principle of legality. The EU has failed to develop comprehensive frameworks 
to correlate the proscribed conduct to the proscribed penalties in a proportionate 
fashion and Member States will continue to sanction all trafficking-related offences 
(aggravated or simple) heavily. The much criticised severity of the legislation 
implementing the 2002 Framework Decision will not be subject to revision and will 
instead be legitimated and encouraged by the introduction of a minimum threshold 
for maximum penalties in all trafficking offences and an increase in the penalty for 
aggravated offences. 
The tendency towards more repressive action encouraged by the minimum 
standards’ provisions encompassed in the EU instruments analysed contrasts with the 
idea that the introduction of criminal sanctions should be conceived as a last resort 
when all other alternatives have proven inadequate to address a given problem. In this 
view, criminal sanctions ought to be confined to the minimum extent possible and 
coexist with other welfare policy tools. 
An important step would be to create, within the systems of legislative evaluations, 
a control mechanism not only of transposition gaps but also of its excesses. Otherwise 






The field of approximation of substantive criminal law has clearly evolved 
following the entry into force of the new EU Treaty and the ensuing communitarisation 
of policies within the EU. Major decision-making and institutional changes (especially 
the new decision-making role of the European Parliament), an increase in the number 
of actors, the insertion of new legal bases and the greater efficiency of EU texts in this 
area are among the fundamental changes that are having and will continue to have an 
impact on the area of substantive criminal law. 
However, it is as yet too early to assess all the effects and consequences of the 
changes introduced. 
As seen previously in the introductory contribution and in the article by Francesca 
Galli on trafficking in human beings, the first lessons to be learned come from the 
first two new directives adopted since the entry into force of the new Treaty, namely 
Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in 
human beings and protecting its victims, replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA  1, and Directive 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA  2. 
Interesting lessons will certainly emerge also from the on-going negotiations 
relating to the five proposals for directives in the field – i.e. the proposal for a 
directive on attacks against information systems, which is designed to replace 
Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA  3, the proposal for a directive on criminal 
1 OJ, no. L 101, 15 April 2011, p. 1 f.
2 OJ, no. L 335, 17 December 2011, p. 1 f.
3 COM (2010) 517 final, 30 September 2010.
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sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation (the Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD))  4, the proposal for a directive on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of 
crime in the European Union  5, the proposal for a directive on the fight against fraud 
to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (the PIF Directive)  6 and 
the proposal for a directive on the protection of the euro and other currencies against 
counterfeiting by criminal law, replacing Council Framework Decision 2000/383/
JHA  7 – and their final results. The evolution of discussions on the following issues 
should be kept under particularly close scrutiny: the legal bases (and for instance the 
choice of Article 325 TFEU as the legal basis for the aforementioned proposal for a 
directive on the fight against fraud relating to the Union’s financial interests by means 
of criminal law), the clauses relating to the approximation of sanctions (and, inter 
alia, the introduction of minimum thresholds for minimum sanctions in the last two 
proposals) and the insertion of provisions relating to general criminal law such as 
prescription. 
Among the short-term prospects, the potential introduction of new initiatives should 
be mentioned as well. In this respect, some ideas have been set out in the Stockholm 
programme, the Commission’s action plan and the Commission’s communication 
entitled ‘Towards an EU criminal policy’, which lists some harmonised EU policies 
where the approximation of substantive criminal law could be developed on the basis 
of Article 83, para. 2 (the so-called ‘annex competence’). Yet it remains to be seen 
whether the ideas will lead to any concrete outcome and/or whether other initiatives 
will be put forward.
The implementation by EU Member States of the new directives and future new 
directives should be observed carefully. It will, for instance, be interesting to see 
whether the new decision-making and institutional framework will result in a higher 
rate of correct transposition than for the approximating acts adopted under the former 
third pillar of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). In this regard, as Francesca 
Galli has demonstrated, the case of the Directive on trafficking in human beings 
does not augur well: in May 2013, only six out of twenty-seven Member States had 
transposed it fully and three partially. It also remains to be seen if the new instruments 
will have a stronger approximating effect than the ‘old’ framework decisions. Indeed, 
as Robert Kert and Andrea Lehner clearly show concerning the Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent 
elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking  8 and as 
Pedro Caeiro and Miguel Ângelo Lemos underline in the field of terrorist offences, 
the approximating impact of the related framework decisions has been limited. 
Besides the evaluation of the transpositions by EU Member States, both the ex 
ante assessment of the new proposals and the ex post evaluation of the new directives 
and of their impact should be given particular attention. The importance of such an 
exercise has been clearly underlined in this book by several authors and especially by 
4 COM (2011) 654 final, 20 October 2011.
5 COM (2012) 85 final, 12 March 2012.
6 COM (2012) 363 final, 11 July 2012. 
7 COM (2013) 42 final, 5 February 2013.
8 OJ, L 335, 11 November 2004, p. 8.
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Gisèle Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen, Robert Kert and Andrea Lehner. Such assessments 
should in particular represent an opportunity to check if fundamental principles of 
criminal law are being respected. These principles, such as ultima ratio, proportionality 
and legality, are at the core of Maria Kaiafa-Gbandi’s contribution. The disregard for 
these principles in the previous framework decisions has often been criticised. Pedro 
Caeiro and Miguel Ângelo Lemos confirm these criticisms in the field of terrorism. It 
is an open question as to whether there will be improvements in this respect stemming 
from the new institutional framework and from the adoption of the 2009 Council’s 
‘Conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal law deliberations’, 
of the 2011 Commission Communication ‘Towards an EU criminal policy: Ensuring 
the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law’ and of the European 
Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 ‘on an EU approach to criminal law’, which 
all underlined the importance of these principles or of some of them  9. The case of the 
directive on trafficking in human beings is not encouraging since the disregard for 
several of these principles has already been pointed out  10.
In addition, and more fundamentally, the following four questions should be 
closely followed in the next few years.
The first question is to find out whether the approximation of substantive criminal 
law will benefit from an effective contribution by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJ) 
and, in case it does, what form this contribution will take. Such a question is all the 
more topical as, following the communitarisation of policies within the EU that has 
been set in stone by the Lisbon Treaty, the jurisdiction of the CJ has been considerably 
strengthened for new acts (i.e. those adopted after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty) and will soon be reinforced for the old acts (i.e. those adopted before the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty), namely after the expiry of the transitional period (i.e. 
1st Dec. 2014). The CJ intervention could be essential for this EU field of action in 
three respects:
– in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the EU’s approximating texts through 
infringement proceedings against EU Member States that did not transpose at all 
or did not correctly transpose provisions of the new directives or, after 1st Dec. 
2014, provisions of the old instruments. 
– in order to clarify the exact meaning of the relevant provisions of the Treaty. 
As seen in the introductory contribution, the wording of both para. 1 and 2 of 
Article 83 is vague in many respects. The CJ could, for instance, clarify the exact 
scope of the general requirements of the first indent of para. 1 and their link 
9 See especially the conclusions of the Council of 25 and 26 April 2002, doc. 9141/03; 
Council document, Council Conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal 
law deliberations, adopted by the JHA Council on 30 November 2009; “Towards an EU 
criminal policy?: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal 
law”, Commission Communication of 20 September 2011, COM (2011) 573 and European 
Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal law (2010/2310 (INI)) 
(see Annex to the present book).
10 H. sAtzger, F. zimmermAnn and G. lAngheld, “The Directive on preventing and 
combatting trafficking in human beings and the principles governing European Criminal policy 
– A critical evaluation”, EUCLR, 3, 2013, p. 114.
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with the second indent. It could also specify the meaning of some expressions 
in para. 1, such as “from a special need to combat them on a common basis”, 
“minimum rules”, “concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions” 
and “areas of particularly serious crime”. Concerning para. 2, it could remove the 
existing uncertainties related to the expression “essential to ensure the effective 
implementation of a Union policy which has been subject to harmonisation 
measures”. The CJ could, moreover, answer the sensitive question as to whether 
Article 325 TFEU can be interpreted as containing additional substantive criminal 
law competence in the field of fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests. 
– in order to give a uniform interpretation of the provisions of the EU approximating 
texts. In this regard, it would, for instance, be interesting to see what would be 
its interpretation of the non-punishment/non-prosecution clause of both the 
Directive on trafficking in human beings and the Directive on sexual exploitation 
of children. It would also be quite  interesting to see whether the CJ will consider 
that some of the “protective” provisions of these directives meet the requirements 
to be able to produce any vertical ascending direct effect. Whatever form it 
could take, such a contribution by the CJ will of course depend on the actions or 
questions referred to it. In other words, to be able to “deploy” itself in the field of 
substantive criminal law, the CJ needs to receive the opportunity to do so. 
The second question is about establishing whether the scope of approximation of 
substantive criminal law will be further extended towards the general part of criminal 
law. As Jeroen Blomsma and Christina Peristeridou explain in their joint contribution, 
EU legislation has so far dealt predominantly with the special part of criminal law 
and more precisely with the definitions of and penalties for specific offences. Up until 
now, there has been no common understanding of basic legal concepts such as the 
notions of actus reus, of mens rea, of criminal liability, of participation, of defences 
etc. Although the CJ has established some general principles of EU law, there are, so 
far, only fragments of a general part of European criminal law. Irrespective of whether 
such an evolution is desirable and would satisfy the subsidiarity and proportionality 
requirements, any evolution in this respect will of course be highly dependent on the 
interpretation of the existing legal basis. This is true whether the adoption of hard 
law acts or soft law instruments is envisaged. There does not appear to be a legal 
basis in the Treaty (as currently phrased) for an approximation or codification of 
common concepts in a separate directive or regulation by the European legislator (a 
sort of ‘general part directive or regulation’). The approximation of common concepts 
in every sectorial directive that deals with the criminalisation of specific offences 
would perhaps constitute a more realistic approach but it is not easily justifiable on 
the basis of Article 83 para. 1 and 2 as currently worded. As seen in the introductory 
contribution, although most of the approximating EU acts have gone further than 
the strict definition of constituent elements of offences and levels of sanctions, it 
is important to understand how extensive the interpretation of the scope of Article 
83 can be in this regard. The discussions relating to the insertion of requirements 
related to prescription in the proposal for a directive on the protection of the euro and 
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other currencies against counterfeiting by criminal law  11 will surely yield interesting 
lessons. The same is true for the interpretation of the limits of Articles 86 and 325 
TFEU because their scope is not explicitly restricted to minimum rules concerning the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions. 
A third question is about determining whether we will witness the establishment 
of a real ‘EU criminal law’, in other words whether there will be a move from the 
approximation of substantive criminal law towards the unification of criminal law. So 
far, there has only been an embryonic EU substantive criminal law, which is mainly 
made up of all the sources of approximation of substantive criminal law. So far, there 
has been no real EU substantive criminal law in the strict sense of the word: there is 
no EU criminal code as we understand it at the national level, no EU supranational, 
unified criminal law adopted via regulations directly applicable in all the EU Member 
States  12. 
Yet, in the current version of the TFEU, two main provisions could open the door 
to such a “unification” trend  13. 
On the one hand, there is Article 86 TFEU, which allows for the adoption of 
regulation(s) aiming at establishing an European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO). As 
Katalin Ligeti underlines in her contribution to this book, the question is to establish 
whether it would be sufficient for the future regulation establishing an EPPO to make 
reference to the upcoming PIF Directive and to the national implementing provisions 
or whether Article 86 TFEU requires that the regulation itself defines the offences 
falling within the competence of the EPPO. She opts for the second alternative and 
considers that Article 86 grants the EU a genuine competence to adopt common 
offence definitions but also to adopt common provisions in relation to the concepts 
of the general part of criminal law. We shall see what the European Commission’s 
position is in this respect in its upcoming proposal on the establishment of an EPPO, 
which is scheduled to come out in June or early July 2013. 
On the other hand, there is Article 325 TFEU in the field of fraud affecting 
the Union’s financial interests. If it is interpreted as containing additional criminal 
law competence in this field, it would allow for the adoption of regulations and 
for the possibility to go beyond the establishment “of minimum rules concerning 
the definition of criminal offences and sanctions”... However, as explained in the 
introductory contribution to this book, it remains to be seen whether the choice of 
this provision as the legal basis for the proposal for a PIF Directive will be confirmed 
during the negotiations. For the time being, it seems that it will not secure a qualified 
majority within the Council.
A fourth and essential question is to determine whether the approximation of 
substantive criminal law will follow or be guided by a real EU criminal policy. As 
things stand, the EU lacks a genuine criminal policy. The EU’s interventions in the 
11 See its Article 12.
12 See H. sAtzger, International and European Criminal Law, München, C.H. Beck, Hart 
, Nomos, 2012, p. 43 f.
13 See also Article 33 TFEU on measures to strengthen customs cooperation (V. mitsilegAs, 
EU Criminal Law, Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2009, p. 109 and S. miettinen, 
Criminal law and Policy in the EU, London – New York, Routledge, 2013, p. 52).
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criminal field are more or less guided by programmes, action plans etc. but they do 
not follow a consistent line of policy or strategy and they do not implement a ‘vision’. 
As John Vervaele states in this book, so far the approach has been events-driven, ad 
hoc and eclectic. 
So far, some scholars have categorised the three aforementioned documents 
– the Council ‘Conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal 
law deliberations’, the 2011 Commission Communication entitled ‘Towards an 
EU criminal policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through 
criminal law’ and the European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU 
approach to criminal law - as ‘European criminal policy documents’  14. As stressed by 
Maria Kaiafa-Gbandi and Cornelis De Jong, these texts have merits – and especially 
the merit of recalling some basic principles of criminal law such as the ultima ratio 
principle which should make it possible to avoid “overcriminalisation” – which 
should not be underestimated. They are in that sense a good start. However, they 
can only be considered as  a very embryonic EU criminal policy. Although the three 
documents contain important common features, it is strange to be confronted with 
three different texts emanating from three different EU institutions. Their purpose was, 
in any case, not to reflect on the bases of a global or inter-institutional EU criminal 
policy. As seen in the introduction to this book, instead they aimed at giving each 
relevant EU institution general guiding principles in their respective field of action 
and at positioning themselves in the context of the decision-making changes and the 
increasing number of actors introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. In addition, as seen 
in John Vervaele’s contribution, there are significant limitations with regard to the 
contents of these documents  15. According to this author, careful consideration of the 
process of criminalisation should be pursued. Among the questions to be examined 
closely is the question of which legal interests deserve criminal protection and to what 
extent. A deeper reflection on the functions of the approximation of criminal law and 
on the functions of criminal law itself is also particularly necessary. And elaborating 
a criminal policy implies more than answering the questions as to what should be 
criminalised, why and how. These are important aspects of a criminal policy but other 
aspects should be tackled as well, such as, for example, the whole issue of criminal 
sanctions and their enforcement. Besides, establishing a criminal policy is not limited 
to organising a repressive approach to crime but should also encompass the preventive 
and protective approaches. It also implies going further than just adopting a criminal 
law response to crime: it entails a deep reflection about the interaction between the 
different legal disciplines and especially between criminal law and administrative law. 
The next multiannual programme which is due to succeed the Stockholm 
Programme and which is due to be adopted under the Italian Presidency of the EU – 
the future ‘Rome programme’ – could be an opportunity to launch a reflection and to 
take the first steps towards the elaboration of an EU criminal policy. 
14 P. de hert and I. WieczoreK, “Testing the principle of subsidiarity in EU criminal law”, 
nJecl, 3, 2012, p. 394 f.
15 See also S. miettinen, op. cit., p. 143.
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Council Conclusions on
model provisions, guiding the Council's
criminal law deliberations 
2979th	JUSTICE	and	HOME	AFFAIRS Council meeting 
Brussels,	30	november	2009	
The Council adopted the following conclusions: 
"Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, several Framework Decisions have been 
adopted on the basis of Articles 31 and 34 of the TEU, establishing minimum rules concerning the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions in various areas, inter alia terrorism, computer crime 
and organised crime.
In addition, the European Court of Justice has clarified that criminal law provisions may under 
certain conditions be included in specific areas of Community law.  
The Lisbon Treaty is likely to have the effect that criminal law provisions will be discussed within 
the Council to an even greater extent than at present. This may result in incoherent and inconsistent 
criminal provisions in EU legislation. Furthermore, provisions negotiated within the Council might 
unjustifiably deviate from wording that is normally used in EU criminal legislation, thus creating 
unnecessary difficulties when implementing and interpreting EU law.  
While noting the understanding reached in the JHA Council on 21 February 20061 on the procedure 
for the future handling of legislative files containing proposals relevant to the development of 
criminal law policy, the Council acknowledges the need for further action and coordination to 
ensure coherent and consistent use of criminal law provisions in EU legislation. 
1 See doc. 7876/06. 
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To this end, it would be useful if the Council were to agree on guidelines and model provisions for 
its work on criminal law. 
Foreseeable advantages of guidelines and model provisions for criminal law include: 
 Guidelines and model provisions would facilitate negotiations by leaving room to focus on the 
substance of the specific provisions; 
 Increased coherence would facilitate the transposition of EU provisions in national law; 
 Legal interpretation would be facilitated when new criminal legislation is drafted in 
accordance with agreed guidelines which build on common elements. 
The following guidelines should be conceived as a starting point for discussions in the Council.
These guidelines do not introduce obligations or constraints that go beyond what is set out in the 
Treaties. On this basis, the Council suggests that the Presidency should conduct future discussions 
on criminal law within the EU, taking these conclusions into account. Furthermore, the Council 
should seek, together with the European Parliament and the Commission, as soon as possible after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, to further develop and refine these conclusions, and it
invites the Presidency to take the necessary measures to that end. 
The Council adopts the following conclusions: 
Assessment of the need for criminal provisions
(1) Criminal law provisions should be introduced when they are considered essential in order for 
the interests to be protected and, as a rule, be used only as a last resort. 
(2) Criminal provisions should be adopted in accordance with the principles laid out in the 
Treaties, which include the principles of proportionality and of subsidiarity, to address clearly 
defined and delimited conduct, which cannot be addressed effectively by less severe 
measures: 
a) in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting 
from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them 
on a common basis, or 
b) if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves 
essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area 
which has been subject to harmonisation measures. 
(3) When there seems to be a need for adopting new criminal provisions the following factors 
should be further considered, while taking fully into account the impact assessments that have 
been made: 
 the expected added value or effectiveness of criminal provisions compared to other 
measures, taking into account the possibility to investigate and prosecute the crime 
through reasonable efforts, as well as its seriousness and implications; 
how serious and/or widespread and frequent the harmful conduct is, both regionally and 
locally within the EU; 
 the possible impact on existing criminal provisions in EU legislation and on different legal 
systems within the EU. 
council conclusions     229
3
EN
Structure of criminal provisions 
(4) The description of conduct which is identified as punishable under criminal law must be 
worded precisely in order to ensure predictability as regards its application, scope and 
meaning. 
(5) The criminal provisions should focus on conduct causing actual harm or seriously threatening 
the right or essential interest which is the object of protection; that is, avoiding criminalisation 
of a conduct at an unwarrantably early stage. Conduct which only implies an abstract danger 
to the protected right or interest should be criminalised only if appropriate considering the 
particular importance of the right or interest which is the object of protection. 
Intent 
(6) EU criminal legislation should, as a general rule, only prescribe penalties for acts which have 
been committed intentionally. 
(7) Negligent conduct should be criminalised when a case-by-case assessment indicates that this 
is appropriate due to the particular relevance of the right or essential interest which is the 
object of protection, for example in cases of serious negligence which endangers human life 
or causes serious damage. 
(8) The criminalisation of an act that has been committed without intention or negligence, i.e., 
strict liability, should not be prescribed in EU criminal legislation.
Inciting, aiding and abetting, and attempt 
(9) The criminalisation of inciting, aiding and abetting of intentional offences should normally 
follow the criminalisation of the main offence. Attempts to commit an intentional offence 
should be criminalised if it is necessary and proportionate in relation to the main offence. 
Consideration should be given to the different regimes under national law. 
Penalties 
(10) When it has been established that criminal penalties for natural persons should be included it 
may in some cases be sufficient to provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
penalties and leave it to each Member State to determine the level of the penalties. In other 
cases there may be a need for going further in the approximation of the levels of penalties. In 
these cases the Council conclusions of April 2002 on the approach to apply regarding the 
approximation of penalties should be kept in mind, in the light of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Model provisions 
(11) Once it has been established that criminal provisions should be adopted, either as the only 
option or as an alternative, there is a need to establish a range of concurrent rules, e.g., rules 
on liability of legal persons. There may also be a need to differentiate between conduct that 
should be prohibited but does not necessarily have to be established as a criminal offence and 
conduct that should be criminalised. 
(12) The model provisions set out in Annex I should guide future work of the Council on 
legislative initiatives that may include criminal provisions.” 





The following wording shall guide future legislative work in criminal and related matters within the 
EU. The aim is to achieve coherent and consistent criminal law provisions, and to avoid 
unnecessary difficulties in the interpretation of EU law and problems for national legislators in the 
process of implementation.2
A – Provision on infringements and penalties that do not necessarily have to be criminal 
Infringements
Each Member State shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the 
provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive. The penalties provided for must be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.
B – Criminal law provisions and related provisions  
Criminal Offences 
Each Member State shall ensure that the following conduct constitutes a criminal offence, when 
[unlawful and] committed intentionally [or with at least serious negligence].
Inciting, aiding and abetting  and attempt 
1.  Each Member State shall ensure that inciting, aiding and abetting the intentional conduct 
referred to in Article (Article on Criminal Offences) is punishable as a criminal offence. 
2.  Each Member State shall ensure that attempting the intentional conduct referred to in Article 
(Article on Criminal Offences) is punishable as a criminal offence.
Criminal Penalties (for natural persons, without approximation of levels)
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred to in 
Articles (Article on Criminal Offences) are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal penalties. 
Criminal Penalties (for natural persons, with approximation of levels)
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that an offence referred to in 
Article (Article on Criminal Offences) is punishable by (penalty levels) of imprisonment.3
2 Text within square brackets indicates that the inclusion of such text should be considered on a 
case by case basis. 
3 The Council conclusions of April 2002 on the approach to apply regarding the approximation 
of penalties which indicates four levels of penalties (doc. 9141/02) should be kept in mind, in 
the light of the Lisbon Treaty. If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the 
Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an 
area which has bee subject to harmonisation measures, as under Article 83.2 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, it should follow the practice of setting the minimum level of maximum penalty. 
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Liability of legal persons
1. Each Member State shall [take the necessary measures to] ensure that a legal person can be 
held liable for offences referred to in Articles (Article on Criminal Offences) where such 
offences have been committed for its benefit by any person, acting either individually or as 
part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person, 
based on 
(a) a power of representation of the legal person,
(b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person, or 
(c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person. 
[2. Each Member State shall also ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of 
supervision or control, by a person referred to in paragraph 1, has made possible the 
commission of an offence referred to in Articles (Article on Criminal Offences) for the benefit 
of that legal person by a person under its authority.]
3. Liability of a legal person under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings 
against natural persons who are perpetrators, inciters or accessories in the offences referred 
to in Articles (Article on Criminal Offences).
4. [For the purpose of this Directive] 'legal person' shall mean any entity having legal 
personality under the applicable law, except for States or public bodies in the exercise of 
State authority and for public international organisations. [NB: This paragraph is preferably 
included in an Article on definitions, if such a provision exists.] 
Penalties against legal persons 
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person held liable 
pursuant to Article (Article on Liability of legal persons) is punishable by effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive penalties [which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other 
penalties, such as: 
(a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; 
(b) temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities; 
(c) placing under judicial supervision; 
(d)  a judicial winding-up order; 
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Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies 
through criminal law 
This Communication aims to present a framework for the further development of an EU 
Criminal Policy under the Lisbon Treaty. The EU now has an explicit legal basis for the 
adoption of criminal law directives to ensure the effective implementation of EU policies 
which have been subject to harmonisation measures. An EU Criminal Policy should have as 
overall goal to foster citizens' confidence in the fact that they live in a Europe of freedom, 
security and justice, that EU law protecting their interests is fully implemented and enforced 
and that at the same time the EU will act in full respect of subsidiarity and proportionality and 
other basic Treaty principles. 
A concern for EU citizens  
EU citizens consider crime an important problem facing the Union. When asked to identify 
the issues on which the European institutions should focus action in the coming years to 
strengthen the European Union, citizens rank the fight against crime in the top four of areas of 
action.1 The EU has been taking measures in the area of criminal law for more than a decade 
in order to better fight crime that has become increasingly international and ever more 
sophisticated. These measures have achieved some degree of approximation of definitions and 
sanction levels for certain particularly serious offences, such as terrorism, trafficking in 
human beings, drug trafficking, and fraud affecting the EU financial interests.2 For lack of an 
explicit legal basis in this respect prior to the Lisbon Treaty3, only very few measures have 
been taken for the purpose of strenghtening the enforcement of EU policies.4 This 
Communication will focus on this aspect of EU criminal law. 
The	added	value	of	EU	criminal	law
Certainly, criminal law is a sensitive policy field where differences amongst the national 
systems remain substantial, for example regarding sanction types and levels as well as the 
classification of certain conduct as an administrative or criminal offence. However, the EU 
1 See Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011. The top four areas where EU action should focus are: economic 
and monetary policy, immigration policy, health policy and the fight against crime. 
2 Framework Decision on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA), OJ L 164/3 of 22.6.2002; Framework 
Decision laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in 
the field of illicit drug trafficking (2004/757/JHA) of 11.11.2004; Directive on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2002/629/JHA OJ L 101/1 of 15.4.2011; Convention on the protection of the European 
Communities' financial interests, OJ L 316/49 of 27.11.1995. 
3 See, however, judgments of the European Court of Justice in Cases C-176/03 and C-440/05. 
4 Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ L 328/28 of 
6.12.2008; Directive 2009/123/EC amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the 
introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ L 280/52 of 27.10.2009; and Directive 2009/52 
providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying 
third-country nationals, OJ L 168/24 of 30.6.2009; Council Framework Decision of 29 May 2000 on 
increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with 
the introduction of the euro, OJ L 140/1 of 14.6.2000. 
toWArds An eu criminAl policy     235
EN 3   EN
can tackle gaps and shortcomings wherever EU action adds value. In view of the cross-border 
dimension of many crimes, the adoption of EU criminal law measures can help ensuring that 
criminals can neither hide behind borders nor abuse differences between national legal 
systems for criminal purposes. 
Strengthening mutual trust 
Common minimum rules in certain crime areas are also essential to enhance the mutual trust 
between Member States and the national judiciaries. This high level of trust is indispensable 
for smooth cooperation among the judiciary in different Member States. The principle of 
mutual recognition of judicial measures, which is the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters5, can only work effectively on this basis.  
Ensuring	effective	enforcement	
Criminal law can play an important role to ensure the implementation of European Union 
policies. These policies depend on effective implementation by Member States. The Union 
alone cannot make sure that its rules, ranging from environmental protection and conservation 
of fisheries resources to road safety, financial services regulation, data protection and the 
protection of the financial interests of the EU, have the desired effect for the citizen.
Member States are obliged to ensure that Union policies are implemented and can usually 
decide themselves on the means of enforcement. In this respect, controls and inspections play 
a crucial role. In cases where the enforcement choices in the Member States do not yield the 
desired result and levels of enforcement remain uneven, the Union itself may set common 
rules on how to ensure implementation, including, if necessary, the requirement for criminal 
sanctions for breaches of EU law.
Coherence	and	consistency	
While EU criminal law measures can play an important role as a complement to the national 
criminal law systems, it is clear that criminal law reflects the basic values, customs and 
choices of any given society. The Lisbon Treaty accepts this diversity.6 For this reason, it is 
particularly important to ensure that EU legislation on criminal law, in order to have a real 
added value, is consistent and coherent.7
A new legal framework 
The legal framework under the Lisbon Treaty provides fresh opportunities to develop EU 
criminal law legislation. The legal framework notably allows the EU institutions and Member 
5 See Article 82 (1) TFEU. 
6 See Article 67 (1) TFEU: "The Union should constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with 
respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States". 
7 On the need for more coherence in the development of EU criminal law, see, as an example, the 
Manifesto on the EU Criminal Policy of 2009 (http://www.crimpol.eu), drafted by an academic group of 
14 criminal law professors from ten Member States of the European Union. 
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States to work together on a clear basis towards a coherent and consistent EU criminal law 
which at the same time effectively protects the rights of suspected and accused persons and 
victims and promotes the quality of justice. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the legal framework 
applicable to most criminal law legislation8 had a number of shortcomings. These included 
mainly the requirement for unanimous approval of all Member States, consultation only of the 
European Parliament and the absence of the possibility of infringement proceedings before 
the European Court of Justice to ensure the correct implementation by Member States. 
The new legal set-up gives a strong role to the European Parliament through the co-decision 
process and full judicial control to the European Court of Justice. The Council can adopt a 
proposal if a qualified majority of Member States supports it. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty 
strengthens the role of national parliaments substantially. They can give their views on draft 
legislation and have an important voice in monitoring the respect of the principle of 
subsidiarity. In the field of criminal law, this role of national parliaments is stronger than in 
the context of other EU policies.9
Criminal law measures comprise intrusive rules, which can result in deprivation of liberty. 
This is why the Charter of Fundamental Rights – made legally binding by the Lisbon Treaty10
– provides important limits for EU action in this field. The Charter, being the compass of all 
EU policies, provides for a binding core of rules that protects citizens.  
When legislating on substantive criminal law or criminal procedure, Member States can pull 
the so-called “emergency brake”, if they consider that proposed legislation touches upon 
fundamental aspects of their national criminal justice system: in this case the proposal is 
referred to the European Council.
Denmark is not participating in newly adopted measures on substantive criminal law, while 
the United Kingdom and Ireland only participate in the adoption and application of specific 
instruments after a decision to "opt in".11
8 Under the former EC Treaty while the usual instrument for criminal law legislation were Framework 
Decisions under the so-called "third pillar", some directives with criminal law measures have already 
been adopted: in order to ensure the enforcement of rules concerning the protection of the environment, 
against ship-source pollution and illegal employment (Directives 2008/99, 2009/123 and 2009/52), 
based on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (C-176/03). Approximation of sanction types and 
levels was only possible in Framework Decisions (C-440/5).  
9 See Protocol No. 1 on "the role of national parliaments in the European Union" and No. 2 on "the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality", in particular Article 7 (2).  
10 See Communication from the Commission on a Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights by the European Union – COM (2010) 573 of 19.10. 2010.  
11 See Protocols No. 21 and 22.  
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Why the EU should act – the added value of EU criminal law legislation 
The Lisbon Treaty grants the EU competence both in the field of criminal procedure and 
substantive criminal law. While it is not the role of the EU to replace national criminal codes, 
EU criminal law legislation can, however, add, within the limits of EU competence, important 
value to the existing national criminal law systems.  
• EU criminal law fosters the confidence of citizens in using their right to free movement 
and to buy goods or services from providers from other Member States through a more 
effective fight against crime and the adoption of minimum standards for procedural rights 
in criminal proceedings as well as for victims of crime.  
• Today, many serious crimes, including violations of harmonised EU legislation, occur 
across borders. There is thus an incentive and possibility for criminals to choose the 
Member State with the most lenient sanctioning system in certain crime areas unless a 
degree of approximation of the national laws prevents the existence of such "safe havens".
• Common rules strengthen mutual trust among the judiciaries and law enforcement 
authorities of the Member States. This facilitates the mutual recognition of judicial 
measures as national authorities feel more comfortable recognising decisions taken in 
another Member State if the definitions of the underlying criminal offences are compatible 
and there is a minimum approximation of sanction level. Common rules also facilitate 
cooperation with regard to the use of special investigative measures in cross-border cases.
• EU criminal law helps to prevent and sanction serious offences against EU law in 
important policy areas, such as the protection of the environment or illegal employment.  
1. SCOPE FOR EU CRIMINAL LAW
The EU can adopt under Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) directives with minimum rules on EU criminal law for different crimes.
First of all, measures can be adopted under Article 83(1) TFEU concerning a list of explicitly 
listed ten offences (the so-called “Euro crimes”) which refers to terrorism, trafficking in 
human beings, sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug traficking, illicit arms 
trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer 
crime and organised crime.12 These are crimes that merit, by definition, an EU approach due 
to their particularly serious nature and their cross-border dimension, according to the Treaty 
itself. Most of the crime areas are already covered by pre-Lisbon legislation, which has been 
or is in the process of being updated. Additional “Euro crimes” can only be defined by the 
Council acting unanimously, with the consent of the European Parliament.  
12 See the Framework Decisions and Directive cited above, in footnote 3. Several of those Framework 
Decisions will be reassessed in the light of the Lisbon Treaty in the coming years, including Framework 
Decision 2000/383, as amended by Framework Decision 2001/888, in 2012.  
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Secondly, Article 83(2) TFEU allows the European Parliament and the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission, to establish "minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member 
States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area 
which has been subject to a harmonisation measure". This clause does not list specific crimes, 
but makes the fulfillment of certain legal criteria a precondition for the adoption of criminal 
law measures at EU level. It is therefore notably in respect of Article 83(2) TFEU where an 
EU criminal policy is particularly warranted; and where this Communication intends to 
provide specific guidance. Most importantly, it is in this field where the EU institutions need 
to make policy choices whether to use or not to use criminal law (instead of other measures, 
such as administrative sanctions) as an enforcement tool; and to determine which EU policies 
require the use of criminal law as an additional enforcement tool.  
Example: The EU's rules on financial market behaviour are a case in point where criminal 
law could be a useful additional tool to ensure effective enforcement. As the financial crisis 
has shown, financial market rules are not always respected and applied sufficiently. This can 
seriously undermine confidence in the financial sector. Greater convergence between legal 
regimes in the Member States, including in criminal law, can help to prevent the risk of 
improper functioning of financial markets and assist the development of a level playing field 
within the internal market.13
Apart from that, Article 325 (4) of the Treaty provides for the specific possibility to take 
measures in the field of the prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial 
interests of the Union, a field where some pre-Lisbon legislation already exists.14 It is an area 
of great importance for EU taxpayers, who are funding the EU budget and who legitimately 
expect effective measures against illegal activities targeting EU public money, e.g. in the 
context of the EU's agricultural and regional funds or development aid.15
2. WHICH PRINCIPLES SHOULD GUIDE EU CRIMINAL LAW LEGISLATION?
As in national law, EU criminal law legislation must be carefully considered. Criminal law, 
whether national or European, consists of rules with a significant impact on individuals. For 
this reason, and because criminal law must always remain a measure of last resort, new 
legislation requires the respect of fundamental legal principles.  
2.1. General principles to respect  
The general subsidiarity requirement for EU legislation must be given special attention with 
regard to criminal law. This means that the EU can only legislate if the goal cannot be reached 
more effectively by measures at national or regional and local level but rather due to the scale 
or effects of the proposed measure can be better achieved at Union level.
13 See 'Communication on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector', COM (2010) 716 of 
8.12. 2010. 
14 See Convention of 1995 on the protection of financial interests of the EU and its protocols, and Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18.12.1995 on the protection of the European Communities' 
financial interests concerning administrative sanctions, OJ L 312/1 of 23.12.1995.  
15 See 'Communication on the protection of the financial interests of the European Union by criminal law 
and by administrative investigations – An integrated policy to safeguard taxpayers' money', COM 
(2011) 293, of 26.5. 2011. 
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In addition, fundamental rights, as guaranteed in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
in the European Convention on the Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
must be respected in any policy field of the Union. Criminal law measures are fundamental 
rights-sensitive. They unavoidably interfere with individual rights, be it those of the suspect, 
of the victim or of witnesses. Ultimately, they can result in deprivation of liberty and therefore 
require particular attention by the legislator. 
2.2. A two-step approach in criminal law legislation 
The EU legislator should follow two steps when taking the decision on criminal law measures 
aimed at ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies which are the subject of 
hamonising measures.  
2.2.1. Step 1: The decision on whether to adopt criminal law measures at all 
• Necessity and Proportionality – Criminal law as a means of last resort ("ultima 
ratio")
Criminal investigations and sanctions may have a significant impact on citizens' rights and 
include a stigmatising effect. Therefore, criminal law must always remain a measure of last 
resort. This is reflected in the general principle of proportionality (as embodied in the Treaty 
on European Union16 and, specifically for criminal penalties, in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights17). For criminal law measures supporting the enforcement of EU 
policies,18 the Treaty explicitly requires a test of whether criminal law measures are 
"essential" to achieve the goal of an effective policy implementation.  
Therefore, the legislator needs to analyse whether measures other than criminal law measures, 
e.g. sanction regimes of administrative or civil nature, could not sufficiently ensure the policy 
implementation and whether criminal law could address the problems more effectively. This 
will require a thorough analysis in the Impact Assessments preceding any legislative proposal, 
including for instance and depending on the specificities of the policy area concerned, an 
assessment of whether Member States’ sanction regimes achieve the desired result and 
difficulties faced by national authorities implementing EU law on the ground.  
2.2.2. Step 2: Principles guiding the decision on what kind of criminal law measures to 
adopt
Should Step 1 demonstrate the need for criminal law, the next question is which concrete 
measures to take.  
• Minimum rules  
EU legislation regarding the definition of criminal offences and sanctions is limited to 
"minimum rules" under Article 83 of the Treaty. This limitation rules out a full 
harmonisation. At the same time, the principle of legal certainty requires that the conduct to 
be considered criminal must be defined clearly.  
16 Article 5 (4) TEU. 
17 Article 49 (3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
18 Article 83 (2) TFEU. 
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However, an EU directive on criminal law does not have any direct effect on a citizen; it will 
have to be implemented in national law first. Therefore, the requirements for legal certainty 
are not the same as for national criminal law legislation. The key is the clarity for the national 
legislator about the results to be achieved in implementing EU legislation.  
Regarding sanctions, "minimum rules" can be requirements of certain sanction types (e.g. 
fines, imprisonment, disqualification), levels or the EU-wide definition of what are to be 
considered aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In each case, the EU instrument may 
only set out which sanctions have to be made "at least" available to the judges in each 
Member State.  
• Necessity and proportionality 
The condition of "necessity" set out above also applies on the level of deciding which 
criminal law measures to include in a particular legislative instrument. The "necessity test" 
becomes the more important the more detailed the envisaged rules are with regard to the type 
and level of sanctions to be required from Member States. The explicit requirement of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights19 that "the severity of the penalty must not be disproportionate 
to the criminal offence" applies. 
• Clear factual evidence 
To establish the necessity for minimum rules on criminal law, the EU institutions need to be 
able to rely on clear factual evidence about the nature or effects of the crime in question and 
about a diverging legal situation in all Member States which could jeopardise the effective 
enforcement of an EU policy subject to harmonisation. This is why the EU needs to have at its 
disposal statistical data from the national authorities that allow it to assess the factual 
situation. As part of its follow up action, the Commission will develop plans to collect further 
statistical data and evidence to deal with the areas covered by Article 325 (4) and Article 83 
(2).
• Tailoring the sanctions to the crime 
The development of criminal law legislation, notably to underpin the effectiveness of EU 
policies requires also careful consideration of, for example, the following issues:  
– whether to include types of sanctions other than imprisonment and fines to ensure a 
maximum level of effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness, as well as the 
need for additional measures, such as confiscation; and  
– whether to impose criminal or non-criminal liability on legal persons, in particular 
with regard to crime areas where legal entities play a particularly important role as 
perpetrators. 
19 Article 49 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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What is the possible content of EU minimum rules on criminal law? 
The definition of the offences, i.e. the description of conduct considered to be criminal, 
always covers the conduct of the main perpetrator but also in most cases ancillary conduct 
such as instigating, aiding and abetting. In some cases, the attempt to commit the offence is 
also covered.
All EU criminal law instruments include in the definition intentional conduct, but in some 
cases also seriously negligent conduct. Some instruments further define what should be 
considered as "aggravating" or "mitigating" circumstances for the determination of the 
sanction in a particular case. 
Generally, EU legislation covers offences committed by natural persons as well as by legal 
persons such as companies or associations. The latter can be important in many areas, e.g. 
concerning responsibility for oil spills. However, in existing legislation, Member States have 
always been left with the choice concerning the type of liability of legal persons for the 
commission of criminal offences, as the concept of criminal liability of legal persons does not 
exist in all national legal orders.  
Furthermore, EU legislation can cover rules on jurisdiction, as well as other aspects that are 
considered part of the definition as necessary elements for the effective application of the 
legal provision.
Regarding sanctions, EU criminal law can require Member States to take effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions for a specific conduct. Effectiveness requires
that the sanction is suitable to achieve the desired goal, i.e. observance of the rules; 
proportionality requires that the sanction must be commensurate with the gravity of the 
conduct and its effects and must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the aim; and 
dissuasiveness requires that the sanctions constitute an adequate deterrent for potential future 
perpetrators.  
Sometimes, EU criminal law determines more specifically, which types and/or levels of 
sanctions are to be made applicable. Provisions concerning confiscation can also be included. 
It is not the primary goal of an EU-wide approximation to increase the respective sanction 
levels applicable in the Member States but rather to reduce the degree of variation between 
the national systems and to ensure that the requirements of "effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive" sanctions are indeed met in all Member States. 
3. WHICH ARE THE EU POLICY AREAS WHERE EU CRIMINAL LAW MIGHT BE NEEDED?
Criminal law measures can be considered as an element to ensure the effective enforcement of 
EU policies, as recognized by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. EU 
policies cover a broad variety of subjects, where common rules have been developed over the 
last decades for the well-being of citizens. These policy areas range from the customs union 
and internal market rules to the protection of the environment.  
In all these policy areas, Member States are obliged to ensure that breaches of EU law are to 
be sanctioned with effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. Member States can in 
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general choose the nature of the sanction which does not have to be criminal but could also be 
administrative.  
Where the discretion of Member States in implementing EU law does not lead to the desired 
effective enforcement, it may be necessary to regulate, by means of minumum rules, at EU 
level which sanctions Member States have to foresee in their national legislation. 
Approximating sanction levels will in particular be a consideration if an analysis of the 
current sanction legislation of administrative or criminal nature reveals significant differences 
amongst the Member States and if those differences lead to an inconsistent application of EU 
rules.
If EU action is required, the EU legislator needs to decide whether criminal sanctions are 
necessary or whether common administrative sanctions are sufficient. This will depend on a 
case-by-case assessment of the specific enforcement problems in a policy area along the 
guiding principles set out above.
There are a number of policy areas which have been harmonised and where it has been 
established that criminal law measures at EU level are required. This concerns notably 
measures to fight serious damaging practices and illegal profits in some economic sectors in 
order to protect activities of legitimate businesses and safeguard the interest of taxpayers:  
• the financial sector, e.g. concerning market manipulation or insider trading;20
• the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union, to ensure 
that taxpayers’ money is protected to an equivalent degree across the Union. In a recent 
Communication, the Commission set out a range of tools that should be considered to 
strengthen this protection,21 including criminal procedure, common definitions of offences 
and rules on jurisdiction. 
• the protection of the euro against counterfeiting through criminal law in order to 
strengthen the public's trust in the security of means of payment. 
The Commission will further reflect on ways how criminal law could contribute to the 
economic recovery by helping tackle the illegal economy and financial criminality.
In other harmonised policy areas, the potential role of criminal law as a necessary tool to 
ensure effective enforcement could also be explored further. Indicative examples could be:  
• road transport, concerning, e.g., serious infringements of EU social, technical, safety and 
market rules for professional transports;22
• data protection, for cases of serious breaches of existing EU rules;23
20 See 'Communication on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector', COM (2010) 716 final 
of 8.12. 2010, p.14. 
21 See 'Communication on the protection of the financial interests of the European Union by criminal law 
and by administrative investigations – An integrated policy to safeguard taxpayers' money', COM 
(2011) 293, of 26.5.2011, p. 10. 
22 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2011) 391 of 28.3.2011, accompanying the White Paper 
'Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient 
transport system', COM (2011) 144 of 28.3. 2011, paragraph 176. 
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• customs rules concerning the approximation of customs offences and penalties;24
• environmental protection, if the existing criminal law legislation in this area25 requires 
further strengthening in the future in order to prevent and sanction environmental damage; 
• fisheries policy, where the EU has adopted a "zero tolerance" campaign against illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing;
• internal market policies to fight serious illegal practices such as counterfeiting and 
corruption or undeclared conflict of interests in the context of public procurement.
These are areas which will require further assessment whether and in which areas minimum 
rules on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions may prove to be essential in order to 
ensure the effective implementation of EU legislation.
This analysis should take into account the following considerations:  
The seriousness and character of the breach of law must be taken into account. For certain 
unlawful acts considered particularly grave, an administrative sanction may not be a 
sufficiently strong response. On the same line, criminal law sanctions may be chosen when it 
is considered important to stress strong disapproval in order to ensure deterrence. The 
entering of convictions in criminal records can have a particular deterrent character. At the 
same time, criminal proceedings provide often for stronger protection of the rights of the 
accused, reflecting the seriousness of the charge. The efficiency of the sanction system must 
be considered, as well as the extent to which and the reasons why existing sanctions do not 
achieve the desired enforcement level. The type of sanction that is considered to be the most 
appropriate to reach the global objective of being effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
should be chosen. An administrative sanction can often be decided and executed without 
delay, and lengthy and resource demanding procedures can thereby be avoided. 
Administrative sanctions may for this reason be considered in areas where, for example the 
offence is not particularly severe or occurs in large numbers as well as in areas where 
administrative sanctions and procedures are suitable and effective for other reasons (e.g. 
complex economic assessments). In many cases, administrative law also provides for a 
broader range of possible sanctions, from fines and suspension of licenses to exclusion from 
entitlement to public benefits, which can be tailored to the specific situation. In many cases, 
administrative sanctions may therefore be sufficient or even more effective than criminal 
sanctions.
4. CONCLUSION
Even though the new legal framework introduced by the Lisbon Treaty does not 
fundamentally alter the possible scope of EU criminal law, it considerably enhances the 
23 See the Communication 'A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European 
Union', COM (2010) 609 of 4.11. 2010, p. 9. 
24 See Communication 'Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe's citizens – Action 
Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme', COM (2010) 171 of 20.4.2010, p. 22.  
25 See Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ L 328/28 of 
6.12.2008; and Directive 2009/123/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for 
infringements, OJ L 280/52 of 27.10.2009.  
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possibility to progress with the development of a coherent EU Criminal Policy which is based 
on considerations both of effective enforcement and a solid protection of fundamental rights. 
This communication represents a first step in the Commission's efforts to put in place a 
coherent and consistent EU Criminal Policy by setting out how the EU should use criminal 
law to ensure the effective implementation of EU policies. It needs to be designed focusing on 
the needs of EU citizens and the requirements of an EU area of freedom, security and justice, 
while fully respecting subsidiarity and the last-resort-character of criminal law.  
For this purpose, the Commission will draft, in close cooperation with Parliament and 
Council, sample language. This should guide the EU legislator whenever drafting criminal 
law provisions setting minimum rules on offences and sanctions. This would contribute to 
ensure consistency, increase legal certainty and facilitate implementation of EU law. The 
Commission will also set up an expert group to assist the Commission in gathering factual 
evidence and in launching further discussions about important legal issues with a view to 
ensuring an efficient implementation of EU legislation into the national criminal law systems 
of Member States. This includes for example:  
- the relationship between criminal and non-criminal sanction systems; and  
- the interpretation of criminal law notions regularly used in EU legislation, such as the 
notion of "effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions", "minor cases" or "aiding and 
abetting".
Based on a thorough evaluation of existing EU criminal law measures and continuous 
consultation of Member States and independent experts, the Commission will continue to 
develop the EU criminal policy over the coming years.  
Our vision for a coherent and consistent EU Criminal Policy by 2020: 
- EU criminal law can be an important tool to better fight crime as a response to the concerns 
of citizens and to ensure the effective implementation of EU policies. . 
- In fields of EU policy where there is an identified enforcement deficit, the Commission will 
assess the need for new criminal law measures based on an evaluation of the enforcement 
practice and in full respect of fundamental Treaty principles such as subsidiarity and 
proportionality. This concerns notably the protection of the functioning of the financial 
markets, the protection of the financial interests of the EU, the protection of the euro against 
counterfeiting, serious infringements of road transport rules, serious breaches of data 
protection rules, customs offences, environmental protection, fisheries policy and internal 
market policies to fight illegal practices such as counterfeiting and corruption or undeclared 
conflict of interests in the context of public procurement.  
- There should be a common understanding on the guiding principles underlying EU criminal 
law legislation, such as the interpretation of basic legal concepts used in EU criminal law; and 
how criminal law sanctions can provide most added value at EU level.  
- Criminal law measures should be firmly grounded in strong EU-wide standards for 
procedural rights and victims' rights in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
annex iii
European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal law  
(2010/2310 (INI))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in particular to 
Part Three, Title V, Chapter 4 thereof, entitled ‘Judicial cooperation in criminal matters’,
– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in particular to Title 
VI thereof on justice,
– having regard to the Commission Communication of 20 September 2011 entitled ‘Towards an EU 
Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law, (COM 
(2011) 0573),
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 30 November 2009 on model provisions, guiding the 
Council’s criminal law deliberations,
– having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2011 on organised crime in the European Union  1,
– having regard to its recommendation of 7 May 2009 to the Council on development of an EU criminal 
justice area  2,
– having regard to its studies on ‘Harmonization of criminal law in the EU’  3 and on ‘Development of an 
EU criminal justice area’  4,
– having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A7-
0144/2012),
A. whereas in accordance with Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the Union shall offer 
its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders, in which the free movement of 
persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to, inter alia, the prevention and 
combating of crime;
B. whereas Parliament and the Council may, in accordance with Article 83 TFEU, establish minimum 
rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions;
C. whereas at the same time Article 83(3) TFEU introduces an emergency brake procedure in the case 
of a member of the Council considering that the proposed legislative measure would affect fundamental 
aspects of its criminal justice system, thus recognising that criminal law often reflects the basic values, 
customs and choices of any given society, albeit in full respect of international human rights law;
D. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as mentioned in Article 5 TEU, are therefore 
particularly relevant in the case of legislative proposals governing criminal law;
1 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0459.
2 OJ C 212 E, 5.8.2010, p. 116.
3 h t tp : / /www.europar l .europa .eu /commit tees /en /s tudiesdownload .h tml? language 
Document=EN&file=30499
4 h t tp : / /www.europar l .europa .eu /commit tees /en /s tudiesdownload .h tml? language 
Document=EN&file=30168
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E. whereas the criminal law and criminal proceedings systems of the Member States have evolved over 
centuries, whereas each Member State has its own characteristics and special features, and whereas, as a 
consequence, key areas of criminal law must be left to the Member States;
F. whereas the principle of mutual recognition is gaining acceptance in an increasing number of political 
fields, in particular in relation to judgments and judicial decisions, and whereas it is a principle based on 
mutual trust, which requires the establishment of minimum protection standards at the highest possible 
level;
G. whereas the harmonisation of criminal law in the EU should contribute to the development of a 
common EU legal culture in relation to fighting crime, which adds up to but does not substitute national 
legal traditions and has a positive impact on mutual trust amongst the legal systems of the Member States;
H. whereas criminal law must constitute a coherent legislative system governed by a set of fundamental 
principles and standards of good governance in full respect of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights conventions to which the 
Member States are signatories;
I. whereas in view of its being able by its very nature to restrict certain human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of suspected, accused or convicted persons, in addition to the possible stigmatising effect of 
criminal investigations, and taking into account that excessive use of criminal legislation leads to a decline 
in efficiency, criminal law must be applied as a measure of last resort (ultima ratio) addressing clearly 
defined and delimited conduct, which cannot be addressed effectively by less severe measures and which 
causes significant damage to society or individuals;
J. whereas EU criminal legislation should, as a general rule, only prescribe penalties for acts which have 
been committed intentionally or, in exceptional circumstances, for those involving serious negligence, and 
must be based on the principle of individual guilt (nulla poena sine culpa), although in certain instances it 
may be justified to provide for corporate liability for certain types of offence;
K. whereas in accordance with the lex certa requirement the elements of a criminal offence must be 
worded precisely in order to ensure predictability as regards its application, scope and meaning;
L. whereas in the case of directives, Member States retain a certain measure of discretion on how to 
transpose the provisions into their national legislation, which means that in order to meet the lex certa 
requirement, not only EU legislation itself, but also its transposition into national legislation must be of the 
highest quality;
M. whereas the introduction of EU criminal law provisions is not confined to the area of freedom, security 
and justice but can relate to many different policies;
N. whereas so far the European Union has often developed criminal law provisions on an ad hoc basis, 
thus creating the need for increased coherence;
O. whereas there is a need for Parliament to develop its own procedures in order to ensure, together with 
the co-legislator, a coherent criminal law system of the highest quality;
P. whereas in order to facilitate cooperation in the field of criminal law between the Commission, the 
Council and Parliament, an inter-institutional agreement is called for;
Q. whereas Article 67(1) TFEU provides that the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and 
justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member 
States;
1. Stresses that proposals for EU substantive criminal law provisions must fully respect the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality;
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2. Recalls that criminal law must fully respect the fundamental rights of suspected, accused or convicted 
persons;
3. Emphasises that in this respect it is not sufficient to refer to abstract notions or to symbolic effects, but 
that the necessity of new substantive criminal law provisions must be demonstrated by the necessary factual 
evidence making it clear that:
– the criminal provisions focus on conduct causing significant pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage 
to society, individuals or a group of individuals;
– there are no other, less intrusive measures available for addressing such conduct,
– the crime involved is of a particularly serious nature with a cross-border dimension or has a 
direct negative impact on the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has 
been subject to harmonisation measures,
– there is a need to combat the criminal offence concerned on a common basis, i.e. that there is 
added practical value in a common EU approach, taking into account, inter alia, how widespread 
and frequent the offence is in the Member States, and
– in conformity with Article 49(3) of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, the severity of the 
proposed sanctions is not disproportionate to the criminal offence;
4. Recognises the importance of the other general principles governing criminal law, such as:
– the principle of individual guilt (nulla poena sine culpa), thus prescribing penalties only for acts 
which have been committed intentionally, or in exceptional cases, for acts involving serious 
negligence,
– the principle of legal certainty (lex certa): the description of the elements of a criminal offence 
must be worded precisely to the effect that an individual shall be able to predict actions that will 
make him/her criminally liable,
– the principle of non-retroactivity and of lex mitior: exceptions to the principle of retroactivity are 
only permissible if they benefit the offender,
– the principle of ne bis in idem, which means that a person who has been convicted or acquitted 
by a final judgment in one Member State cannot be prosecuted or punished for the same matter 
in criminal proceedings in another Member State,
– the principle of the presumption of innocence, which states that every person accused of a crime 
is deemed innocent until his or her guilt is established under law;
5. Welcomes the recognition by the Commission in its recent Communication on an EU criminal law 
policy that the first step in criminal law legislation should always be to decide whether to adopt substantive 
criminal law measures at all;
6. Encourages the Commission to put forward measures that facilitate more consistent and coherent 
enforcement at national level of existing provisions of substantive EU criminal law, without prejudice to 
the principles of necessity and subsidiarity;
7. Stresses that harmonisation measures should be proposed primarily with a view to supporting the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in practice, rather than merely expanding the scope of 
harmonised EU criminal law;
8. Encourages the Commission to continue to include in its impact assessments the necessity and 
proportionality test, to draw on the best practices of those Member States with a high level of procedural 
rights guarantees, to include an evaluation based on its fundamental rights checklist and to introduce a test 
specifying how its proposals reflect the aforementioned general principles governing criminal law;
9. Stresses the need to establish uniform minimum standards of protection at the highest possible level 
for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings in order to strengthen mutual trust;
10. Encourages the Commission and the Member States also to consider non-legislative measures that 
consolidate trust among the different legal systems in the Member States, enhance coherence and encourage 
the development of a common EU legal culture in relation to fighting crime;
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11. Stresses the need for a more coherent and high-quality EU approach to criminal law and deplores the 
fragmented approach followed so far;
12. Welcomes the existence of an inter-service coordination group on criminal law within the Commission 
and asks the Commission to provide Parliament with more specific information on its mandate and 
functioning;
13. Calls for a clear, coordinating authority within the Commission for all proposals which contain 
criminal law provisions, in order to ensure a coherent approach;
14. Welcomes the existence of a Council Working Party on Substantive Criminal Law and asks the 
Council to provide Parliament with specific information on how it relates to other Council working groups 
dealing with criminal law provisions in policy areas other than justice and home affairs;
15. Calls for an inter-institutional agreement on the principles and working methods governing proposals 
for future EU substantive criminal law provisions and invites the Commission and the Council to establish 
an inter-institutional working group in which these institutions and Parliament can draw up such an 
agreement and discuss general matters, where appropriate consulting independent experts, with a view to 
ensuring coherence in EU criminal law;
16. Believes that this inter-institutional working group should help to define the proper scope and 
application of criminal-law sanctions at EU level, as well as examining existing legislation with a view to 
reducing the fragmentation and conflicts of jurisdiction characterising the current approach;
17. Resolves to examine how a coherent approach to EU legislation on substantive criminal law can best 
be ensured within Parliament, and points in this respect to the current lack of a coordinating committee and 
to the important role that its Legal Service could potentially play;
18. Emphasises the importance of establishing an information service for Parliament that can support the 
individual Members in their daily work, thus ensuring the quality of Parliament’s work as a co-legislator;
19. Points out that a coherent approach requires Parliament, before adopting any legislative proposal on 
substantive criminal law, to have at its disposal a legal analysis of the proposal showing whether all the 
requirements mentioned in this Resolution have been fully met, or which improvements are still necessary;
20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the national 
parliaments of the Member States and the Council of Europe
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Bruxelles 
Cornelis de Jong, Member of the European Parliament 
Francesca gAlli, Dr., FNRS Post-doctoral Researcher, Institut d’Etudes Européennes, 
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